



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

1880  
M.V.M.



Nebraska  
1883











LECTURES  
ON  
THE HISTORY OF ROME,

FROM  
THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE FALL OF THE  
WESTERN EMPIRE.

BY  
B. G. NIEBUHR.

EDITED BY  
DR. LEONHARD SCHMITZ, F.R.S.E.,  
RECTOR OF THE HIGH SCHOOL OF EDINBURGH.

Second Edition.

WITH EVERY ADDITION DERIVABLE FROM DR. ISLER'S GERMAN EDITION.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:  
TAYLOR, WALTON, AND MABERLY,  
UPPER GOWER STREET, AND IVY LANE, PATERNOSTER ROW.

M.DCCC.XLIX.

ANSWER

TO THE  
QUESTION

TO HIS MAJESTY  
**FREDERIC WILLIAM THE FOURTH,**  
**KING OF PRUSSIA,**

**THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PUPIL OF NIEBUHR,**  
**THE GENUINE AND MUNIFICENT ADMIRER OF HIS MERITS,**

**THIS WORK**  
**IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED**  
**BY**

**THE EDITOR.**



## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

---

THE first edition of the present lectures, published in 1844, was based entirely upon notes taken during their delivery in the University of Bonn, in the years 1828 and 1829, the last time that Niebuhr lectured on Roman history. When Dr. Isler was afterwards entrusted with the preparation of a German edition of the same lectures, he thought it right to avail himself also of the notes of an earlier course of lectures on the same subject, which Niebuhr had delivered during the winter of 1826 and 1827. In this earlier course, the historian did not embrace the whole history of Rome, but only the portion from the earliest times down to the death of Sertorius<sup>1</sup>, and he was consequently enabled to treat his subject more in detail than in the later course. In preparing the new edition, I have made use of everything which Dr. Isler has thus incorporated in his edition from the course of 1826 and 1827. The amount of this additional matter is very considerable, occupying nearly one hundred pages of the present edition. In the lectures relating to the period subsequent to the death of Sertorius, the additions and corrections are less numerous and important; as for this portion of the history, the German editor had no other notes than such as had been taken during the course of 1828 and 1829; that part of the German edition therefore presents no other differences from the first English edition, than those arising from the fact, that the two editions were formed from sets of notes taken by different students.

In the latest part of the history, however, an important addition has been introduced from the German edition, namely, the history from the death of Constantine down to the overthrow of the Western Empire. The history of that period was not published in the first edition, because I had no manuscript notes referring to that time, having, along with most other students, left the university before Niebuhr ceased lecturing. This part has now been translated from the German edition,

<sup>1</sup> See Lecture lxxxix., vol ii. p. 405. note 11.

and divided into eight lectures, from p. 320 to the end of Vol. III. As the German edition is not divided into lectures, I applied to Dr. Isler to inform me of the precise point at which each of these additional lectures begins ; but it unfortunately happens, that in his own manuscript notes, the lectures are not marked. He kindly pointed out to me, however, the passages, where the different style of writing and the appearance of the ink, seemed to him to indicate the beginning of a new lecture. According to these hints, I have divided the additional portion of the history into eight lectures, without, however, being able to answer for the correctness of that division, which will appear the more doubtful when we consider the extreme brevity of those last lectures. It is, however, not impossible that this brevity may arise from the fact, that the students on whose notes they are based, were less anxious to take down every remark of Niebuhr, and noticed only the principal events mentioned by the lecturer. Few students, moreover, were present during the concluding part of the course, so that the manuscript notes collated by the German editor, were much fewer in number than those relating to the earlier history.

As regards the relation in which the present edition stands to that of Dr. Isler, it must be observed that I have incorporated in my edition, every word and sentiment in the German edition, which was not contained in my edition of 1844, so that the German work comprises nothing which is not to be found in the present volumes. Dr. Isler, who, in his edition, has not adhered to the form of lectures, has by that very circumstance, often been obliged to transfer passages from one place to another: this necessity did not exist for me, and hence I may lay claim to having produced a more faithful representation of the course of lectures, as actually delivered by Niebuhr, than Dr. Isler, who, I may observe by the way, declared to me last autumn, that if he had to do the work again, he would not be inclined to make those transpositions as often as he has done.

It may, perhaps, at first sight appear presumptuous when I assert that the present edition is even more complete than the German; but a comparison of the two editions will soon convince any one who will take the trouble, that in making that assertion, I do not go beyond the bounds of truth, and the

following facts will at once explain the matter. My first edition was founded upon a set of manuscript notes inaccessible to Dr. Isler: they were partly my own—partly those collected by me in Germany. Every one knows that notes taken by one student in a lecture-room may, and do differ widely from those taken by another, every one noting down only that which he happens to think important or interesting. Hence Dr. Isler found in his notes many statements which did not occur in mine, and I, on the other hand, found in my notes many things of which there was no trace in his. Now all such statements as I found in his edition, have been translated and transferred to the present edition: but Dr. Isler's position was different; for although in preparing his work he had my first edition before him, still when he met with a passage which did not occur in his notes, he was not at liberty to translate it from the English, as he was bound scrupulously to preserve the very words and expressions of Niebuhr; and how could he have done so by re-translating from the English into German? Thus it happens that a great many remarks and observations are found in the present edition, which do not appear in the German one.

Several errors occurring in my first edition have been corrected with the aid of Dr. Isler's edition, and some of the difficulties noticed by me in the former edition have been solved by the same means.

In now offering to the public Niebuhr's Lectures on Roman History in the completest form which it is rational to expect, in the circumstances of the case, they will ever be able to assume, I indulge the hope that they may contribute to keep alive and increase the interest in a branch of study which can never fail to be of the deepest interest to enlightened Englishmen.

L. SCHMITZ.

*Edinburgh, May, 1849.*

*Note.*—Wherever, in these volumes, reference is made simply to Vol. I., Vol. II., or Vol. III., the reader will understand, that these references are to the three volumes of Niebuhr's History of Rome, translated by Bishop Thirlwall, Arch-deacon Hare, Dr. W. Smith, and myself.

## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

---

UPWARDS of thirteen years have now elapsed since the death of Niebuhr, and none of the many courses of lectures delivered by him have yet been published. It must at first sight, appear strange that those lectures, which, as far as their intrinsic merits and their suggestive nature are concerned, cannot easily be surpassed, should so long have been neglected by Niebuhr's countrymen; and it will probably appear still more strange that the first attempt to rescue these precious relics is made in this country. But there are circumstances which will account for this apparent neglect of a man, whose opinions on subjects of ancient history must be of the highest interest to every scholar. The main cause is the *pietas* which Niebuhr's pupils feel for their great master, and which has deterred them from publishing anything that might possibly place him before the public in an unfair light. This apprehension arises from the condition of the notes which were taken by his pupils in the lecture-room, and which are the only materials out of which the lectures can be re-constructed, for Niebuhr himself never committed them to paper. The difficulty of casting these confused, fragmentary, and sometimes unintelligible, notes into a proper and intelligible form is indeed so great, that this of itself would be sufficient to deter any one from undertaking a task which is far more irksome than that of producing an original work, and the result of which, however carefully it may be performed, cannot fail to be far indeed from completely satisfactory.

It is not indifference therefore on the part of Niebuhr's pupils, that has so long delayed the publication of any of his courses of lectures, but simply anxiety to do justice to his memory, and the difficulties which present themselves at almost every step. The anxiety to be just towards Niebuhr has gone so far indeed, that when I applied to one of his most eminent pupils to undertake the publication of the lectures on Roman history, or at least to give me his assistance, if he declined the task, he declared that no one ought to venture upon such an

undertaking, unless he felt that he could accomplish it in the manner in which Niebuhr himself would have done it, if the thought of publishing his lectures had occurred to him. Honourable as this feeling is, still, if we were to wait till any of Niebuhr's pupils could, without presumption, say that he was equal to his master, the lectures would in all probability remain buried for ever. I am as anxious as any one to do justice to Niebuhr; but although I am very far from believing that I have attained that competency which my late fellow-student regards as the *conditio sine qua non*, I have been induced by various favourable circumstances to undertake the task; and the completion of the work, with all its defects affords me at least this consolation,—that I have made my best efforts; and that I have spared neither time nor trouble to make the greatest possible use of my materials, without altering any of Niebuhr's sentiments and opinions. With regard to the difficulties of accomplishing this, I think I may say that I have felt them more strongly than others who have merely looked at, without actually trying to overcome them; and the reader of the present work will find indications enough of my inability to solve them in all instances. This fact would have deterred me, like other pupils of Niebuhr, from the undertaking, had I not been favoured by circumstances, among which I mention with gratitude the advice, encouragement, and assistance of my distinguished friends, Bishop Thirlwall, the Chevalier Bunsen, the Rev. Philip Smith, and Dr. William Smith.

In order to put the reader in a position fully to understand these preliminary remarks, it will be necessary for me to give some account of the materials I had to work upon, and of the principles I have endeavoured to follow. The notes, upon which the present work is founded, were made in the winter of 1828-29 and the summer of 1829, when Niebuhr gave a course of lectures on the History of Rome in the University of Bonn, the last time that he ever lectured on that subject. His intention was to relate the history of Rome from the earliest times to the downfall of the Western Empire, during the winter course of 1828-29: but though he delivered five lectures of three quarters of an hour each, every week, the time devoted to them proved insufficient, and he was not able to carry the history further than the reign of Augustus. In order to fulfil his engagement, he resumed the lectures in the summer of 1829,

when the history of the emperors was related, an hour each week being occupied with this subject.

It must be observed that Niebuhr delivered his lectures before young men who were supposed to be acquainted with the leading events of Roman history, or at least to possess an acquaintance with the ancient languages sufficient to enable them to read the Greek and Latin works which are the sources of our knowledge. It was therefore Niebuhr's object not so much to fill their memory with all the details of history, as to enable them to *understand* its important events, and to form correct notions of the men and institutions which occur in the history of Rome. Hence some events were passed over altogether, and others were only slightly alluded to, especially where he could refer his hearers to the ancients themselves for accurate and satisfactory information.

Niebuhr, as a lecturer, was a singular phenomenon; he delivered his discourses extempore, and without having any written notes before him to assist his memory. The form of his lectures was that of a familiar and lively conversation with friends, in which he made use of his most varied and inexhaustible stores of knowledge and personal experience to illustrate the subjects of his discourses, and abandoned himself without restraint to the expression of his strong feelings, as they might be called forth by the subjects under consideration. A few harsh expressions which escaped him under the influence of such passionate feelings have been softened down in the present work, for an expression when printed makes an impression very different from that which it conveys when spoken in the heat of the moment. When Niebuhr spoke, it always appeared as if the rapidity with which the thoughts occurred to him interfered with the power of communicating them in their regular order of succession. Nearly all his sentences, therefore, were anacoluths; for, before having finished one, he began another, perpetually mixing up one thought with another, so that few were completely expressed. This peculiarity was more particularly striking when he was labouring under any mental excitement, which occurred the oftener, as, with his great sensitiveness, he felt that warmth of interest in treating of the history of past ages, which we are accustomed to witness only in discussions on the political affairs of our own time and country. This singular manner of delivering his thoughts—

a deficiency of which Niebuhr himself was painfully conscious — rendered it often extremely difficult to understand him; and it may easily be inferred in what a state of confusion the notes are, which were taken by the students under such circumstances. But, notwithstanding this deficiency in Niebuhr as a lecturer, there was an indescribable charm in the manner in which he treated his subjects: the warmth of his feelings, the sympathy which he felt with the persons and things he was speaking of, his strong conviction of the truth of what he was saying, his earnestness, and, above all, the vividness with which he conceived and described the characters of the most prominent men, who were to him living realities, with souls, feelings, and passions like ourselves, carried his hearers away, and produced effects which are usually the results of the most powerful oratory only. Would that my materials had enabled me in all cases to preserve these features in the lectures which I am now bringing before the public!

Another circumstance, which gave rise to mistakes and confusion in the notes, was the ignorance of Niebuhr's hearers about a countless number of things which he introduced as illustrations of the history of Rome, and which were taken from the history of countries with whose languages we pupils were unacquainted. Hence proper names were constantly misunderstood or misspelt. Niebuhr, moreover, spoke very rapidly; and in addition to all this it must be remembered that students are not trained as short-hand writers, like the reporters of lectures in this country, and that every student notes down as much as he can, or as much as he may think proper or useful to himself, no one being able to write with the rapidity with which a lecturer like Niebuhr speaks. Some slight mistakes also were made by Niebuhr himself, but these were chiefly such as any one engaged in a lively conversation would be apt to commit: for example, the name of one person was occasionally mentioned for that of another, dates were confounded, or the order of events was reversed. Sometimes also he forgot to mention an event in its proper place, and afterwards, when the oversight occurred to him, he stated what he had omitted. All such mistakes, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies, I have endeavoured to remedy tacitly, wherever it was possible for me to do so. These corrections could of course be made only by tracing Niebuhr's statements to their sources,

both ancient and modern; and I have never made them except where they were commanded by positive evidence. There are a few points which I was obliged to leave as I found them, and which I could not consider as mistakes, although the authorities which I had before me seemed to justify such a supposition. But Niebuhr may have had other authorities which were unknown to me. Wherever such a case occurred, I have pointed it out in a note. There are lastly a very few statements which I was unable to substantiate by any authority, but which I have nevertheless preserved, in the hope that they may induce others to search, and with better success than myself.

It would perhaps have been desirable to publish the complete course of lectures at once, but I thought it preferable, on mature consideration, first to give to the world only the lectures on that portion of the history of Rome, which is not contained in the three volumes already before the public, so that the present lectures will form a sort of continuation to Niebuhr's great work. But in determining upon this plan I have added two things, which at first sight may seem to be out of place and inconsistent with my plan,—viz. the twelve Introductory Lectures, and those on the first Punic war. With regard to the Introductory Lectures, it is true, the translators of the first two volumes of the History have prefixed to Vol. I. a short introduction by Niebuhr; but that contains only a few general remarks, and was written as early as the year 1810, whereas the twelve Introductory Lectures now published give a complete summary of all that has ever been done for Roman history; they contain some very valuable remarks on both ancient and modern works, and are intended to direct the student to the materials upon which our knowledge of Roman history is based, and to instruct him about the manner in which he should make use of them. An account of the first Punic war is contained at the end of Vol. III. but it is only a fragment, and was moreover written as early as the year 1811. These were reasons sufficient in themselves to induce me to publish the lectures on the first Punic war, which also contain discussions not to be found elsewhere, upon a variety of subjects.

When I had made up my mind to set about the task of preparing these lectures for publication, I soon found that my own notes alone would be too insecure a basis to found the work

upon, as no one of Niebuhr's pupils was able, even if he had wished to do so, to make his notes complete and accurate. I therefore procured from Germany as many and as good manuscripts as I could, by means of which I have endeavoured to correct and complete my own. But I am well aware that notwithstanding all this, some of the lectures cannot be complete, considering the small space they occupy in this work, and the fact, that the delivery of each occupied three-quarters of an hour. This incompleteness, however, is only apparent, and affects only the form; for the substance of Niebuhr's discourses is preserved throughout, and there are only a very few instances in which the omission of explanatory matter is perceptible. The students in German universities seldom write down the remarks of the lecturer on things not closely connected with the subject under consideration, although the remarks of a man like Niebuhr, even when they appeared less important to an inexperienced student, were always of the greatest interest and highly suggestive. But I am happy to say that my own manuscript, as well as the others which I have collated, have few omissions of this kind, all the students seeming to have been well aware of the importance of Niebuhr's remarks on extraneous subjects. The very few lectures in which such omissions occur, are for this reason somewhat briefer than the rest. In a spoken discourse, the introduction of explanatory or extraneous matter always appears to interrupt the context less than in a written or printed one. In most cases, therefore, where such observations by the way seemed to interrupt the narrative and could be conveniently removed, I have taken them out of the text and put them at the foot of the page as notes. In order to distinguish them from the notes which I have added myself, I have always marked them with Niebuhr's initial—N.

All these lectures are only brief summaries, that is, the results of Niebuhr's investigations. He never gave any references to his authorities except in the general way in which they occur in the text. Wherever I have been able to find the passages of his authorities, and thought them useful to the student, I have given the exact references. It would have been easy to multiply their number; but I was not inclined to swell the bulk of the book with a useless display of learning; suffice it to say that I have endeavoured to verify every one of

Niebuhr's statements by referring to the ancient as well as to the modern authorities. I have purposely abstained from giving references to the numberless modern works on the History of Rome or on separate portions of it, except in a few cases in which Niebuhr's words seemed to suggest the propriety of doing so, and a few others in which I could refer to Niebuhr's own works. Still less did I feel called upon to controvert opinions of Niebuhr; and it is only in one or two instances that I have made any remarks of this kind, because on referring to the authorities, statements at once presented themselves to me, which were at variance with Niebuhr's opinion. In these cases, however, I am very far from asserting that Niebuhr is wrong; all that I mean to suggest is, that I have not been able to discover the authorities on which his opinions or statements may be founded.

If I have not succeeded in reproducing these lectures in a manner worthy of Niebuhr in all respects, I venture to hope that a consideration of the difficulties with which I have had to struggle, will suggest some excuse at least for my inadequate performance. I have often been on the point of giving up the undertaking altogether in despair; but my love and admiration for Niebuhr, my conviction of the peculiar interest and value of his lectures, and the encouragement of learned friends, always urged me on, and gave me fresh strength to proceed with my task. And now that the work is completed, I would rather see all its defects attributed to my own incapacity, than that any one of them should, through my fault, be imputed to Niebuhr.

L. SCHMITZ.

*London, April, 1844.*

## C O N T E N T S.

---

### LECTURE LII (*continued*).

	PAGE.
Events which preceded and led to the first Punic war .....	1
The Campanian legion .....	1
The early history of Sicily .....	3
The Mamertines in Messana .....	7
Hiero and the Carthaginians defeated by the Romans .....	10
Peace with Hiero, and beginning of the first Punic war .....	11

### LECTURE LIII.

Foundation of Carthage .....	11
Sketch of its history .....	13
Its dominions at the beginning of the war with Rome .....	15
Political constitution and national character of the Carthaginians .....	16

### LECTURE LIV.

Physical nature of Sicily .....	18
Division of the first Punic war into periods or masses .....	19
Siege and capture of Agrigentum .....	20
Ancient ships .....	22
Roman fleet; boarding bridges .....	23
Victory of C. Duilius off Mylae .....	25

### LECTURE LV.

Less important events, and new Navy of the Romans .....	26
Victory of the Romans near Ecnomus .....	28
Regulus lands in Africa .....	29
The gigantic Serpent .....	30
Negotiations for peace .....	31
Xanthippus .....	32
Defeat of Regulus .....	33
Disasters of the Romans at sea .....	34
Victory of L. Caecilius Metellus at Panormus .....	36
Character of the last period of the war .....	37

### LECTURE LVI.

The death of Regulus, and criticism of the stories about it .....	37
Siege of Lilybaeum .....	39
Defeat of P. Claudius, near Drepana .....	41
Wreck of the Roman transports .....	44
The taking of Mount Eryx .....	44
Hamilcar Barcas .....	45

PAGE.

## LECTURE LVII.

The Romans build a new fleet .....	47
Victory of the Romans, near the Aegatian islands .....	48
Conclusion of the war and peace .....	50
Sicily a Roman province .....	50
Constitutional changes at Rome; Praetor peregrinus .....	51
The aediles and the public festivals .....	52
Change in the character of the Senate .....	52
War against the Faliscans .....	53
Insurrection of the mercenaries at Carthage .....	53
Revolt of Sardinia .....	55
New peace between Carthage and Rome .....	55
The first Illyrian war .....	56
Embassy of the Romans to Greece .....	58

## LECTURE LVIII.

History strengthens the belief in Divine Providence .....	59
The agrarian law of C. Flaminus .....	60
War with the Cisalpine Gauls .....	61
Battle of Clastidium .....	65
The second Illyrian war .....	66
Foundation of a Carthaginian empire in Spain .....	67
The tribes of Spain .....	69
Death of Hamilcar .....	70

## LECTURE LIX.

The second Punic war .....	70
Literature on the second Punic war .....	71
Hannibal .....	73
P. Cornelius Scipio .....	75
Q. Fabius Maximus, and M. Claudius Marcellus .....	77
Division of the war into periods .....	78
Contemporary wars .....	78

## LECTURE LX.

Carthaginian empire in Spain .....	79
Treaty of Rome with Hasdrubal .....	79
Siege of Saguntum .....	81
Embassy to Carthage .....	83
Hannibal crosses the Pyrenees .....	83
Hannibal in Gaul .....	84
Proceedings of the Romans on the approach of Hannibal .....	84
Hannibal crosses the Alps .....	87

## LECTURE LXI.

Conduct of the Romans on the approach of Hannibal .....	91
First engagement with the Romans on the Ticinus .....	93
Battle on the Trebia .....	94
C. Flaminius .....	98
Hannibal's march through the marshes into Etruria .....	99
Battle of lake Trasimenus .....	101

## LECTURE LXIL

	PAGE.
Extraordinary phenomena in nature.....	103
Proceedings of Hannibal after the battle of Trasimenus .....	104
Why he did not march against Rome .....	105
Q. Fabius Maximus is made dictator .....	106
Hannibal cut off near mount Callicula.....	107
L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro .....	109
Battle of Cannae .....	110
Maharbal's advice to march to Rome .....	114

## LECTURE LXIII.

Revolt of the Italicans from Rome.....	115
Hannibal in Campania .....	116
Capua .....	116
Third period of the war .....	117
Exertions of the Romans .....	120
They gain advantages in Campania .....	121
Tib. Sempronius Gracchus conquers at Beneventum .....	122
Siege of Capua .....	123
Hannibal at the gates of Rome .....	123
Death of Hiero .....	124
Hieronymus of Syracuse .....	125
His successors, Hippocrates and Epicydes .....	125
Siege and capture of Syracuse by the Romans .....	127
Archimedes .....	127
Conduct of Marcellus .....	128

## LECTURE LXIV.

Surrender of Capua .....	129
The period from 541 to 545 .....	130
The war in Spain.....	131
Death of the two Scipios .....	132
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus .....	133
Capture of New Carthage .....	134
Hasdrubal goes to Italy.....	135
Battle near Sena .....	137

## LECTURE LXV.

Continuation of the war in Spain .....	138
Insurrection of the Italian allies in the army of Scipio .....	139
Scipio visits Syphax in Africa .....	140
P. Cornelius Scipio, consul, crosses over to Africa .....	141
Masinissa .....	145
Syphax is taken prisoner.....	147
Negotiations for peace .....	147
Hannibal and Mago recalled to Africa .....	149

## LECTURE LXVI.

The negotiations for peace broken off .....	150
Battle of Zama .....	150
Peace concluded .....	151

	PAGE.
Consequences of the second Punic war .....	153
First war with Macedonia .....	153
Condition of Macedonia .....	154
Philip III.....	155
General view of the state of the East .....	156
Peace with Macedonia .....	157

## LECTURE LXVII.

Philip and Antiochus attack Egypt .....	158
Affairs in the East .....	158
Internal condition of Rome .....	160
Second Macedonian war .....	161
Condition of Greece .....	162
T. Quinctius Flamininus .....	163
Battle of Cynoscephalae .....	167
Disputes between Romans and Aetolians .....	169
Peace with Philip.....	170
Freedom of Greece proclaimed .....	171

## LECTURE LXVIII.

War against the Insubrians and Boians .....	173
Antiochus the Great and his empire.....	175
Hannibal at the court of Antiochus .....	176
Feelings of the Greeks .....	180
Battle of Thermopylae .....	181
War against the Aetolians .....	182

## LECTURE LXIX.

Battle of Myonnesus .....	183
Battle of Magnesia.....	186
Peace with Antiochus, and the subsequent arrangements in Asia .....	187
War against the Galatians .....	188
Death of P. Cornelius Scipio.....	191
Increase of the tribes and of the praetors .....	193
Beginning of demoralisation among the Romans .....	195
M. Porcius Cato.....	198
Importance of capital at Rome .....	200
Death of Hannibal .....	201

## LECTURE LXX.

Early acquaintance of the Italians with Greek literature .....	201
Roman literature .....	202
Atellanæ and Praetextatae .....	202
Livius Andronicus .....	203
Nævius .....	203
Plautus .....	204
Ennius.....	205
Pacuvius .....	206
Romans who wrote Greek, Fabius Pictor, Cincius Alimentus .....	206

## LECTURE LXXI.

The Ligurian war.....	207
-----------------------	-----

## PAGE.

Standing Armies .....	208
Wars of Cato in Spain .....	209
Tib. Sempronius Gracchus concludes peace with the Celtiberians .....	210
The last years of the reign of Philip of Macedonia .....	210
Conduct of the Romans .....	211
Demetrius.....	212
Perseus .....	213
Death of Philip .....	213
The first period of the reign of Perseus .....	214
War of Perseus against the Romans .....	215
Feelings of the Greeks at that time .....	217

## LECTURE LXXII.

Continuation of the war against Perseus .....	218
L. Aemilius Paullus .....	220
Battle of Pydna.....	221
Perseus taken prisoner .....	222
Conduct of the Romans after their victory.....	223
New arrangements in Macedonia and Greece.....	224
The period between the conquest of Macedonia and the third Punic war ..	226
Moral condition of Rome.....	226
Peace with the Rhodians .....	227
Wars in Gaul and Dalmatia .....	227
Prusias, Eumenes.....	228
Occurrences in Egypt; the Parthians.....	228
The war in Spain; L. Sulpicius Galba.....	229
Lex Voconia .....	229
Lex Aelia et Fufia .....	230
Internal changes at Rome .....	231
Law of bribery .....	231

## LECTURE LXXIII.

Carthage during the interval between the second and third war with Rome	232
Massinissa becomes the occasion of the third Punic war.....	232
Conduct of the Romans.....	235
Beginning of the war.....	238
P. Cornelius Scipio, Pauli f.....	241

## LECTURE LXXIV.

Topography of Carthage .....	243
Its siege and destruction .....	246
Pseudo-Philip of Macedonia; his war with Rome and his defeat.....	248
Achaia, its constitution, and the evils resulting from it .....	250
Unreasonable demands of the Romans.....	253
Insults offered to the Roman ambassadors at Corinth.....	253

## LECTURE LXXV.

Condition of the Achaeans.....	254
They declare war against Rome .....	255
Critolaus defeated .....	256
Metellus.....	257

## PAGE.

Diaeus.....	257
Mummius.....	258
Destruction of Corinth .....	258
Wars in Spain against the Celtiberians .....	259
M. Claudius Marcellus concludes peace with them .....	260
Wars against the Lusitanians, Viriathus, and Numantia .....	261

## LECTURE LXXVI.

War against Numantia continued .....	265
Its destruction by Scipio .....	269
Servile war in Sicily .....	270
Attalus of Pergamus .....	271
Aristonicus defeated .....	272
Constitutional changes at Rome .....	273

## LECTURE LXXVII.

Ager Publicus and the Licinian law .....	275
Condition of the Roman people at the time of the Gracchi .....	278
Agrarian law of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus.....	281
Character of the opposition.....	284

## LECTURE LXXVIII.

Machinations of the opposition.....	285
M. Octavius is deprived of his tribuneship, and the law of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus is carried .....	286
Opposition of the Latins .....	287
The bequest of Attalus .....	288
Gracchus tries to obtain the tribuneship for the next year .....	289
Is murdered.....	291
Persecutions of his friends .....	291
C. Papirius Carbo .....	293
Death of P. Cornelius Scipio.....	294
Events of the period from the death of Tib. Gracchus to the tribuneship of C. Sempronius Gracchus.....	295

## LECTURE LXXIX.

C. Sempronius Gracchus in Sardinia.....	296
His Tribuneship and legislation .....	298
His lex frumentaria.....	299
Facilitates military service .....	300
Transfers the judicia from the senate to the equites.....	301
Contemplates the extension of the franchise.....	304
Distribution of the provinces .....	305
Intrigues of the senate to deprive him of the favour of the people.....	306

## LECTURE LXXX.

Consulship of L. Opimius, and death of C. Gracchus .....	309
C. Papirius Carbo.....	311
L. Crassus.....	312
Foreign wars during this period .....	313
The Jugurthine war and Sallust's description of it .....	314

## PAGE.

Condition of Numidia .....	315
Division of the kingdom; Jugurtha .....	316
M. Aemilius Scaurus .....	317
Historical knowledge of Horace .....	318
L. Calpurnius Bestia .....	319

## LECTURE LXXXI.

Jugurtha at Rome .....	320
Q. Caecilius Metellus goes to Africa.....	321
C. Marius brings the war to a close .....	323
The Cimbri and Teutones .....	327
Defeats of the Romans by the Cimbri .....	329
C. Marius four times consul; begins his campaign in his fourth consulship	330

## LECTURE LXXXII.

C. Marius defeats the Teutones, and, in conjunction with C. Lutatius Catulus, the Cimbri also .....	332
The consulships of Marius .....	338
L. Appuleius Saturninus and his legislation.....	339
He and his associates are put to death.....	343
The equites are judices and farmers of the public revenue .....	344

## LECTURE LXXXIII.

Internal condition of Rome .....	345
The judicial power of the equites.....	346
The question about the franchise of the Italicans .....	346
M. Livius Drusus and his legislation.....	348
His assassination .....	352
His laws are annulled .....	352
Q. Varius .....	353

## LECTURE LXXXIV.

The Social or Marsic war .....	345
The Roman proconsul murdered at Asculum .....	355
The state of the Italicans .....	356
The Lex Julia.....	357
Division of the scene of war into three regions .....	358
Victory of Cn. Pompeius Strabo .....	359
Some Italicans obtain the franchise .....	359

## LECTURE LXXXV.

C. Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla .....	361
The kingdom of Pontus.....	363
Mithridates VI.....	364
First war against Mithridates .....	365
Massacre of Roman citizens in Asia .....	366
Sulla appointed commander against Mithridates .....	367
Civil war between Marius and Sulla .....	368
Victory of Sulla, and his departure for Greece .....	370
The tribes of the new citizens .....	371

	PAGE.
<b>LECTURE LXXXVI.</b>	
Cinna and Cn. Octavins .....	373
Struggle between the parties of Marius and Sulla.....	373
Q. Sertorius .....	374
Rome besieged and taken by the Marian party .....	375
Sulla's exploits in Achaea and Asia .....	377
<b>LECTURE LXXXVII.</b>	
Sulla's return to Italy.....	381
The consulship of C. Marius, the younger; and Cn. Papirius Carbo .....	383
Blockade of Praeneste .....	383
Sulla at Rome, and his victory at the Colline gate.....	384
His proscription.....	385
His military colonies .....	386
His reforms of the constitution and criminal legislation .....	387
His abdication and death.....	382
<b>LECTURE LXXXVIII.</b>	
Sallust's <i>Historiae</i> ; Sisenna .....	393
Claudius Quadrigarius .....	394
Pacuvius; Terence; Caecilius Statius .....	394
Prose and manners of the Romans.....	395
Cicero; Hortensius.....	396
Attempt of M. Aemilius Lepidus to rescind the acts of Sulla.....	397
Fuel for a new conflagration.....	398
Q. Sertorius.....	399
<b>LECTURE LXXXIX.</b>	
Proceedings of Sertorius in Spain .....	402
His war against Q. Metellus Pius and Pompey .....	403
Pompey .....	403
M. Perperna .....	405
Murder of Sertorius .....	405
War against Spartacus .....	406
Second war against Mithridates, and cause of the third war .....	408

THE  
HISTORY OF ROME, FROM THE  
FIRST PUNIC WAR.

---

LECTURE LII. (CONTINUED).

THE punishment inflicted by the Romans on the Campanian legion stationed at Rhegium, is the most important event of this period, as it brought the Carthaginians in conflict with the Romans. Campania contributed one legion to the Roman armies, and was on terms of perfect equality with Rome, according to the ancient right of *municipium*,<sup>1</sup> although Rome had, in reality, decided advantages over it. Of the eight legions sent against Pyrrhus, one was composed of Campanians,<sup>2</sup> and was placed as a garrison at Rhegium,<sup>3</sup> to keep that town in submission; for though fear of the Bruttians had, in former times, induced the Greek towns of Italy to entertain friendly relations with Rome, yet after the arrival of Pyrrhus in Italy, their fidelity was more than suspicious, and it was found necessary to secure them by garrisons. Several of them had already got rid of these garrisons by treachery, and the inhabitants of Rhegium were said to harbour a similar design; at least, Decius Jubellius, the commander of the Campanian legion, charged them with this crime,<sup>4</sup> and exacted a truly Satanic vengeance. In order to remove any scruples which his soldiers might otherwise have felt, he caused forged letters of the Rhegines to Pyrrhus, in which they offered to surrender the garrison to the king, to be read aloud to them. Thereupon the soldiers began their reckless butchery: the men were massacred, the women and children were sold as slaves, and the city fell into the hands of the soldiers. About eight years before this occurrence, the Mamer-tines, Oscan mercenaries and kinsmen of the Campanians,

<sup>1</sup> vol.iii. p.144.    <sup>2</sup> id. p.464; ii. p.58, with the note of the translators.

<sup>3</sup> vol. iii. p.477.

<sup>4</sup> id. p. 480.

had done the same at Messana, and their common crime now united them together still more closely. The Romans themselves took no part in these horrors, but after the war was over, marched against Rhegium, where the rebellious soldiers had already maintained themselves for ten years. Had they delivered up to the Romans their guilty leaders, they might have escaped with a mild punishment; but their crimes had brought them into a state of savagery, and they thought it impossible that the Romans should pardon their conduct. They consequently determined to offer resistance to the last, and indulged in the hope that they might, after all, maintain themselves with the aid of the Carthaginians. The Carthaginian general in Sicily ought to have acted with decision; but this was too dangerous, considering the disposition of his countrymen, for if he had been unsuccessful, he would certainly have been sacrificed. The siege lasted for a long time without the Carthaginians interfering. At last the city was stormed: of the 4,000 men, only 300 survived, who were sent to Rome and beheaded. The Carthaginians had hesitated, perhaps on account of their alliance with Rome; for the memorable treaty which had been concluded between the two states after the expulsion of the Tarquins, had been renewed several times,<sup>5</sup> especially with regard to the boundary of their dominions in Sicily and Sardinia. At the beginning of the war with Pyrrhus, they had entered into a formal alliance which had not previously existed,<sup>6</sup> and which bound them to mutual assistance; neither of the two states being allowed to conclude peace with Pyrrhus without the consent of the other. When Pyrrhus was in Sicily, both nations were in the highest degree jealous of each other; and when, in the second year of the war with Pyrrhus, a Carthaginian fleet of 120 vessels appeared before Ostia to assist the Romans, it was dismissed with thanks without being used.<sup>7</sup> After Pyrrhus had quitted Italy, and while the war against Tarentum was still going on slowly, a Carthaginian fleet cast anchor in front of the harbour of Tarentum, to assist the town against the Romans.<sup>8</sup> The Carthaginian admiral entered into negotiations with Milo, which, however, only accelerated the peace with the Romans, and Milo availed himself of the opportunity of obtaining several thousands of gold-pieces more than

<sup>5</sup> vol. iii. p. 86, foll.   <sup>6</sup> id. p. 506.   <sup>7</sup> vol. iii. p. 506.   <sup>8</sup> id. p. 538, foll.

he would otherwise have received. This was the first misunderstanding between the Romans and Carthaginians, which, strangely enough, is not noticed by Polybius, while it is mentioned by other writers. This is the more surprising, as there was nothing to induce Polybius to suppress the circumstance; and he is, besides, the most honest of historians.

During the siege of Rhegium, the Romans concluded a treaty with Hiero of Syracuse which was the first treaty of Rome with a Greek state beyond the boundaries of Italy. Hiero supported the Romans with energy;<sup>9</sup> for his great object was to recover Messana, and to expel the Mamertines, which could be effected much more easily if Rhegium fell first, and might have been accomplished indeed, if the war had been prosecuted with greater vigour. But the siege was protracted, the assistance which Rome had received from Hiero was almost lost sight of, and the Romans now did what they would before have been ashamed of doing.

The first cause of the misery inflicted upon Sicily, was the unfortunate expedition of the Athenian fleet against Sicily; it was, to speak with the poet, the *νῆες ἀρχέκακοι*, the first link in the long chain of misfortunes. That expedition was a mistake, for even if it had succeeded, it would have been extremely difficult to derive advantages from it; but it is nevertheless a pardonable error, that a people full of imagination and love of activity, should have allowed itself to be persuaded to such an undertaking. The Athenians were first invited by the Chalcidian towns, in consequence of the sad hatred existing between the Doric and Ionic races, which was propagated even in the colonies; but the great expedition under Alcibiades, was undertaken at the request of the Segestani, a Pelasgian or Doric people, at the foot of Mount Eryx, in the west of Sicily, who were hard pressed by the Selinuntians, a people of the Ionic race. The expedition, as is well known, utterly failed. As the Syracusans were becoming sole masters of the island, the Segestani, fearing that they might be attacked in consequence of their having solicited the assistance of the Athenians, threw themselves into the arms of the Carthaginians, who, with a large army, conquered Gela, Camarina, and other towns, and encamped before the walls of Syracuse, where Dionysius was then becoming tyrant. The war was carried on with

<sup>9</sup> p. 541, with note 981.

varying success; but in the second campaign, Dionysius seemed by the conquest of Motye (the surviving inhabitants of which founded Lilybaeum) to gain the ascendancy; so that it appeared probable that the Carthaginians would be expelled from the island altogether, when a peace was concluded, which left Carthage in possession of the territories of Sclinus and Himera, that is, of one third of Sicily. The country was now shamefully governed by Dionysius, the younger; under Dion, it was torn to pieces by internal struggles, but was pacified by Timoleon. The latter defeated the Carthaginians, and although they retained their conquered province, the Greeks were enabled to restore their towns in it. There now followed a period of peace and happiness in the Greek part of Sicily; but then came the fearful usurpation of Agathocles and his stormy reign, which, with all its vicissitudes, was long and victorious; but it was a terrible time, and the reign of Dionysius was, comparatively speaking, looked upon as having been an age of humanity and happiness. Agathocles was a man of no ordinary talents, but he was a monster. His reign, although sometimes surrounded with splendour, was for Syracuse a period of the greatest misery. He lavished the marrow and heart's blood of the country, while he surrounded himself with the splendour of magnificent palaces and the like. The devastations of Sicily under this tyrant were so fearful, that it is scarcely conceivable how agriculture and population could maintain themselves; and especially how Syracuse could be one of the greatest cities of the world. His wars are, on the whole, memorable on account of their awful calamities; but, as his adversaries had likewise severe reverses, these wars still cast some lustre upon his reign. His peace with Carthage was concluded on tolerable terms, although it did not answer his previous expectations. Agathocles was one of those men who suffer the punishment of their crimes even in this world. Contentions divided his family, and it can scarcely be doubted that he was poisoned by his own son, or grandson; he did not die, but was burnt half-alive, as the poison acted too slowly; and his whole family was at last extirpated. The curse which rested upon the house of Lysimachus, passed over to that of Agathocles. After his death, the democratic form of government was restored at Syracuse, but could not maintain itself, and the island fell into complete decay. The Carthaginians

had destroyed Agrigentum in the reign of Dionysius; it had been restored to some extent, and after the death of Agathocles became an independent city, under a prince of the name of Phintias. Sicily, as early as the time described in the letters which bear the name of Plato, was in such a condition, that the Hellenic races were in danger of being oppressed by the Carthaginians and Oscans. This was the case after the death of Agathocles, whence I believe that the letters ascribed to Plato, at least the earlier ones, among them, the seventh and eighth, belong to that period; for there can be no doubt that they are ancient, and belong to the classical period, though they are not genuine, that is, they were not written as early as the time of Plato. Bentley says there are two ways of proving the spuriousness of a book; the one, by means of its contents; the other, by means of its language. Very little can be said in this case against the contents. As to the seventh and eighth letters, people may have different opinions in regard to the language, but their contents shew that they belong to a later age than that of Plato. One instance, among others, is the prophesy that the Greek race would perish, and that the inhabitants of the island would speak Oscan and Phoenician. Agathocles had carried on his wars by means of mercenaries, who were for the most part barbarians; many also were Samnites, Lucanians, and Oscans, which last name at that time comprised all the Sabellian tribes. We never hear of Romans having served as mercenaries, whereas Etruscan soldiers are mentioned in Sicily, and especially Mamertines, which was the common name for Oscan mercenaries; and the latter occur in Sicily at a time when Rome was at war with their mother country. This fact shews that the relation of individuals to the state was quite different at Rome from that which subsisted among other nations, and this accounts for the strength of the Romans. The feeble hands which, after Agathocles, undertook the task of government, were unable to manage those troops, and therefore gave them money that they might return to Italy. The troops accordingly went to Messana to embark; but the Messanians, quite forgetting the curse which the Zanclaeans, once faithlessly expelled by them, had pronounced, received them into their houses; soon afterwards, however, they were massacred by their guests, and then those mercenaries regularly established themselves as an independent

people, under the name of Mamertines, and many other Oscans joined them. The horrors which these mercenaries perpetrated, resemble those which were committed in the Netherlands in 1576, where bands of mercenaries plundered whole towns, as a means of procuring their hire: such, for instance, was the fate of Maestricht. This Oscan colony was allied with the Reginas, and supported them; and it was only with the aid of Hiero that the Romans were enabled to conquer them.

After Pyrrhus had left Locri, the whole island appeared to be in a state of dissolution. Not long after this, however, Hiero, then a young man, was at the head of the Syracusan army, and the soldiers, fortunately for Syracuse, proclaimed him king. He was a great man, and as good a king as they could have wished for. He was descended from an ancient noble family at Syracuse, and some, perhaps from flattery, traced his origin to Hiero, the son of Dinomenes, so that his circumstances favoured his usurpation, at a time when the state could be happily governed only by a monarch, and when a monarchy could be established only by usurpation. In his reign, which lasted upwards of fifty years, the first Punic war broke out. The strength of his little kingdom became, of course, much exhausted by the support he gave to the Romans, although he reigned with the greatest wisdom and economy. He made a gentle use of his power, ruled like a citizen over his equals, and never insulted the feelings of his subjects.<sup>10</sup> The last twenty years of his reign were very prosperous, and Syracuse began to recover from its sufferings.<sup>11</sup> But notwithstanding all this, Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, was still a very decayed place. Hiero, had in his youth been of a warlike disposition, but this afterwards almost entirely vanished. There is a circumstance connected with his history, which is mentioned by the Scholiast on Ovid's *Ibis*, but is seldom noticed. Hiero is there said to have ordered Theocritus to be put to death, on account of some satire; and such a thing is by no means unlikely in the case of a Greek ruler of that time.

Hiero was anxious to expel the Mamertines from Messana and to take possession of the town; he would then have been a neighbour of the Romans, and he hoped that he might be able to fall back upon them, if the Carthaginians should become too powerful in the island. Carthage had extended her

<sup>10</sup> vol. iii. p. 561, foll.

<sup>11</sup> id. p. 617.

dominions, had gained possession of Agrigentum, and advanced as far as Gela and Camarina, so that she now occupied as great a portion of the island as after the first peace with Dionysius. Hiero's external relations to Carthage, however, were at that time of a friendly nature, and there is little doubt that an actual peace had been concluded between Carthage and Syracuse. The latter city had but few dependent towns, Catana and Tauromenium being allies.

When Hiero had, by an excusable stretch of power, got rid of his old mercenaries, whom he betrayed in war, and caused to be cut to pieces by the Mamertines, and when he had firmly established his authority, he formed a new army, and undertook the war against the Mamertines,<sup>12</sup> who had extended their sway over almost the whole of the north-eastern part of the island. Hiero was successful, and being supported by the Carthaginians, with whom he still kept up a good understanding, he gained a great battle. Messana was besieged by both in concert; and under these circumstances the Mamertines saw no means of escape. It was the wish of Hiero to destroy them, because they endeavoured to annihilate the Greek population; but the Carthaginians had not the same interest in so doing, and merely wished to expel them from the island; for as they were Oscans and Italicans, and of the same race as the Romans, the Carthaginians mistrusted them, and feared lest they should open to the Romans the way into Sicily, which they themselves were anxious to keep clear of an Italian population. It was, moreover, the intention of the Carthaginians, in case of success, to keep Messana for themselves, and to use Hiero as their tool.<sup>13</sup>

The Romans had, in the meantime, punished their faithless allies, and compelled the legion besieged at Rhegium to surrender. The Mamertines, in their distress, solicited the assistance of the Romans. This was, as Polybius expresses it, an *ἀτοπον*, or something the absurdity of which must strike every one. The Romans, who had just punished their own allies for the very crime of which the Mamertines were guilty, at first

<sup>12</sup> The beautiful idyl of Theocritus, called Charites, or Hiero (xvi.), refers to this war. Theocritus is a poet in whom we perceive the intellectual freshness of Sicily at that time.—N.—Compare vol. iii. p. 562.

<sup>13</sup> The Carthaginians had moral principles which differed from those of the Romans, and there may be some truth in the charge of faithlessness brought against them; but it is wrong to say that *fides Punica* was the same as the Roman *injuria*.—N.

scrupled, and refused to comply with their request; but the demon of ambition had already taken possession of their minds. They reasoned with themselves thus: that they must not take too strict a moral view of the case, and that they could not be made to answer for the sins of the Mamertines in a foreign country: moreover, they owed it to themselves not to allow the Carthaginians to become masters of Messana and its excellent harbour, which would give them an opportunity of sending a fleet to Calabria without any difficulty; whereas now their nearest port was that of Palermo, from which such an undertaking could not be ventured on. Their calculation was quite correct, for Carthage, in possession of Messana, would have become as invulnerable to Rome as England was to Napoleon.<sup>14</sup> What intentions the Carthaginians entertained in regard to Italy, might be inferred from the fact of their having sent a fleet to Tarentum; and if they were allowed to acquire the full possession of Sicily and Sardinia, Rome, through her false delicacy, would soon see the war transferred to her own territory, which would be the more dangerous, as the fleet of the Carthaginians might sail wherever they liked. It would have been in accordance with true moral and political principles, against which nothing could have been said, if they had endeavoured to put Hiero in possession of Messana. The state of things required a quick resolution, since the Mamertines might easily secure the protection of the Carthaginians, by merely throwing the gates open to them. The senate took no resolution, and it seems that it even rejected the proposal, either from timidity, or on account of moral scruples. Had the ancient regulations been still in force, according to which, nothing could be brought before the centuries without a proposal of the senate (*μηδὲν ἀπροθύλευτον*), the matter would have been decided; but the tribunes now could bring the question before the assembly of the people without a resolution of the senate, and there it was decreed that assistance should be sent to the Mamertines. Polybius attributes this step to what he believes was the fact, that the people, oppressed by debt, were anxious for a war in order to enrich themselves. If this view is correct, it shows that even as early as that time, the poor people predominated in the assembly. But Polybius probably assumed this motive, only because he conceived that

<sup>14</sup> vol. iii. p. 563. Compare Polyb. i. 10.

it might have existed; there may have been many other motives. At any rate, however, the resolution was rash and thoughtless, for the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, and the Romans had not a single ship of war. In the maritime towns which they had taken, they had even destroyed all the galleys of the Etruscans and other nations, perhaps in order to prevent piracy, and to avoid the responsibilities which they would have thereby incurred. According to Polybius, they had only a few triremes and pentecontors from the Greek towns to carry their troops across from Rhegium to Messana. Pliny, on the other hand, states that within forty days they built 300 triremes; and a few ships would certainly not have sufficed. From Rhegium they negotiated with the Mamertines, who, as the Romans had been too slow in their movements, had admitted the Carthaginian general with a very few Carthaginian troops, or perhaps none at all, into the town. A legate of Appius Claudius went to Messana, and negotiated with the Mamertines, who were glad to obtain a peace which was quite unworthy of the Romans, and the Carthaginian commander was obliged to quit the town. The Carthaginians, whose fleet was stationed at Pelorus, although war was not yet declared, had wished to prevent the Romans from crossing over into Sicily; but the Romans were favoured by the current and wind, and with incredible boldness crossed the straits in small bodies. The Carthaginians, who had undertaken to protect Messana against Rome, now allied themselves, as I have already stated, with Hiero; and when the Romans were in possession of Messana, they were besieged by the Syracusans and the Carthaginians in separate camps; the Carthaginians were probably encamped to the north, and Hiero to the south of the city, and the communication between the two may have been difficult. As Messana was situated on the slope of a hill of considerable extent, the Romans could easily sally forth against King Hiero, who offered a powerful resistance indeed; but the Sicilian soldiers could not hold out against the Roman legions, and he was defeated. After this victory, the Romans turned against the Carthaginians, apparently without any declaration of war, whereupon the latter retreated with their insufficient forces, and the Romans advanced without encountering any resistance. In the following year, 489, when the consuls, M'. Otacilius and M'. Valerius (surnamed Messalla, from

Messana) landed in Sicily, the Romans appeared before the walls of Syracuse. A number of Greek towns, as Tauromenium, Catana, and others opened their gates to them; and when preparations were made for laying siege to Syracuse, Hiero, following the wishes of his people, made overtures to the Romans, and found a favourable reception, as it was evident that Carthage would not continue to look on while the Romans were making such progress in Sicily. Hiero remained the sovereign of only a small state, became the ally of the Roman people, and paid down a small contribution of one hundred talents.<sup>15</sup> The alliance thus established between the Romans and Hiero was both offensive and defensive.

The beginning of the first Punic war is usually dated from the passage of the Romans into Sicily; but their alliance with Hiero must be looked upon as its real commencement. The condition of Carthage at that time is very obscure, although much has been written about it. The Carthaginians were an Oriental people, and of a character widely different from that of the Romans or the Greeks, who, for this reason, should not be our guides in judging of the Carthaginians. The first Punic war was, on the whole, conducted very awkwardly; and previously to the time when the great Hamilcar Barca appeared in the field, it presents no such claims upon our sympathy as we meet with in the history of the wars against Pyrrhus and the Samnites.

### LECTURE LIII.

EVERYBODY knows that Carthage was a colony of Tyre. We may adopt the statement, that the building of Carthage took place seventy-two years before the alleged foundation of Rome.<sup>1</sup> This statement is quite historical, and, like many which occur in Josephus' work against Apion,<sup>2</sup> of infinite

<sup>15</sup> Polyb. i. 16. Compare vol. iii. p. 569, where Niebuhr follows the account of Orosius (iv. 7), according to whom Hiero had to pay 200 talents.

<sup>1</sup> vol. i. p. 272.

<sup>2</sup> It is strange that Josephus did not look into the Phoenician originals themselves, but was satisfied with Greek translations and extracts.—N.

importance ; it is in all probability founded upon Phoenician chronicles, of which he used a Greek translation made by Menander of Ephesus. They are as genuine as Berossus and Sanchuniathon, and are closely connected with the history of the Jewish kings. To suspect a forgery by Josephus is quite out of the question. It is evident that Timaeus had the same statement in view, though he made the foundation of Rome contemporaneous with that of Carthage ; but the difference is not great, if we calculate the saecula at 110 years. Historical works existed at Carthage and were known to the Romans ; but after the destruction of Carthage they were given to the kings of Numidia.<sup>3</sup> Whenever we meet with such dates in history, and wish to act in a truly philosophic manner, we must endeavour to understand them with great precision, and accept them with gratitude.<sup>4</sup> Carthage was not the first Tyrian settlement in those regions. Utica (in Phoenician Athica) had been previously founded ; its establishment belongs to the time when the power of the Phoenicians was at its height, when they founded settlements in Cyprus and many other places. The stories about Pygmalion, Elisa, etc., although we look upon them as something more than mere fables, are beautiful and truly poetical legends. The Phoenician settlements in Cythera, Thasos, and other places belong to a much later date than is commonly supposed. I believe that Cadiz existed before the foundation of Carthage.

The original name of Carthage was Bozra (a town *Βύρσα*, whence the story of a cow's hide and of the mode of purchasing the ground). By the side of Bozra there soon arose a new town Carthachadta, contracted Carchadta (Carthago, *Καρχηδὼν*),

<sup>3</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xviii. 5 ; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 17.

<sup>4</sup> Some time ago I found a wish expressed somewhere by a writer of our nineteenth century, that historians would adhere to the old-fashioned chronology which counted the years from the creation of the world. But whoever writes such things, shews that he does not know history, and that he has no notion of the manner in which it should be treated. That system of chronology has become ridiculous by the abuse which has been made of it. If a man will now write a chronology, and like Calvisius ascend to the beginning of the world, and according to this plan give us, in his table, for instance, a list of the kings of Attica, it is something more than old-fashioned, it is laughable. I may add here, that a true philologer does not attach any great importance to his being able to state exactly in what month or on what day a Roman emperor ascended the throne : such things are trifles, although in certain instances they may be interesting enough.—N.

just as Neapolis arose by the side of Parthenope. This town remained, perhaps for two hundred years, an insignificant place, and rose very slowly; it was in a state of dependance upon Tyre, and paid tribute to the neighbouring Libyan tribes. The relation between Carthage and its mother-city is a beautiful feature in its history, and Carthage never neglected the duty it owed to its parent Tyre, even when the condition of Tyre had become completely altered. The manner in which, and the time when, Carthage began to extend its dominion, are unknown; situated in the midst of barbarous tribes which were incapable of assimilation, it could not thrive as quickly as the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia, which were inhabited by nations closely related to the Pelasgians, if not in their language, at least in their purely human character which was so peculiar to them. Such nations were, e.g. the Lycians and Carians, who, even previously to their being Hellenised, possessed a high degree of civilisation, as we see from their monuments and institutions. The Carthaginians were not compelled to attend to agriculture, and therefore could not increase at the rate which we find when families are much subdivided. The Libyans were hard and oppressive neighbours; they were barbarians (they are called Berbers to this day) who became mixed with the Phoenicians only by slow degrees. It was not till the middle of the third century of Rome, that is, more than 300 years after its foundation, that Carthage appears in history as a political power. The early times of Carthage are involved in impenetrable darkness; we have only a few statements in Justin from Trogus, and in Diodorus who probably derived his information from Timaeus. From Justin<sup>5</sup>, we hear of a civil war in which Maleus, a Carthaginian general, conquered his native town; but I cannot dwell upon any detail, and shall give you only a rapid sketch of the history of Carthage. This much is certain, that for a long period Carthage paid tribute to the Libyans; and the first symptom of strength was that they shook off the yoke in a great war. It seems to have been particularly fortunate for Carthage, that the position of its mother-country Phoenicia was so peculiar; it had struggled long and vigorously against Egypt, and at length obtained the protection of Persia, under which its condition was sometimes tolerable indeed, but still at times it felt

the foreign dominion to be very oppressive, and many Phoenicians may have emigrated to their free and independent colony, which now began to flourish the more, as by its connection with Persia, Tyre became the port for all Asia, even as far as India. The treaty of Carthage with Rome, in the year of the city 245, shews that the Carthaginians then ruled over a part of Sicily, Sardinia and Libya, and formed a large state, comparatively speaking.

About the year of Rome 272, the Carthaginians are said to have crossed over into Sicily with a great army of 300,000 men, against Gelo of Syracuse and Theron of Agrigentum; but this expedition is fabulous; I do not mean to say that there was no expedition at all, but its reputed greatness is fabulous. Their defeat at Himera, and the battle of Salamis, are said to have occurred on the same day;<sup>6</sup> but a more correct chronology founded on Timaeus shews, that Gelo, to whom this victory is ascribed, did not ascend the throne until after the battle of Salamis. The synchronism is altogether visionary, and destroys the whole chronology of the history of Sicily, nor is it possible that the expedition of the Carthaginians can have been so important. The only things that can be regarded as certain are, that the expedition took place about Olymp. 76 or 77, that the Carthaginians were defeated, and that for a long time afterwards they did not think of any fresh attempt against Sicily; but they strengthened themselves in other parts. At the time when the Athenians were in Sicily, the Carthaginians were confined to three points, viz.: Motye, a Punic settlement in the island, and the two Greek towns of Panormus and Soloeis,<sup>7</sup> and during the Athenian expedition no mention is made of the Carthaginians. After the unfortunate issue of that enterprise the implacable enmity of the victorious towns against the towns which had admitted the Athenians, brought great calamities upon the island. The Carthaginians were invited by the inhabitants of the former, and came over with a considerable army. In this campaign, about 350 u.c., Selinus, Agrigentum, Camarina, and Gela were destroyed, and the very existence of the Greeks in Sicily was threatened. Dionysius, the elder, concluded a disadvantageous peace, and in some measure restored the former boundaries; but afterwards he was more fortunate. In the reign of Dionysius II.

<sup>6</sup> Diodor. xi. 20, foll.

<sup>7</sup> Thucydides, vi. 2.

the war with the Carthaginians was renewed, but Timoleon defeated them, and compelled them to withdraw to Motye and Lilybaeum. A favourable peace, however, was then concluded, and the western part of Sicily, including Selinus, was ceded to the Carthaginians, and a line from Himera to Agrigentum, (the rivers Himera and Halycus,) marked the limits which afterwards remained the normal boundary, and was usually restored on the conclusion of a peace. In the time of Agathocles the Carthaginians besieged Syracuse, but he twice landed with an army in Africa, and having destroyed Motye he confined them for a time to Lilybaeum; but afterwards he was compelled to restore the normal boundary. Soon after the death of Agathocles there followed the war of Pyrrhus,<sup>8</sup> who prosecuted the plans of Agathocles. After his departure, the Carthaginians again extended their dominion, and recovered Agrigentum.

At the commencement of the first Punic war, the Carthaginians were in possession of the whole of the western half of the island, and of the north coast as far as Myle and Messana. Their empire in Africa extended as far as the great marshes in the east, and comprised nearly the whole of modern Tunis. Along a great part of the coast they had a number of colonies, and probably in the interior also. The coast of Algiers, as far as the straits of Gibraltar, was covered with fortified factories, or properly speaking, colonies; but in those parts of the coast where the mountains advance too near the sea, they appear to have had no strong settlements.<sup>9</sup> All Sardinia was subject to them, with the exception of the mountainous districts, which were inhabited by savage tribes, who then lived in the same manner as they do at the present day.<sup>10</sup> There were also a few

<sup>8</sup> vol. iii. p. 511. foll.

<sup>9</sup> The Libyans had received a Punic civilisation, and adopted the Punic language. Saint Augustine says, that Punic was his mother tongue. The Libyans are a remarkable instance of the great influence of a people like the Carthaginians. It is very probable, that when the Arabs conquered those countries, they found a people there, which, to some extent, was able to understand their language; and this must have greatly facilitated their progress. The idioms of Tunis and Malta undoubtedly contain Punic elements, modified by the influence of the Arabic, and are certainly worthy to be investigated by Orientalists; but, unfortunately, those scholars do not often write about things of any historical importance.—N.

<sup>10</sup> They still wear the same dress of goat skins which Cicero (*Pro Scauro*, c. 2.) calls *mastrucca*.—N.

Carthaginian settlements in Corsica, probably near its excellent harbours. Carthage was moreover the sovereign of the Balearian islands. In Spain she possessed the coasts of Granada and Murcia, and Gades was in a state of dependence, although it was a sister-town.

In regard to the political constitution of Carthage, we are quite in the dark. I have made several attempts to see my way clearly, and have read all that has been written upon it, but no important result is to be gained. It is evident, however, that when Aristotle<sup>11</sup> speaks of a δῆμος at Carthage, we must conceive it as a perfect commonalty which was gradually formed out of colonial citizens and Libyans.<sup>12</sup> The δῆμος of Carthage consisted of such σύγκλιδες, Libyans and Punians, who though quite distinct from each other, even in their language, could easily be formed into a δῆμος, like the patricians and plebeians of Rome, though they belonged to one and the same nation. The relation between the Punians and Libyans was analogous to that existing between the Lettian and Lithuanian tribes and the German colonists, or between the Slavonic population about Lübeck and the Germans, the former of whom likewise became completely Germanised. We know that Carthage had a senate, γέροντες, which held the reins of government down to the first Punic war. According to Aristotle, the δῆμος of Carthage had not much more power than that of Sparta, where the people were like the three hundred legislators of Napoleon, who were obliged to submit to his will. At Sparta, the magistrates alone were permitted to speak in the assembly, and the δῆμος was silent. The people might, it is true, reject what was brought before them, but it would not have been very advisable to make use of this right. At Carthage, says Aristotle, matters were different, for any one might at least come forward and speak. Those whom

<sup>11</sup> *Polit.* ii. 8. p. 63, foll. ed. Göttling.

<sup>12</sup> There is a prejudice which might seem to be opposed to this supposition. In speaking of Africans, we are apt to think only of negroes, and to forget that the Libyans, or the Amazirgs (Shilhas, Maxyes, Masscsylians), as they call themselves, do not differ in their whole physical constitution from the inhabitants of southern Europe. The Libyan tribes had, it is true, a peculiar language; but all the coasts of the Mediterranean, including the principal part of Egypt, previously to its conquest by the Ethiopians, were occupied by white nations, which although differing in language, did not find any greater difficulties in assimilating themselves to the Romans, than an Iberian or Celtic population.—N.

he calls *βασιλεῖς*,<sup>13</sup> (the suffetes, schoffetim,) had in former times undoubtedly been the highest military officers ; afterwards, when powers were scrupulously divided, they became a mere administrative authority, and their power was carefully kept distinct from that of the military commanders. Moreover, we find mention of a body called the Hundred, probably the same as the One Hundred and Four of Aristotle, who compares them to the Spartan ephors. I have shewn elsewhere<sup>14</sup> that this number bears a relation to the fifty-two weeks of the year, just as in the Greek constitutions so many things are connected with the divisions of the year into twelve months. There were also magistrates, whom Aristotle calls *πενταρχαι*,<sup>15</sup> but what they were we do not know; they were elected by the body of One Hundred and Four. The council of the One Hundred and Four were unquestionably the *centum senatores* before whom, according to Justin, kings and generals had to undergo the *εὐθύνη*: perhaps they were a council which, like the ephors at Sparta (*παραπλήσιοι ἔφόροις*), had the right to interfere with the administration of the senate and the kings. Aristotle further remarks, that in reality the senate was invested with the entire power of administration and government, and that only the decision of certain cases rested with the people. There existed, accordingly, no representatives of the people to set them in motion, like the tribunes at Rome. The highest offices at Carthage were given *ἀριστίνδην* and *πλουτίνδην*, and were *ἀνγαλ*, as Aristotle says. This statement agrees with a passage in Polybius,<sup>16</sup> who says that it was customary at Carthage to purchase offices from those who had them to dispose of, without any scruple; a practice which we also find in the smaller cantons of Switzerland, especially in the Grisons, where the office of high-bailiff is sold in a most disgraceful manner. At Venice, too, the practice was once very notorious, though there, indeed, the offices were not formally sold, but it was understood that every one should pay for them. At Venice, persons sought the great offices of state as a *provvigione*, to restore their ruined estates. The rich were never punished, not even for murder, but paid down

<sup>13</sup> *Polit.* as above.

<sup>14</sup> vol. i. p. 339, note 851.

<sup>15</sup> *Polit.* ii. 8. p. 64, ed. Göttling, if the reading is correct. Our text of Aristotle's *Politics* is derived from a single Paris MS. of the 14th century, and is one of the most corrupt texts of ancient writers.—N.

<sup>16</sup> vi. 56.

fines, and cartes blanches for murder were regularly sold. Such also was the character of the Carthaginians. They were, it is true, a commercial people, but this should not have deadened their feelings of honour, any more than it does, for example, in England. But sentiments like those which we find in modern times in America, were quite general among the Carthaginians, and were the source of their misfortunes.<sup>17</sup> As far as their wealth reached, they were all-powerful; but their avarice drew upon them the hatred of their neighbours and subjects. Lybia had to pay exceedingly heavy taxes, and had, like India, to give up a fourth, or in extraordinary emergencies, even half of its produce. To these heavy taxes, we must add all that the Carthaginian governors received or extorted. When Aristotle<sup>18</sup> says that the Carthaginians kept the commonalty in good humour by sending its members to other towns, not to settle there, but to suck out the blood of their inhabitants, we must own that Carthage was altogether in a very bad condition. Hence, the contrast between Carthage and Rome in its better days is very striking. Certain great men, however, such as Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, succeeded nevertheless in gaining the affections of the people in subject countries; for they acted like kings, with perfect independence. When Hamilcar was in Spain, the Carthaginians were really popular there. Had Mago or Himilco been sent thither, the state of things would have been far different.

The Carthaginians themselves were very unwarlike, and thought that money would indeed be worth nothing, if, notwithstanding their wealth, they themselves should be compelled to serve as soldiers. Their armies, therefore, consisted of mercenaries, only the cavalry being formed of Carthaginians. Their military system had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. The mercenaries were an evil, but the circumstance that their generals were not magistrates at the same time, had its advantages; for the same general might often be allowed to pursue his plans for a number of years, whereas the Romans allowed their consuls to act during one year only, or at most during a second year as proconsuls. The Carthaginian generals, therefore, were intimately acquainted with their soldiers,

<sup>17</sup> In some parts of America, any profit which a person can make is thought lawful.—N.

<sup>18</sup> *Polit.* p. 66.

and a great general like Hamilcar could accomplish incredible things. Previously to the time of Hamilcar, however, the choice of their generals was often so unfortunate, that it would have been better if changes had been made more frequently.

---

#### LECTURE LIV.

IN order to understand the operations of the belligerents during the first Punic war, it is necessary to have a clear view of the physical structure of Sicily. The heart and kernel of Sicily is Mount Aetna, from which a chain of mountains stretches along the coast towards the Apennines, and proceeds through Bruttium as far as Hipponium. The range of mountains in southern Italy belongs, if we consider it geologically, to Sicily, and forms a continuation of Mount Pelorus. The Apennines, which are of quite a different structure, terminate in the neighbourhood of Hipponium, and are connected with the Sicilian mountains only by low hills, so that the Greeks often entertained the idea of making a canal across the isthmus, which would at present be a very easy undertaking. The range of mountains from Aetna to Messana often runs so close to the shore, that there is hardly a narrow road between the sea and the mountains. South of Aetna, the mountains leave a considerable plain towards the sea, especially about Leontini. In the south of Sicily, between Syracuse and the western part of the island, there are only low hills. West of Aetna, there run chains of mountains which are designated by the names, Heraei montes and Nebrodes montes. From Pelorus to Himera, the mountains run close by the sea-shore; the sea washes the foot of the mountains, and in many places there is no road at all between the mountains and the sea. An artificial road might indeed be built, as is the case on Mount Posilipo near Naples; but that has not yet been done. To the west of Himera, there is a small extent of flat coast, and the mountains become gradually lower. A short distance from Palermo there is a perfect plain, out of which there rises only one hill, the ancient Hercte (Monte Pellegrino), which is crowned with

the convent of Santa Rosalia. Further west, the mountains rise again, and Mount San Giuliano (Eryx) is, next to Aetna, the highest point in Sicily, and rises in an unusual manner from groups of lower hills. The country about Enna is flat. The south-western portion, as far as Agrigentum, is for the most part a flat coast; near Gela and Camarina, the country is likewise flat; and further east from Agrigentum, the mountains are at a considerable distance from the coast, so that if we imagine a line drawn from Agrigentum to Catana, the country south of this line is a perfect plain, which is only interrupted here and there by low hills. By means of this general outline we shall be able, I hope, to estimate the manner in which the war was conducted. Persons have asked, "Why did not the Romans, who were in possession of Messana, proceed along the coast to Panormus, which would have facilitated the communication?" The answer to this lies in the nature of the country, with which I have become acquainted, not through the description of travellers alone, but through paying strict attention to the events of the year 1812, when the English sent an expedition to Palermo. This expedition also, could not reach Palermo by land, but was obliged to be transported in ships. And as it is now, so it was with the ancients: the communication between Messana and Panormus was not practicable by land.

In order to avoid filling our heads with a mass of confused detail, we must divide the first Punic war into five periods. The first comprises the first four years, from 488 to 491, during which the Romans carried on the war without a fleet, and the Carthaginians were masters of the sea; the Romans had the greatest difficulty in crossing, and could reach their enemies in Sicily only by land.

The second extends from 492 to 496; the Romans now built a fleet, and were more successful than could have been expected; the Carthaginians were defeated by sea, and Regulus effected a landing in Africa.

The third contains the campaign of Regulus in Africa during the years 496 and 497.

The fourth begins with the destruction of the army of Regulus, and ends with the victory of L. Caecilius Metellus, at Panormus, from 497 to 501. Fortune during that time was almost equally balanced; the Romans lost two fleets by storms,

and the Carthaginians had the ascendancy in Sicily; but the Romans, nevertheless, conquered in the end.

The fifth period is a struggle of ten years, about Lilybaeum and Drepana, from 502 to the victory near the Aegates insulae in 511. During this last period, the war was confined to the extremely limited space about Lilybaeum and Drepana. The diversion which Hamilcar Barca made, and of which we unfortunately know so little, is one of the most brilliant exploits in the history of ancient or of modern warfare, on account of his taking Hercte and Eryx, although it is more important in a military than in an historical point of view: it was a military game at chess, which shewed a general who created his own resources, and had them under his full control.

Wars which have been protracted through a considerable number of years, cannot be properly understood, unless they are divided into such separate and distinct masses as I have just made in regard to the first Punic war. The thirty-years' war is generally related without such divisions; and it is for no other reason that people find it so difficult to form a distinct and accurate idea of it.

Respecting the tactics of the Carthaginians, we know in reality nothing; but it can scarcely be doubted, that each kind of mercenaries retained its own peculiar weapons and mode of fighting; the Carthaginians themselves, when they did serve in their armies, formed most probably a phalanx, like the Greeks. The Spaniards and Celts fought, I believe, *catervatim*, with small swords, and wore linen breast-plates. The Gauls, no doubt, fought in great masses.

In the year 490, the third of the war, the Romans besieged Agrigentum with two armies.<sup>1</sup> This city was of very great extent; but, as a city, it was only a shadow of what it had been 140 years before, that is, previously to its first destruction by the Carthaginians. A Carthaginian army of 50,000 men, under the command of a general of the name of Hannibal,<sup>2</sup> had thrown itself within its extensive and very strong walls. The Romans besieged them very closely for a period of seven months.

<sup>1</sup> vol. iii. p. 570, foll.

<sup>2</sup> The Carthaginians are mentioned only by their praenomen, and we might be easily led to think that they were all related to one another, as there are so few praenomina, such as Hannibal, Hanno, Hamilcar, and a few others. They answer to our Christian names, and to the Roman praenomina, such as Gaius. There can be no doubt, however, that all had, at the same time, family names,

The Roman consuls advanced from the south, formed two camps, and drew two lines of fortifications against the city and any one who might attempt to relieve it. At the commencement of the war, the Carthaginian generals were very inferior men, and it was unfortunate for Carthage that Hamilcar Barca came too late, and at a time when it was no longer in his power to recover what had been lost. During the first period, the Carthaginians seem to have made little or no use of elephants, and to have shrunk from entering upon an open contest with the Romans. Hannibal had been careless enough to allow himself to be thus shut in; and as Agrigentum was not situated close to the sea, he was unable to obtain any succour from that quarter; but he succeeded in conveying urgent requests to the Carthaginians for support, by means of messengers and letters. The siege had already lasted for five months, when the Carthaginians did at last send a large army, and fifty elephants, under Hanno, to the relief of the besieged in Agrigentum; but not having sufficient courage to fight, he protected himself and his troops in a fortified camp near Heraclea, whence he hoped to compel the Romans to raise the siege by cutting off their necessary supplies. He took Erbessus, the place of arms of the Romans, and encircled them by means of abattis and the like, in such a manner that they came into great difficulties in regard to provisions and the health of the troops. Thus Agrigentum suffered for want of provisions through the Romans, and the Romans through the Carthaginians. As the latter were masters of the sea, the Romans were much confined by the Numidian horsemen, the Cossacks of the ancients, and in foraging excursions they often sustained great losses; it seemed as if they must raise the siege and retreat; but to this they could not make up their minds, and their perseverance in this instance also led them to victory. They continued the blockade with such strictness, that Hannibal saw no way of improving the condition of his troops. After Hanno had been encamped in the manner above described for two months, he may have seen reasons for making an attack; but the Romans gained a complete victory, and indemnified themselves by the

---

which were not used then; they even had surnames which, however, are almost lost to us. The generals bearing the name of Hannibal, throughout the history of Carthage, are so insignificant, compared with the one great man who gave to the name its celebrity, that they are but rarely mentioned.

booty they found in his camp. Meantime, Hiero had afforded them all possible assistance; and without him they would have been annihilated. Hannibal, whose situation was one of extreme difficulty, availed himself of an opportunity, while the Romans, in the night after their victory, were indulging in rejoicings, for making preparations for a sally. Whether the Romans allowed the besieged to escape, in order not to drive the enemy to desperation, or whether the Carthaginians forced their way through the Roman camp, cannot be said with certainty; but the Carthaginian army left the city, and made its way through the Roman fortifications: all those who could bear arms followed them; and the rest of the population, the defenceless and the sick, remained behind. Next morning the Romans took the town, and committed all the horrors which usually accompany such an event: the soldiers indemnified themselves for the sufferings and hardships they had endured during the seven months of the siege, and the whole of the unfortunate population was carried away.

After this fearful catastrophe, a year passed without any events of importance. The Carthaginians had their other places in the west well provided and fortified, but they also acted on the offensive: their fleet was cruising off the coasts of Italy, which they ravaged; and the northern coast of Sicily surrendered to them from fear, while the Romans occupied the interior and the eastern coast. The taking of Agrigentum suggested to the Romans entirely new ideas respecting the objects of the war. At its commencement, they had merely wished to have Messana and Syracuse as their dependent allies, but they now cherished the plan which Dionysius, Agathocles, and Pyrrhus had endeavoured to realise, namely, the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the island altogether. But they saw at the same time, that it was impossible to accomplish this without a fleet. The difficulty was the same as at Athens, where, during the Peloponnesian war, and the period immediately succeeding it, no other vessels were built than triremes, lembi, and pentecontors. A trireme contained from 200 to 220 men who were partly rowers and partly epibatae and was provided with a deck. The pentecontors were open boats, and contained 50 men.<sup>3</sup> The benches of the rowers in both, ran

<sup>3</sup> This number is found in the *Lexit. Rheticum* (in Bekker's *Anecd.* i. p. 298); Herodotus (vii. 184) mentions that pentecontors contained eighty

across the ship, and one before the other. These ships had long since been surpassed by others. After the Peloponnesian war, larger vessels were first built at Syracuse, the chief seat of mechanical science: at first, quadriremes, and soon afterwards, quinqueremes; the latter were larger, but not round ships, and may be termed "ships of the line," for the difference between triremes and quinqueremes cannot have consisted in the number of benches and rowers alone, but must have been visible chiefly in their construction, otherwise it would have required no particular art to build them. They were used in the Macedonian fleets, as early as the time of Alexander the Great, and in Sicily, and they afterwards occur during the first Punic war; but the Romans, as well as their subjects, had only triremes.<sup>4</sup> Where ships of the Antiatans are mentioned, we must understand triremes. Although the ancients, like the modern Greeks, had excellent sails, their object was to make their ships independent of the wind, current, and waves, like our steam-boats; and they found the power which gave them this independence, in their oars. A quinquereme had 300 rowers, and 120 marines; and a trireme with 120 rowers bore the same proportion to a quinquereme, which a steam-boat of twelve-horse power bears to one of thirty, and could do as little against it as a frigate or a brigantine can effect against a ship of the line. At the commencement of the war, the Romans had transported their soldiers to Sicily in triremes, and hence it is said, that they had no armed vessels. It is certain that they were not acquainted with the art of ship-building. The most natural course for the Romans would now have been, to send some shipbuilders to Greece or to Egypt (for they had connexions with Ptolemy Philadelphus) to obtain models; for the ancients, like ourselves, built from models, which is the most natural method, and is also expressly mentioned. But this they did not do, and it fortunately happened that a Carthaginian quinquereme was thrown upon the coast of Bruttium, after which model the Romans built 120 ships.<sup>5</sup> They were of a clumsy construction, and in no way to be compared with the Carthaginian ships. In addition to this, the

men. The number given in the text occurs only in one, but a very careful copy of the notes taken down in the lecture-room. <sup>4</sup> vol. iii. p. 575, note 1052.

<sup>5</sup> vol. iii. p. 576, note 1053. These ships were 100 quinqueremes, and 20 quadriremes.

Romans had no sailors, or only a few; and as a fleet of one hundred quinqueremes required 30,000 rowers, they were obliged to man their ships chiefly with men from the interior of the country, and with slaves, for the number of sailors from Etruria and the Greek towns was far too small.<sup>6</sup> The Romans had to learn the service in the fleet, just as in Russia and France those men who come from the inland districts. Polybius goes too far in saying that they had no trained sailors at all. But what seems to us most ludicrous is, that the men were exercised on scaffoldings: if the Carthaginians were at all like modern nations, such a method of drilling men must have called forth a host of caricatures, for it was truly laughable. The contrast between a Roman and a Carthaginian vessel was the same as there is at present between a Russian ship of the line and an English or an American one. But the Romans were great in all things, and devised means by which they overcame their difficulties. Their fleet could not possibly stand against that of the Carthaginians, unless the ordinary tactics were changed. The idea of getting rid of artificial evolutions in maritime warfare, and of letting ship fight against ship, must have presented itself at this very time, and not afterwards, as is commonly believed. For it required the greatest skill to manage and direct a ship against wind and waves, in the same manner as a horseman manages his horse, and so as to destroy, by means of the rostrum, the enemy's ship, and tear away the benches of the rowers. The Romans could not hope to effect any such thing. If we have to fight against an enemy of superior skill, the only means by which we can hope to conquer him, is to oppose him with greater masses, or with some unforeseen contrivance.<sup>7</sup> In order to make up for the awkwardness of their ships, the Romans attached boarding bridges to

<sup>6</sup> A different opinion is expressed in vol. iii. p. 576.

<sup>7</sup> The great Carnot saw this, and rejected the old tactics of lines which our forefathers had used, and with which the French commenced the wars of the revolution and were deplorably beaten. Carnot was one of the greatest men of modern times: he saw the problem at once, and solved it. He formed the troops into masses, with which he rushed upon the enemy. These masses, if once broken through, would have been lost; but they had confidence, and threw themselves irresistibly upon the thin lines. A whole year passed away before the enemy comprehended this new method. It was with these new tactics that Carnot decided the battle of Wattignies (on the 15th and 16th of October, 1793), which forms the crisis of modern military history, and the importance of which has never yet been rightly understood. General Hoche made use of the same

them.<sup>8</sup> It was a simple idea to form wooden bridges which held two or three men abreast; both sides were protected by parapets, to prevent the men falling into the water. In the fore part of every ship a tall mast was set up, along which the bridge was drawn up, and at the upper end of the bridge there was an iron ring, through which ran a cable. The bridges were drawn up and let down by means of a pulley; they were thrown upon the ships of the enemy by the help of this simple mechanism, and took a firm hold of them by means of grapping irons. When a Carthaginian vessel was thus boarded, the advantage of its greater speed and lightness was lost, and the Romans were able to make use of the best soldiers of their legions. As the Carthaginian soldiers were bad, or at least, far inferior to the Roman legionaries, the latter had decided advantages. But the principal object now was, to get so near the enemy's ships as to be able to make use of the boarding machines. In the first attempt at maritime warfare in the year 492 according to Cato, or 494 according to Varro, the Roman squadron was lost near Lipara, through the imprudence of its commander Cn. Cornelius Scipio. But a few days after, the Carthaginians had likewise to sustain a heavy loss, for one of their squadrons, under Hannibal, fell in with the Roman fleet and was almost completely destroyed. The victory of the consul, C. Duilius, off Mylae, which soon followed, was decisive. The Carthaginians began the engagement with great contempt of the Roman navy: they had 130 ships against 100 of the Romans; but they soon discovered their delusion, and despair came over them when they saw the sea-fight changed into a land-fight. Fifty Carthaginian ships were taken; many others were destroyed, and the Romans, intoxicated with joy at this brilliant victory, landed in Sicily and relieved Segesta, which, like Rome, boasted of its Trojan origin. Fortune thus favoured their first enterprise on the unstable element, and thenceforth remained faithful to them on it.

---

military system in Lorraine: it was by means of heavy masses, that the Americans defeated the English ships, which they could not have done in any other way.—N.

<sup>8</sup> vol. iii. p. 577, foll.

## LECTURE LV.

EVERY one knows the great honours with which C. Duilius was rewarded for his victory; he was the first who celebrated a naval triumph; and was afterwards allowed to be accompanied home in the evening from banquets by torch-light and a flute-player, which must otherwise have been forbidden, and the celebrated *columna rostrata*, the shape of which is unknown to us,<sup>1</sup> was erected, with inscriptions recording the details of his victory. A small fragment of these inscriptions is still preserved; but it is not generally known, that the present table which contains it is not the original one,—the antiquaries at Rome are aware of this, but not those of Germany,—for it is a piece of Greek marble, which was unknown at Rome in the time of Duilius. The original column, according to Tacitus, was struck by lightning in the reign of Tiberius, and restored by Germanicus, who retained the old spelling and language. The forms of the letters, also, agree with those of the age of Tiberius; those on the tombs of the Scipios are quite different.

After this victory, the hopes of the Romans knew no bounds; the war in Sicily was commenced with redoubled energy, and in the following year, a Roman fleet proceeded to Sardinia. The conquest of this island was difficult, because the Punic language and civilisation had become established in the coast districts; however, all these subjects had been kept in an unwarlike condition, in consequence of the jealousy of the mother country, so that the proceedings of the Romans were facilitated; but still no great progress was made.

The two following years were spent in that expedition against Sardinia, and in making conquests in Sicily. In the latter war, A. Atilius Calatinus found himself in an impassable district, and a tribune, whose name is differently stated, some calling him M. Calpurnius Flamma, others, Q. Caeditius or Laberius, sacrificed himself with a small band for the safety of the army, just as Decius had done in Samnium. According to

<sup>1</sup> It was, perhaps, a brass pillar made of the beaks of the conquered ships. The common description of it, as a pillar with the brass beaks projecting from it, is quite modern and without any authority whatever.—N.

Cato's *Origines*, he was severely wounded in the battle, but being found still breathing among the slain, he afterwards recovered.


In the third year after the victory of Duilius, the Romans with a large naval armament appeared off the coast of Sicily, and an indecisive battle was fought off Tyndaris on the northern coast; but as the war in Sicily could not be brought to a close, year after year being spent in conquering a few small places, while the Carthaginians still maintained themselves from Selinus to Lilybaeum, and on the whole northern coast of the island, from Lilybaeum to Mylae, the Romans in the year 496, the ninth of the war, determined to attack the Carthaginians in Africa. Agathocles had shewn that they were most vulnerable in their own country, and the Romans accordingly resolved to compel the Carthaginians to make peace. There can be no doubt that at that time the Romans only wanted to make themselves masters of Sicily. In order that they might be able to act with the necessary energy, they increased their navy to no less than 330 men of war, which were, according to Polybius, for the most part quinqueremes; the Carthaginians, on being informed of these preparations, increased their fleet to 350 quinqueremes. Polybius, in his preface, draws attention to the tremendous efforts of this war, and with justice; for as every quinquereme had 300 rowers, and 120 marines, the Romans employed about 140,000 men, and had, besides, a number of transports for their horses (*ἵππηροι*). He observes that even the great battles of the Macedonian kings, of Demetrius, Ptolemy and others, and afterwards of the Rhodians, were small in comparison.

Such immense masses have nothing pleasing in history, for barbarians too can muster them. The victory of talent and art over physical strength cannot shew itself on such occasions. The victory even of Duilius, with his boarding-bridges, was, properly speaking, the result only of a rude invention, by which the true art of the Carthaginian navy was frustrated. In the Seven years' war, when the tactics of lines were customary, the military art was at a higher point than now, when battles are fought with masses. In like manner, the use of great masses of artillery is a manifest sign of the decay of intellectual power and humanity in modern warfare. At a later time, the ancients also rivalled one another in the magnitude

of their ships, which were increased even to enneres, as, e. g. the ship which Archimedes built for Hiero, who sent it to Alexandria. They were useless colossuses, surpassing in magnitude even our ships of the line. Subsequently, however, they returned to very light ships, *liburnae* and *lembi*, of which we cannot form any accurate idea. In the most brilliant times of the Byzantines and Venetians, battles were fought in small ships. The Carthaginian forces were equally strong; the Roman ships were still awkward, and their success still depended upon their boarding-bridges. They sailed along the eastern and southern coasts of Sicily, because the northern coast was in the enemy's possession, and because they had to take in provisions at Syracuse. The Carthaginians met them between Agrigentum and Pachynus (near Ecnomus).<sup>2</sup> The Romans adopted the system of fighting in masses, and divided their fleet into four squadrons. Each consul commanded one; the third and fourth were commanded by generals whose names are unknown. As they sailed against the enemy, the first and second squadrons formed two sides of a triangle, so that only two ships were facing the enemy. These two lines gradually formed a right angle, and the triangle was closed by the third squadron. The fourth was placed behind to protect the transports. They accordingly formed an  $\xi\mu\theta\omega\lambda\sigma$ ; a manoeuvre which required many favourable circumstances for its execution.<sup>3</sup> The Carthaginians, who met them near Ecnomus, had made a more skilful division of their forces: their left wing, about one quarter of the whole fleet, sailed in a long line along the coast, and was joined at a right angle by the immense fleet, one ship after another, so as to extend far out into the sea. The Romans sailed past the line along the coast, and threw themselves upon the centre of the line which was drawn out. The Carthaginian admiral did not intend that the latter should resist the point of the advancing wedge; and, drawing up their sails, the Carthaginians pretended to flee, in

<sup>2</sup> vol. iii. p. 583.

<sup>3</sup> 1, 2, 3, 4, are the numbers of the squadrons; 5, the transports.



order to separate the Romans from their third and fourth lines. The Romans pursued them; but two parts of the long line returned and attacked the two foremost Roman squadrons. The third part of the Carthaginian fleet, which was sailing in the open sea, likewise returned and threw itself upon the fourth Roman squadron. Meantime, the line along the coast advanced to attack the third, which now left the transports to their fate. Thus there arose three naval engagements. The first and second Roman squadrons speedily conquered; the fourth gained an equivocal victory, and the third came into great difficulties. The centre retreated to protect them, and the boarding-bridges did good service on this occasion. The engagement ended in the complete defeat of the Carthaginians: 30 ships were sunk or thrown upon the coast, and 64 were captured. From 30,000 to 40,000 men fell into the hands of the Romans.

After this defeat, the Carthaginian fleet made for Africa, to protect Carthage against any attack. They had lost their strength and courage to an inconceivable degree. The sea was now open to the Romans for executing their plan, and both the consular armies under L. Manlius and M. Atilius Regulus, sailed to Africa. They landed south-east of cape Hermaeum, which, opposite to Carthage, closes the gulf of Tunis, near the town of Clupea (in Greek Aspis, the Punic name is not known), and took the place after a brave defence. They made this town their place of arms, and hence spread into other parts of Africa. The main army of the Carthaginians was still in Sicily, as they had entertained to the last the firm hope of preventing the Romans from landing in Africa, where they were consequently unprepared to meet the enemy. The Romans found the people everywhere inclined to desert their cruel masters. Their fortified colonies existed only on the coast. In the interior they had, except in a few municipia, adopted the policy of the Vandals, who, from fear of rebellions pulled down the walls of all the towns just as at a later period the Lombards did in Italy. The Carthaginians, therefore, had but few fortified places in Africa to keep their subjects in submission; most of the towns belonging to them being open places. Although the Carthaginians were not barbarians, still they treated their subjects very harshly; they followed the system which is found throughout the East, where the sovereign is the owner of the soil, and everybody else has the use of it it only according to the pleasure of the

king. They required immense sums of money to pay the Celtic and Iberian mercenaries, and were therefore, obliged to extort them from their subjects. The consequences of this system had been seen in the wars of Agathocles: the progress of an enemy in Africa could not be stopped; but the Africans were perhaps discouraged from attempting to revolt, by the unfortunate issue of the war of Agathocles; for, after his departure, the Carthaginians had taken cruel vengeance on those who had joined him; but, nevertheless, they did not now promote the interest of Carthage. It is almost inconceivable what could induce the Roman Senate at this juncture to call back L. Manlius and his army, and to think that Regulus and his army would alone be sufficient to carry on the operations against the Carthaginians. Manlius sailed back with nearly the whole fleet and carried the booty to Rome.

After the departure of Manlius in 497, Regulus nevertheless defeated the Carthaginians near Adis.<sup>4</sup> Their militia was excessively timid, and withdrew into inaccessible districts to protect itself; unwarlike and without zeal as their soldiers were, they were easily driven out of their strong places, so that Regulus found no difficulty in taking the fortified town of Tunes, in the immediate vicinity of Carthage. He encamped on the river Bagradas, and the Carthaginians were in extreme difficulties. Africa seems to have been looked upon at that time as a land of fabulous monsters and dragons. The story about the huge serpent on the river Bagradas, whose skin is said to have measured one hundred and twenty cubits, and whose defeat could only be effected by the exertions of the whole Roman army, with their ballists and catapults, although Livy<sup>5</sup> related it quite seriously, must be regarded as a fable. It is very surprising to find such a story in the midst of an historical narrative. There may indeed have been a gigantic serpent, for it cannot be absolutely denied that the earth and sea contain creatures which are so rare that we are inclined to consider them as fabulous; it is also not unlikely, that the Romans had to sustain losses through large serpents; but this particular tale is worth nothing, and was, perhaps, like many others, borrowed from the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius, who had served in the war, and, as a poet, might with all propriety invent such a marvellous occurrence. At any rate it would

<sup>4</sup> vol. iii. p. 587.

<sup>5</sup> Epitome xviii.

be most wonderful, if the monster had measured exactly that number of cubits, which so often occurs in Roman institutions, namely a multiple of 10 and 12.

The Carthaginians were reduced to the last extremity; their courage failed them, and they could not withdraw their army from Sicily without giving up the island altogether. An embassy was therefore sent to Regulus to sue for peace. Regulus is one of those men who, without deserving it, have acquired a great name through apophthegmatic histories: in his prosperity he was without mercy, intoxicated with victory, and ungenerous. There is a story, according to which he petitioned the senate for his recall, because his farm was going to ruin during his absence.<sup>6</sup> But we know from Polybius, that he had set his heart upon concluding the war himself, in order that his successors might not reap the fruits of his labours; and this shews the more clearly how unreasonably he acted, in demanding from the Carthaginians things which were utterly impossible; for just as if he had wished to drive them to despair, he made the terms of peace even more distressing than those which they actually obtained at the end of the war.<sup>7</sup> Had he demanded the surrender of Sicily, and a sum of money to indemnify the Romans for the expenses of the war, the Carthaginians would have consented; but he had the foolish conceit to think that he could crush Carthage at one blow. His terms were senseless; the Carthaginians could not have been dealt with more severely, if their very capital had been besieged. He demanded the recognition of the supremacy of Rome; an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome; assistance in all her undertakings; the surrender of all their ships of war except one; they were to have only triremes, and if the Romans should require it, then Carthage was to send fifty triremes to assist them; they were not to conclude a treaty with any other nation without the permission of Rome. It was further demanded that they should give up Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Liparian islands; surrender all the Roman prisoners and deserters without ransom, but pay ransom for the Punic ones, and defray all the expenses of the war, and a military tribute besides. These terms were unreasonable, and Regulus deserved the fate which awaited him. Carthage would not

<sup>6</sup> vol. iii. p. 586.

<sup>7</sup> vol. iii. p. 588.

submit to them, and declared that it would rather fight to the last. It was fortunate for the Carthaginians that the Romans conducted the war unskilfully; the latter ought to have established themselves opposite to Carthage, within the Gulf of Tunes. But they had sent back their fleet, and the Carthaginians, by means of their ships, enlisted mercenaries in all parts of the Mediterranean, and all the citizens capable of bearing arms were enrolled. Among those mercenaries was the celebrated Xanthippus. Diodorus<sup>8</sup> calls him a Spartan, which he certainly was not. He was a Lacedaemonian, or, according to Polybius, a Neodamodes (*νεοδαμώδης*), who in his education had been subjected to the rigid Spartan discipline,<sup>9</sup> and had thereby acquired an inferior kind of franchise. The accounts which we have of the Spartan affairs at this time are obscure; but it may be regarded as a fact, that while every Spartan was obliged to obey the laws of Lycurgus, strangers, and not merely Lacedaemonians (*περιόκοι*), or Neodamodes, but even the children of foreign proxeni, were allowed to adopt the same ἀρωγή. This matter, however, has not yet been made quite clear. Xanthippus came to Carthage as the leader of a band of Peloponnesians, which he himself had probably collected at Taenarus, the chief recruiting place at that time. When he saw the preparations of the Carthaginians, he declared openly that they had been defeated, not by the superiority of the Romans, but through the ignorance of their own generals. It was now a fortunate circumstance that civil and military powers were kept distinct at Carthage. When Xanthippus was introduced into the senate of Carthage, and requested to propose a better plan for carrying on the war, he reminded them that they had a great number of elephants,<sup>10</sup> and in their Numidians a better and more numerous cavalry than the Romans; that they possessed a formidable power compared with the small army of the Romans<sup>11</sup> in a hostile

<sup>8</sup> xxiii. Eclog. 13. p. 504.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, i. 32.

<sup>10</sup> The Carthaginians had not been long familiar with the use of elephants in war; and I believe that it was at the beginning of this war that they used them for the first time, for we do not find them mentioned either in the war against Dionysius, or in those against Agathocles. In India, elephants have been used in war from time immemorial, and it must have been there that the Macedonians became acquainted with their use.—N.

<sup>11</sup> Regulus, according to Polybius, had not more than 16,000 legionaries, and in all perhaps about 20,000 men; consequently his army could not have con-

country; that they ought to seek the plains, for that the advantage of the Romans was in the hills; and that it was cowardice alone which could wish to transfer the war into the mountains. Xanthippus was appointed to the supreme command of the army of mercenaries; a great resolution on the part of Carthage! He arranged the army according to his own views; what he did excited astonishment; the soldiers thought that under his command they must conquer, and all demanded him as their commander: the Carthaginian general, who in this instance probably received his orders from the city, surrendered the command to him. After the soldiers were well drilled and exercised, he marched out into the open field to the great surprise of the Romans, which was increased on the appearance of the elephants. He compelled the enemy to engage in battle, and drew up his army in a masterly manner. The Roman army had no centre, but the Greeks had three divisions, and he drew up his forces in this manner: the Carthaginians occupied the centre as a phalanx, because they were citizens, and could be useful only in masses;<sup>12</sup> the mercenaries formed the wings, and were flanked by the cavalry. The Romans likewise placed their cavalry on their flanks, but in drawing up their infantry they abandoned the usual method, for one hundred elephants were posted in front of the Carthaginian centre, and against these they formed very deep masses. But the shock was irresistible, and although the left wing defeated the mercenaries, yet the cavalry of the Carthaginians in the meantime attacked the right wing of the Romans, and the elephants trod down every thing before them. The phalanx then advanced, and the whole Roman army was destroyed. Only 2000 of the left wing escaped in the rear of the Carthaginians to Cluera; and Regulus, having retreated with 500 Romans to a hill, was obliged to surrender.

Xanthippus was now the hero of the day, and proposals were made to him to remain at Carthage; but he had the wisdom to return to his own country with the rich presents of the Carthaginians, and to withdraw himself from the jealousy and heartlessness of a nation like the Carthaginians. Polybius informs us that there was another account, stating that the

---

tained more than from 1500 to 1600 horsemen. The Numidian cavalry in the Carthaginian armies was always very considerable.—N.

<sup>12</sup> The *legiones urbanae* of the Romans were likewise only phalangites.—N.

Carthaginians gave him a bad ship that he might perish on his voyage; and that according to some authorities he actually became their victim, while according to others he escaped to another ship. The Romans sent out their whole fleet to rescue the garrison of Cluera; the Carthaginians, encouraged by their victory, equipped their fleet and sailed out to meet the enemy, but were defeated. The statement which we read in Polybius, that a hundred and fourteen Carthaginian ships were taken, is probably false: the word ἐκατὸν should be omitted in his text, and then we have the right number of ships, that is, fourteen.<sup>13</sup>

The Roman consuls then sailed to Cluera, took their soldiers on board, and after having evacuated their last post in Africa, they sailed along the southern coast of Sicily towards Syracuse, with the view of returning to Rome by the Straits of Messina. The pilots cautioned the Romans; for it was just the season, about the beginning of the dog-days, in the first days of July, when the Sirocco is sometimes accompanied by fearful hurricanes;<sup>14</sup> but the Roman commanders despised the warning of the strangers, and a terrible storm arose while the Roman fleet was returning. When vessels, which depended solely on their oars, were overtaken by a storm of this kind, they were completely destroyed among the breakers on the harbourless coast. It was impossible for the Roman ships to escape: nearly the whole fleet was wrecked on the coast between Agrigentum and Pachynus. Nearly 300 ships out of a fleet of 360 were completely destroyed (A.U. 497).<sup>15</sup> This was the first great disaster; but in the very same year it was to be followed by a second, in which a fleet and an army were destroyed.

The Carthaginians had now reason to believe that the Romans would make peace on fair conditions; but, as they were disappointed in this hope, and as the Romans, notwithstanding their disasters, were determined to continue the war, the Carthaginians prepared themselves with double courage: they sent considerable reinforcements to Sicily, and applied the system of tactics which Xanthippus had taught them. The Romans were somewhat intimidated, and retreated to the mountains. The expenses of building a fleet were immense; hence the Carthaginians wished to carry on the war either by sea or by land, for to do both at once was too expensive.

<sup>13</sup> Polybius, i. 36. Comp. vol. iii. p. 592.

<sup>14</sup> vol. iii. p. 592, foll.

<sup>15</sup> Not long afterwards Seleucus Callinicus suffered a similar shipwreck.—N.

The Romans, after receiving the news of the disaster which had befallen their fleet, immediately turned their thoughts towards building a new one. They now made considerable conquests on the coast of Sicily, and also took possession of Panormus. Thereupon they sailed again with a large fleet towards the coast of Africa; but after they had laid waste the coast between Carthage and Tripolis, and had with great difficulty escaped destruction on the sands of the Lesser Syrtis, they returned to Sicily; and while they were boldly steering across the sea towards the mouth of the Tiber, they were surprised by a fearful storm, in which nearly the whole fleet was wrecked. It is of importance to know that south winds are always most dangerous storms in the Mediterranean—the *Noti* in Horace are heavy gales and of the same character as our north-west winds, which are harmless in the Mediterranean, where all south winds, from south-west to south-east, are equally destructive. The danger is all the greater, as the coast of Italy is almost without a harbour and full of breakers. But in the neighbourhood of the Syrtes (from the verb *σύρειν*) the north-west wind is equally dangerous. Vessels, which approach too near, are in such a wind driven upon the sandbanks with incredible force. The danger is increased by the circumstance, that the currents which come from the Adriatic and the Euxine drive the ships with irresistible violence into the Syrtes, so that they are in them before any one is aware of it. The accounts which the ancients give of the dangers of the Syrtes are by no means exaggerated. At the present time, attention has again been directed towards those dangerous places.

The loss of the second fleet was a blow which bowed down the courage of the Romans; however they were resolved not to make peace, but to try how far they could carry on the war with more moderate exertions. The Carthaginians were masters of the sea, and availed themselves of the opportunity for ravaging the coasts of Italy; but they conducted the war in a wretched manner. The Romans remained unshaken in Sicily, so that, although avoiding any general engagement, they yet took several places under the very eyes of the enemy, and confined the Carthaginians to the north-western part of the island. In this manner the year 501, according to Cato, approached, four years after the defeat of Regulus. From the year 499 fortune had, on the whole, favoured the Cartha-

ginians. But the fourth period of the war now ended with the victory gained by L. Caecilius Metellus over Hasdrubal near Panormus. The Carthaginian general had hoped to turn to his advantage the fear of the Numidian horsemen and the cavalry, which the Romans had shewn ever since the defeat of Regulus, and to conquer Panormus. He advanced to the distance of about two miles from the town, where he encamped in a beautiful plain—he may have had a secret understanding with some persons in the place. It was harvest time, and he ravaged the fields. Metellus proved himself to be a great general, for he remained in his fortified camp ; and in order to draw the Carthaginians into a position where their elephants would be of no avail, he drew up his lines of light-armed troops before the trenches of the camp, which was close by the walls of Panormus. The legions acted on the wings, and the light-armed infantry was driven back by the elephants into the camp. The Carthaginians followed, and advanced nearer the camp and the town. The Romans, who were constantly supplied with fresh missiles from the town, sent showers of javelins and darts upon the Carthaginians and their elephants. The wounded animals grew wild, and threw themselves upon the Carthaginian cavalry and infantry. This was the moment which Metellus had been waiting for. During the confusion which was thus produced, and while the Carthaginians were making a valiant attack, the Roman legions sallied forth from the camp on the left flank of the enemy. The Carthaginians were routed, and their disorder was so great, that more than one hundred elephants fell into the hands of the Romans; they were conveyed to Rome on rafts specially constructed for the purpose. In the Circus they were killed with missiles, perhaps to give to the people an idea of the battle in which they had been taken. This was the greatest defeat which the Carthaginians had yet suffered in the open field.<sup>16</sup> It revived the courage of the Romans, and disheartened their enemies. The Carthaginians were now confined to the extreme west of the island, where they possessed only Lilybaeum, Eryx, and Drepana. The conclusion of the war, however, was extremely difficult, the Romans not daring again to sail to Africa, and the Carthaginians endeavouring to recover what had been lost in Sicily.

In the year after this victory (U. C. 502), the siege of Lily-

<sup>16</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 597. foll.

bæum was commenced, and during the whole of this last period of the war we hear of nothing but sieges, which are interrupted only by blockades. The siege of Lilybaeum is one of the most obstinate efforts against one place on record; and from the moment it began, the war may be called the Lilybaean war, just as one part of the Peloponnesian war is called the Decelean. All the five periods of the first Punic war might, in fact, be called by particular names, which would indeed assist our memory greatly; but I will not recommend such a method, for there is much that may be said against it. The fifth and last act of this war is, for Carthage, the noblest and most glorious: the Romans shewed only perseverance and obstinacy. Concerning the civil history of Rome during this time, little can be said, for few changes were made, and the crisis was over for a time.

---

## LECTURE LVI.

I DID not mention yesterday the embassy of Regulus to Rome. Every one remembers the beautiful verses of Horace, and what Cicero says, concerning Regulus. After the defeat of the Romans in Africa under Regulus, the Carthaginians, it is said, sent Regulus to Rome with proposals of peace, with the understanding that if he should not succeed, he should endeavour at least to effect an exchange of prisoners. Regulus, however, is stated to have dissuaded his fellow citizens from either measure, to have returned to Carthage, and there to have been tortured to death. The first who, with great independence of mind, demonstrated the untenableness of this story, was the excellent French philologer, Paulmier de Grentemesnil (Palmerius).<sup>1</sup> Beaufort afterwards adduced further reasons to prove that this tragedy is a complete fiction,<sup>2</sup> and that it was probably invented because the Romans allowed that the terms of peace proposed by Regulus were abominable, and that he had to make amends for his shameful conduct. Beaufort

<sup>1</sup> He was a contemporary of the brothers Henry and Hadrian Valesius (Valois); he was particularly well read in Polybius, and remarked how unaccountable it was that Polybius, relating the history of Regulus with great minuteness, does not mention this occurrence at all.—N.

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 598, foll. Palmerius, *Exercit. in Auct. Graec.* p. 151, foll.

has drawn attention to a fragment of Diodorus,<sup>3</sup> according to which, two noble Carthaginians were retained at Rome as hostages for the life of Regulus, and were given over to his wife and family. The same fragment states, that they were tortured by the relatives of Regulus in a frightful manner, and that the tribunes summoned the senate, and compelled the monsters to release one of the hostages, who was kept shut up in a case containing the dead body of his comrade. Now, as both Palmerius and Beaufort justly observe, if the Carthaginians actually did torture Regulus to death, it was only an act of retaliation. It was probably this crime, committed by the family of Regulus, which caused the fabrication of the whole story about the death of Regulus. But even this story is not the same in all authors: according to some, his eyes were put out; others say that he was tortured with iron nails; others again, that he was killed by being exposed to the sun and insects. Some middle-age writers take especial delight in inventing the most fearful and complicate tortures, e. g. the authors of the forged *Acta Martyrum*. Such also is the case with the story of Regulus. It surely cannot have been known previously to the time of Polybius; for had he been acquainted with it, as told by later writers, he would not have passed it over in silence. The common account of the death of Regulus may be effaced from the pages of history without any scruple. It may be, that it was taken from Naevius, for Diodorus was not acquainted with it, as is clear from his fragments. He knew the history of Rome but very imperfectly, and only from the earlier, almost contemporary writers, as Philinus of Agrigentum, Timaeus, and Fabius Pictor. He had not read Naevius, and hence the latest Roman historians were probably those who gave currency to the story from Naevius. Cicero knew it, and it must therefore have been related either in Cato's *Origines*, or by Naevius.<sup>4</sup> If it originated with later authors, it arose, at the earliest, from 100 to 120 years after the time of Regulus.

Although the war had now lasted for nearly fourteen years,

<sup>3</sup> *Fragm. lib. xxiv.* p. 566, ed. Wesselung.

<sup>4</sup> The observation that the story of the death of Regulus was taken from the poem of Naevius, was not repeated by Niebuhr in 1829, which may perhaps justify the inference that he had then abandoned this conjecture; but it must at the same time be remarked, that in 1829 he treated this whole subject much more briefly.

there had been only two pitched battles, the one at Adis and the one in which Metellus had defeated the Carthaginians; but the latter were, nevertheless, confined to the western corner of Sicily. The siege of Lilybaeum began in the year 502, and the Lilybaean war lasted full nine years: in the tenth, peace was concluded. The siege was undertaken by the Romans under unfavourable circumstances: the Carthaginians were in reality masters of the sea, but they limited their naval forces as much as possible on account of their enormous expense. The Romans, encouraged by their late success, had again built a fleet, though likewise of a limited number of ships; but it was sufficient, if not to render the communication between Carthage and Lilybaeum impossible, yet to make it difficult. Lilybaeum was the only Punic town in Sicily, and had been built by the inhabitants of Motye after the destruction of the latter town by the elder Dionysius<sup>5</sup>. Its name is Punic, and shows the unimaginative character of the Carthaginians, for according to Bochart it signifies nothing but Le Lubi, that is, a place opposite to Libya. The colony was undoubtedly a mixed one, like Carthage in Spain, consisting of Punians and Libyans, and had now become a place of considerable importance. Panormus, on the other hand, had an entirely Greek population consisting of Greeks and Hellenised Sicilians and Sicanians, although it had for a long time been under the dominion of the Carthaginians, and in fact, the inhabitants of Sicily were all Greeks, even those who had acknowledged the sovereignty of Carthage. Lilybaeum was strongly fortified, and had an excellent harbour, which was the more safe, as it was difficult to sail into it on account of the sandbanks and lagoons. The sand, which is driven thither from the Syrtes by south winds, had accumulated and formed lagoons as early as that time; in the course of ages it has completely filled the harbour, and the present town of Marsala has no harbour at all, but only a miserable road.<sup>6</sup> Drepana (the modern Trepanti) about fifteen miles from Lilybaeum has preserved its excellent harbour to this day, although the Emperor Charles V., from cowardice and fear of the Moors, endeavoured to destroy it. Not far from Drepana was the town of Eryx, with the mountain of the same name. These were the chief places in the small district occupied by the Carthaginians;

<sup>5</sup> vol. iii. p. 601.

<sup>6</sup> See a different opinion in vol. iii. p. 605.

and the war, which was concentrated there for nine years, caused immense misery in that part of the island, for wherever armies were encamped, everything was destroyed.

The Romans began the siege of Lilybaeum in a bold manner.<sup>7</sup> They enclosed it on the land side and at the same time cruised with their fleet before its harbour, so that Carthage had no communication with Lilybaeum. They made an attack upon the walls, and broke down a portion of them; but Himilco the commander of the Carthaginians resisted them with the greatest perseverance. The troops of the Carthaginians often seemed inclined to betray the place into the hands of the enemy, for these troops hardly ever consisted of Carthaginian citizens, who served only as officers and sometimes in the cavalry; the main body consisted of mercenaries, whence it is the more surprising to find that Carthage had distinguished generals. It was always very difficult to manage those soldiers, who came to Carthage from all parts of the world, especially from Greece, Gaul and Spain; and it was hardly possible to rule them by anything else than the prospect of gain. It was only such men as Hamilcar and Hannibal who knew how to attach to themselves even these motley masses; at all other times they were ready for money to embark in any treacherous plot. Such a one was now formed by some individuals in concert with the Roman Consuls; and it would probably have succeeded, had not a faithful Achaean of the name of Alexo informed Himilco of the existence of the plot, and had he not contrived by promises and sacrifices to secure some, and to dismiss the others from the service. Alexo was a man of honour, although he belonged to a contemptible class. The Romans had now for the first time adopted the Greek method of besieging: in their wars against the Samnites they had only used towers, and simply blockaded the towns of their enemy; but no regular sieges are mentioned previously to the first Punic war.<sup>8</sup> The Romans made great progress indeed, and were very successful with their fire-engines. It seems however to be a mistake of Polybius to state, that at the commencement of the siege they threw down six towers;

<sup>7</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 602.

<sup>8</sup> There is a fragment of Diodorus in which the Romans are made to request the Carthaginians not to force them to learn maritime warfare also, for they said, they had always been learning new tactics of their enemies, and had always soon conquered those of whom they had learnt.—N.

this circumstance belongs to a later time.<sup>9</sup> Hannibal, a bold Carthaginian admiral, kept up the communication between Carthage and Lilybaeum by making his way through the Roman fleet. When Carthage heard that the besieged were reduced to extremities, and that without speedy assistance the town would be lost, they resolved to send reinforcements to Sicily, and Hannibal conducted 10,000 men safely into the harbour, to the great consternation of the Romans. The besieged immediately made a sally, which, however, proved unsuccessful, notwithstanding their immense exertions. But a fearful west wind soon after accomplished what men had not been able to achieve. The storm blew in the direction of the Roman camp, which was full of fire engines and combustibles, and as the besieged threw fire into the camp, all the machines, towers, and galleries of the Romans soon became a prey to the flames. The six towers which, according to Polybius, had been thrown down at the commencement of the siege, seem to have fallen just before this catastrophe. The Romans now confined themselves to blockading the fortress, and as they must have been convinced that they could thereby effect nothing, they attempted, like Cardinal Richelieu, to obstruct and destroy the entrance of the harbour; but they succeeded only so far as to render the communication between the fortress and the sea less free. The Roman fleet was stationed near Lilybaeum, and that of the Carthaginians in the port of Drepana.

In the year 503, the Romans sent reinforcements to their troops, as well as to their fleet, without the Carthaginians being aware of it. They were commanded by one of the consuls of this year, P. Claudius, the son<sup>10</sup> of Appius Claudius the Blind, who had all the faults of his father without any of his great qualities: he was a daring and unprincipled man. The Romans, in consequence of the great expense, appear to have limited their forces to a single army. It is uncertain whether Claudius came to Sicily as consul previously to the sally of Himilco, or afterwards. The greater part of the Roman fleet was drawn on shore near Lilybaeum, only a few ships being

<sup>9</sup> Polyb., i. 42. In vol. iii. p. 603, Niebuhr seems to have adopted the statement of Polybius without expressing any doubt as to its correctness.

<sup>10</sup> In some MSS. he is called a *grandson*, which is contrary to the Fasti indeed, but seems more in accordance with chronology, as there are 58 years intervening between the consulships of the two men.

out at sea to keep up the blockade; the marines were armed and employed in the land army. Meantime, epidemics had broken out here and there, as might have been foreseen, the small island of Sicily being quite exhausted by the protracted war; many men also had perished in the battles, so that there was a want of sailors. To remedy this, new sailors were enlisted at Rome; but they were people of the lowest orders, whose property amounted to less than 400 ases, and who had certainly never been out to sea. In a council of war, Claudio proposed to attempt to take by surprise the enemy's fleet at Drepana, and the council, according to Polybius, seems to have adopted the plan. Polybius himself thinks that the scheme was feasible, but this is hardly credible, as it was prevented so easily. Among the Carthaginian generals, there were now some whom experience had raised far above mediocrity, whereas, among the Romans there was not one of any great merit; and while the Romans were superior in their soldiers, the Carthaginians excelled them in their generals.<sup>11</sup> Claudio manned his gallies in the stillness of the night, and before daybreak sailed into the port of Drepana, expecting to find the Carthaginians unprepared. They had not indeed expected the enemy, but their general had been watchful, and had observed from his watch-towers that some of the Roman ships were already in the harbour. The Carthaginian commander, Adherbal, saw that by confining himself to the defence of the city, the ships in the harbour would be in great danger of being taken; he therefore quickly manned his ships, and while the Roman vessels were running into the extensive harbour at the western entrance, one after another in a long line, he led his ships into the sea along the opposite coast. When the Romans discovered what was going on, and that it was the intention of the Carthaginians to drive them into the harbour, and there to throw them on the coast, which was occupied by Carthaginian troops, a signal was given and they hastily retreated. But while the ships which were hastening to get out, pressed upon and injured those which were still running through the narrow entrance into the harbour, the Carthaginian fleet, which was outside the harbour, drew up in battle array and attacked the Romans. The consul drew up his ships along the coast in a long line, with the prows towards the land.

<sup>11</sup> vol. iii. p. 607.

The Carthaginians, who had the open sea in their rear, had the advantage of being able to manoeuvre freely. It seems that the Romans had given up using their boarding-bridges, for had they made use of them, the issue of the engagement might have been different.<sup>12</sup> The Romans were completely defeated, and lost ninety-three ships; many were destroyed, and only about thirty escaped to the road of Lilybaeum, and with them the consul.

The Carthaginians had now decided advantages over the Romans. P. Claudius was recalled to Rome; he was severely reproached as being the cause of the misfortune, because he had impiously despised the predictions and ordered the augury-birds to be thrown into the water, as they would not eat. He was requested to appoint a dictator; for after the curiae had lost their privileges, the right of the consul to proclaim a dictator had gradually become a right to appoint him.<sup>13</sup> He insultingly appointed M. Claudius Glycia, the son of a freed-man. The Fasti mention only the name of his father, but not that of his grandfather, and he was consequently yet a *libertinus*. Claudius was tried for high treason, and appears to have been sent into exile, where he died soon after. According to Polybius, and an expression of Cicero, he was sentenced to pay a heavy fine; according to others the comitia broke up in consequence of a thunderstorm, and the matter was dropped, which seems to suggest the influence of a powerful party. After his death, his sister, a vestal virgin, while riding in a procession through the crowds in the Circus, loudly expressed her regret that her brother was no longer alive, since, by causing the defeat of another fleet, he might have sent a great many more of the rabble out of the world<sup>14</sup>. She, too, was accused and condemned in a heavy penalty as guilty of high treason against the people. The dictator Glycia was, of course compelled by the senate and people to lay down his dignity. The conduct of Claudius is in keeping with the many crimes committed by his race, which we can trace from the middle of the fourth century down to the emperor Tiberius: a criminal character was almost hereditary with them.

Another disaster yet awaited the Romans. They still re-

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 605, foll.

<sup>13</sup> Compare vol. i. p. 566, foll.

<sup>14</sup> Suetonius, *Tiberius*, c. 2; Livy, *Epitome* xix. (This is another proof that the sailors were taken from the *capite censi*.—N).

mained undaunted, and sent a convoy of eight hundred ships<sup>15</sup> with provisions to relieve the wants of the army at Lilybaeum. It was no doubt escorted by a considerable fleet, under the command of the consul C. Junius; but the men of war were unable to protect the transports. The consul again sailed through the straits of Messana to Syracuse, took in a cargo there (for it was chiefly at Syracuse that provisions were obtained), and sent a part of the convoy under escort to Lilybaeum, intending himself to follow afterwards with the remainder. This was very imprudent; for the accompanying ships of war were not sufficient against the powerful fleet of the Carthaginians, which frightened the Roman detachment so much that it took shelter in the rocky road-stead between Agrigentum and Camarina. The Carthaginian admiral Carthalo did not venture to attack them there, but still succeeded in destroying many of the transports. Had the Romans received speedy support, the affair might yet have turned out well. But Junius delayed his departure, and when he sailed from Syracuse and heard that the Carthaginians were between him and the other convoy, he too sought shelter in bad road-steeds near Camarina. There now arose one of those frightful storms, which in Italy are always south winds. Carthalo, adroit and active, doubled cape Pachynus towards the north, where he found protection against the wind. The whole of the Roman fleet, the ships of war as well as the transports, were thrown on the rocks and coast with such vehemence, that, as Polybius<sup>16</sup> says, not a plank was saved which could be used again. Two ships only remained out of the whole fleet. A large number of men also perished; but the consul with the survivors withdrew by land to Lilybaeum, where he found an opportunity to do at least something: he took Eryx by surprise; the town itself was situated on the declivity of the mountain, and the temple of Venus on the top of it formed the acropolis. He made himself master of the town by bribery. This was the only advantage which the Romans gained in the course of that year.

The Romans were now unable to compete with the Carthaginians at sea; fortune seemed to be against them, and they

<sup>15</sup> This fact is worth remembering, as it refutes the false notion, that the commerce of the ancient world was of no great importance; it shews that navigation in the Mediterranean was carried on upon a very large scale.—N. <sup>16</sup> i. 54.

renounced the sea entirely, but still kept up a few ships. The war was hopeless for them; and it required a Roman perseverance to preserve them from utter despair.

Carthage was now the sole mistress of the sea. It seems to have been shortly before this time, that the Carthaginians made the attempt to contract a loan of more than two thousand talents with Ptolemy Philadelphus. But the king of Egypt refused to comply with their request, as he wished to remain neutral.<sup>17</sup> Carthage had to raise extraordinary contributions; the continuation of the war drained her last resources, and exhausted her strength as it did that of Rome.

At this time the great Hamilcar Barcas appeared on the scene of action. It is not certain whether he belonged to any of the great families at Carthage<sup>18</sup>. In my opinion it may almost be said that he was a greater man than even his son Hannibal. There is no parallel case in history of a father and his son being so eminently great in their art as Hamilcar and Hannibal. To be a good general is an art; it requires genius, and the talent for it must be born with a man, just as in the case of a poet or an artist; the mechanical part alone can be learnt. Had Hamilcar been in a position to influence the senate of Carthage at an earlier period, the war would have terminated unfortunately for Rome. He began his operations with a boldness which surpasses everything of its kind. In the neighbourhood of Palermo there is a mountain, Monte Pellegrino, with the convent of Santa Rosalia; in ancient times it bore the name of Hercte (the *Eipkrē*, the name seems to indicate that a state prison existed there), and near it was a small harbour just sufficient to form a landing place<sup>19</sup>. Here Hamilcar, who had just returned from an expedition against Bruttium, appeared unexpectedly with a squadron, took possession of the mountain either by surprise or by treachery, established himself, and made excursions in which he ravaged the Italian coast as far as Cumae, perhaps with the intention of stirring up the Roman allies to revolt. On this mountain, Hamilcar maintained

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Sicul.*, vol. i. p. 92, ed. Schweigh.

<sup>18</sup> The surname Barcas seems to be of the same meaning as Barak in the Old Testament, and we may safely recognize in it the Semitic word *barak*, i. e. lightning; the Syriac form is *barca*; it may also signify *blessing*, but the other interpretation is more suitable. The Romans, in like manner, called the Scipios, the *fulmina belli*, and the Turks called their great sultan, *Bayazid*, lightning.—N.

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 610.

himself as in a fortress for three years (504-508), during which he often suffered from extreme want of provisions, but continually making excursions both by land and sea, and endeavouring to wear out the Romans. His appearance there drew the Romans away from Lilybaeum. Skirmishes took place every day from mere exasperation. In the third year, he found an opportunity of entering into an understanding with the inhabitants of Eryx and of making himself master of the town. He left Hercte, and with a detachment of his troops occupied Eryx, where he blockaded the Romans who were still in possession of the acropolis; he was encamped between the arx and the foot of the mountain, where the town was situated. His object was to keep the Romans engaged, to turn them away from Lilybaeum and Drepana, and to tire them out. This he effected very completely, and therefore remained four years in his position, during which the Romans were unable to make any progress. This struggle shows what perseverance can do; even Polybius, himself a practised soldier, expresses the highest admiration of it. The communication with the sea was much more difficult here than even on mount Hercte, and the corps which he commanded consisted of profligate mercenaries, hundreds of whom would have been ready for money to deliver up their own parents into the hands of the enemy; but he inspired these faithless savages with such a degree of admiration, that they did not venture to make the attempt. He carried on the war in the most simple manner; Polybius justly remarks<sup>20</sup>, that it is impossible to relate the history of these years, on account of the uniformity of the occurrences, and hence we know little about them. But the engagements which took place in this small space were, nevertheless, often very bloody, and although the troops of Hamilcar were occasionally beaten, the Romans gained nothing decisive, and never made any progress beyond the momentary advantage. The newly-discovered fragments of Diodorus<sup>21</sup> contain an anecdote about Hamilcar which is beautiful, and shews his character in the clearest light. In the year preceding the close of the war, C. Fundanius, an obscure general, marched out against him; the troops of Hamilcar were defeated through the fault of Vodostor, a commander of the infantry, and many were slain. Hamilcar

<sup>20</sup> i. 56.

<sup>21</sup> Lib. xxiv. 2 and 3, p. 60, ed. Dindorf.

sent to the Roman General and asked for a truce, that he might be able to bury the dead<sup>22</sup>. The consul sent him back the answer, that he ought rather to be concerned about the living, and capitulate. Hamilcar either did not receive the bodies at all, or only with this insulting reply. A short time afterwards another engagement took place, in which the Romans suffered great losses. Heralds were now sent by the Romans or their allies to effect the delivery of the dead, and Hamilcar granted their request by saying, that he would always be willing to allow them to take back the dead after a battle, for he made war against the living only. This answer was either the simple expression of his own feelings, or was intended to put the Romans to the blush. This and similar anecdotes were probably derived from Philinus, who is said to have always represented the Carthaginians in a more favourable light than the Romans.

---

## LECTURE LVII.

THE peculiar nature of the war in Sicily gradually convinced the Romans, that it could not possibly be brought to a close without extraordinary exertions. It was therefore decreed, for the third time, to build a fleet; but the state was no longer able to raise the necessary sums by a property-tax (consisting of one or more per thousand), which must have pressed very hard upon the people. The state may, in the meantime, have sold large portions of the *ager publicus*; the allies, too, had no doubt contributed much to the earlier fleets. A special loan was therefore contracted with wealthy individuals for building and equipping a fleet of two hundred ships of war,<sup>1</sup> on condition that the money should be returned if the undertaking turned out favourably. This condition implied, of course, that the advanced sums were not to be returned if the under-

<sup>22</sup> This *pietas* towards the dead was generally observed in the wars of the ancients, but more especially by the Greeks; the Romans were not much concerned about the dead.—N.

<sup>1</sup> According to Orosius, Aurelius Victor, and Eutropius, it consisted of 300 ships.

taking failed.<sup>2</sup> The loans which the ancient states contracted were usually different from those of modern times; but those which were contracted during the Hannibalian war<sup>3</sup> approached nearer to our system.<sup>4</sup>

The ships were less awkward than before, for at Lilybaeum the Romans had taken an excellent galley, which they now used as a model for their two hundred quinqueremes<sup>5</sup>. They also provided themselves with better sailors, whom they selected from all the maritime towns of Italy; and the best soldiers of the legions were used as marines. Boarding-bridges were no longer used, for the Romans were now resolved to let the issue depend upon an open sea-fight. To the Carthaginians this news was quite unexpected, for they had entirely neglected their fleet from want of money; and as their patriotism was not so strong as that of the Romans, no extraordinary exertions could be expected. They hastily manned and repaired all their old ships to convey provisions and reinforcements to Lilybaeum, Drepana, and Eryx, where the want of both was very much felt. Their fleet, loaded with corn, arrived at the Aegatian islands, whence they intended to sail across to the coast. In order that a great number of transports might not be necessary, the provisions were conveyed in ships of war. Their marines were not of the best kind, and the whole expedition had been got up in too great a hurry. The Roman fleet commanded by the consul C. Lutatius Catulus and the praetor Q. Valerius Falto, was cruising along the coast, and the Carthaginians intended to land their provisions, in order to take on board Hamilcar and the best of his soldiers as marines, and then to venture on an open sea-fight against the Romans. The latter saw that everything would be lost if the Carthaginians were allowed to carry out their plan, and determined on attacking them before they had accomplished their object.<sup>6</sup> The Romans had only the advantage of lighter ships

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, i. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxvi. 36; xxix. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Down to the 17th century all loans were repaid as soon as it could be done, in order to avoid the continued payment of interest. In many cases, however, it was impossible to follow this system, and in Holland, Spain, and at Nürnberg, there still exist bonds which were signed in the 15th century.—N.

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, i. 59.

<sup>6</sup> Corn is a dangerous cargo, and vessels laden with it are easily upset, if it is not laden in sacks. There are many instances of ships with corn having been upset. — N.

and of better troops; the wind was favourable to the Carthaginians, while the Romans had to work hard with their oars, which was a great disadvantage in the naval engagements of the ancients, since a vessel sailing against the wind presented a larger front to the assailant. Hanno, the Carthaginian admiral, endeavoured, with a favourable wind and full sails,<sup>7</sup> to cross over from the island of Hiero to Lilybaeum. He thus fell on the Romans with double force, and had decided advantages over them, so that the latter thought it hazardous to accept the battle. But they were bold nevertheless: the Carthaginians could hardly move their vessels, and both the cargo of the ships and the bad condition of the Carthaginian soldiers rendered it easy for the Romans to gain a complete victory. Seventy Carthaginian ships were taken, many others were sunk, and the rest dispersed.<sup>8</sup>

The Carthaginians, unable to introduce provisions into the distressed fortresses, or to equip a second fleet, began to negotiate for peace. According to the account of Polybius,<sup>9</sup> which seems to be probable, Hamilcar Barca was chosen to conduct the negotiations. It was soon agreed that Sicily should be evacuated and surrendered to the Romans, that Carthage should pay a contribution of 2200 talents, restore all Roman prisoners and deserters, without ransom, and pay a ransom for the Carthaginian prisoners.<sup>10</sup> The Romans had also demanded, that Hamilcar should lay down his arms and return home as a prisoner of war; but he had rejected this humiliating condition, and declared that he would rather die sword in hand than return home in such a state.<sup>11</sup> It was agreed, that the peace should not be valid until the Roman people had given their sanction to it. When its terms were laid before the people at Rome, the contributions were raised by one thousand talents, and it was further demanded that the Carthaginians should give up all the smaller islands between Sicily and Carthage. This circumstance alone, is sufficient to shew that the Liparian islands were still in the possession of the

<sup>7</sup> Galleys often used no sails at all or small ones; but when the wind was favourable, large sails were hoisted.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, i. 61. Compare Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxiv. *Eclog.* 3, p. 509; Oros. iv. 10; Eutrop. ii. 16.

<sup>9</sup> i. 62. Compare Valerius Max. vi. 6. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, i. 62, iii. 27. Compare Appian, *De Reb. Sicul.* p. 94, ed. Schweigh.; Eutrop. ii. 16. <sup>11</sup> Cornel. Nepos, *Hamilc.* 1.

Carthaginians. These terms were necessary to establish a lasting peace.

Thus ended the first Punic war, which had lasted for twenty-four years, and which made the Romans masters of Sicily indeed, but had changed that island into a wilderness; the whole of the western part in particular was laid waste; and from that time Sicily, in fact, has never recovered, though civilisation existed, and the Greek arts continued to be cultivated. The devastation was completed in the second Punic war. During the servile war the island was a complete wilderness; and however bad the condition of Sicily is at the present time—the modern Sicilians are, next to the Portuguese, in the lowest stage of civilisation among the nations of Europe—yet it was still more desolate and deserted in the time of Verres. Under the Roman emperors it did not recover; hence, we do not find in the Itineraries that the high roads passed through towns, but through large estates, for the towns had perished. Sicily remained thus parcelled out into large properties down to the time of Gregory the Great, when we again become acquainted with its condition through the letters of that pope. The present population, notwithstanding its wretched government, is almost double what it then was. In the time of Verres, the population was less than one million. It is as if the soil had lost all its life and fertility; the small kingdom of Syracuse alone formed an exception, in consequence of the great wisdom with which Hiero governed it.

After this peace, Sicily was constituted a Roman province. This was a new system, and Sicily was the first country to which it was applied. A province, in the Roman sense of the word, was a country in which a Roman general (either during the time of his *magistratus curulis*, or in case of his year of office having elapsed, during the time for which his *imperium* was prolonged) exercised over his soldiers, as well as over the inhabitants of the country, the same power as in times of war, by virtue of the *lex de imperio*.<sup>12</sup> It is a wrong notion, that the inhabitants of a province were not the owners of the soil: that they unquestionably were, though not according to the Roman, but according to the provincial law.<sup>13</sup> The owners retained the use of it on the payment of a land-tax. This happened also when a province revolted and was re-conquered,

<sup>12</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 620.

<sup>13</sup> vol. iii. p. 618.

whereby it came to pass that in some provinces almost all the land fell into the hands of the Roman republic, and in others none at all. This was not understood by later writers, such as Theophilus, and even Gaius. Within the boundaries of a province there were *civitates liberae*, *civitates foederatae*, and subjects.<sup>14</sup> The allied states were treated like the Italian allies; some had property, and paid taxes, sometimes in proportion to their produce, and sometimes in fixed sums of money. The property of those who had lost it during the war was, of course, disposed of by the Romans in what manner they pleased. The dominions of Hiero, who retained his title of king, the state of the Mamertines and Tauromenium, Segesta, Centoripa, and other towns in the interior, remained entirely free. Thenceforward, there were usually one praetor, and one quaestor in Sicily.

The first Punic war was injurious to the Romans, because it impoverished the people; and it therefore had a demoralising influence also, for such wounds do not always heal when peace is restored. During such a war, provision agents, contractors and scoundrels get rich, while honest citizens become poor. Hence, this war was one of the first causes of the degeneracy of the Roman people. Many things must have been altered in the course of the war, of which we have scarcely any information. All we know about the changes made in the Roman constitution during the last fifty years, is little more than nothing, and I think myself very fortunate in having discovered some isolated small points. One of them is, that in the year 506 a second praetor was appointed to administer the law for the *peregrini*, as we learn from a passage in Lydus, "De Magistratibus."<sup>15</sup> This was a great change, for thenceforth a *peregrinus* was a real *persona* at Rome, whereas formerly he had been obliged to choose a *patronus*, by whom he was represented. We must recognise in this measure, an important diminution of the spirit of faction. Suetonius relates that a Claudius, who undoubtedly lived about the beginning of the first Punic war, resolved to rule Italy through the clients, which is one of the proofs that the clientela was, in some respects, a dangerous thing; and that it was salutary to break up that connexion. But the praetor was not confined to administering

<sup>14</sup> vol. iii. p. 616.

<sup>15</sup> i. 38. 45. Compare vol. iii. p. 619, foll.; Livy, *Epit. lib. xix.*

justice; for Q. Valerius also commanded the fleet; and at a later time we find another praetor in Etruria; nor do we find in Livy, a praetor for the peregrini every year. The expression *praetor peregrinus* is barbarous; Livy, in his fourth decad, always paraphrases the title.<sup>16</sup>

Another great change which took place during the war has, from an accidental circumstance, not been fully recognised, and I almost think that I am the first that has drawn attention to it. Dionysius,<sup>17</sup> who calls the first Punic war Φοινικὸς πόλεμος, says, that down to its commencement, the Roman commonwealth paid every year the sum of 50,000 minas to defray the expenses of the public festivals and games. This payment then ceased, but the festivals were not discontinued: from this time forward, wealthy individuals were obliged to cover the expenses of the great festivals, which is an imitation of the Greek system of liturgies, and we find it expressly stated, that the expenses were defrayed by the aediles. This was an important change, for as the aedileship was an introduction to the higher offices, this practice could not but produce the most serious consequences. I wonder that Polybius did not see its importance; for while he blames the Carthaginians for selling the highest state-offices, he says nothing about the Romans, who had in reality adopted the same practice; for if an aedile did not gain great popularity by the splendour of his games, he could scarcely hope to obtain any of the higher offices afterwards.

A short time before the beginning of the first Punic war a change had been made, which affected the character of the senate. Originally there had been two quaestors, but their number was doubled; and from the year 485 it was increased to eight.<sup>18</sup> The quaestors were the *seminarium senatus*; he who had been quaestor had the right *sententiam dicendi in senatu*, and the censors were obliged to make him a senator as soon as a vacancy occurred, unless any thing was brought forward against him. The senate had, at first, been the representative of the gentes and curiae. After the plebeians had become eligible, it was left to the discretion of the censors to

<sup>16</sup> This must be understood as follows: previously to the fourth decad, the office is not mentioned at all in Livy; but thenceforward, and in the fifth decad, it occurs more frequently. Respecting the paraphrase, see Siganus on Livy, xxxiii. 21. 9. <sup>17</sup> vii. p. 475, ed. Sylburg. <sup>18</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 551.

choose persons to fill the vacancies which occurred in it, and the Roman senate was, perhaps, at no time more beneficial to the state than during that period. But this now ceased. If it were possible to devise any means, by which the election of really great and good men could be secured, it would undoubtedly be better than to leave the elections in the hands of the *vulgar imperitum*; but that power of the censors was a dangerous anomaly, as the example of Appius Claudius had shewn. Thenceforth the senate was an assembly elected for life directly by the people. Eight quaestors were appointed every year; after the lapse of thirty years 240 persons had been quaestors, and a great number of men were thus made senators by popular election. The censors, however, continued to have the power of expelling an unworthy individual. At a later period, when the number of quaestors was still greater, and when the tribunes of the people also became senators by virtue of their office, the senate was altogether an assembly whose members were elected by the people.

It was of course not without great difficulty that, after the peace with Carthage, the Romans recovered from their exhaustion; for although they had not seen the enemy in their own country, immense treasures had been lost, and not less than seven hundred ships of war.<sup>19</sup> We know very little of their plans and measures after the restoration of peace; but soon after that event, they had to carry on a war against the Faliscans, which, however, was brought to a close within six days.<sup>20</sup> It is an almost unaccountable phenomenon, that during the long period of the Punic war, Italy, with the exception of some isolated movements in Samnium, remained tranquil; and, that after its termination, an insignificant people like the Faliscans could venture to rise against the victorious giant. It may be, that a truce between them and the Romans had expired just at that time; and, that as the Romans may have been unwilling to renew or fulfil its conditions, those unfortunate men were induced by senseless individuals to resist the demands of the Romans by force. Their town was destroyed, as a warning example to the Italians.

Carthage was still worse off than Rome; she was in equal distress, and being the conquered party had to pay, every year a part of the heavy tribute, and the Romans were by no

<sup>19</sup> Polybius, i. 63.

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, i. 65; Livy, *Epit. lib. xix.*

means lenient creditors. The Carthaginians, moreover, were obliged to pay their mercenaries who came from Sicily; but they had no money, and their state was badly governed. Hamilcar, the greatest man of his time, was opposed by a whole faction; his friends also were called a faction, which, however, means nothing else but persons from all ranks, or the best part of the nation, who joined the great man whom the majority endeavoured to decry. Thus the powerful assistance which Providence gave to the Carthaginians, in the persons of Hamilcar and Hannibal, led to nothing but misery. Had they followed the advice of Hamilcar, had they not spared their wealthy citizens, and had they made but one more great effort, they might have paid off their mercenaries and formed a new army. Instead of this, they foolishly tried to negotiate with those barbarians, and for this purpose assembled the whole army. The consequence was that it broke out in open rebellion. A fearful war arose, which for Africa became a national war, the Libyans throwing themselves into the arms of the troops even with enthusiasm, and the women offering their gold and jewels to defray the expenditure of the war. The rebels were also encouraged and supported by the Italian deserters, who feared lest they should be delivered up to the Romans. One of these deserters was Spendius, a Campanian, who had been a slave among the Romans, and now made himself very conspicuous.<sup>21</sup> Carthage was brought to the brink of destruction; and not only Libya, but ancient Phœnician colonies, such as Hippo, Clupea, and Utica also revolted. The cruel manner in which the war was carried on, shews the character of those Ligurian, Iberian, Gallic, and Libyan mercenaries: they were not real savages, but they acted like savages.<sup>22</sup> The Carthaginians had often not an inch of territory beyond their walls and fortifications. The war lasted for three years and four months.<sup>23</sup> At length, under the command of the great Hamilcar, and through the horrors committed by the rebellious monsters themselves, the Carthaginians succeeded in suppressing the insurrection and destroying the rebels. The Carthaginians had declared the revolted

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, i. 69, foll.; Diodor. *Fragm. lib. xxv.* *Excerpt. De Virt. et Vit.* p. 567.

<sup>22</sup> Similar instances occur in the Thirty Years' war.—N.

<sup>23</sup> Polybius, i. 88. Compare Diodorus, *l. c.* and Livy, *xxi.* 2.

towns in Africa in a state of blockade; and here we find one of the instances in which the Romans shewed themselves just even towards their own rivals, for they recognised the right of blockade, exchanged their prisoners with the Carthaginians, forbade all commerce with the rebels, and protected the provisions which were conveyed to Carthage.<sup>24</sup> The Italian merchants did not always observe the commands of Rome, but sailed whither they were drawn by the prospect of gain. Hence the Carthaginians had the right to seize all vessels bound for a harbour of the rebels, to confiscate their cargoes, and to keep the crews as prisoners. The Romans even allowed the Carthaginians to levy troops in Italy, and made an exchange of the prisoners who were still in their hands from the late war. In the same spirit they refused the offer of the Uticans, who proposed to surrender their town into the hands of the Romans. These acts of justice make it the more surprising, that shortly afterwards the Romans committed such glaring injustice towards Carthage.

During this war in Africa, the mercenaries in Sardinia, the maritime towns of which were entirely Punic down to the time of Cicero<sup>25</sup>, had likewise revolted, and had massacred the Carthaginian colonists in the island. Polybius<sup>26</sup> thinks that, at first, they murdered only the Carthaginian officers. The native Sards rose against the mercenaries, expelled them from the island, but at the same time refused obedience to Carthage. After the conclusion of the war against the rebels in Africa, when the Carthaginians made preparations to reconquer Sardinia, the Romans protected the Sards and took possession of the island, threatening the Carthaginians with a fresh war, if they would not give up their claims to Sardinia and Corsica, as those islands had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. The Carthaginians were too much exhausted to make any resistance; and Hamilcar, who, like all intelligent men, gave up what could not be retained, without indulging in sentimental melancholy, advised his countrymen to yield till better times should come. The Carthaginians determined, for the present, not to wage war, but swore that they would take vengeance, and accordingly concluded a peace, by which they

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, i. 83. Here we see the first traces of maritime law and of the claims of neutrality, which have caused so many disputes in modern history.—N.

<sup>25</sup> See vol. i. p. 170.

<sup>26</sup> Polybius, i. 79 and 88.

gave up Corsica and Sardinia, and paid an additional contribution of 1200 talents. This is one of the most detestable acts of injustice in the history of Rome.<sup>27</sup>

Subsequently to the Peloponnesian war an empire had arisen in Illyricum, where formerly there had been only independent tribes. After the time of Philip of Macedonia especially, a greater state had been created out of smaller ones, the origin of which cannot be traced with accuracy; nor is it certain whether it was founded by Bardylis, who is known to have formed a kingdom in those districts during the reign of Philip.<sup>28</sup> Not even the capital of this Illyrian state can be distinctly ascertained; all we can say is, that it must have been situated somewhere in the neighbourhood of Ragusa. The worst Illyrian pirates must have been those who inhabited the northern part of Dalmatia. The maritime power of the Rhodians was still of considerable importance; but about the year 520 the Illyrians, like the modern Albanese, became formidable in those seas and ravaged the defenceless coasts in a dreadful manner, especially the unfortunate Cyclades; they carried off all grown up persons, and destroyed all commerce. Perhaps none but the Macedonians and Rhodians were able to resist them, though they may not have disliked to see other nations annoyed by piracy, as is sometimes the case with modern maritime powers. But the Illyrians, unfortunately for themselves, also ventured to disturb the commerce of the allies of the Romans, and their boldness increased, when in the reign of their king, Agron, their prizes became greater and greater, and when they found themselves very successful on the coasts of Epirus and Acarnania. Ambassadors were sent by the Romans to demand reparation; but Teuta, the queen of the Illyrians—for Agron had died in the meantime, and his son Pinnes was under the guardianship of his mother Teuta—answered, that piracy was the national custom of her subjects, who took what they could find; that she herself and her state had not wronged the Romans, and that she could not forbid her subjects that which was their right and their privilege. One of the ambassadors, probably a son of the great Tiberius Coruncanius, having replied

<sup>27</sup> Polybius, i. 88; Zonaras, viii. 18.

<sup>28</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 4; Cicero, *De Off.* ii. 11; Photius, *Bibliothe.* p. 530, ed. Bekker; Libanius, *Orat.* xxviii. p. 632.

that it was the custom of the Romans to abolish bad customs, Teuta, enraged at such boldness, despatched assassins who murdered the ambassadors.<sup>29</sup> Previously to this time the Romans had never entertained the thought of crossing over to the eastern coast of the Adriatic; but they now sent an army and a fleet, which landed on the Dalmatian coast. The Illyrians who were now beginning to extend their dominion, were just besieging Corcyra, which, before the Peloponnesian war had been a paradise, with a fleet of some hundreds of galleys. The island, which is now almost a wilderness, was obliged to surrender before the Romans arrived. They landed at Dyrrhachium and delivered this town as well as Apollonia and Epidamnus. The neighbouring tribes also surrendered, and the governor of Corcyra, Demetrius Pharius, a traitor, who was probably bribed, gave the island up to the Romans. Issa also was delivered, and the Romans advanced through Upper Albania, along the Dalmatian coast. They met with no great resistance, all the towns surrendering except one fortified place, so that the queen was obliged to make peace. The Illyrians renounced the sovereignty of a part of the Dalmatian islands and of Upper Albania, pledging themselves not to sail further south than the Drin, a river issuing from the Lake of Scutari, with more than two un-armed vessels. The Romans thus became the real benefactors of the Greeks.<sup>30</sup> What became of the people between Epirus and Scutari, cannot be stated with certainty; but they probably remained, like Apollonia and Epidamnus, in a certain state of dependence on Rome, though neither a garrison nor a praetor was kept there: they probably paid only a moderate tribute. Being the benefactors of the Greeks, and drawn to them by the irresistible charm which many nations felt when praised by the Greeks, the Romans sent an embassy to Greece to announce the terms of the peace with the Illyrians. The Aetolians and Achaians were then allied against Demetrius of Macedonia, a circumstance which gave to the unhappy country a short breathing time; and the Romans for political reasons sent this embassy to both confederacies. Another embassy to Athens had no other object than to obtain the praise of the Greeks; it was an act of homage paid to the spiritual power of that city, for the poor Athenians were in a state of extreme

\* Polybius, ii. 8; Appian, *De Reb. Illyr.* 7.

\* Polybius, ii. 12.

weakness; but the remembrance of their forefathers was still alive and gave a value to the honours conferred by Athens.<sup>31</sup> As Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus were Corinthian colonies, we see at once why a separate embassy was sent to Corinth, although it belonged to the Achaean league. The Corinthians rewarded the Romans by bestowing upon them the right to take part in the Isthmian games<sup>32</sup>, and the Athenians gave them the rights of isopoliy and access to the Eleusinian mysteries.<sup>33</sup>

Even before this time, either during the Punic war, or shortly after it, the Romans had interfered in the affairs of Greece. The Acarnanians were at war with the Aetolians; for the latter, and Alexander of Epirus, had divided Acarnania between themselves. The Acarnanians recovered their independence, defended it against the Aetolians, and applied to Rome on the ground that their ancestors had not fought against Troy, in proof of which they appealed to the catalogue of ships in the *Iliad*; and Patron, who conducted the ships of Aeneas, they said, had been an Acarnanian. The Romans also adduced these circumstances as the reasons for protecting them; but their embassy was treated by the Aetolians with insult and contempt, and produced no effect.<sup>34</sup> Justin relates this from Trogus Pompeius, with a certain feeling of pleasure, for Trogus was not a native Roman, but belonged to a Ligurian or Gallic tribe.<sup>35</sup> Now, however, in the year u. c. 524, the Romans were more successful, and obtained the before mentioned distinctions.

<sup>31</sup> The following affecting occurrence is related by Suidas.—When Antigonus Gonatas had conquered Athens, which had bravely resisted during the long war, and had been compelled to surrender by famine, the aged poet Philemon was still living in Piraeus, whither he had perhaps removed after the fall of the city. Although extremely old, he was still very vigorous, and not forsaken by his muse. His last comedy was finished, except the final scene; and he was lying on his couch half dreaming, when on a sudden he saw nine virgins before him in the room, and on the point of walking out. When he asked them who they were, and why they were going away, they answered that he undoubtedly knew them. They were the Muses, and turning round, they left him. Philemon then rose, finished his comedy, and died. Greek literature perished with the loss of Piraeus: the spirit literally withdrew from Greece.—N.

<sup>32</sup> Polybius, ii. 12.      <sup>33</sup> Zonaras, viii. 9.      <sup>34</sup> Justin, xxviii. 1 and 2.

<sup>35</sup> According to Justin, xlili, *in fin.*, Trogus Pompeius was a Vocontian, from the south-east of Gaul. Comp. Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Gesch.* i. p. 9.

## LECTURE LVIII.

As the contemplation of nature shews an inherent intelligence, which may also be conceived as coherent with nature, so does history on a hundred occasions shew an intelligence distinct from nature, which conducts and determines those things which seem to us to be accidental. It is not true that the study of history weakens the belief in a divine providence: on the contrary, history is of all kinds of knowledge the one which most decidedly leads to that belief. Circumstances, which are called accidental, combine in such a wonderful way with others to produce certain results, that men evidently cannot do what they please.<sup>1</sup> For example, the Gauls alone would have been sufficient to crush the Romans; and had they invaded Italy during the first Punic war, the Romans would have been utterly unable to make their efforts against Sicily. Again, had Alexander, the son of Pyrrhus, tried to avenge the misfortunes of his father in Italy,—had he formed Italian connexions at the time when Regulus was defeated, the Romans would not have been able to offer any resistance. But Alexander's eyes were directed toward petty conquests; the Gauls were quiet, and the Carthaginians had no good generals, except at the close of the war: in short, it was providential that all things combined to make the Romans victorious. They themselves seem to have been prepared for some attack from the east; for ever since the time of Pyrrhus they kept a strong garrison at Tarentum, to prevent any undertakings from that quarter.

During this period the Romans extended their relations with foreign powers far and wide. Previously to the Punic war, they had formed friendly connexions with Ptolemy Philadelphus<sup>2</sup>, and they now did the same with Seleucus Callinicus of Syria.

After the Gauls had lost the Romagna, they had fallen into a kind of torpor. During the last fifty years they had been perfectly quiet in their Cisalpine districts, either because there were no immigrations into their territory, or because they themselves were satisfied in the belief that the Romans had

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus often says, οἵσε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀπολέσθαι; and we may equally often say, οἵσε γὰρ αὐτὸν σακεσθαι.—N.

<sup>2</sup> vol. iii. p. 548.

forgotten them. After the extermination of the Senones, their beautiful country, Romagna and Urbino, had passed into the hands of the Romans as a wilderness.<sup>3</sup> This country afforded room for a great many Roman settlers according to the right conferred by the agrarian law. After the first Punic war, about the year 522, the tribune C. Flaminius, by a decree of the people, caused this *ager Gallicus et Picenus* to be divided.<sup>4</sup> The *ager* of the Senones comprised a part of Romagna, Urbino, and of the territory of Ancona, where the colony of Ariminum had already been established. Polybius most strangely calls this bill of Flaminius an attempt at revolution, a proof that even an intelligent man may err in matters of detail, especially when he follows others without reflecting for himself. Flaminius carried this decree in spite of the vehement opposition of the senate (for we can now no longer speak of patricians), and as none of the other tribunes opposed him, the rulers induced his aged father to ascend the rostra and lead his son away.<sup>5</sup> This distribution of Gallic territory and the settlement of a great number of Romans on the frontiers, we are told, disturbed the Boians who inhabited the country about Modena, Parma, and Bologna, as far as the Romagna. It may be asked whether it was prudent at that time to establish strong settlements in those districts, as the Romans dreaded a war with the neighbouring Gauls. To this we must answer, that the war could not be avoided; the Gauls could not continue to dwell quietly in Lombardy, and it was a matter of little consequence whether the war broke out a little sooner or later. It is certain that the new settlements made the Gauls uneasy; fifty years before, they had been almost extirpated, but the population was now nearly restored. They feared lest the powerful Romans who had lost their large estates in Romagna,

<sup>3</sup> vol. iii. p. 428 foll.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, *Brutus*, c. 14, *Academ.* ii. 5.; Polybius, ii. 21.

<sup>5</sup> This opposition by his own father shews the great change which had taken place. The father was, like his son, a plebeian at the time; but this need not surprise us, since, according to the Licinian Law, the plebeians had the *jus occupandorum agrorum*, as well as the patricians, and both classes had enriched themselves by it. This law of C. Flaminius is the first instance of a mere plebiscitum, without the consent of the senate, becoming binding as a *lex*, in accordance with the Hortensian law; and the expression of Polybius ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ἐν τῷ χεῖρον διαστροφῆς τῆς Πεμπάλων πολιτείας, must probably be understood with reference to this fact.—N. Compare vol. iii. p. 418, foll; Cicero, *De Inventione*, ii. 17.

should seek new ones in their territory; but the Romans did not yet think of a war with them. Their eyes were directed towards Spain, and they had no hopes of being able to expel the Gauls from Lombardy. It is said that at this time the Romans were carrying on war with the Ligurians; we should however be greatly mistaken, if we were to imagine that they had already penetrated into Liguria Proper, or the territory of Genoa; the Ligurians here meant are those who had spread in the Apennines as far as Casentino and Arezzo, after the power of the Etruscans and of the Gauls on the lake Vadimo had been broken. The war against these Ligurians was difficult, for they defended every separate hill, and every little tribe resisted until it was almost annihilated.

The Gauls in Northern Italy were the Boians and Insubrians; the former lived south of the Po in Romagna, the latter in the neighbourhood of Milan, and in the plain of Bergamo and Brescia. These two towns themselves, however, were not Gallic, but probably belonged to the Raetian or Etruscan race. The Cenomani dwelt between the Insubrians and Veneti, between Milan and Mantua, and had placed themselves under the protection of the Romans. Ever since their first conflict with the Romans, the Gauls had been longing for an opportunity to take vengeance upon them; and now, when the Romans settled on their frontiers, they began negotiations with the Transalpine Gauls, among whom great movements were going on at this time. Several years, however, passed away without anything further being done. The negotiations with the Transalpine Gauls caused great apprehensions among the Romans, and at length, eight years after the Flaminian law, an innumerable host of Gauls invaded Italy, and the war broke out in the year 527.<sup>6</sup> The swarms which now descended into Italy from the north, were like those of the Cimbrians in after times. Among these hordes of barbarians we also find Tauriscans, who otherwise occur only in Carinthia; whether at that time they occupied a part of Helvetia, is uncertain. This war is memorable on account of the extraordinary preparations of the Romans, who made a general levy throughout Italy. The Italian allies obeyed this time also, and even more readily than ever; for they anticipated with horror an invasion like the one which had taken place about 150 years

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, ii. 22, foll.

before. The Romans sent one army by the ordinary road to Ariminum, under the consul L. Aemilius, and stationed another in Etruria, under the command of a praetor. The consul, C. Atilius, was still in Sardinia with his army and fleet, as the Sards refused obedience to Rome. A corps of reserve was stationed in the neighbourhood of Rome. All the Italian allies capable of bearing arms were kept ready to march. A list of them is given by Polybius<sup>7</sup>, but it shews that he himself was not quite clear about the matter. The numbers are unfortunately not exact, and Schweighaeuser's computation is quite wrong, for he speaks of the legions as if they had not been contained in the census. But this is the only instance in which I can say that Polybius used materials without being perfectly clear about them. I believe that Fabius spoke thoughtlessly, when he said that the Roman forces consisted of about 800,000 foot and 80,000 horse, numbers of which we can make no use and from which we can draw no conclusions; but least of all can we, as was done in the dispute between Hume and Wallace, deduce from them any inference as to the amount of the population of Italy; for although Hume is the more sensible of the two, still he treats the matter too lightly. The list in Polybius is perhaps not complete; but I cannot think that he could have made a mistake in his calculations without being aware of it, for he is always very exact in his numbers. I have said this much upon the point, because the census of that time is so often referred to. If we had the original lists we might see where the fault lies: but as things are, we can only say that there is something wrong.

The Romans looked forward to the breaking out of this war with far greater apprehensions than they afterwards did to that of Hannibal: such is human foresight! The Apennines north of Tuscany were then quite impassable, and there were only two roads by which Italy could be invaded, the one leading by Faesulae, and the other through the territory of Lucca, in the neighbourhood of Pisa, where the whole valley was then one extensive marsh. The Gauls must have taken one of these roads, and probably the latter. Hannibal's march through those marshes has become celebrated, but history is silent about the passage of the Gauls through the same district. The Gauls, unconcerned about the Consul near Ariminum, thus marched

into Etruria, with an army of 50,000 men, and the swarm advanced irresistibly as far as Clusium, a distance of only three days' journey from Rome.<sup>8</sup> The Roman army was probably stationed in the neighbourhood of Florence, to prevent the Gauls from marching towards Rome; and thus we can understand how it did not hear of the arrival of the Gauls at Clusium till late. The Romans now broke up, if not to cut the enemy off from the road to Rome, at least to pursue them. When the Gauls perceived that an army was closely following their traces, they turned back. They marched from Clusium through the territory of Siena towards the sea, and we there find them in the neighbourhood of Piombino, on the coast opposite to Elba. Polybius says that the Romans met the Gauls near a place called Faesula (*Φαισολα*). The commentators on that passage are wrong. Fiesole cannot possibly have been the place; for how could the Gauls have afterwards marched thence along the sea coast?<sup>9</sup> It must have been a place between the sea and Chiusi, perhaps on the frontier of the Papal dominions near Aqua Pendente.<sup>10</sup> The Gauls had left their cavalry behind and lay in ambush at some distance; the infantry was to entice the Romans after it, to retreat slowly, and thus to draw them to the spot where the Gauls wished to meet them. The Romans, imagining that the enemy were taking to flight, and that the cavalry was only protecting their rear, followed, and fell in with their whole army in full battle array. The Romans suffered a great defeat, and a part of them withdrew to a hill in the Apennines, on which they were besieged by the Gauls. The consul, L. Aemilius, who had been stationed near Ariminum, fortunately hastened across the Apennines to their assistance; but as he arrived after the defeat, he found the Roman army blockaded by the Gauls. However he rescued them from their precarious position, and the Gauls marched away along the sea coast; for as they had already collected an immense booty, and did not wish to begin a new contest with an *agmen impeditum*, they resolved first to secure their plunder in a safe place, and then to return for battle. Such a resolution can be taken only by barbarians. They marched slowly along the sea coast, ravaging everything.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, ii. 25.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, ii. 26.

<sup>10</sup> Montepulciano, in the lectures of 1826.

<sup>11</sup> Many persons have been inclined to believe, that the ancients, whose intellectual powers were surely not inferior to ours, carried on their wars at random.

The Consular army followed them, but had not the courage to attack them; and they would have returned home through the territory of Pisa without interruption had not the army of C. Atilius fortunately just returned from Sardinia and landed near Pisa, whither it had been driven by contrary winds, and where the Gauls arrived at that very time. C. Atilius, had intended to join the other armies, but when he heard of the invasion of the Gauls, he left his baggage at Pisa, and began to march towards Rome along the coast; of the defeat of the Romans he knew nothing. Near a place called Telamon his light troops fell in with the Gauls; some of them who were taken prisoners, revealed their whole situation, and told the consul that the main army of the Gauls was approaching, followed by the consul Aemilius. The latter, in the meantime, had heard of the movements of Atilius, but did not suspect that he was so near. As the battle of Telamon took place in the neighbourhood of Populonia, this is another proof that Φαεσολα cannot possibly be Faesulae near Florence. The Gauls were now in a fearful situation: they first abandoned their baggage, and then tried to occupy a hill near the road-side, whither Atilius had sent his cavalry, and where the battle commenced. The Gauls placed one front against Atilius and the other against Aemilius. Atilius fell, and his head was carried to the chief of the Gauls; but his troops avenged his death, and the cavalry took possession of the hill. The troops facing Aemilius fought naked like true savages; the other Gauls were likewise without breastplates, but had small shields and large Celtic cloaks.<sup>12</sup> The Gaesatae mentioned among the Gauls were not mercenaries, as Polybius interprets their name<sup>13</sup>, but men armed with javelins.<sup>14</sup> All the Gaesatae faced Aemilius, and were met by the light troops who were also armed with missiles. They took to flight after a fierce struggle. The other Gauls united on both sides in enormous masses, but the day resulted in the death of 40,000 and the capture of 10,000 Gauls, so that scarcely any escaped. The danger was thus averted by a most fortunate circumstance; but the war was not concluded till the fourth year.

---

Here we have an instance of such a warfare; but the Gauls were barbarians, and the Romans never acted in such a way.—N.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, ii. 27—31.

<sup>13</sup> ii. 22.

<sup>14</sup> From *gaesum* (a javelin) which word is used by Virgil in his beautiful description of the Gauls, in contradistinction from those armed with swords. The Gaesatae were Allobroges, for they came from the Rhone.—N.

In the second year of the war the Romans crossed the Apennines, and the Boians submitted to them. During the last two years, 529 and 530, the war was carried on in the country of the Insubrians, that is, in the territory of Milan. The Insubrians, who were supported by the Transalpine Gauls, defended themselves very bravely, which, considering the open nature of their country, reflects much honour upon them. The Romans were obliged to retreat towards the confluence of the Adda and the Po. A portion of the Cisalpine Gauls, the Cenomanians, between the river Adda and the lake of Garda, the Venetians, whose capital was Patavium, and the Euganeans, were allied with the Romans and remained faithful to their interest. The Venetians, who excelled even the Cenomanians in fidelity to the Romans, were a civilised people occupying the country between the rivers Adige and Plavis; they were perfectly foreign to the Tuscans, and probably belonged to the Liburno-Pelasgian race.<sup>15</sup> The Insubrians afterwards sued for peace, but in vain; the Romans did not trust them, and wished to annihilate them. In the year 529, C. Flaminius gained a great victory over them to the north of the Po. It is unjust towards him to assert that he conducted the war badly, and I shall say more about him hereafter, for it is the duty of an historian to rescue from the contempt of posterity those to whose names blame is attached undeservedly. The war was decided in the fourth year by the great general M. Claudius Marcellus, who slew Viridomarus, the leader of the Gauls.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Compare vol. i. p. 166, foll.

<sup>16</sup> The Capitoline Fasti state, that Marcellus triumphed, *de Gallis Insubribus et Germanis*. The corner of the stone which contains the syllable *er*, was broken off at one time; but whether, when the stone was restored, the syllable *er* was put in at random, or whether it was so on the original stone, I can neither assert nor deny. I have often seen the stone; but although a friend of mine wished me particularly to ascertain the truth, I was never able to convince myself whether the corner containing the syllable is part of the original stone or not. It is evident that the name cannot have been *Cenomania*, since they were allied with the Romans, and the *g* is quite distinct. *Gonomani* does not occur among the Romans. If the author of these Fasti actually wrote *Germanis*, the inscription would be the most ancient document in which the name of our nation is mentioned. The thing is not at all impossible. At the time of J. Caesar, it is true, the Germans did not live further south than the river Maine or the Neckar; in earlier times they extended much farther south, but were driven back by the Gauls. The Germans in the Wallis, of whom Livy (xxi. 38, comp. vol. ii. p. 525) speaks, were the remnants of an earlier German population which had been expelled by the Gauls.—N.

The victory was gained at Clastidium, in the district between Alessandria and Piacenza. The Insubrians, who were almost annihilated, recognised the supremacy of the Romans, who now became masters of Milan and the whole plain of Lombardy. Here they founded the two colonies of Placentia and Cremona on the banks of the Po; and I am inclined to believe that Modena, though it is not mentioned till a later period, having been lost for a time in a fresh insurrection of the Boians, was likewise fortified by the Romans immediately after this war, in order to secure the possession of their new acquisitions.<sup>17</sup> The frontier was pushed forward as far as the Ticinus. The Ligurian tribes in Piedmont were, in point of law, still independent, though not in point of fact.

In the first Illyrian war, the Romans owed their rapid success to a Greek, Demetrius Pharius, who being governor of Corcyra had probably been bribed to surrender the island to them, and had through their influence been appointed guardian of the young king of the Illyrians. His character was quite in accordance with the despicable age of Greece, and treacherous towards every one. He now conspired against the Romans, and during the Gallic war, induced the Illyrians to revolt, which proves that those people paid tribute to the Romans. He moreover indulged in piracy, with a fleet of fifty lembi, against the Cyclades. The Romans sent over a consular army under L. Aemilius Paulus. The hopes of the rebels were speedily destroyed, and their chief place, Dimalus<sup>18</sup>, was taken. The residence of Demetrius was in his native island Pharos, which the Romans took by a stratagem; but he himself escaped to Macedonia, where the last Philip had just ascended the throne, and Demetrius became his evil genius. The second Illyrian war was thus quickly brought to a close. The Romans at this time extended their dominion in other parts also. We are not informed when the Veneti lost their independence, but in the great Gallic war they were allies of Rome. The Istrians were subdued even before the time of the Hannibalian war, so that even the Veneti must have been conquered at an earlier period, and probably at the time I am now speaking of.

<sup>17</sup> This may be inferred from Polybius, iii. 40, and Livy, xxi. 25.

<sup>18</sup> This name shews that the modern Albanese language is like the ancient Illyrian; for *dimal* in Albanese signifies "a double hill."—N.

While these things were taking place, events were ripening in secret, the greatness and fearfulness of which the Romans were unable to conceive. During the interval that had elapsed since the first Punic war, Hamilcar Barca had displayed the qualities which commonly distinguish a great man. The differences of character are never seen more distinctly than in times when men are surrounded by difficulties and misfortunes. There are some who, when disappointed by the failure of an undertaking from which they expected great things, make up their minds at once to exert themselves no longer against what they call fate, as if thereby they could avenge themselves upon fate; others grow desponding and hopeless; but a third class of men will rouse themselves just at such moments, and say to themselves, "The more difficult it is to attain my ends, the more honourable it will be;" and this is a maxim which every one should impress upon himself as a law. Some of those who are guided by it prosecute their plans with obstinacy, and so perish; others, who are more practical men, if they do not succeed in one way, will try another. There are, it is true, persons who succeed in nothing; but the old proverb *audaces fortuna adjuvet* holds good nevertheless. Of this Hamilcar is an example. Carthage had for centuries been wasting her best energies in Sicily. I believe that there were fellows at Carthage, such as Hanno<sup>19</sup>, who partly from envy of Hamilcar, and partly from their own stupidity, would or could not see that, after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, there were yet other quarters from which the republic might derive great benefits. When, after the American war, it was thought that the ignominious peace of Paris had put an end to the greatness of England, Pitt undertook with double courage the restoration of his country, and displayed his extraordinary powers. It was in the same spirit that Hamilcar acted: he turned his eyes to Spain. The Phoenicians had formed settlements in that country at an early period. Gades is said to have been older than Carthage, and the former place was certainly very important as an entrepôt for the commerce with the Cassiterides<sup>20</sup>. With the exception of Gades, there were

<sup>19</sup> The early part of the second Punic war in Livy is disfigured by Hanno's speeches.—N.

<sup>20</sup> Tin was of the highest value to the ancients, for the purpose of smelting copper, of which they had great quantities; the use of calamine in making brass is a much later invention.—N.

probably no settlements, either Phœnician or Carthaginian, on the western coast of Spain; but there were several on the southern coast, in Granada, Malaga, Abdera; and there had arisen the Bastulians, a mixed people, called *Μιξοφοίνικες*. Into the interior the Carthaginians had not yet penetrated, although they seem to have had connections with it; and Hamilcar now showed his great tact and sagacity; for he formed the plan of making Spain a province, which should compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. The latter island was then and is still very unhealthy, and its interior was almost inaccessible. Sicily had an effeminate and unwarlike population, and rich as it was, it might indeed have increased the maritime power of Carthage, but it would not have given her any additional military strength. The weakness of Carthage consisted in her having no armies; and it was a grand conception of Hamilcar's, to transform Spain into a Carthaginian country from which national armies might be obtained. His object therefore was, on the one hand, to subdue the Spaniards, and on the other to win their sympathy, and to change them into a Punic nation under the dominion of Carthage.<sup>21</sup> The conduct of the Romans towards their subjects was haughty, and always made them feel that they were despised. The highly refined Greeks, who were themselves wont to look down with contempt upon all foreigners, must have felt that haughtiness very keenly. The Spaniards and Celts were of course still less respected. Common soldiers in the Roman armies not unfrequently, especially in the times of the emperors, married native women of the countries in which they were stationed. Such marriages were regarded as concubinage, and from them there sprang a class of men who were very dangerous to the Romans. The Carthaginians acted more wisely, by making no restrictions in regard to such marriages. Hannibal himself married a Spanish woman of Castulo<sup>22</sup>, and the practice must have been very common among the Carthaginians. This was an excellent way to gain the good will of the natives. The whole of the southern coast of Spain had resources of no ordinary kind: it furnished all the productions of Sicily and Sardinia, and in addition to them it had very rich silver mines, the working of which has

<sup>21</sup> Polybius, ii. 1; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxv. eclog. 2, p. 510.

<sup>22</sup> Livy, xxiv. 41. Compare Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxv. eclog. 2, p. 510, foll.

been revived in our own days. Hamilcar was the first who introduced there a regular and systematic mode of mining, and this led him, or his son-in-law, to build the town of New Carthage (Carthagena). While the Carthaginians thus gained the sympathy of the nation, they acquired a population of millions which relieved them from the necessity of hiring faithless mercenaries, as they had been obliged to do in the first Punic war: they were enabled to raise armies in Spain, just as if it had been in their own country. The Romans no doubt observed these proceedings with feelings of jealousy, but could not prevent them, as long as the Cisalpine Gauls stood on their frontiers, ready to avenge the defeats of the Senones and Boians.

All Spain was inhabited by a multitude of small tribes which were without any connexion among themselves, whereas in Gaul, some tribe or another, the Aedui or Arverni, had the supremacy. The Spaniards were people of very different kinds. Whether the Turditani and the northern Cantabri belonged to different races, as the ancients say, or whether all the Iberians belonged to one race, as the great Humboldt maintains, cannot be decided. I must abstain from expressing an opinion, because I do not know the language; but I think that notwithstanding the great authority of Humboldt, the statements of the ancients ought not to be neglected. This much is certain, that the people south of Sierra Morena, the inhabitants of Baetica, had a character quite different from that of the northern tribes: they had a high degree of civilisation, a literature, written laws and books; and there are inscriptions and coins, on which we still possess some remnants of their very peculiar alphabet, which was not derived from that of the Phoenicians. But these people were just as warlike as those in the north, though they were less able to attack an enemy than to defend themselves. It was only at the beginning that they succeeded in driving the Celts across the Pyrenees as far as Aquitania; for afterwards we always find them confined to their own boundaries, within which they defended themselves with desperate courage, so that the saying of an Arab general about them is quite true: "Behind walls they were more than men, but in the field more cowardly than women." The latest wars, too, have proved this. The Celtiberians however formed an exception, and the others also

behaved bravely when they were commanded by able generals, such as Hannibal and Sertorius; so also in the 15th and 16th centuries. Otherwise they confined their efforts to desperately defending themselves, and that even behind bad fortifications. They sometimes put to death their wives and children, and fought as long as a drop of blood was left in their bodies, rather than surrender.

Hamilcar had come to Spain as soon as he had subdued the rebellious mercenaries. There he remained eight years, which time he employed with incomparable wisdom, in establishing the Carthaginian empire. When he died, he left the command to Hasdrubal, his son-in-law. Here we see a characteristic difference between the Romans and Carthaginians: the general of the latter not only holds his office for life, but leaves it to his son-in-law, like an inheritance. It is true that this required great influence at Carthage, and is what Livy calls *Barcina factio*.

---

## LECTURE LIX.

LIVY opens his narrative of the second Punic war with the remark which others had made before him, that it was the greatest and most memorable that had ever been carried on by the greatest states, and at the periods of their greatest freshness and vigour: he could say so with justice; but after the lapse of more than 2000 years we cannot think the same, for in the wars of the French revolution far greater energies were called into action; even the seven-years' war, especially the campaign of 1757, has a greater accumulation of events, and as for the greatness of the generals engaged in it, it is by no means inferior to the second Punic war. In the first Punic war, there appears only one great general; in the second we have, besides Hannibal, Scipio, Fabius, Marcellus, and many second-rate ones. We may, however, truly say, that in all ancient history there is no war which equals that against Hannibal in the greatness of the events. We may also on the whole assert, that there never was a general superior to Hannibal, and in antiquity there is not one whom we could even place by his side; before him all the other Carthaginian generals shrink into

insignificance. Against him there stood Scipio, who, although he perhaps did not quite equal Hannibal, yet must be considered as a general of the first order: Fabius and Marcellus, who might have acquired great fame in other wars, are eclipsed by him. I do not hesitate to adopt the opinion of Hannibal himself, when he places himself above Scipio.<sup>1</sup>

The second Punic war was described separately by several writers. The first, but more especially the second war against Carthage, was the real subject of the annals of Fabius and Cincius. The latter prefixed to his history of it a brief sketch of the early history of Rome, and described the war very minutely, as far as he himself had witnessed it. I have no hesitation in saying, that the account which Appian gives of this war is mainly based upon that of Fabius. Dionysius of Halicarnassus failed him at the beginning of the first Punic war. I can prove satisfactorily, that some characteristic points in the narrative of Appian and Zonaras are derived from Fabius, for Dion Cassius also knew that he could not have a better guide than Fabius. The Hannibalian war was also described separately by two Greeks, Chaereas and Sosilus, both of whom are spoken of by Polybius with contempt<sup>2</sup>; he regards them as untrustworthy, although Sosilus, if we may trust the account<sup>3</sup>, had lived in the camp of Hannibal. When Livy wrote the history of this war, he did not think of using the memoirs written by Hannibal, or the Greek letter which Scipio had addressed to Philip of Macedonia. Polybius<sup>4</sup> made use of a document of Hannibal, engraved on a brass tablet in the temple of Juno Lacinia,<sup>5</sup> in which the numbers were stated with particular accuracy. As far as we possess his work, we cannot wish for anything further or better: his third book is a master-piece, which satisfies the mind of the reader in all respects. Unfortunately we possess his account only for the first years of the war. He undoubtedly had before him the excellent work of L. Cincius, who described the war as an eye-witness. In the Latin language there was only one separate history of the second Punic war, by L. Coelius Antipater, who,

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxx. 30.

<sup>2</sup> iii. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Cornel. Nepos, *Hannib.* 18, where also one Silenus is mentioned, who had lived in the camp of Hannibal, and written a history of the war.

<sup>4</sup> iii. 34 and 56.

<sup>5</sup> Should be in Lacinium, Polybius, iii. 33, 56.

to judge from his name, must have been a Greek, and was either a freedman, or enfranchised and adopted into the gens Coelia. He wrote in the seventh century with declamatory pretensions, and many points in Livy's account are, I believe, derived from him, especially those parts in which he falls into the romantic; for it had been the object of Antipater to write an elegant history, and Cicero was probably not wrong in speaking of him with contempt. The work of Dr. Ulr. Becker, of Ratzeburg<sup>6</sup>, on this war is good, although it is not founded on matured studies. It contains some strange prejudices, and neglects many points which one would like to see explained. It is a valuable work nevertheless, which should not be overlooked; and the name of its author will not be forgotten. In the narrative of Livy, we can distinguish the different sources from which he derived his information. The account of the first period of the war, and especially the rhetorical description of the siege of Saguntum, are unquestionably derived from Coelius Antipater; and if his history of the remaining period of the war were not based on better authorities, the whole of his third decad would be worth nothing. But in some parts Livy follows Polybius very carefully; in other parts of this decad, as for instance at the end of a year, when he gives a brief summary of the events which occurred during the year, he followed the pontifical annals, or some annalist. He evidently wrote this decad with great pleasure, and some portions of it are among the most beautiful things that have ever been written. The points in which he is deficient are, a knowledge of facts, experience, an intimate acquaintance with the affairs of real life—he does not step beyond the walls of the school—and a control over his subject. He worked with great ease, and repeated what others had said before him without toiling and moiling. Wherever he differs from Polybius, he deserves no credit at all; and however beautifully his history of this war is written, still it is evident that he could not form a vivid conception of anything. His description of the battle of

<sup>6</sup> The book here alluded to bears the title *Vorarbeiten zu einer Geschichte des zweiten Punischen Krieges*, Altona, 1822. A supplementary work by the same author, is entitled "Ueber Livius xxx. 25 und 29: oder Entwicklung der Begebenheiten, welche zwischen Hannibals Rückkehr nach Africa und der Schlacht bei Zama liegen."

Cannae, for instance, is untrue and impossible, whereas that of Polybius is so excellent, that it enables the reader to see the locality and to draw a map of it; and the better the locality is known, the clearer his description becomes. The work of General Vaudoncourt, "Campagnes d'Annibal," which was published a few years ago at Milan, and which was praised so much because the author is so able a man, is a thoroughly wretched production; the maps are good for nothing, and the plans are quite arbitrary. The author was unable to read his authorities critically, knew no Greek, and has given no new information. There is only one point in ancient tactics on which I have learned anything from him. He is especially mistaken respecting the order of battle of the Carthaginians, which he considers to have been that of the phalanx; this it was not; their troops were just as moveable as those of the Romans, and the sword alone decided with them; they probably had no lances at all, but great quantities of javelins.

If I were to relate the history of this war according to my own inclination, the time which is set apart for these lectures would be much too short. I must therefore confine myself to brief sketches and outlines; but abridged narratives require a perfect consistency in all their parts, a thing which a person can attain only by writing them down with great care. Lord Chesterfield very appropriately said on a similar occasion, "I beg your pardon for my prolixity, but I have no time." All abridgments require time. The greater part of my labours consists in condensing what I have written; but in these lectures I cannot give such an abridgment with the necessary consistency; and if the limits of an abridgment are overstepped here and there, in a subject which has been dear to my heart for the last forty years, I trust no one will find fault with me.

When Hasdrubal had had the administration of Spain for nearly nine years, he was assassinated by an Iberian, whose chief he had ordered to be put to death. This personal attachment to their chiefs was a peculiar feature among the Iberians; no one allowed his master to be killed unavenged, and, if possible, no one survived him. Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar Barca, was living in the camp of Hasdrubal to finish his military education, and became the favourite of the army. Nothing in history is so well known as the vow of Hannibal, which I believe to be historical. Hannibal himself is said to have

mentioned it in aftertimes<sup>7</sup>: and what reason have we for doubting it? The fact that the circumstances under which it was made are stated differently, is no ground for disbelieving it: according to some, it was the condition on which Hamilcar took his son to Spain: according to others, it was made at the moment he took leave of his father. I also believe that when Hamilcar went to Spain in 516 or 517, Hannibal was not more than nine years old, and consequently must have been born in 507 or 508, previously to the time when Hamilcar went to Sicily, so that he began his expedition to Italy in his twenty-seventh year. Against such an age nothing can be said: it is just the age at which a general may best display all his great qualities. Frederick the Great was not more than twenty-eight years old when he undertook the conquest of Silesia; and Napoleon was twenty-seven or twenty-eight years old, when he made his first Italian campaign. Remarks like these may be laughed at when they are mistaken for proofs; but I know what proofs are, and what I mean to say here is simply this: that at such an age he *could* act the great part which history ascribes to him. His whole conduct in this war is that of a very young man; and at the time of his death he was not much more than fifty years old. He had two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago. Whether Hasdrubal was older than Hannibal is unknown, but Mago was very young when Hannibal went to Italy.

Opinions as to the personal character of Hannibal were naturally divided among the ancients: in Latin authors he appears everywhere as a formidable being. The description in Livy of his character as a general is in parts very beautiful; but when Livy adds that his virtues were counterbalanced by as many vices, he contradicts Polybius<sup>8</sup>, who expressly denies the charge of cruelty, and asserts that, wherever any cruel or faithless action is mentioned, it must be attributed to Hannibal's subordinate officers in the Carthaginian army; and especially to another Hannibal, surnamed Monomachus<sup>9</sup>, whose name gave rise to false reports about the great Hannibal. The name Hannibal was as common at Carthage as many of our Christian names are among us. There are statements respecting his cruelty, especially in

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, iii. 11; Corn. Nepos, *Hannib.* 2. Compare Val. Maximus, ix. 3. Ext. 3; Appian, *De Rep. Hispan.* 9. p. 110.

<sup>8</sup> ix. 22.

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, ix. 24.

Appian, who derived them from Fabius, but Polybius knows nothing of them. I do not mean to say that he committed no act of cruelty; but what he did was no more than the common practice among the Romans themselves, with whom, as with the ancients in general, the destruction of the enemy was the principal object of war. Sometimes cruelty is one of the necessities of war.<sup>10</sup> In modern times warfare has assumed a more humane character; and really destructive wars, such as we find in the history of Spain, are among the exceptions. Of Hannibal's alleged *perfidia plus quam Punica*<sup>11</sup> not a single instance is known, and Polybius absolutely denies it. We may confidently assert, that in capitulations he always kept his engagements; for if he had not, the charge would have been brought against him, and no one would have made any capitulation with him. The Romans are terrible liars when they blame an enemy: stories like those of the murder of the senate of Nuceria, and the massacre of that of Acerrae<sup>12</sup>, are not established by any good authority. His greatness, however, was not less striking in peace than in war; and in this respect the difference between him and Scipio is very remarkable. In times of peace Scipio was a useless citizen; nay, the dangerous example which he set in defying his lawful accusers<sup>13</sup> may have led the Romans to despise the laws of their country; and who knows whether his example was not actually a slow poison! I like Scipio for many reasons, and he was really great in not making a selfish use of the popular enthusiasm for him; but there is, on the whole, something exceedingly haughty in his character: he was conscious of his own greatness. He shewed his haughty pride from the moment he began to take part in public affairs, until he became a candidate for the consulship; afterwards he set himself altogether above the laws of his country. This feature in his character is visible throughout his life: he wanted to be superior to the laws, and submission to their sovereign power was quite foreign to him. We do not hear that he was the author of any institution or law to benefit his country, although he might have bestowed great blessings upon it by his influence; and Rome

<sup>10</sup> Thus it was a case of necessity, when in the crusades Bohemund, for the purpose of keeping off the Turks, ordered the corpses to be roasted and shown to the ambassadors.—N. Comp. Wilken, *Geschichte d. Kreuzzüge*, i. p. 187.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxi. 4.      <sup>12</sup> Zonaras, ix. 2 (from Dion. Cassius); Appian, *Pun.* 63.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 55, foll.; A. Gellius, iv. 18, foll.; Val. Maximus, iii. 7. 1.

was surely in need of blessings. This neglect after the Punic wars was one of the main causes of the decline of the Roman constitution and morals. Hannibal, on the other hand, shewed his genius in everything; and, in times of peace, after the second Punic war, he was the benefactor and reformer of his country by wise laws and institutions. He and Scipio were both men of highly cultivated minds, and were intimately acquainted with Greek literature. Hannibal's companions were Greeks with whom he conversed in his leisure hours, and although they were not men of the first order, still the fact shews that his amusements were of an intellectual kind.<sup>14</sup> Among many other advantages in his relations with others, he possessed irresistible personal attractions, which he seems to have inherited from his father, who subdued savages, and then managed and guided them without any difficulty. For a period of sixteen years he commanded an army, in which, like that of Gustavus Adolphus, there was at last not one of the old soldiers left, but which consisted only of a crowd of reckless adventurers. He was placed in difficult circumstances; but although individual Gauls and Celts, or some of the frivolous and unprincipled Numidians were now and then faithless, or deserted and betrayed him, yet not one ever raised his hand against him.<sup>15</sup> He was obliged to sacrifice his soldiers to his objects; he could not spare the Italicans, and made enormous demands upon them: but none of them ever attempted any thing against him. He was like a being of a higher order, who governed all men, and dazzled them by his lustre. A man who settled the administration of Spain, crossed the Alps, shook the power of the Romans, and reduced them to extreme weakness—such a man I call the greatest among his contemporaries; yea, I may call him the greatest of all ages. How small, in comparison with his, are the achievements of Alexander the Great, who had no difficulties to overcome! Scipio came forward against Hannibal under the most favourable circumstances, and he could not but conquer, unless Hannibal had been a being of supernatural powers. Hannibal's perseverance and faithfulness towards his country cannot be sufficiently praised; his transactions with other states had only one

<sup>14</sup> Cicero (*De Orat.* ii. 18) in relating the anecdote of the rhetorician who preached to Hannibal about the virtues of a general, says that Hannibal did not speak Greek very well (*non optime Graece*).—N.

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, xxiv. 9.

object—to serve his own country. Wherever he was he commanded; he did not seek protection even when he was in exile, and he bowed before no one; he never violated truth, nor did any thing which was opposed to the dignity of his character. This man I honour, esteem, and love, almost unconditionally; although I do not wish to deny, that things are related of him which fill our eyes with tears. But when he was at Capua, and allowed Decius Magius to depart uninjured, he did not follow the dictates of policy, but those of his own generous heart. Few Romans could boast of such magnanimity; and at that time Scipio was, perhaps, the only one among them who was capable of it.

The third hero of this war is Q. Fabius Maximus, a man who has been very much overrated. Great circumspection and self-control are indeed qualities which we cannot help recognising in him; and he was a very good general, but not a better one than many others. He had already acquired reputation in the preceding and more obscure wars, but the surname Maximus was an inheritance from his grand or great grandfather, Q. Fabius Rullianus, who lived at the time of the Samnite wars, and received that surname for having separated the four city tribes from the rustic ones. He acted in the way that he thought useful, and did not hesitate to do that which brought upon him the charge of cowardice. Ennius says of him: *unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.* As a general he was calm, cautious, and circumspect, but the only important feat of his is the recovery of Tarentum; and what was that, after all? The fact of his holding out after the battle of Trasimenus was no more than the republic had a right to expect of him. I am inclined to compare him with field-marshall Daun, and am convinced that Daun, as a general, was at least not inferior to him. I am very apt to transfer my affection for great ancestors to their descendants; but however much I should like to speak of Q. Fabius Maximus with affection, I cannot. His opposition to Scipio is not a rhetorical exaggeration, but an historical fact. The speeches which Livy puts into the mouth of Hanno are rhetorical flourishes taken from Coelius Antipater, but the character of those of Fabius is historical: it is evident that he was envious, and that he could not bear the star which was rising above him. It must make a man feel wretched, if, when on the

threshold of old age, he looks upon the rising generation with uneasiness, and does not rather rejoice in beholding it; and yet this is very common with old men. Fabius would rather have seen Hannibal unconquered, than see his own fame obscured by Scipio. Hence he would not endeavour to destroy Hannibal, but only to wear him out.

Claudius Marcellus, an able and enterprising general, was quite the opposite of Fabius by his great boldness; he was distinguished as a general and a brave warrior.

These are the men who acted the most prominent part in the second Punic war, which, like the first, must be divided into several periods. The first comprises all that took place in Spain, including the conquest of Saguntum, etc., until the year 534, when Hannibal began his march towards the Alps. All the events of this period, however, must be regarded merely as preliminary to the war itself. The second period comprises the next three years and a part of the fourth, from 534 to 537, during which Hannibal made his irresistible progress, crossed the Alps and overran Italy. During the third period from 537 to the taking of Capua in 541, his star began to sink: the Romans recovered their ground, and their hopes of success received new strength, for it was now evident that Hannibal had irreparably lost the object of the war. The fourth period extends from 541 to 545; Hannibal now began to set his hopes on Spain and on the reinforcements which he expected from his brother Hasdrubal. He maintained himself in Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium, and the Carthaginians raised fresh armies in Spain, until the defeat of Hasdrubal on the Metaurus. The fifth period extends from 545 to 550, when Hannibal, at the command of the Carthaginian senate, left Italy. The sixth and last extends from his arrival in Africa down to the end of the war, and may be termed the African war.

Several other wars run parallel to, or are interwoven with that against Hannibal; thus we have to notice, from 535 to 547, the wars of the Romans in Spain, which were carried on with various success until the taking of New Carthage; from 535 to 540 the Sicilian war and the insurrection of Sardinia, form an episode, and were brought to a conclusion by the subjugation of Sardinia and the conquest of Syracuse; and lastly, from 540 to 547, the Macedonian war. Those who wish to

form an accurate idea of the second Punic war, must keep all these great masses separate from one another, whereby they will get rid of much that is perplexing in the detail.

---

## LECTURE LX.

WHILE Hamilcar was establishing a Carthaginian empire in Spain, the Romans acted the part of mere spectators. On his arrival in that country, the Carthaginians possessed only the coasts of Granada and Murcia; but under his administration, Andalusia and the greater part of Valencia seems to have been added to their dominions. The empire of Carthage did not yet extend beyond the Sierra Morena, but connexions with the natives had already been formed, and it may have been under Hasdrubal that greater progress was made in that quarter. When we read that Hannibal was master of all Spain<sup>1</sup>, it is a mistake of the writer, for the Carthaginians never advanced farther than a little north of New Castile and Estremadura. Old Castile and Leon never belonged to them. The northernmost point to which we can, in Polybius, trace the conquests of Hannibal, is Salamanca<sup>2</sup>; and even if we could consider this acquisition as a lasting one, still the Carthaginian empire did not extend over one half of the peninsula. The tribes of the interior and the Celtiberians seem not to have recognised the supremacy of Carthage, and were only her allies, retaining their own peculiar form of government, and merely furnishing mercenaries for the Carthaginian armies; which they did the more willingly, as they were of a very warlike disposition. Polybius<sup>3</sup> justly remarks, that the Romans were silent at the progress which the Carthaginians were making in Spain, because they were afraid to renew the war against them, while they were threatened themselves in Italy by the Gauls. Had Hamilcar been alive, he would, perhaps, have taken part in that war. Hasdrubal was thus enabled to train and prepare the new nation, during the great war of the Romans with the Cisalpine Gauls. We are surprised at an account, which mentions that during this time a Carthaginian

<sup>1</sup> Corn. Nepos, *Hannib.* 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Polybius, iii. 14.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 13.

fleet appeared off the coast of Etruria.<sup>4</sup> If that statement is true, it was certainly not a step taken by the government, but probably by Hasdrubal on his own responsibility. During the Cisalpine war the Romans had, strangely enough, concluded a treaty, not with the government of Carthage, but merely with Hasdrubal, the governor of Spain.<sup>5</sup> This seems to shew, that Carthage was in a state of anarchy. The treaty, however, had reference to Spain only, where the river Iberus was fixed upon, as the boundary between the two empires. It is owing to the loss of the second decad of Livy, that we do not know at what time the Romans had gained possession of that part of Spain; for, at the beginning of the second Punic war, we find them in possession of Tarraco, and the inhabitants of the coast of Catalonia were under their protection. Their friendship and alliance with Massilia were very old. Livy adds, that it was stipulated in the treaty that Saguntum should be free, between the dominions of the two powers; and if this had really been the case, the hostilities of the Carthaginians against that town would certainly have been a violation of the treaty. But Polybius knows nothing of such a clause; and if he, who had authentic documents before him, had found anything about it, he would assuredly have stated that Hannibal had committed a breach of the treaty. However excellent Polybius generally is, yet he sometimes errs in details: he had first published his work down to the war with Perseus; the second edition contained the history down to the taking of Corinth, and it can be clearly shown, that the first books were not revised in the second edition. It is evident that at the time he was quite unacquainted with the geography of Spain, and he, like Livy, appears to have imagined that Saguntum was situated east of the Iberus. The Romans, no doubt, did not wish to give up the Saguntines who were their friends, but it had not been stipulated that an attack upon Saguntum should be regarded as a breach of the peace. Hannibal carried on the war in Spain only as a preparation; for his real object was the war in Italy which he endeavoured to kindle. The Carthaginians stood to him in the same relation as the Romans did to Cæsar: he was stationed, with an army devoted to him, in a country which he himself had subdued, and over which consequently the senate had no

<sup>4</sup> Zonaras, viii. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxi. 2; Polybius, ii. 31. 22, iii. 27. 29.

control. Carthage, according to the natural career of its constitution, was already in a state of decay, authority having passed from the senate into the hands of the popular assembly; and although the people may have adored Hannibal, yet the senate cannot have been favourably disposed to him; nor, although the Romans were generally hated, is it likely that the majority of the Carthaginians expected that their condition would be improved by a war with Rome, or could see how Rome was to be attacked. The nobles, moreover, dreaded Hannibal at the head of a victorious army.

Livy places the siege of Saguntum in the year 534, although he could not but have seen that this was an impossibility, and that it must have taken place the year before, 536.<sup>6</sup> Polybius blames Hannibal for endeavouring to kindle the war by all kinds of intrigues, and he has, on this account, been charged with being too partial to the Romans; but neither he nor Hannibal is deserving of censure. Polybius thinks that Hannibal ought at once to have demanded the restoration of Sardinia; but this Hannibal could not do. Had he been a king, he might perhaps have done it, but as it was, he was obliged gradually to draw the Carthaginians into the war, whether they would or not. He accordingly interfered in the hostilities between the Saguntines and Turdetanians, or, as I should like to read, the Edetanians, for it is hardly to be conceived how the Turdetanians, at so great a distance, could have had any complaints against the Saguntines. The Edetanians, on the other hand, were the inhabitants of Valencia, and must at that time have been under the protection of the Carthaginians.<sup>7</sup> Saguntum was probably not a purely Iberian town; it is said that colonists from Ardea had settled there, in which case it must have been a Tyrrhenian town; and this is not improbable, although afterwards the Iberian population perhaps predominated. The statement that the Saguntines were a colony of Zacynthus, seems to have arisen solely from the name. Some years before, disturbances had arisen at Saguntum; for several of those Spanish cities were republics, and their inhabitants must not be looked upon as barbarians like the Celts. The Romans on that occasion had interfered as mediators, and the victorious party had taken cruel vengeance

<sup>6</sup> See Siginus on Livy, xxi. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 10, calls them Tarboletans.

upon the conquered. Hannibal availed himself of this circumstance and stirred up the latter, and at the same time he complained at Carthage that the Saguntines in their reliance upon Rome, had committed acts of violence against Carthaginian subjects. This was certainly a bad intrigue, but he could not act otherwise, as he wished to bring about a war. The Romans had an extraordinary dread of a war with Carthage, for the manner in which that city had recovered must have made a deep impression upon them. They did not know how to conduct the war; they could transfer it to Africa only by means of a fleet, which would have cost an enormous sum, and with which was associated the recollection of so many disasters. Against Spain too the war would have had to be carried on by sea, and there they had scarcely any basis for their operations, having only some insignificant allies in Spain, whereas Carthage had at her disposal all her subject-population, and had all her troops ready at hand, while Rome could only fight with her own forces which she would have had to transport at an immense cost. For these reasons, the Romans allowed Hannibal to extend his dominion without venturing upon anything; nay, when he was besieging Saguntum, they only negotiated, and took no measure to send relief, so that Hannibal carried on the siege for eight months, while they were engaged in the Illyrian war. This siege has gained an imperishable celebrity in history from the heroic resistance of the Saguntines. But the minute description of it in Livy is a romance, undoubtedly derived from the account of Coelius Antipater. According to him the town, like several others in Spain, was destroyed by its own inhabitants in despair. The description of Polybius is much more authentic; he only knows that the town, situated one mile from the sea, on one of the last hills which there rise and separate Aragon from Castile was taken, not destroyed; that Hannibal made extraordinary booty, gained courage and strength for further undertakings<sup>8</sup> and was enabled to send rich presents to Carthage. This completely refutes the tale of Livy, which, in fact, betrays its character by its minuteness. Hannibal then took up his winter quarters at New Carthage, and completed the preparations for his great expedition. The Romans had sent ambassadors to him to call him to account for his conduct

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, iii. 17.

towards Saguntum; but he referred them to Carthage, where they complained and demanded the surrender of Hannibal and the Carthaginian commissioners (*σύνεδροι*) who were with him, a circumstance which throws some light upon the otherwise obscure institutions of Carthage. The ambassadors were received in the senate in a manner which might have been foreseen, after so long an irritation and so ardent a desire to take vengeance for the injustice which Rome had inflicted on Carthage in regard to Sardinia. The Carthaginians instead of complying with the demand, endeavoured to show that Hannibal had not acted wrongly, and that Carthage could not be restrained by Rome in extending its dominion in Spain. Polybius justly remarks that they disputed about secondary matters without entering into the real question at issue. One of the Roman ambassadors having made a fold of his toga, requested the Carthaginians to choose either war or peace. The Carthaginians replied that they would follow the choice of the Romans; and when the latter declared for war, their words were received by the Carthaginians with loud acclamations.

It might now have been expected that the Romans would have made serious preparations, but this was not the case; they had at the time only a small fleet, which afterwards, too, was always very limited. Hannibal assembled his troops in the neighbourhood of Cartagena, and shewed great foresight in drawing Libyans to Spain, and sending the most distinguished Spaniards to Libya, where they were to serve as garrisons; but, at the same time, he retained great numbers of Spaniards, to accompany him on his expedition. The army with which he crossed the Iberus, is said to have consisted of 90,000 foot, and 12,000 horse.<sup>9</sup> This event must have happened in the early part of May. P. Cornelius Scipio, and Tiberius Sempronius Longus had been consuls since the 15th of March. The tribes east of the Ebro were under the protection of Rome, but without being in the condition of subjects, and were hostile to the Carthaginians: they offered a gallant resistance, but Hannibal advanced very rapidly, and conquered the fortified places with the sacrifice of many lives. He crossed the Pyrenees in the neighbourhood of Figuera and Rofas, in the direction of Roussillon, where

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, iii. 35; Livy, xxi. 18. Polybius has taken his numbers from the table of Hannibal, and no doubt intended to give them correctly; but I suspect that this is some mistake in the writing, and that we ought to read 70,000, instead of 90,000.—N.

the mountains slope down towards the coast of the Mediterranean, and are of no considerable height. He had previously sent envoys to the Gallic tribes, to ask for a free passage through their country. These envoys now returned with presents, and the assurance that Hannibal would meet with no resistance in Gaul as far as the Rhone. A part of his forces was left behind in Catalonia, and when he had crossed the Pyrenees, a dangerous mutiny broke out among his soldiers. Three thousand Carpetanians returned home, and that others might not be encouraged to follow their example, Hannibal was wise enough to send back all those in whom he discovered any unwillingness to follow him, since he was convinced that a cheerful and small army is better than a numerous and discontented one. After having allowed his soldiers some rest in the neighbourhood of Perpignan, he continued his march with 50,000 foot, and 9,000 horse.

When the Romans discovered that it was his plan to cross the Alps, they sent the consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, the father of the great Scipio, with an army of two legions and 10,000 allies to Spain, and a fleet was equipped to sail to Africa, under the command of the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius, who was already dreaming of besieging Carthage; but even before he arrived, things had happened which quite altered the state of affairs. Carthage at this time had no fleet of any importance, which was the first great fault in the management of affairs on the part of the Carthaginians; whereas all that Hannibal did was wise and well calculated. But in the senate of Carthage there were men of a different stamp; and it is not improbable that a property-tax was found necessary to cover the expenses of the war, and that in paying it the wealthy shewed a niggardly spirit; otherwise the mean parsimony of Carthage is quite unaccountable. The plan of the Romans was, in certain respects, not ill-calculated, but it proves that they underrated their enemy and his strength. Had P. Cornelius Scipio arrived in Spain with his fleet before Hannibal passed the Ebro, Hannibal might possibly have been stopped in his progress; although I am almost convinced that Hannibal would have thrown him back upon the sea, and that thus his expedition would have been facilitated. But the Roman fleet did not sail until Hannibal was master of Catalonia; and it cannot be denied that at the beginning of this, as of every other great

war, the Romans were slow and awkward, so that Hannibal was beforehand with them in everything. It is true that they had just before made great exertions against the Cisalpine Gauls, but with the exception of this, they had been engaged only in petty warfare since the conclusion of the first Punic war, and they had no standing armies. Their troops were a sort of militia, without any regular training; whereas the Carthaginian army under Hannibal consisted of veterans. Moreover, the Romans did not think it necessary to place the best of their generals at the head of their armies, but made their choice with their usual views; and the consuls of this year were dull and slow like their soldiers. In the year before they had commenced establishing the colonies of Placentia and Cremona; they now hastily sent out the colonists, and the fortifications were completed before the opening of the campaign, so that neither Hannibal nor the Gauls were able to take those places. Polybius censures the authors of his time, for speaking of Hannibal's enterprise as of a thing which had never happened before, and as if he had intended to do something unheard of, and which was impossible without the interference of higher powers. Hannibal certainly did not undertake the expedition without some precedent. The story that a spirit shewed Hannibal the way, is changed by Livy into a dream, which is exquisitely beautiful; but the writers of that time had related this as a real occurrence.

Hannibal continued his march with the utmost rapidity, and, according to the calculation of Polybius<sup>10</sup>, led his Carthaginians a distance of 9,000 stadia. This is indeed rather exaggerated; but still the distance between Carthagena and the river Po is immense, and what difficulties had he to overcome! When Hannibal arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, envoys of the Gauls implored his assistance against the Romans; but until then he had had to make his way through a country all peopled by independent and hostile tribes, to whom an army like his must have appeared a curse. In such a host it was impossible to prevent acts of violence, especially if we consider the wants with which they had to struggle, and which impeded their progress everywhere. He passed through the magnificent country of Lower Languedoc to Pont St. Esprit on the Rhone, in order to reach the Alps. The inhabitants of

Languedoc could not resist the torrent that poured in upon them, and they sent their women and children into the Cevennes mountains for shelter; but the Gauls in Dauphiné and Provence had the rapid river before them, and could defend themselves. They perhaps heard at the same time that a Roman army was in Catalonia, or perhaps even on the Gallic coast; and although the hostile feeling which existed between the Gauls and the Romans was very strong, and the inhabitants of Languedoc had rejected with scorn the request of the Romans, still they now looked upon them as auxiliaries against the starving host of invaders, who in their rapid course were obliged to take all they could. Hannibal had immense difficulties in effecting a passage across the Rhone: as it would have been difficult to make a bridge of boats, he purchased of the people on the banks of the river as many ships as he could, and ordered canoes to be made of trees; he then sent during the night a part of his army up the river, where they passed over on rafts, that they might get to the rear of the Gauls. The plan succeeded, and it is inconceivable how the Gauls did not observe it in time. When the detachment had got across, Hannibal threw all his forces into the ships and passed the river, while the Gauls were attacked in their rear. The elephants were transported with great difficulty. This success, in a place where nature herself seemed to have drawn the boundary line, made the deepest impression upon the barbarians. Had Hannibal arrived one week later, Scipio would have prevented his crossing the river.

Scipio, on his voyage to Spain, had landed near Marseilles, and when he heard that Hannibal whom he imagined to be still on the Ebro, had already arrived on the Rhone, he must have felt the danger of opposing an army so much more numerous than his own. In conjunction with the Gauls of the eastern bank, he might have prevented the enemy from crossing the river; but it was too late, and Hannibal was already on the left bank before the arrival of a detachment of Roman cavalry which Scipio had sent up the river from Marseilles. Both parties were astonished to meet each other, for Scipio who had scarcely heard that Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenees, could not expect to find him on the eastern bank of the Rhone. A trifling engagement took place in which the Romans were victorious, but Hannibal, unconcerned about

Scipio, now marched farther up the Rhone, and Scipio returned to his ships. At this point begin the most contradictory accounts of Hannibal's march. Had he taken the road described by Livy, through the valley of the Durance up to Briançon, over mount Genève, so as to descend by Susa in the neighbourhood of Turin, he could not have given the Romans a greater advantage, for Scipio might have attacked his rear, and the Gauls might have stopped him on the other side from penetrating into their mountains by abattises, ambuscades and the like.

It is one of the most disputed points of ancient history, in what part Hannibal crossed the Alps, and the ancients themselves differ widely in their accounts. Livy's description is obscure, and Polybius does not enter into any disquisition concerning the localities, because they were known in his time, and no one had any doubt about them. The ancient writers are divided in their opinions: some maintained that he passed over the Little, and others that he passed over the Great St. Bernard; some even thought it probable that he crossed the Simplon: across mount Cenis there was no road. Modern writers<sup>11</sup> are likewise divided; but, after the masterly researches of General Melville, which have been published by De Luc<sup>12</sup>, and are based upon an accurate knowledge of the localities, there can no longer be any doubt as to the road which Hannibal took; and if any one who has a practical mind compares with these researches the account which Polybius gives, he must see that no other road than that over the Little St. Bernard is possible. It is strange that even ingenious and learned men, as Letronne, have, in this instance, remained unconvinced by the most palpable evidence. Melville has conclusively proved that Hannibal marched across the Little St. Bernard, and that he reached the highest points about the beginning of October. The mountain is not a glacier covered with eternal ice; it is only a little higher than the Brenner; not far from its top a little corn is grown, and during the summer months it is a green Alp, serving as pasture; whereas the Great St. Bernard is covered with eternal snow. On his arrival there, Hannibal found fresh snow and a frequented road. But the

<sup>11</sup> A complete list of the modern works on this subject will be found in Ukert's *Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, ii. 2, p. 565, foll.

<sup>12</sup> J. A. de Luc, *Histoire du Passage des Alpes par Hannibal*, Genève, 1818.

following circumstance is more decisive still: on one occasion Hannibal had a severe contest with the Alpine tribes; and Polybius, evidently with the intention of marking Hannibal's road, says that he halted near *a white rock*.<sup>13</sup> Now there is only one gypseous cliff in those Alps, and that is in the valley of the Tarantaise, near the Little St. Bernard, along which the ancient road runs; it is discernible even at the present day, and is known to the inhabitants of the country by the name of *la roche blanche*. De Luc observes that any one who has travelled that road, cannot help recollecting that rock. This circumstance alone would suffice to remove all doubts; but the hypothesis that this was the road is perfectly consistent also with the number of days which Hannibal spent upon his march; which number differs so widely from that required for the road over Susa, that the latter place cannot come into consideration at all. Polybius applies the name of Alps to the whole range of mountains from Savoy to Aosta; they form several chains running one behind the other, and must be crossed.

Hannibal was obliged to march farther up the Rhone. Had Scipio ventured to follow his enemy, Hannibal would certainly have defeated him, and Scipio would have been lost among the Gallic tribes, which would have risen against him. General Melville truly remarks, that Hannibal marched up the Rhone as far as Vienne, the ancient capital of the Allobrogians, a fact which is not mentioned by Livy. Here Hannibal found the people engaged in a civil war, and took up the cause of one of the pretenders. After having established him on the throne, he received supplies for his army and continued his march. The Allobrogians were at that time in possession of the country between the Rhone, Saone, Isère, the western districts of Savoy, and some other neighbouring territories. At Vienne, Hannibal left the Rhone. Melville saw here a Roman road leading to Yenne, which was used throughout the middle ages, and down to the beginning of the seventeenth century. From Vienne Hannibal went to Chambéry, and into the valley of the Tarantaise, and followed the course of the Isère up to its source. General Melville has shewn that the march through this narrow valley must have been a very troublesome one, as it was easy for the inhabitants to defend themselves in their mountains. It is a gross mistake, when some writers describe

<sup>13</sup> iii. 53.

Hannibal as marching over immense fields of ice; for about the Tarantaise there are luxuriant plantations of nut trees, and in the valley itself a considerable quantity of corn is grown. The arrival of Hannibal and his army was a fearful calamity for the inhabitants of this valley, for the host consumed everything that these poor people possessed. The less Hannibal was able to satisfy their hunger with the supplies he carried with him, the greater was the devastation caused by his army, for in such circumstances soldiers destroy everything. However great, therefore, his exertions were to pacify the mountaineers, yet they manifested a desperate exasperation against him, and the losses of the Carthaginians in these contests were immense. They did not indeed venture upon open resistance, but they made use of a stratagem, which is quite characteristic of those small Alpine tribes: they brought him provisions and even hostages, and then fell upon the Carthaginians while marching through the passes. Hannibal, however, not trusting them—he was in fact never deceived by any one—contrived to send his baggage ahead, followed cautiously, protected his rear very strongly, and thus succeeded in repelling the mountaineers. Melville has shown that the sequel of the march, though very difficult, was by no means over fields of ice and snow, but that the road passed through a thickly peopled and beautiful country. The road passes between the mountains, through richly cultivated valleys, forests of nut-trees and cornfields; but as the road ascends higher, it becomes extremely narrow and difficult, and is generally fit only for mules, so that at best two can pass each other, on the edge of precipices through which the mountain torrents roll down. It is only in the present century that a carriage road has been made. Hannibal spent fifteen days on his march through these mountains, but during the greater part of that time he was traversing splendid valleys full of cultivation and wealth, whose inhabitants must be conceived to have been not more barbarous than the Tyrolese of the fifteenth century.<sup>15</sup> About the end of September, Hannibal reached the Little St. Bernard. Snow had already begun to fall in those regions, and frosts and the other miseries of winter were now added to the sufferings with which he had hitherto

<sup>15</sup> Comp. L. Aretino's description of the roads and the inhabitants of Tyrol in the fifteenth century, in his journey to Constance, which quite reminds one of the times of the Romans.

been struggling. The main difficulty consisted in transporting the provisions necessary to feed from 30,000 to 40,000 men, 8000 horses, and certainly not less than 4000 mules and sumpter horses which carried the bread; for when snow fell, it was impossible to obtain green fodder for the cattle. A large quantity of his baggage had been taken by the mountaineers. Up to the time when he reached the top of the Little St. Bernard, Hannibal had not suffered much from cold, his main difficulties being want of provisions and the hostility of the mountain tribes; but when he arrived at the summit, there were heavy falls of snow which rendered the roads quite impassable. Imagine the distress of Africans! As the snow covered many of the crevices in the rocks, the horses slipped and fell into the abysses; fodder was wanting, and many of the elephants perished with cold. His army suffered not less from hunger than the French did on their retreat from Russia: thousands perished in a few days, but yet Hannibal must have been glad that he had arrived at the summit of the mountain. Those among his soldiers who were rather discontented, and had been lingering behind, now rejoined him. The account of Livy, that Hannibal broke the rocks by means of vinegar, is one of those tales which we grieve to see related seriously by an intelligent man. It was undoubtedly derived from Coelius Antipater, and is nothing but a misrepresentation of an actual fact which has been explained by General Melville. The descent was particularly difficult; the roads in the Alps run along rivers, by which they were originally formed. These rivers often pass from one mountain to another, and then roads run along above the rivers. Such a road is often buried under avalanches, or cut off by a sinking of the ground. Hannibal found such a spot on his march from the Little St. Bernard to the valley of Aosta<sup>15</sup>, where the road had fallen down the year before, and had not yet been restored, as Polybius very plainly relates. He was obliged to encamp there for three days, though suffering severely from hunger, cold, and snow, and to open a new road. General Melville has admirably illustrated this part of the march from Polybius. Livy<sup>16</sup> says, that the mountain formed a precipice one thousand feet high, and that Hannibal made a new road down that precipice! This is nonsense, as every one must see. According

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, iii. 54, foll.

<sup>16</sup> xxi. 36, foll.

to the account of Polybius, on the other hand, the avalanche extended to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  stadia, that is, about one thousand feet deep into the torrent Dora, at the beginning of the valley of Aosta. In this statement there is not one feature which is not perfectly correct, and founded upon accurate observation. Hannibal endeavoured to strike into a new road, for he had probably been informed that Alpine hunters had gone by several other roads; but in this he failed, and for three days and three nights he was obliged to encamp in the snow, in order to make a new road of wood in those parts where the old one had broken down, and that sufficiently broad to carry his sumpter horses. This was the point at which his army was really in immense distress, and where he sustained great losses, especially of animals. After these difficulties were overcome, the army gradually came down into the valley of Aosta, which was a cultivated and tolerably civilised country, inhabited by the Salassians. The statement that from the top of the mountain Hannibal showed to his soldiers the fertile plains of Italy, is likewise an impossibility, and merely a rhetorical invention; for from the top of the Little St. Bernard nothing is seen but mountains. On his arrival in the valley of Aosta, Hannibal had lost a large number of elephants, and his army was reduced to 20,000 foot (12,000 Africans and 8000 Spaniards) and 6000 horse<sup>17</sup>, for the most part Numidians. It is astonishing that so large a number of horses were preserved; but it shews what hardships the southern horses are able to endure, and the great care which the Numidians must have taken of them.

---

## LECTURE LXI.

THE whole mode of conducting the war on the part of the Romans is a remarkable instance of the same want of design, and of the same slackness, with which wars were carried on in the time of the French Revolution, whereby the French were enabled to gain many a victory. Without knowing any particulars, and by mere tradition, we may form the most

<sup>17</sup> Compare Livy, xxi. 38, with Polybius, iii. 56.

vivid image of the manner in which the Romans viewed their impending danger. When they heard that Hannibal had passed through the country of the Allobrogians towards the Alps, they undoubtedly thought him a fool, whose army must perish by the elements. It is, indeed, only by supposing that this conviction was general among them, that we can account for their inactivity and drowsiness. The consul Scipio, who was stationed at Marseilles, and had advanced into the interior as far as Avignon, ought to have been in Lombardy before Hannibal arrived at the top of the mountains<sup>1</sup>; but he did not reach the Po until Hannibal had descended from the Alps, and, to the amazement of the Romans, had defied and overcome all the immense difficulties which nature had placed in his way. We may well imagine what reports were spread about the losses sustained by the Carthaginian army, if we remember the logic of the senseless among the allies in the war against the French Revolution. What the Romans believed and said to one another was something to this effect: that it was madness in Hannibal to have led his army to such a monstrous undertaking; that he and his host would be destroyed by disease, and by want of all the necessities of life; and that not one individual would survive to return home across the Alps. It has often caused me the deepest grief to hear such reasoning, when people consoled themselves in this childish manner, and neglected the most necessary precautions. Had Hannibal been an ordinary general, he would indeed have been in a precarious position; but with an undaunted spirit he advanced with his army, which after its severe sufferings must indeed have been in a frightful condition, and may not have appeared much better than a host of gypsies. Scipio had only two legions, a corresponding number of allies, and a small number of cavalry. The Romans were in many respects slaves to custom, which they often did not know how to abandon when a danger presented itself unexpectedly. Thus such an army had from early times been deemed sufficient, and for this reason they did not send a larger one. One part of the Gauls was in full insurrection; in the preceding summer the Boians had defeated one

<sup>1</sup> We saw the same slowness in the year 1800, when the Austrians had it in their power either to prevent the passage over the Great St. Bernard, or to render it fruitless.—N.

Roman legion, and blockaded the rest in Modena, for they extended from Parma and Piacenza as far as the frontiers of Romagna. They treacherously captured three Romans of rank, who had been sent as triumvirs to superintend the establishment of the colony at Placentia, hoping that thereby they might recover their own hostages. They sent ambassadors to Hannibal when he was yet on the Rhone, to invite him to come to Italy. The Gauls north of the Po, the Insubrians, were anxious to get an opportunity to rise against the Romans, but they did not venture to move until Hannibal arrived, for the Romans kept them in submission. Hannibal turned against the Tauriscans, and made himself master of Turin. While he was there engaged, Scipio had arrived at Genoa, and astonished at what he heard, had crossed the river Po, and encamped on the Ticinus, probably in the neighbourhood of Pavia. Hannibal now turned against him; they met for the first time on the Ticinus, and to the great astonishment of the Romans, Hannibal still had a large army. An engagement with the Roman cavalry took place, in which the Romans were beaten by the Spanish and Numidian horsemen. In this skirmish, the consul Scipio received a dangerous wound, and it was only with great difficulty that he was rescued from the tumult, according to some writers by his own son<sup>2</sup>, afterwards the great P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus.

The issue of this engagement, which would have created but little sensation in other wars, at once convinced the Romans of the delusion under which they had been labouring, and that they must keep on the defensive. Scipio retreated across the Po, gave up its northern bank, and pulled down too early the bridge of rafts which he had constructed. A portion of the soldiers, intended to protect the bridge on the left bank, thus fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. Hannibal had difficulties in crossing the Po, and had to collect boats from the neighbouring rivers. In the meanwhile the Insubrians declared for him.

The Romans now fixed their hopes on the support of Tib. Sempronius, who had made a descent upon Malta, had taken some places on the African coast, and was now on his return to join Scipio. Here we meet with a fine example of the

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xxi. 46; Polybius, x. 3.

discipline of the Romans: they knew that nothing was so fatiguing to the soldiers as to march along the road in columns, and accordingly avoided it as much as they could; but now they did something which seems possible only in the very highest degree of enthusiasm: the army was not kept together to march to its place of destination, but every soldier was obliged to take an oath, that on a certain day he would appear at the appointed place; a violation of the oath was to be severely punished. Sempronius had his troops at Puteoli<sup>3</sup>, and there disbanded them, with the command to join him again at Ariminum. Thence they marched towards the Trebia, and joined Scipio. It is inconceivable how the two consuls could join each other; Sempronius must have marched through Liguria by way of Genoa.<sup>4</sup> Both consuls now undertook the command alternately. I believe that there is something incorrect in our description of the occurrences which now ensued. General Vaudoncourt has endeavoured to clear up the matter; but his idea of the battle on the Trebia is false in the highest degree. We must suppose that Hannibal was on the eastern bank of the Trebia: the Romans cross the river to offer battle, consequently Hannibal, who was on the right bank of this river, must have crossed the Po somewhat below Placentia.<sup>5</sup> In order to render a battle in which you are sure of victory quite decisive, you must elude the enemy, and cut off his retreat: such was the constant method of Hannibal, and has at all times been the method of every courageous general who was conscious of the strength of his army as well as of his own superiority, and was confident of victory.<sup>6</sup> We must therefore suppose that the Romans had crossed the Po in the neighbourhood of Piacenza, and Hannibal, as all circumstances shew, and as I have already observed, some distance below Piacenza.<sup>7</sup> It is said, for instance, that the Romans trans-

<sup>3</sup> So it is in the MS. notes; but Niebuhr probably made a mistake, for according to Polybius Lilybaeum is meant.

<sup>4</sup> In 1828 Niebuhr quite positively expressed this opinion, "Sempronius came from Africa to Genoa," on which account he omitted the mention of the soldiers' oath to reassemble at Rimini.

<sup>5</sup> See Livy, xxi. 47, foll.; Polybius, iii. 58, foll.

<sup>6</sup> When in the year 1800 Napoleon crossed the Po, between Pavia and Piacenza, he defeated Melas, the old and awkward Austrian field-marshall, by the same tactics, i. e. by placing himself between Melas and his basis to fight the battle of Marengo, whereby Melas was compelled to sign the convention.—N.

<sup>7</sup> One of my friends, Major-General von Schütz, of Magdeburg, who is a

ferred their camp from the left bank of the Trebia towards the foot of the Apennines, where they were better protected against the cavalry of the Carthaginians by several low hills rising out of the plain.<sup>s</sup> This and several other things are intelligible only if we suppose that Hannibal crossed the Po somewhere between Piacenza and Parma. The Romans had gained their object and joined the army of Tib. Sempronius, but were cut off from Rome and pressed towards Piedmont. When Providence has once decided upon the destruction of an army, all the most unfortunate circumstances will conspire for that purpose. At that moment the wound of Scipio was no trifling matter. It healed very slowly, and was so severe that he could not appear at the head of his army; and who among his legates could have undertaken the command? Two months and a half had elapsed from Hannibal's passage over the Little St. Bernard to his arrival on the Trebia, and he had employed his time in establishing himself in the country, and in restoring his men and horses. The 6000 horsemen whom I mentioned before, may have included those who had been newly mounted. Hannibal distressed the Romans very much, by taking their stores of provisions. The consul Sempronius, now united with Scipio, thought it a disgrace to the Roman name to remain idle, and insisted upon offering battle, saying that a blow must be struck, as soon as possible, to prevent the enemy from appearing formidable; but Scipio refused to give his consent, partly on account of the state of his health, and partly because he had already had some experience of the character of his enemy. Hannibal, on the other hand, being perfectly sure of victory, was greatly inclined to begin an engagement with the Romans; for as long as the two armies were encamped opposite each other, he could not take up his winter quarters, which was an essential point, as he wanted rest for his troops, and was also anxious to get rid of the Romans in those districts, that the Gauls might be enabled to declare their sentiments. He was encamped some miles south of Piacenza, on the right bank of the Trebia, and the Romans opposite to him on the left bank. He irritated the enemy by little skirmishes, in

---

highly distinguished tactician, has perfectly convinced himself and me too, that Hannibal cannot have followed the traces of the Romans.—N.

<sup>s</sup> Polybius, iii. 58; Livy, xxi. 48.

which he allowed them some apparent advantages over him. The Trebia has become memorable in modern history for a battle which Macdonald lost on its banks in the year 1799 against Suwarrow: it does him great honour that he effected his retreat to Genoa, where he joined the rest of the army. I never saw the river myself, but I have gathered information concerning its localities; and it is remarkable that to this day they perfectly agree with the description given by Polybius. The Trebia is a very broad torrent which comes down from the Apennines in many branches, and in such a manner that it flows between its two banks in the form of several small streams. The ground consists of gravel and is covered with shrubs. In winter, when the snow melts on the mountains, or after a heavy rain, the river is very broad and overflows the neighbouring country; but at other times one can walk through it. Hannibal placed some detachments in ambush among the shrubs, which then, as now, covered the banks of the river to a considerable extent. He had for some days been trying the Romans, and Sempronius began to imagine that Hannibal was timid and would not venture upon an open contest. But the simple truth was that he wanted to induce the Romans to cross the river; he would not attack the Romans on the left bank, because he would not lead his army, at a cold season, through an icy river. The Romans fell into the snare. Pedestrian travellers in Italy are accustomed to walk through the Trebia in summer, but at that time the cold was very severe. Hannibal had large fires in his camp, for brandy was then not known except in Egypt<sup>9</sup>; he gave his soldiers warm and plentiful food, and made them rub their bodies with oil at the fires, so that they became quite brisk and warm.<sup>10</sup> During the day there was a plentiful sprinkling of snow, and the cold in that part of Lombardy, especially in the neighbourhood of Verona, is in truth not less severe than an ordinary winter in Germany. Notwithstanding all this, the Romans were imprudent enough, during the night, to wade through the river; which had risen so much that they were up to their chins in water; in addition to this, the wind blew the snow into their faces, so that they were almost frozen when they arrived on the right bank. Hannibal now

<sup>9</sup> In the paintings on the walls of Thebes, the whole process of distilling is represented.—N.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, iii. 72; Livy, xxi. 55.

advanced to meet them, and the Romans, although in reality they were already defeated by the elements, yet fought as brave soldiers; they formed indeed an army of 30,000 men against 20,000 enemies, but the Carthaginian cavalry quickly drove back the Romans, whose infantry was in fact worn out: they did all they could, but they were a militia against an army of veterans, and were opposed by the elements. When all had got through the river, the Carthaginians, who had been lying in ambush, rushed forth and attacked their flanks. The loss of the Romans was very great: many were thrown back into the river and perished; the left wing, about 10,000 men, escaped to Placentia. The weather afterwards became so fearful, that the Carthaginians did not pursue the Romans any farther, although their usual maxim was to follow up a victory to the utmost. All the Romans who survived the day, threw themselves into Placentia, where they had their stores, and there they remained for some time. The consul was at first base enough to deceive the senate at Rome by false despatches, and to conceal the extent of his loss; but the truth soon became known. Hannibal's army spread over both banks of the Po, where he now took up his winter quarters in order to give his soldiers rest, and lived in plenty upon the stores of the Romans. The Insubrians now openly espoused the cause of Hannibal. He did not attack Placentia, because it was of no importance to him: and he always knew what was necessary. The Roman army in Placentia thus escaped, and a portion of it marched down the Po to Cremona, whence the whole afterwards went to Ariminum, where the new consul, C. Flaminius, had arrived with reinforcements.

According to Livy<sup>11</sup>, Hannibal, that same winter, made an attempt to march across the Apennines into Etruria; this is indeed possible, though hardly probable, and Polybius knows nothing of it. That period was one of those which afford abundant materials for rhetorical exaggeration. It may be, however, that Hannibal made some excursion to reconnoitre the country, or perhaps even some greater expedition; but the description which Livy gives of this reputed march from Modena to Lucca, of the localities and the storm, is a masterly production. I have myself witnessed a storm in those Apennines in summer, and judging from what I then saw, a storm in winter

<sup>11</sup> xxi. 58.

must render it utterly impossible to ascend the mountains. But to the inhabitants of the adjacent country such a storm is nothing uncommon: they speak of it as an ordinary occurrence. In the plain its effects are not so strongly felt, but on the mountains it is really frightful.

Caius Flamininus had now obtained the unlucky honour of the consulship. His name has come down to us in an unfavourable light; but so far as we can judge of his actions, unjustly so. In his tribuneship he had carried the assignment of the *ager Gallicus Picenus*, for which the noble Roman families never forgave him. He afterwards, as consul, made himself still more obnoxious by supporting a tribunician law which was very offensive to the Roman nobles. This transaction is a curious example of the hypocrisy of those aristocrats who always talked of the good old times, and spoke of all trade and industry with contempt; although they endeavoured to gain by the same means for themselves all the advantages they could. Such men are not capable of a generous action under any circumstances, or of sacrificing their own personal interests in any way. The tribunician law which C. Flamininus supported forbade all senators to have, either directly or indirectly, any sea-going ships of a greater burden than 300 amphoræ, and those which they were allowed to have, were only to be used in conveying corn from their estates to Rome.<sup>12</sup> This law prevented the nobility from acquiring wealth by commerce and trade, and confined them to agricultural pursuits on their own estates. The greediness of the Roman aristocracy was extremely hurt at the blow thus inflicted upon them; but the principle of the law was perfectly consistent, and it was only right that the senators should not interfere with the pursuits of the equites or wealthy merchants, who now formed the second class in Roman society, and to whom banking, commerce, and industry should have been left undisturbed.<sup>13</sup> But the law, nevertheless, produced among the aristocrats so much excitement against C. Flamininus, that they spoke of him only as a mutineer. He may have been a sanguine and inconsiderate man; but I am convinced that he was actuated by anything but revolutionary ideas. If a man is once doomed to be decried, he is generally

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxi. 63.

<sup>13</sup> Such a law would have been quite in the spirit of the Venetian aristocracy at its best period.—N.

made to feel his doom in all possible ways. Thus, in regard to his march to Ariminum, he was charged with rashness because he had gone thither without waiting for the Latin holidays—a charge which is quite ludicrous. Surely Hannibal would not have waited till the holidays were over; he had, on the contrary, set out so early, that Flaminius was in reality already too late.

The prospects of the Romans were very gloomy, for the enemy was now in Italy with his superior forces; they formed new legions, and here they were labouring under a disadvantage, for their veterans were lost, and their tactics were the worst of all when the soldiers were untrained (this was the cause of the defeat at Cannae); whereas, with well-drilled soldiers they were the best. They ought, under these circumstances, to have formed only phalanxes, so as to fight in masses. Hannibal had before him three roads, two leading through Tuscany, and one along the Adriatic to Rimini, in the neighbourhood of which Sempronius was encamped, with the reinforcements which the new consul had brought to him. It is an unaccountable fact, that the Romans do not appear to have expected the enemy in Etruria; no army seems to have been there, for Hannibal penetrated into the country through the marshes without meeting with any resistance. One of the two roads into Etruria led across the Apennines, by Prato towards Florence, and the other from Bologna by Pietramala and Barberino, where the Apennines are broadest and wildest. The latter must then have been impassable and overgrown with woods, perhaps in order to prevent the inroads of the Gauls. Hannibal might have forced his way through, though perhaps with some danger; but, for his purpose, it ran too close by the Apennines<sup>14</sup>, and if he had been betrayed there, Flaminius might easily have fallen upon his flank from Rimini. Hannibal therefore took the other road. It is surprising that this road has ever been a subject of dispute. Strabo, who very seldom makes a mistake, had a wrong idea of the matter, in speaking of the marshes in the neighbourhood of Parma.<sup>15</sup> In Italy, or at least in Tuscany, no one has any doubt as to which road is to be understood. The road ran by Lucca and Pisa, and is at

<sup>14</sup> This seems to be an error, though all the MS. notes have "Apennines"; it is difficult to say with certainty what should be substituted, perhaps "Rimini."

<sup>15</sup> Strabo, v. p. 217. Compare Polybius, iii. 78, and Livy, xxii. 2.

present very agreeable; but formerly the Arno penetrated into the country as far as Sendi<sup>16</sup>, and formed a shallow bay which, at a very remote period, had gradually been filled up, like the Pomptine marshes, though it is not so unhealthy. On its northern bank, not far from its mouth, there is still a number of lakes, some of which are quite close to one another; and there are traces everywhere that the marshes have been drained by canals. This is the case as far as Pisa, which itself is situated somewhat higher, the ground on which it stands being a continuation of the fruitful fields of Lucca. Hannibal marched through this country, which in the spring is covered with water, and forms a lake; he had learned that it was not a morass, but that the water was fordable. The Romans, however, thought themselves quite safe in that quarter. Hannibal first, probably, went to Modena, to deceive the Romans, and then turned to the right; he shewed his enemies that he could get through, although he had to struggle with unspeakable difficulties. In war he never asked whether what he thought necessary could be done with or without loss, and acting in this spirit, he set out on his march towards Etruria. The difficulties which he it said to have encountered may be exaggerated; but the description which we have of his march seems, on the whole, to convey a correct idea of it. He lost a great number of men and horses, and had only one elephant left. During his passage over the Alps he had been attacked by a disease of the eyes, and now on his passage through the marshes, he lost the use of one eye completely. After a march of three days and a half, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Faesulae, and then turned towards the valley of the Upper Arno, behind Florence, where the country was even then drained, but is now wonderfully improved. His army had been considerably increased by the Gauls, and he now allowed the men time to recover from their fatigues.<sup>17</sup> A report of his march had reached C. Flaminius,

<sup>16</sup> This name, too, is probably incorrect; the MS. notes have either this name, or some one which has a similar sound.

<sup>17</sup> The following account belongs to the Lectures of 1826-7, but I do not think it right to suppress it:—

“Whether Hannibal now marched along the Arno into the upper valley of the river, or turned towards the territory of Siena, cannot be ascertained. I believe he did the latter, although Livy speaks of his ravaging the valley of the upper Arno (which is perhaps an invention of Coelius Antipater), in which case Flaminius could not have made his unfortunate march. Hannibal’s object

who was encamped at Arezzo, and who, thinking that Hannibal would throw himself upon Ariminum, intended to hasten through Romagna to the assistance of the Romans there. But when Hannibal suddenly appeared in the heart of Etruria, Flaminius broke up his camp without delay, in order to gain possession of the road to Rome before Hannibal's arrival. The latter proceeded on the road of Chiusi towards Rome, and ravaged the country which he traversed. Flaminius followed him with the greatest speed. One of the hypocritical charges brought against Flaminius was, that he paid little attention to the auguries, and that he did not defer his march because the standard-bearer — probably from fear — could not draw the standard out of the ground.<sup>18</sup> We can scarcely form an idea of the influence exerted by such absurdities; but they prove what Polybius says, that during this war the Romans were very much given to superstition.

Hannibal advanced on the road to Rome from the valley of the upper Arno, below Cortona, and had the lake of Trasimenus on his left. Flaminius followed him in haste and amazement,

must have been, not to devastate some districts of Etruria, but to gain the road to Rome before Flaminius; and so he did. Hence, I believe, that on issuing from the marshes he turned towards Chiusi into the hills. Flaminius heard of this march, and endeavoured by quick movements to reach the road to Rome. If my opinion be correct, the account of Polybius is erroneous, for according to him and Livy, Hannibal passed by Cortona, and threw himself between the hills and lake Trasimenus, whither Flaminius followed him. Hannibal, they say, then halted, took possession of the heights, and lay in ambush against Flaminius. According to my opinion, both generals, though from different sides, marched round the lake; for otherwise Flaminius could not possibly have allowed himself to be taken by surprise. Had Hannibal come by this road, he would have been only a few hours' distance from Arezzo, and Flaminius must have been informed of his march long before; but if Hannibal passed through the territory of Siena, by San Gemignano and Colle, everything is clear; we then comprehend how Flaminius, who broke up to follow him, was unable to overtake him; and how Hannibal came to the south side of lake Trasimenus, while Flaminius imagined that he had already advanced much farther on the road towards Rome, and that he was only intending to cut him off. In this manner, moreover, it might happen that Hannibal, encamping on the south side of the lake, placed his light troops on the hills around the lake, between which and the mountains the road ran. That Flaminius did not perceive this, could be true only on the supposition of his not knowing that Hannibal had marched that road."

Although the general presumption is, that when Niebuhr's later opinions differ from the earlier ones, he had changed his views, and that accordingly the latter only should be given, still, the present case seemed to be different, and for this reason the minute discussion about Hannibal's route has been given here as a note.

<sup>18</sup> Livy, xxii. 3.

for Hannibal had gained a few days' marches upon him, and might have advanced still further: but he knew the advantages of his ground and wished to gain a decisive battle. When the Romans came to the pass on the south side of the lake, they found it closed, for Hannibal had in the meantime marched round the lake, and Flaminius, in the belief that he was still continuing his road towards Rome, descended from the hills which stretch along the lake: in some places they are not more than a stone's throw from its borders. Hannibal ascended the hills from behind in columns, took his station upon them, and placed his light armed troops where the space between the hills and the lake was narrowest, and formed a very long defile. Here we see again the finger of Providence; for the day was foggy, and the Romans, without being able to see either the lake or the hills, broke up very early, before sunrise, to continue their march, in very thick columns which were unable to manoeuvre. When they arrived in the narrow defile, they fell in with the light armed troops of Hannibal, and imagining that the Carthaginians were returning to meet them, they thought it necessary to hasten onward without delay, and repeatedly assailed the enemy, but without success. Hannibal drew his columns to the right and outflanked the Romans; and while they attempted to force their way through the light armed troops, Hannibal attacked them from behind and from the hills. Thus the Romans were driven into the lake, and not more than 6000 forced their way through the enemy, and thus escaped<sup>19</sup>; the greater part perished in the lake, and C. Flaminius was among the slain. In Dutens' *Manuel du Voyageur*, and other books, two spots, La Ossaia and the Ponte di Sanguinetto, are pointed out as the places where the battle was fought, and they are generally cited as instances of the manner in which local traditions are preserved. But the Sanguinetto cannot possibly have been the actual scene of the battle, which may, however, have been fought in the vicinity; and as for La Ossaia, I have discovered that in the sixteenth century it was called Orsaria (a bear's den), and that the nobles of Perugia used to keep bears (*orsi*) on that spot, from which it derived the name Orsaria, which was subsequently corrupted into Ossaia.

<sup>19</sup> This battle strongly resembles the unfortunate day of Auerstadt, for there, too, charges were continually attempted, and one detachment was destroyed after another.—N.

## LECTURE LXII.

SHAKESPEARE has connected awful phenomena of physical nature with occurrences in the moral world, as Thucydides connects the physical phenomena of the Peloponnesian war with the moral condition of the people. During the second Punic war, the earth was in like manner shaken by extraordinary convulsions and fermentations which were going on in its bowels, and Pliny<sup>1</sup> says, that in the year of the battle of Trasimenus fifty-seven earthquakes were reported at Rome, a greater number than had ever been observed before within so short a period. Whether the earth shook in fifty-seven different places, or at different times of the year, cannot be decided, on account of the vague manner in which Pliny speaks of the fact. Many places were changed into heaps of ruins, as Cannae in Apulia; and others lost their walls. We cannot, however, believe the statement of Livy, that the earth shook under the feet of the combatants, without their being aware of it, although the motion was so violent that the walls of many Italian towns fell down.<sup>2</sup> It may be that the thick fogs, which covered the scene on the morning of the battle, had some connexion with these internal convulsions of the earth, although in spring such fogs are not unfrequent in those districts. I myself saw one, in the month of June, in the valley of the Tiber, not far from lake Trasimenus, which reminded me very forcibly of the description given of the morning of that memorable battle. Flaminius had fallen in an honourable struggle; but although his guilt is infinitely smaller than that which is laid to his charge, yet in my opinion he cannot be entirely acquitted of negligence in the battle; but in great events intended to change the fate of the world we often see a prevailing fatality which blinds even the most prudent.

After the battle of Trasimenus, Hannibal, as he had done after that on the Trebia, exchanged the Libyan armour of his soldiers for that of the Romans<sup>3</sup>, which shews how well he knew how to train his army. In order to use the Roman

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. Nat.* ii. 86.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *L.c.*; Livy, xxii. 5; Zonaras, viii. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, iii. 87; Livy, xxii. 46.

armour with success, it was indispensable to adopt their whole method of training and exercising the troops, and this could not be learned as quickly as the manoeuvres of the phalanx. The introduction of the pilum, the use of which could not be easily learned, alone proves that even in the midst of war, he kept his troops ready for any improvement. The Spaniards were allowed to retain their own armour. Ever since the battle on the Trebia he had made a distinction between the prisoners: he treated the Italicans with kindness; he took care of the wounded, often gave them presents, and restored them to freedom, probably on condition that they should never again take up arms against him. He now adopted the same line of conduct towards the far greater number of prisoners who were taken in the battle of Trasimenus, and proclaimed himself to the inhabitants of Italy as their deliverer from the Romans. When he crossed the Alps, it was not his intention to fall upon Rome like a torrent, and to scale its walls; he was not capable of such a false calculation; he must, like Pyrrhus, have entertained the idea of forming a close alliance with the Italicans, and of thus crumbling Rome to dust by a series of wars. Pyrrhus had had the power to crush Rome, but Hannibal was obliged to create for himself a power in Italy, before he could hope successfully to contend with Rome.

When he broke up from lake Trasimenus, which must have been immediately after the battle, he encountered in Umbria, a detachment of four thousand Romans chiefly cavalry, who had been sent from Rimini by the consul Servilius, to reinforce the army of C. Flaminius; they were surrounded by Hannibal, and almost all of them were cut to pieces. This at least is stated, with the greatest probability, by Polybius; but Livy says, that Centenius, by the command of the Senate, formed an army after the defeat of Trasimenus had become known. This is not likely, as the news of the defeat could not then have reached Rome.

Hannibal did not march towards Rome, but to Spoleto, which belonged to the third line of Roman colonies, in the hope of making an impression upon the town, the conquest of which would necessarily afford him great advantages. But the town held out, and remained faithful to the Romans.<sup>4</sup> One feeling

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxii. 9.

which Hannibal, in common with many great generals of modern times, such as Frederic the Great, entertained, was an aversion to sieges. He himself never besieged a place, and long sieges were always conducted by his generals. When, therefore, he found that his attempt upon Spoleto did not succeed, he broke up, and continued his march into Picenum. The gates of all the towns were closed against him, except where they had been thrown down by earthquakes. Now, every one will ask, Why did he not march directly towards Rome? Why did he not avail himself of the general consternation which prevailed there?—for the Romans were alarmed in the highest degree, and the city and its immediate vicinity were no longer their recruiting places; their forces could be strengthened only by drawing reinforcements from distant parts of Italy;—or why did not Hannibal attempt to blockade Rome, if he despaired of taking it by assault? To these questions we may give the following answer: in those times Rome was an extremely strong fortress, protected by steep rocks, walls, banks, and moats. The Capitoline rock was hewn quite steep; one side of the Quirinal, as far as the Porta Collina, was a rugged rock, and protected by a strong wall; further on was the wall of Servius Tullius, an Italian mile in length. Where the city was not protected by anything but a wall, as between the Aventine and Caelius, there it was backed, at least partly, by marshes; in short, a great army would have been required to undertake the blockade. Hannibal would further have required very large engines, of which he had none. He might have burnt down the suburbs, and thus have produced great terror and alarm; but that was not what he wished, and he had, besides, several reasons for not undertaking anything of the sort. His army was suffering from diseases, principally of a cutaneous nature, and required rest for the recovery of its health. The horses too had suffered much, and he was obliged to find quarters for them.<sup>5</sup> The connexions which he hoped to form with the Italicans by his generous conduct towards them, had not yet been effected.<sup>6</sup> Another reason must assuredly have been, the unhealthy state of the atmosphere in the neighbourhood of Rome, during the summer months. The battle of Trasimenus may have taken place about the end of May, or the beginning of June: there is a passage from which its exact date can be

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, iii. 87.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius, iii. 90.

inferred, but I do not recollect it at present.<sup>7</sup> His army, therefore, would have been consumed by diseases, even if the health of the soldiers had not already been impaired. He accordingly took up his summer-quarters—which are as necessary in Italy as winter-quarters are in other countries,—in Picenum and the Marca Ancona, a fruitful and healthy country, with a moderate temperature. Providence here again evidently interfered on his behalf; the earthquakes, which announced awful events to the world, had paved his way, and been his battering-rams, for the walls of several fortified towns were thrown down, and he was enabled to gain an entrance into many places without resistance and provide himself with the stores he found in them.<sup>8</sup> While his soldiers thus recovered from their sufferings, the Romans exerted all their powers. Q. Fabius Maximus was made dictator, and received the command of the army which he formed by collecting those who had survived the day of Trasimenus, and by fresh levies, for the flower of the Roman troops had been destroyed.<sup>9</sup> The Romans began even to enlist prisoners as soldiers, when they were willing to serve. With such troops he was to oppose Hannibal, whose strength necessarily increased with every fresh success, whereas the Romans were suffering under the feeling that they were the conquered, and could not venture upon a battle; but Hannibal too, like all great commanders, did not like to fight a battle unless it was necessary. Fabius saw that he must train his troops, and that the fidelity of his allies was a great piece of good fortune. Of this circumstance he was obliged to avail himself. He further hoped that the consequences of the fact that Hannibal's army was such a motley host, would soon become manifest; but this was not the case. The army, it is true, was composed of a variety of nations; the Gauls especially were very numerous, but they were so enraged against the Romans, that Hannibal could firmly rely upon them. The nucleus of his troops consisted of Africans, and a smaller number of Spaniards, who were probably the best of all. Lastly, he had many slingers; his infantry did not amount to more than 40,000 men altogether,

<sup>7</sup> (It was ix. cal. Jul; see Ovid, *Fast.* vi. 765, foll.) The atmosphere in and about Rome is pestiferous even before the end of June; and in ancient times it was no less so than at present.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxii. 18, who gives one instance of it.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxii. 11; Polybius, iii. 88.

and with this army he was in a country where as yet no town had, of its own accord, opened to him its gates; the country through which he had marched last was particularly attached to the Romans: in Apulia the feeling was probably different.

In the meantime Hannibal left his quarters, at the beginning of autumn, when the season became more favourable. He marched through Abruzzo, the country of the Pelignians and Marrucinians, along the coast of the Adriatic; but he was opposed by Fabius, who endeavoured, and partly succeeded, in cutting off his supplies; but Hannibal in these difficulties deceived him, broke up without being observed, and suddenly appeared in Campania, wishing to reach Casinum and the Via Latina, and by confining the communication between Rome and Campania to the Via Appia, to ascertain whether such a position would encourage the Italians to venture upon something decisive. He soon found himself involved in difficulties on account of his having no maps, though it is wonderful how well, in general, the ancients attained their objects without them. He knew that Casinum lay on the road, and he commanded one of his guides to lead the troops thither. Now whether it was that he made a mistake in speaking, or that the guide misunderstood or wished to betray him, we know not, but the guide led his troops through upper Samnium and down the Vulture, to Casilinum.<sup>10</sup> Hannibal did not discover the mistake till it was too late, for Fabius was beforehand, and had turned from the Via Latina into Samnium, and fortified himself there. When, therefore, Hannibal saw that his plan was thwarted by this unlucky accident, he ravaged the Falernian district and the beautiful country of Campania, where many of the Roman nobles had their estates, and where he made immense booty. He then intended to return through Samnium into Apulia, in order to take up his winter-quarters in those mild districts, and at the same time to have, by his presence, the southern Italians more under his direct influence. He had already conceived the idea of forming an alliance with Tarentum and other towns, and even with the king of Macedonia. Fabius, however, cut off his retreat near mount Callicula, by closing the road of Caudium while another detachment secured the passes of Casinum on the road to Rome. Hannibal, however, did not lose his presence of mind; he was

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxii. 18.

encamped at the foot of the hills occupied by Fabius, and availed himself of a celebrated stratagem. The story related by Livy about the fastening bundles of brushwood to the horns of a great number of oxen, and kindling the wood in the darkness of night, etc., represents the Romans in a foolish light. The truth is stated by Polybius.<sup>11</sup> Nothing was more common among the ancients than the march by night with lanterns; and when the Roman out-posts saw the lights between themselves and the unoccupied district, they thought that the Carthaginians were forcing their way, and quickly advanced towards the scene of the supposed danger to shut the road against the enemy. In the meantime Hannibal quickly took the position which had been occupied by the Romans; the whole army thus escaped without loss, and the Roman camp was destroyed by fire. Hannibal continued his march through Samnium, until he reached the frontiers between Apulia and the Fretanians, where he pitched his camp. Here Fabius again met his enemy, but without suffering any defeat: in petty skirmishes the Romans even gained some advantages. But these little victories led the Romans to forget their real position, and to believe that their former defeats were to be attributed merely to chance, and that Fabius, with more courage, might wipe off the disgrace from the Roman name. Fabius was obliged to return to Rome, and left the whole command of the army to his magister equitum, M. Minucius Rufus. It is well known that the senate gave to Minucius the power of pro-dictator, so that both had equal powers<sup>12</sup>; and afterwards when Fabius returned, the troops were divided between him and Minucius. When Hannibal was informed of this measure he provoked Minucius, lay in ambush, and gained such a victory over him, that he would have been completely lost, had not Fabius and a faithful corps of Samnites come to his assistance. Minucius now resigned his power, and Fabius terminated the campaign in as favourable a manner as the circumstances would allow.

During the ensuing winter, Hannibal was, properly speaking, in distressed circumstances: the harvest appears to have been safely carried into fortified towns before his arrival; for provisions were scarce, and he had great difficulty in supporting his

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, iii. 93; Livy, xxii. 16; Zonaras, viii. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxii. 26; Polybius, iii. 103; Dion Cassius, *Fragm.* 48; Plutarch, *Fabius*, c. 7; Zonaras, viii. 26.

army; but what more than anything else rendered his situation precarious, was the fact that not one of the Italian nations had yet joined him against the Romans.

The consuls of the year 536 were L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. This is the first and perhaps the only time in Roman history that we read of events such as we are quite familiar with in the history of Athens at the time of Cleon and Hyperbolus, when tradespeople rose to the highest offices of the republic. The account that Varro's father was a butcher, is so strongly opposed to everything that had gone before or followed afterwards, that it is hardly credible. But if it was so, the idea of the character of a plebeian must have been completely altered; and such trades must have been carried on not only by strangers, aliens, and freedmen, but by native citizens. In former times, it would have been impossible for any person to obtain the consulship in such a case. Whether a man possessed a hide of land, of two or four jugers, nay, whether they were his own property, or whether he merely tilled them as a labourer, was a matter of indifference to the Romans; but it was husbandry, which in their opinion made a man honourable. Varro is said to have risen, like Cleon at Athens, by demagogic artifices<sup>13</sup>; but whether the account of Livy is correct or exaggerated, or whether it is a mere tale, cannot be ascertained. If, however, we look at the events themselves, we cannot help doubting the justice of the sentence of condemnation which our historians pronounce upon him. Had he been really and solely the cause of the defeat of Cannae, how did it happen that, after the battle, the senate went out to meet him, and offer thanks to him for not having despaired<sup>14</sup>; and that from that moment, down to the end of the second Punic war, he alone had an army with extraordinary powers? It was only *omnis causa*, that he was not re-elected to the consulship. If he had actually been a contemptible man, as Livy says, such distinctions would be incomprehensible. My belief is, that he was one of those unfortunate persons who, like Cn. Flavius, were decried by the pride of the nobles. In their political opinions the two consuls were diametrically opposed to each other. Aemilius Paullus was not merely a patrician, which would have made little difference, but he was literally a

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxii. 25, foll. Polybius knows nothing of it.

<sup>14</sup> Livy, xxii. 61; Plutarch, *Fabius*, 18.

*μισθίημος*, on account of an unjust charge which had been brought against him before the beginning of the Punic war, when he had with difficulty escaped condemnation. The learned M. Terentius Varro, who scarcely 150 years later, belonged to the aristocratic party, was no doubt a descendant of the consul: so much and so quickly do circumstances alter!

Each consul usually commanded an army of two legions, each containing 4200 men, and 200 horsemen, with the corresponding number of allies, that is, 5000 foot, and 600 horse. When this force was united it consisted of four legions, and a corresponding number of allies, i.e. 16,800 Romans, 20,000 allies, and 3,200 horse. The Romans had now exerted themselves to the utmost to raise their troops to an equal number with those of the Carthaginians. Their forces consisted of no less than eight legions, all more than complete, each consisting of 5000 foot and 300 horse. There were consequently 40,000 Romans, independently of their allies, who served as infantry<sup>15</sup>, 2400 Roman horsemen, and 6000 of their allies. This army was commanded by the consuls of the year, and those of the preceding year, under the title of pro-consuls. All met in Apulia. Q. Fabius urgently requested the commanders to adopt his plan, and this also was the wish of the consul L. Aemilius Paullus: but at Rome people thought differently. Hannibal had no longer any elephants, but he had a considerable number of Gallic horsemen; the Spanish cavalry, however, was the best. The Numidians, like the Cossacks, were not made for a charge, but were most excellent for reconnoitering, foraging, and harassing the enemy: against the infantry or heavy cavalry they were useless.

The description of the battle of Cannae in Appian is taken from Fabius Pictor, and occurs also in Zonaras. According to it, Terentius Varro was not by far as guilty as he is described in Livy and Polybius. When the consuls set out from Rome, the whole people, it is said, murmured at the slackness of Fabius, and demanded a battle, because the protracted war was oppressive. This account has internal probability, and also explains why Paullus yielded against his own conviction. The two consuls united in Apulia, and by their superiority in numbers, somewhat alarmed Hannibal, who established himself at Cannae. The town had been destroyed by an earthquake,

<sup>15</sup> Polybius, iii. 107; Livy, xxii. 36.

but the arx which he took by treachery, was still standing, It is a mere chance that we know the date of the battle of Cannae, and we are astonished to find that it was at so late a season of the year: Gellius<sup>16</sup> says that it took place on the second of August. If the statement is correct, we may ask, how was it that so long a time was allowed to pass away in inactivity? But according to Polybius' account, the season does not seem to have been so far advanced; this, however, is an obscure point. At any rate, the harvest, which takes place in those districts about the end of May, must have been over. The two armies were encamped for a considerable time opposite each other on the banks of the Aufidus, in the real plain of Apulia, the soil of which consists of lime, as in Champagne, and therefore contains few springs, so that water had to be fetched from the Aufidus. Hannibal is said to have been so pressed for provisions, that if the battle had been delayed, he would have been obliged to break up. He enticed the Romans to a battle, and in a skirmish during a foraging excursion, they gained a victory, Hannibal not supporting his troops, and pretending to be timid. The Roman forces were yet divided into two camps, each occupying one bank of the river; their head quarters were at Canusium, and their stores at Cannae. The latter place, which was only a few miles distant from the Roman camp, was taken by Hannibal before their own eyes, because they were not yet strong enough to prevent it.<sup>17</sup> Even afterwards, Paullus was too timid to engage in a decisive battle. It may be, however, that all the troops had not yet arrived, and that for this reason Aemilius Paullus would not yet venture to attempt anything. But what ought to have been done? The wisest plan, I believe, would have been to refuse a battle as long as Hannibal did not compel them to it; for the longer the hopes which Hannibal entertained in regard to the Italicans continued to be disappointed, the better it was for the Romans. But it might, on the other hand, be said also, that a longer delay might have encouraged the allies of the Romans to do what they wished, but did not yet venture to do. Everything depended upon one decisive moment; and if the Samnites or Capua had deserted the Romans, their situation would have been fearful. Aemilius Paullus knew that if he conquered in


<sup>16</sup> *Noct. Att.* v. 17; *Macrob. Sat.* i. 16.

<sup>17</sup> *Polybius*, iii. 107.

the battle, the advantages would be immense; but he also knew that if he lost the battle, all would be lost. One camp of the Romans crossed the river Aufidus, and joined the other.

The traveller Swinburne was the first who gave a satisfactory and clear description of the scene of the battle of Cannae, and with his description, the battle can be easily understood. The Aufidus near Cannae forms a great reach, and on this the two armies draw up, the Romans standing on the chord of the arc which is formed by the river. Hannibal likewise crossed the river, and drew up his army in battle array in the face of the enemy, in such a manner that his two flanks were leaning against the curve of the river.<sup>18</sup> His position was such, that the Romans had the land in their rear, and could derive no advantage from their superiority in numbers. His own position was very dangerous; but he knew that he would be lost, if he did not win the battle. The Romans placed their cavalry on the two wings: Hannibal did the same, but in such a way, that one wing was occupied by his light, and the other by his heavy cavalry. The Romans had 80,000 foot, and from 6000 to 8000 horse, there being among the latter about 2500 Romans. The Carthaginians had 40,000 foot, and about 8000 horse, for the most part Numidians, who were excellent for foraging, reconnoitering, and harassing the enemy, but could not stand a shock in battle, nor be used at all against heavy cavalry, but at best only against light infantry. The Romans left 10,000 men behind in their camp, and advanced against the enemy with only 70,000, from which, however, must be deducted the large number of those who always remain behind, either from illness or other causes. The Roman cavalry stood on the right wing, and that of the allies on the left. Hannibal had no elephants; he placed his best cavalry on the left wing, to face that of the Romans, and the Numidians and Lybians on the right wing, while to the right wing he added Celts and Spaniards. Some

18



a. Passage of the Romans.

c. Battle array of the Carthaginians.

b. Passage of the Carthaginians.

d. Battle array of the Romans.

Libyans and Celts also were placed in the centre. The space was too small for the whole of the Roman army, and they were accordingly drawn up unusually deep, several maniples being placed behind one another. The battle was opened by an attack of the left wing of the Carthaginians upon the Roman horse, which, though fighting bravely, was soon thrown back, as, in fact, the whole battle lasted only a short time: it began two hours after sun-rise, and was finished two hours before sun-set. The Numidians were at the same time engaged on the right wing against the cavalry of the allies. Hannibal now divided his line in the middle, ordering part to advance with their right shoulders, and the other with their left, so that they formed a wedge against the Roman centre. This was an application of what is called the oblique battle line, which became so fatal in the Seven Years' war near Collin; in this manœuvre, one of the extreme points of the line remains immovable while the other advances. Hannibal made the experiment with two lines. The Romans advanced, the battle was very bloody, the Carthaginian troops could not penetrate, and retreated through the two wings. As the Romans followed them, the two wings made half a turn, and attacked the flanks of the Romans. At the same time, the cavalry of the left wing of the Carthaginians went round the Romans and, joined with the Numidians, routed the cavalry of the Roman left wing, so that now they could freely attack the Roman infantry in its rear. Aemilius Paullus was mortally wounded; in the immense confusion there was no possibility of giving or obeying orders; and two hours before sunset, the whole of the Roman army was destroyed. The losses are stated differently: Polybius, contrary to his usual practice, gives the largest numbers, stating that out of 80,000, 50,000 were killed, so that only 30,000 survived; but the statement of Livy appears to be more correct.<sup>19</sup> The survivors consisted not only of those who had remained behind in the fortified camp, but at least 8000 escaped from the field of battle, so that the Romans must have lost about 40,000 men. I must here notice a curious circumstance, which is mentioned by Appian and Zonaras<sup>20</sup>, and was probably derived from Fabius—in that part of Apulia, it is said, a

<sup>19</sup> Livy, xxii. 49. Compare Polybius, iii. 117; Appian, *De Bello Annibal.* 25; Plutarch, *Fabius*, 16.

<sup>20</sup> Appian, *De Bello Annibal.* 20, foll.; Zonaras, ix. 1 foll. Comp. Livy, xxii. 46.

sea-breeze rises every day at noon. This is probable enough. The entire district is of a calcareous nature, and in summer the whole of Apulia is covered with clouds of dust. But in this case it is added, that on the day before the battle, Hannibal had ordered the fields to be ploughed, and that he took such a position that the wind, blowing towards the Romans, carried the clouds of dust into their faces, so that they were unable to fight. I readily believe that Hannibal may have availed himself of the wind; but the rest sounds rather marvellous, and is perhaps nothing more than one of those fictions by which a conquered party endeavours to cover its own disgrace. Another story relates, that Hannibal allowed a number of Spaniards with concealed daggers to go to the Romans, as if they were deserters; they were placed by the Romans in the rear of the army, and afterwards fell upon them. This wretched tale is quite childish.

On the day after the battle, the surviving Romans of both camps capitulated, but Varro, with a small detachment of 70 men, threw himself into Canusium, where all those who had escaped reassembled, and with them he went to Venusia. The camp surrendered, on condition that Hannibal should enter into negotiations with Rome concerning the ransom of the prisoners, as had been done in the first Punic war, when the captives were always exchanged, and the party which had the greater number received a sum of money as a compensation. Hannibal, who, as I have already remarked, had an aversion to sieges, was unconcerned about the Romans at Canusium, and marched towards Capua, with which town he had already commenced negotiations. This must have been sooner after the battle than Livy represents it: Hannibal cannot have deferred it, for there is yet an immense number of events, all of which belong to this year.

It is a very well known story related by Cato<sup>21</sup>, that immediately after the battle, Maharbal<sup>22</sup>, the commander of the Carthaginian horse, requested Hannibal to send him to Rome, where, in five days, he promised to celebrate his victory by a banquet on the Capitol. Hannibal answered with a smile, that it was a fine idea, but impracticable; whereupon Maharbal replied, "Thou knowest, indeed, how to gain a victory, but

<sup>21</sup> Gellius, *Noct. Att.* x. 24. Compare Livy, xxii. 51; Plutarch, *Fab.* 17.

<sup>22</sup> I believe we must pronounce *Maharbal*, and not *Mahárbal*.—N.

not how to make use of it." We cannot, indeed, say how great the consternation and paralysis would have been at Rome, if the Carthaginian cavalry had made its appearance on the Via Latina, before the mournful tidings of the destruction of the Roman army had reached the capital; but no part of the army could have reached Rome in so short a time, except the cavalry, and even this not without the greatest difficulty, and without changing the horses on its road; for the distance between the field of battle and the city of Rome was at least two hundred miles, even if we suppose the road to have formed a straight line. The only thing, however, which the Romans would have had to do against cavalry, in order to be safe, would have been simply to shut their gates. It is not impossible that Maharbal may have fancied Rome to be in a state of consternation, similar to that after the battle on the Allia; but, although there were in the city only recruits and soldiers destined for the navy, yet I can never believe that the Romans would have been so desponding as not to defend their walls; and though the defence would perhaps have been unavailing, it might at least have compelled Hannibal to lay encamped before Rome in the middle of August, which is the most unfavourable season. He might have ravaged the neighbourhood of the city, but this would have been useless; and if he had returned with his cavalry without having effected anything, it would have made the worst possible impression upon the Italicans.

---

### LECTURE LXIII.

LIVY<sup>1</sup> and Polybius give lists of the Italian nations which deserted Rome after the battle of Cannae; and the fact is represented as if it had happened immediately after the battle. But this cannot have been the case: several of them continued to be faithful to Rome for a considerable time afterwards; and we see that the belief in the unshaken omnipotence of Rome was still very strong among them. Those which at once deserted Rome after its great defeat, were a portion of the Apulians,

<sup>1</sup> xxii. 61, with the note of Glareanus.

Samnites, and Lucanians; their example was afterwards followed by the Bruttiens, and at a much later time by the Sallentines. None of the Greeks yet joined Hannibal. It was especially the fortresses of Cales, Fregellae, Interamnum, Casinum, Beneventum, Luceria, Venusia, Brundusium, Paestum, and Aesernia, that exerted their influence upon the people far around them, so as to paralyse them and prevent their joining the Carthaginians.

Even before the battle of Cannae, Hannibal had entered into negotiations with Capua,—next to Rome the most flourishing city of Italy, but, in regard to moral power and political importance, quite the reverse of Rome. How soon he arrived at Capua, cannot be said, the ancients usually giving no dates in such things; but it is certain that he became master of Capua in the year of the battle of Cannae much earlier than would appear from Livy's narrative. Campania was proverbial for its wealth, but its inhabitants were luxurious and effeminate in the highest degree: Capua stood to Rome in the very favourable relation of isopoly; and its great families thought themselves quite equal to those of Rome, and were connected with them, even with the Claudii, by intermarriages.<sup>2</sup> They entertained the hope that the fall of Rome would transfer the supreme power to Capua; but this was manifestly absurd; for why should the nations of Italy have cast off the yoke of Rome to become subjects of Capua? Hannibal, however, supported their dreams, though without making any promises to them. When, therefore, he appeared in Campania, every thing was prepared. The Romans had small garrisons in all other places, but at Capua there was none, and the only thing which made the inhabitants of Capua hesitate was the circumstance, that 300 of the noblest Campanians, who formed the cavalry belonging to the Campanian legion, were still engaged in the service of Rome, and had been sent to Sicily, where they were kept, so to speak, as hostages to insure the loyalty of Capua. Livy's account of the manner in which Hannibal established himself in the city, of the repast and of the attempt to murder him, is exquisitely beautiful, but is no doubt a romance. The story of Decius Magius, the only man at Capua who recommended the people to remain faithful to Rome<sup>3</sup> seems to have some real foundation, however much it may be embellished;

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 109, foll. and p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxiii. 7.

and it may be doubted whether Hannibal exiled him as a friend of the Romans. The apostasy of Capua was the most glaring ingratitude, and it is only natural that the Romans could not forgive it; for no kind of ingratitude is so mortifying as the assumptions of unworthy men, when they become refractory, and wish to occupy places which are filled by others worthier than themselves. The Campanians had derived advantages from their connection with Rome, and now they were not merely ungrateful, but displayed a useless barbarity by putting the Romans to death in hot bath rooms. Capua concluded a very favourable treaty with Hannibal, in which no mention is made of any kind of Carthaginian supremacy; Hannibal on the contrary recognised their independence, did not claim the right of levying contributions among them, or of making them serve in his armies, and allowed them to select 300 from among the noblest of his Roman captives as a compensation for the 300 Campanian horsemen in Sicily; in short everything was avoided which had made the treaty with Pyrrhus disagreeable to the Tarentines. He also promised them, in the name of Carthage, that they should not be forgotten in any future peace. It is not known what became of those 300 noble Romans, whether the Campanians put them to death, or exchanged them for their own nobles; but I believe that they were exchanged, for at that time Rome was not so haughty as she had used to be.

The acquisition of Capua was a great gain to Hannibal. It may be taken for granted, that on his march into Campania the Hirpinians, Frentanians and Caudines had declared for him. Acerrae, which also enjoyed the right of isopoly with Rome, was taken after a long siege.

The taking of Capua forms the conclusion of the second period of the war. Hannibal had now reached the highest point of his glory. Whether it be true, that his winter quarters in the luxurious city of Capua destroyed the character and discipline of his army, or whether this statement be a mere rhetorical declamation, is a point concerning which I think it preferable to be silent. This much however is certain, that when, after extraordinary exertions, men betake themselves to rest, they lose their disposition for great and energetic activity, and sometimes never acquire it again. This is a dangerous epoch in the lives of many, and it may have

been so to Hannibal and his army. But there is another circumstance which is usually overlooked, namely, that he could not recruit his army either from Africa, or from Spain or Gaul. Every battle cost him a number of men; his being in the heart of a foreign country rendered a constant succession of little skirmishes unavoidable; many also must have perished by diseases, and the greatest loss is always that which is sustained in a foreign land. When Hannibal descended from the Alps, he had only 20,000 foot and 6000 horse; since then he had fought three great battles, and had not received a single man to reinforce his army. He had no choice but to recruit his forces by Italicans. We know that he drew soldiers from Brutium, and we may suppose that he strengthened himself by levies in other parts also. He was in the same situation as Napoleon in Russia after the battle of Borodino, when the offered peace was not accepted. He had indeed been joined by a part of southern Italy, but all the Latin colonies throughout that country remained faithful, and were not to be conquered. He was master of a country containing a number of hostile fortresses: if he wished to advance through Campania, he had to conquer or break through a whole series of fortified colonies, and to conquer the Latin and Hernican towns in the neighbourhood of Rome. The people favouring Hannibal could do nothing but blockade these towns, and could furnish him with no reinforcements. He calculated upon assistance from Carthage and Spain. The year after the battle of Cannae, or even later, he received from the former reinforcements and elephants; the exact numbers are not mentioned, but they must have been considerable, as is stated by Zonaras (from Dion Cassius).<sup>4</sup> At the end of the war, only a few of the veterans who had crossed the Alps survived. All this is sufficient to account for the fact, that the character of his soldiers was afterwards inferior to that of the army with which he had begun the war.<sup>5</sup> Whatever injurious influence,

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxiii. 13, relates (probably after Coelius Antipater) that the senate of Carthage decreed in the very year of the battle of Cannae, to send reinforcements to Hannibal; and he adds, that the decree was carried into effect with that slowness which is common in prosperous circumstances, as if the Carthaginians had looked upon Hannibal's whole enterprise as senseless. These considerations might, indeed, have delayed the arrival of the reinforcements till the year after; but elephants are mentioned in the camp of Hannibal even before he took up his winter quarters.—N. Livy, xxiii. 18.

<sup>5</sup> The Prussian army of 1762 was infinitely inferior to that of 1757; and those

therefore, the stay at Capua may have had on the army of Hannibal, the above-mentioned circumstances alone would satisfactorily account for its state of dissolution. If financial exhaustion had had that decided influence in ancient as in modern times, the Romans would have been completely paralysed, but they made all possible efforts, and thus it happened, that through the battle of Cannae they lost only those districts which surrendered to the enemy, while in regard to the others they were in no danger. The Marsians, Marrucinians, Sabines, Umbrians, Etruscans, Picentians, and others remained faithful to them.

Hannibal's object in Campania was to obtain possession of a seaport, to enable him to communicate with Carthage; but the attempts against Cumae, Naples, and Nola were unsuccessful, and, near the last of these places, the Carthaginians were repulsed with some loss by Marcellus. Livy<sup>6</sup> does not seem to think that this loss was very considerable, and it may certainly have been somewhat exaggerated by other writers, as it was the first advantage which the Romans gained after many defeats. It was, however, at any rate of great importance to them that Hannibal did not succeed in his attempts to obtain possession of Cumae and Naples; for if he had been successful, he would have had a place of arms and of communication with Carthage, from which he might have derived incalculable advantages. But he was now in the strangest position: he had, in reality, not a single sea-port town; and although he was the general of a maritime state, yet he was in the midst of a foreign country, and shut out from the sea. Marcellus showed great skill as a general, and revived the confidence of the Romans. The Bruttians, after revolting from Rome, succeeded in gaining possession of Locri, the first Greek town that declared for Hannibal. Croton was taken by force, and this brought about the complete ruin of that once populous and flourishing city; only the central part of it was inhabited, as is the case at present with Leyden, and still more so with Pisa, so that the deserted walls could be easily stormed. Any attempt to defend the town was impossible, for the number

---

who have seen the French armies must own, that the one of 1807 was incomparably better than that of 1812, during the campaign to Russia.—N.

<sup>6</sup> xxiii. 16.

of its inhabitants had been greatly reduced by the repeated devastations of Dionysius, Agathocles, and the Romans under Rufinus in the war against Pyrrhus.

I shall relate very briefly the history of the period from the taking of Capua in 537, down to its recovery in the year 541. The Romans now made almost incredible exertions. Their legions were thenceforth constantly increased. Allies are no longer mentioned; the best among them had deserted Rome, but it is highly probable that in this year they were incorporated with the legions for the whole duration of the war, in order that they might not stand isolated. This is, however, a mere conjecture of mine, which I do not mean to give as an historical fact; it may be merely a plausible error, but until evidence to the contrary is produced, I must take it to be correct. Instead of confining themselves, after such losses, to operations on a smaller scale, the Romans conceived the great idea of multiplying everything. They were obliged to create a new army, and with it to meet the Carthaginians, who were accustomed to victory. They refused to ransom those who had been taken prisoners at Cannae<sup>7</sup>; but whether this measure was wise and just, and whether the prisoners were worth being ransomed, are points about which a great many things might be said. The awful consequence, however, was, that Hannibal sold them all as slaves, and that they were scattered over the whole world. Many must have made away with themselves. The actions of those who act as members of a great body of men, must not be judged with the same severity as those of single and independent persons, for the former are obliged to give up their own individuality. I have known persons who, at a moment of consternation and bewilderment, acted in a similar manner, although they were perfectly incapable of doing the same thing either before or after such an occasion. We have, moreover, to consider whether Hannibal did not perhaps demand ready money, which the Romans were not in a condition to pay. But even those who survived the day of Cannae, without having been taken prisoners, were treated as cowards, with unfair bitterness and contempt<sup>8</sup>; just as the unfortunate Admiral Byng was shot by the English, in order to establish a maxim. All the young men were enlisted, and as a sufficient number of young freemen could not be

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxii. 59, foll.; Polybius, vi. 58.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxiii. 31, xxv. 6.

found, (many undoubtedly endeavoured to avoid entering the service out of despondency), all those who were unable to pay a *delictum*, as well as all *addicti*, were set free under the guarantee of the state; 8000 slaves were bought on credit of their masters, and formed into two regiments<sup>9</sup>; nay, even gladiators were enlisted with their arms, for arms too were wanting. The Marsians, Marrucinians, Vestinians, Frentanians, Pelignians, and Picentians, were the only tribes among the warlike people of Italy that still sided with Rome. Its greatest strength consisted in the many Latin colonies extending from Bruttium to the Po. Such were the resources of Rome, and in spite of Livy's description, it is perfectly clear that the distress must have been very great. He describes the wealthy private individuals who advanced money to the state as excellent patriots, although it is known on good authority that they exacted the most disgraceful usury: the contractors got the transports with provisions for Spain insured against the dangers of the sea, and then contrived to get the ships loaded with the worst goods and wrecked. We can hardly form an idea of the distressed state of Rome: corn had risen to ten times the ordinary price, and the city was in a state of positive famine.<sup>10</sup> Lucania (with the exception of Petelia, which the Carthaginians destroyed as a punishment for its fidelity), Bruttium, the greater part of Samnium, and many of the Greek towns of Italy, threw themselves into the arms of Hannibal<sup>11</sup>; and it is surprising that, under these circumstances, he not only gained no lasting advantages, but that, from this time forward, the Romans continually acquired new strength. Their troops became gradually trained, as Hannibal did not fight any great battles, and left them time to drill them. The Romans thus created an army which was certainly better than the one they had had before the battle of Cannae.

As early as the year 539, the Romans gained a decided ascendancy in Campania. Hannibal was opposed by Q. Fabius Maximus and Marcellus; and he is reported to have said at the time, that he respected Fabius as his tutor, but Marcellus as his rival; that Fabius prevented his committing any mistake, and that Marcellus gave him exercise for the development

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxiv. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, ix. 44.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxiii. 80; Polybius, vii. 1.

of his own powers.<sup>12</sup> This is not a mere rhetorical phrase. The Campanians were cowards; they took the field only in the neighbourhood of Cumae, but were defeated, and allowed themselves to be shut up like sheep in a fold. Hannibal made several attempts to relieve them; one Carthaginian army, under the command of Hanno, advanced as far as Beneventum, but was beaten there by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and his slaves (*volones*), whose bravery was afterwards rewarded with freedom.<sup>13</sup> In the following year, the Romans recovered Arpi, and in this manner they gained back many small places one after another. These petty undertakings accompanied sometimes by successful, sometimes by unsuccessful engagements, fill up this period down to 540, when Tarentum surrendered to Hannibal. The revolt of Metapontum and Thurii from Rome, is quite justifiable on moral grounds. These towns had given hostages to the Romans; the hostages made their escape, but having been re-taken, the Romans put them to death indiscriminately. As in this manner many a one had lost a son or a brother, and the most distinguished families were injured, those towns, naturally seeking revenge, surrendered to Hannibal. But the citadel of Tarentum remained in the hands of the Romans, and thither the garrison of Metapontum repaired. I do not understand why Hannibal, who had in the meanwhile received reinforcements from Carthage, did not exert all his powers to relieve Capua, which was blockaded by the Romans with double entrenchments. It is true the communication with the city was extremely difficult, but Hannibal ought to have stormed the entrenchments; this neglect is almost unaccountable to me. It is possible, however, that the negotiations with Philip of Macedonia, which belong to this time, may have kept him in the east of Italy. He lingered in Apulia and Lucania, made some petty conquests, and endeavoured to keep in good humour the allies whom he had gained, for the Lucanians and the tribes in their neighbourhood were of a fickle disposition. The Romans, in the meantime, were making serious preparations to conquer Capua. Hanno was still operating in that district, but the Romans had already been established near Suessula for the last two years, ravaging the whole country, so that famine had been raging at Capua for some time. At last, however, in

<sup>12</sup> Plutarch, *Marcellus*, c. 9.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxiv. 14. foll.

541, at the most urgent request of the Campanians, Hannibal made an attempt, the real meaning of which history is at a loss how to explain. There are many contradictions in the accounts of this undertaking; if we follow the most unpretending account, Hannibal attacked the Romans without being able to break through their lines, only a few Numidians having forced their way and opened the communication with the town. But this could not be kept up, and Hannibal therefore determined to make a diversion. There are two accounts as to the road which Hannibal took; that of Coelius is the most improbable. For it is a disputed point whether he marched through the country of the Pelignians and appeared at the Colline gate from the north, and whether on his retreat he began his return at the Porta Capena, or the reverse. The former statement is most entitled to belief; the other implies too round-about a way. Hannibal seems to have taken the Romans so much by surprise with this plan, that there was hardly time for half of the troops from Capua to reach Rome before him by the Via Appia, as he was a few days' march ahead of them; for he marched along the arc of which the Appian road forms the chord, that is across the Vulturnus, and through the territory of Cales towards Fregellae, which was very strongly fortified. The people of Fregellae had, with great circumspection, broken down the bridges over the Liris, and Hannibal was obliged to halt till they were restored, during which time he ravaged their country. He then advanced by the Latin road and Tusculum towards Rome; but found no favourable reception anywhere. The consul Fulvius, however, who had marched along the Via Appia, had arrived at the Porta Capena before him. When Hannibal was already on the Esquiliae, Fulvius arrived there at the right moment, through the town, across the Carinae, and by a sudden attack prevented Hannibal from taking the city by surprise. He had probably calculated that both armies would be recalled from Capua, which would have enabled him to relieve that city, and to introduce provisions, or to lead away its population. But it seems that the general, to whom he had left the command to effect this, was not fit for the task. Hannibal was encamped near the Porta Collina, on a projection of Monte Pincio, opposite the low grounds of the gardens of Sallust, and he challenged the Romans to fight. Here our history

again begins to be poetical. Hannibal marched out twice to offer battle to the Romans. They advanced towards him, but each time a thunder storm began at the same moment, and when the armies withdrew, the sky became bright again; so that Hannibal was convinced by these portenta, that he could not effect anything against Rome. Other stories sound very beautifully, but are likewise fables. It is said, for example, that the Romans sent reinforcements to their army in Spain about the time that Hannibal was at the gates of Rome, and that the field on which the enemy was encamped was sold at as high a price as if it had been a time of the most profound peace. It cannot have been the real object of Hannibal to fight a battle in that position; for he had in his rear absolutely nothing to back him. When he had been encamped before Rome for eight days, and the Roman allies far and wide did not stir, he broke up, and returned by Antrodoco and Sulmo into Samnium and Apulia, through the midst of hostile countries, where all towns were closed against him; he went like a lion pursued by hunters, but passed through unhurt. The object of his undertaking was thwarted. He who had great objects and great means was in the sad predicament of wanting the something which could accomplish these objects and render his means available, however trifling this something may have been. If his Italian allies, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians, had, in the meanwhile, compelled the other consul to raise the siege of Capua, Hannibal would have gained his end; but he was always obliged to do every thing himself.

Hiero died at the age of ninety, either in the year of the battle of Cannae, or the year after, and was succeeded by his grandson, Hieronymus. We find almost invariably in Greek dynasties, that the successors of great men do not seem to know what use to make of the power bequeathed to them, except so far as their own enjoyment is concerned. Hieronymus was the son of Gelo, the son of Hiero; had Gelo been alive, he would have followed quite a different line of policy<sup>14</sup>, for he enjoyed the same reputation for mildness as his father. Gelo had two or three daughters, and a son, Hieronymus. Hiero's authority was rooted as firmly as if his dynasty had been on the throne for centuries; but Hieronymus, in the belief that, after the battle of Cannae, Rome would not raise her head

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, vii. 8.

again, thought that he might treat the Romans with disdain, although he had no wish to throw himself into the arms of the Carthaginians. He was a contemptible young man, without ability or experience, and fancied that, in the confusion of the war, he might make himself sole master of Sicily.<sup>15</sup> He intended to give up the alliance with Rome, and to negotiate with the Carthaginians. It is quite natural that the Syracusans did not like the Romans to be their real masters; but they could not avoid recognising either the Carthaginians or the Romans, and the latter had, on the whole, treated them well. But it was a general fatality which induced all nations to revolt from Rome. Hannibal had behaved towards Sicily in the same manner as after the battle of lake Trasimenus towards the Italicans. Syracusan prisoners had been dismissed by him with presents; and after the battle of Cannae he sent ambassadors to Syracuse to draw the king into an alliance. Among these ambassadors were Hippocrates and Epicydes, the grandsons of an exiled Syracusan who had settled at Carthage, a proof that such aliens at Carthage did not cease to be Greeks, although they sometimes had Carthaginian names, as we see from monuments. These ambassadors found Hieronymus willing to listen to them: their first proposal was to divide Sicily between Carthage and Syracuse, with the Himera for their boundary, as in the time of Timoleon; Hieronymus, however, was not satisfied with this, but demanded the sovereignty of all Sicily as the reward for his alliance. Hannibal, who kept his own objects in view in such cases, made the concession without any scruple, on condition that Hieronymus should at once renounce his alliance with Rome, for he hoped to subdue him afterwards. This Hieronymus did; but he took no further steps. The Syracusans, who in Hiero's reign had never thought of a revolution, were exasperated by his grandson's ridiculous imitation of Eastern kings, and by the crimes of himself and his associates; a party accordingly was formed to restore the republic, and it was joined by all those who were in favour of Rome, and by all sensible men who considered the rule of the Carthaginians to be more detrimental than that of the Romans. The conspiracy was discovered, and one of the accomplices was put to death; those, however, who had been found out, would not betray their other associates. Hieronymus was thus unwarned

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxiv. 6; Polybius, vii. 4.

when a numerous conspiracy carried out its design, and he was murdered on the road from Syracuse to Leontini, one of the most important places of his little kingdom.<sup>16</sup> After his death a republic was proclaimed, and a number of strategi were to be appointed, probably one for each phyle; the *Bouλλα* was allowed to continue, as even under the kings it had taken part in the administration of the state, which was in fact the case in all republics governed by tyrants. The question now was who were to be appointed strategi: the king's own brothers-in-law were elected among them, so that the revolution cannot have been very radical. It was not yet decided, whether the alliance with Carthage should be kept up. The Roman praetor, Appius Claudius, was negotiating with that object, and the citizens of Syracuse hesitated very much about breaking it; but the two ambassadors of Hannibal contrived to be elected among the strategi, and exerted all their influence to disturb the negotiations. The whole account of these transactions is extremely complicated; but Livy took it from Polybius, and it is therefore authentic. There had repeatedly been a prospect of peace being concluded, but at last the Carthaginian party brought about a revolution through the mercenaries, by which the government was placed in the hands of Hippocrates and Epicydes, and all the members of Hiero's family were butchered at the very altars of the gods. After these scenes of horror, Syracuse was in a state of anarchy: the name of the republic existed indeed, but those two men ruled by means of the mercenaries, and the unhappy Syracusans were only their tools. But on the other hand, the unpardonable cruelty of the Romans also exasperated the minds of all: the commonalty of Enna, which had been convened under a false pretence, was massacred on account of an apparent attempt at insurrection, so that far and wide all towns revolted to the Carthaginians, who now sent a considerable fleet under the command of Himilco, to Sicily. This measure was perhaps prudent, and in accordance with the wish of Hannibal himself, the object being to maintain their possession of the island, and to divide the forces of the Romans. This fleet kept open for a time the communication between Carthage and Syracuse, but the commanders proved themselves to be most unfit for their task.

M. Marcellus, who had acquired fame by his fight against

<sup>16</sup> Livy, xxiv. 7; Polybius, vii. 6.

Viridomarus and at Nola, now obtained the command of an army in Sicily, and enclosed Syracuse. The town could easily be enclosed on the land side, but the sea remained almost always open. This war lasted for two years (538—540); it is described as a blockade of Syracuse, but was probably conducted by the Romans in such a manner, that they made war upon the neighbouring country from two very strongly fortified camps. Himilco had made himself master of Agrigentum, and thence of a great number of Sicilian places, so that the whole semi-circle round Agrigentum belonged to the Carthaginians; it was only the western towns of Lilybaeum and Panormus, and the northern ones, Messana and Catana, that continued to remain faithful to the Romans. The Carthaginian army endeavoured to relieve Syracuse, and encamped in the neighbourhood; but the unhealthy atmosphere which has prevailed there ever since its foundation, and has at different times saved the city, destroyed the whole army, the commander himself and Hippocrates who had gone out to him being among the dead. Marcellus made various attempts against Syracuse: he attacked Achradina from the sea; but here all his endeavours were defeated by the mechanical talent of Archimedes. It is well known that there are many accounts about this subject, but that which is best established merely says, that Archimedes thwarted all attempts of the Romans to undermine the walls, and destroyed their *vineae* and the besieging engines on board their ships by means of his superior skill in mechanics. It seems less probable that he should have set fire to the Roman fleet by means of burning glasses: the silence of Livy and consequently that of Polybius, also are against the story. Marcellus would never have conquered the city, had he not accidentally perceived that a portion of the wall near the sea was ill fortified; and had he not at the same time learned from deserters that the citizens were celebrating a festival without apprehending any danger. Of this day he availed himself: he scaled the weak part of the wall, and thus the Romans took two quarters of the city, Tycha and Neapolis, and soon after Epipolae also, that is the part built on the heights: the greater part, however, viz., the old town (*Nāos*) and Achradina, the most prosperous quarter, were still unconquered; for Tycha and Neapolis were only suburbs and not even connected. Negotiations were now commenced: the Syracusans were strongly

inclined to surrender, and Marcellus desired nothing so much; but the Roman deserters, in their fury and despair, were determined to defend themselves to the last, and they succeeded in misleading the mercenaries, and in inspiring them with their own madness. A massacre thus commenced, in which the most distinguished citizens were murdered, and those barbarians usurped the reigns of government. The condition of Syracuse was now as horrible as that of Jerusalem during its siege, according to the description of Josephus. If the Romans could ever have publicly deviated from their principles, and granted a free departure to the deserters, Syracuse would have remained undestroyed; but although they did not ostensibly abandon their principles, they did it in another way, for in this war they had recourse to bribery and seduction of every kind, things which they had formerly disdained. Marcellus bribed Mericus, a Spanish commander of mercenaries, to surrender to him a part of Achradina; and this piece of treachery was contrived with such diabolical skill, that it completely succeeded: the garrison of Nasos was enticed to come out, under the pretence of defending itself, and Nasos as well as Achradina was taken. Syracuse was then the most splendid of all the Greek cities, for Athens had long since lost its splendour. Timaeus, who had lived in the latter city, and must have had a vivid recollection of it, acknowledged that Syracuse was the first and greatest of all.

The humanity and gentleness of Marcellus after the taking of Syracuse are generally spoken of as something quite extraordinary<sup>17</sup>, but from the Excerpta *Περὶ Γνωμῶν*, published by A. Mai<sup>18</sup>, we see this humanity in a different light. The town was not set on fire, but thoroughly plundered, and those of its inhabitants who were not sold as slaves were driven out of the town into the open fields, where they tore up the grass from the earth to satisfy their hunger, or died of starvation, so that the free Syracusans had to envy the lot of slaves, and many of them pretended to be slaves, merely to obtain the means of satisfying their hunger. Everything in the city became the booty of the soldiers or of Rome; and Marcellus was the first who carried Greek works of art in large quantities to Rome.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxv. 40.

<sup>18</sup> Diodorus, *Excerpta Vaticana*, p. 68 ed. L. Dindorf; compare *Excerpt. Vales.* p. 569.

Livy's remark that this sad gain was no blessing to him is true, for in Livy's own time, the temple of Virtus and Honor, which had been adorned with the spoils, was plundered by others. After the taking of Syracuse, the war in Sicily continued for two years longer, and ended with the taking of Agrigentum, which was treated still more cruelly, all free persons being sold as slaves. Agrigentum thus experienced three destructions, first under Dionysius, 140 years earlier in the first Punic war, and fifty years later a third time. Next to Syracuse it was the most splendid city in Sicily, but at last became the insignificant place which it still is. In 549, M. Valerius Laevinus, a humane Roman again formed a community there. This victory over the Carthaginian army was likewise gained by treachery, Mutines, a Numidian captain, deserting with his troops, and being liberally rewarded by the Romans for it, as Mericus had been before. In the sixth year after the revolt of Hieronymus, all Sicily thus came again under the dominion of Rome.

---

## LECTURE LXIV.

THE taking of Syracuse and the treatment which its inhabitants experienced, shew how little the wars of the ancients can be compared with those of modern times, and how grateful we may be that the principles of war are so much altered for the better.<sup>1</sup> Another example of the same cruelty was exhibited at the taking of Capua, which occurred in the same year as that of Syracuse, A.U. 541. Cicero<sup>2</sup> seems to think it a wise clemency that the Romans did not destroy Capua, but they raged against its inhabitants with all imaginable fury. The distress in that city had reached its highest point, and it was ready to capitulate; but the Romans demanded its surrender at discretion. The heads of the party hostile to the Romans, Vibius Virrius and twenty-seven other senators then resolved to die; and the event indeed shewed that they were wise in so doing; for the Romans acted with the most heartless cruelty. The whole senate of Capua was led in chains to Teanum, and the pro-

<sup>1</sup> The last really horrible war in modern times, was the destruction of the Palatinate under Louis XIV.—N.

<sup>2</sup> *De Leg. Agr. i. 6.*

consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus would not even leave the decision of their fate to the Roman senate. The proconsul Appius Claudius, to whom alone with Flaccus the city had been surrendered, wished to save as many as possible, and had requested the senate to institute a *causae cognitio*; but Flaccus, who suspected this went to Teanum, and ordered all the senators of Capua to be put to death, without opening the letters he had received from the senate. Jubellius Taurea, the bravest of the Campanians, whose heroism was acknowledged even by the Romans, killed his wife and children, but himself awaited his fate at the hands of the Romans. When the gates were opened, the inhabitants suffered everything that can be inflicted by an army of enraged soldiers, who were, in truth, no better than demons. The town was not destroyed, but all Campanian citizens were compelled to quit it. Most of them went to Etruria; many also were put to death as guilty, and even though guiltless were deprived of their property. Only freedmen and slaves were allowed to remain and inhabit the place.<sup>3</sup> The town thus received quite a different population; and its whole territory with the houses it contained was confiscated by the Romans.<sup>4</sup> The town afterwards gradually filled again with a new population of Roman citizens and others; and a Roman prefect was sent thither to administer justice. Atella and Acerrae, the perioeci of Capua, experienced the same fate; and from one of these Campanian towns the whole population emigrated to Hannibal.

The period from 541 to 545 is enlivened by battles in which Hannibal on the whole always gained advantages. Ever since the tenth year of the war, he had been in possession of the greater part of Apulia, Samnium, Lucania, and of the whole of Bruttium; and during the 10th, 11th and 12th years, the latter country was the seat of the war. Hannibal defeated the proconsul Cn. Fulvius near Herdonia,<sup>5</sup> and from an ambuscade he fell upon the consuls M. Marcellus and T. Quintius Crispinus. Marcellus was slain, and Crispinus died afterwards in consequence of his wounds.<sup>6</sup> Hannibal gained possession of the towns of Arpi and Salapia, but both were re-conquered by the Romans: he took Tarentum after a long siege of three years, the issue of which was, for a time, very doubtful, and

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxvi. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxviii. 46.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxvii. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxvii. 27; Polybius x. 32.

during which he displayed the whole greatness of his mind. All the Greek towns in southern Italy had now joined him; but Tarentum which had been treacherously surrendered to him was afterwards delivered up to the Romans by the treacherous governor of the Bruttian garrison, whom he had entrusted with the command of it. The city was treated as if it had been taken by the sword, and all its treasures were carried to Rome. Thenceforth Tarentum was a deserted place, until C. Gracchus sent a colony to it.

Let us now turn our attention to Spain. At the beginning of the war the Romans may have thought that the Carthaginians, after the brilliant successes of Hannibal, would send army upon army from Spain to reinforce him; and although the Romans themselves were in the most difficult circumstances, they sent out an army under the brothers Publius and Cneius Scipio<sup>7</sup>, not to protect their own small possessions in Spain, but to prevent the Carthaginians from sending new armies into Italy. They arrived in Spain in the year 535, the second of the war, established themselves in the neighbourhood of Taragona and thence harassed the Carthaginians. After the battle of Cannae the Carthaginians wished Hasdrubal to march into Italy, but he was prevented by the Scipios. The Spaniards were a strange people: they always hated their rulers, whether they were Carthaginians or Romans; and they now began to side with the Romans, seeing that they were used only as tools by the Carthaginians to furnish numerous armies and the expenses of the war, although at first their government had been truly popular. The manner in which the war was carried on cannot be distinctly seen in the narrative of Livy. It seems surprising, but cannot be doubted, that the Romans advanced into Andalusia as far as Cordova (for Illiturgis is probably the place of this name near Cordova, not the other). How they could venture to penetrate so far, is quite unaccountable. This war in Spain deserves the less to be minutely described, as, owing to the great distance of the scene of war, all accounts of it differed according to Livy, who is here our only guide, most widely one from another, and were very far from being trustworthy.<sup>8</sup> We cannot even say with certainty how long

<sup>7</sup> The name of the *duo fulmina belli* seems to have been transferred from Hamilcar Barca to the Scipios.—N.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxv. 39, xxvi. 49. Compare xxvii. 7. (Even the death of Marcellus is related in three different ways.—N.)—See Livy, xxvii. 27.

the two Scipios (the *duo fulmina belli*, in Lucretius and others) carried on this war. Livy mentions the eighth year. If he begins his calculation with the arrival of the Scipios in Spain, this does not agree with the year in which he relates their death. But I am very much inclined to believe that they died in 542, for otherwise there would be a gap, and Hasdrubal's expedition from Spain would fall too early.

The Carthaginians had increased their troops, and formed a considerable army, which Hasdrubal was to lead into Italy; they had divided it into three parts, which, by skilful manœuvres, separated the two armies of the Scipios, and gained two victories over them. In the first, Publius fell by the faithlessness of the Celtiberians, who served in the Roman army, and who allowed themselves to be bribed by the Carthaginians.<sup>9</sup> Thirty days afterwards, Cneius also fell. The Romans lost by these defeats all their possessions west of the Iberus; but, if we trust to the account given by Livy, who did not himself really believe it, the progress of the enemy was checked by the eques, L. Marcius, who is said to have assembled the surviving Romans, and to have completely defeated the Carthaginians. The senator, Acilius, who described this victory in Greek, had said that on that occasion the Carthaginians lost 30,000 men and their whole camp. Livy himself, however, seems to agree rather with Piso, in believing that Marcius only collected the surviving Romans, and repelled the attacks of the Carthaginians upon the camp. The advantage, however, which Hasdrubal derived from his victory, was that it afforded him the means for his expedition into Italy. Whether Spain in his absence would remain faithful to the Carthaginians or not, was to him a matter of indifference, for he thought that it would be easy to re-conquer it after having gained possession of Italy. The Romans, on the other hand, were determined not to give up Spain. Their army, with the exception of the remnant at Taraco, was destroyed; reinforcements were therefore sent under C. Claudius Nero, but could effect nothing,

<sup>9</sup> Polybius, x. 6; Livy, xxv. 35; Appian, *Hispan.* 14–16. These Celtiberians had many of the peculiarities which distinguish the barbarous nations of early times. The same features are found among the Vandals and the Goths, who were anything but faithful. Faithfulness is not a characteristic of barbarians; and the more civilised men are, the more faithful do they become. The ancient Germans were as faithless as the modern Albanese, who will do anything for money. Such also was the character of the Celtiberians, notwithstanding their great heroism in other respects.—N.

except that they maintained a somewhat more extensive district east of the Iberus, and detained Hasdrubal. Accordingly, as both consuls were engaged in Italy, it was resolved to send a pro-consular army to Spain. The *comitia centuriata* were held as for the election of consuls. No one, however, presented himself to undertake the command until Publius Scipio, the son of Publius Scipio who had fallen in Spain, came forward and offered to go. He is said to have warded off a fatal stroke aimed at his father in the battle on the Ticinus; but if we consider that he was not more than twenty-four years old when he went to Spain<sup>10</sup>, it seems impossible that he should have done what is ascribed to him as early as the battle on the Ticinus. After the battle of Cannae, he is said to have compelled the noble young Romans who, in their despair, wanted to quit the city and emigrate to Macedonia, to swear upon his sword not to go away. As there was no other choice, he obtained the votes of the people, although many objected because he was too young, and, in their superstition, considered it an evil omen that he was yet in mourning for his father. Scipio was called by his contemporaries the Great, a designation which has unjustly fallen into disuse, for no man in Roman history can be preferred to him. His personal character was eminently great; he was not only a great general, but a man of high education; and he understood the Greek language so well that he wrote his memoirs in it. There is one point in his character which has led many to the belief that he was an impostor: he was accustomed to go early in the morning into the sanctuary of Jupiter on the Capitol, and to remain there alone for some time, pretending that he had interviews with the gods. His pretension to prophetic powers, which, in some instances, seemed to be justified by what actually took place, gained him the confidence of all. Sometimes he would say that he had heard a voice promising him victory; sometimes he related to his soldiers, that within three days he would take the enemy's camp with all its stores; and the event verified his prediction. Similar things are related of Mohammed and Cromwell; and some persons believe that these men were under the influence of a supernatural inspiration, while others regard them as mere hypocrites; but I think that we are justified in supposing that

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxvi. 18; Appian, *De Reb. Hisp.* 18. But Polybius, x. 6. says "Ἐτος ἑβδόμον τέχνην πρὸς τοῖς εἰσοι.

there was a mixture of both: the truth is known to God alone. Scipio was very popular, and was supplied with all that was necessary for his great undertaking.

The first period of his stay in Spain, passed away amid preparations at Tarragona, and probably lasted longer than is stated by Livy. The year in which New Carthage was taken is uncertain, as Livy<sup>11</sup> himself confesses; but I believe that it was the year 546, for otherwise it would be hardly conceivable how the Romans could have taken the town, considering that their possessions were confined to the small coast of Valencia, and that there were three Carthaginian armies in Spain. The event, however, shews that it *was* possible. The historians probably thought that it was inglorious for Scipio to remain inactive so long. Hasdrubal had gained the Celtiberians as free allies, and among them he levied an army for his expedition to Italy. Besides Hasdrubal, there were in Spain, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago the brother of Hannibal. Scipio led his army to Carthago Nova before the Carthaginians suspected it. Respecting the detail of the events of this campaign and its duration, it is impossible to arrive at any certain results. Carthago Nova was a small town, as, in fact, most towns in southern France, Italy, and even in Spain, were smaller in ancient times than they are now; it was almost exclusively a military place; but during its short existence, it had become of great importance, and had a numerous Punic population.<sup>12</sup> It contained arsenals and ship-wharves, and was strongly fortified with high walls. To take such a place was almost an impossibility, and became possible only because it had not been expected, the Carthaginians taking no pains to relieve the town. It was situated on a peninsula, and Scipio must have had information about its weak points. He first made a powerful attack upon its walls from the land side, but was repelled with great loss. On the northern side of the peninsula there was a marshy district which, when the tide came in, was always under water, but did not belong to the harbour.<sup>13</sup> The existence of that district was not unknown to Scipio, and after having sent some men with fishing-boats to reconnoitre, and having heard that it was possible to ford the

<sup>11</sup> xxvii. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxvi. 42, foll.; Polybius, x. 11, foll.

<sup>13</sup> The tide does not rise as high here as in the ocean, but it is nevertheless of considerable importance.—N.

district, he renewed his attack from the land side; and while the inhabitants were defending themselves here, a detachment of the Romans entered the town from the marsh, not far from the low wall, which was scaled with ladders, and they took possession of one of the gates; the town was thus taken by storm. This was an irreparable loss to the Carthaginians. It seems that Hasdrubal must at that time have been in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees; but his whole care and attention were directed to his Italian expedition, and he imagined that the town could defend itself.

The number of his forces is not known, for Polybius is here wanting<sup>14</sup>; he did not take a large army from Spain, but with an adroitness equal to that of his father and his brother, he formed connexions of friendship with the Gauls, by whom he increased it. Livy expressly says that, since the passage of Hannibal across the Alps, many Carthaginian messengers had followed the same road in going to Hannibal in Apulia, and that in this manner they had become better acquainted with the Gallic tribes.<sup>15</sup> By an intercourse of twelve years those tribes had become convinced that the passage through their country was only a necessary means for an ulterior object, and that it was their interest to grant it on favourable conditions. Hasdrubal avoided the fault of his brother in breaking up too late. In the autumn his preparations were completed; and now he made a great round-about march. From a careful examination of the statements we have, it is clear that after a short engagement with Scipio, he marched from the country of the Celtiberians not through Catalonia, but through Biscay, by way of the modern Bayonne along the northern side of the Pyrenees, in order to deceive the Romans, and not to be detained by them. He took up his winter quarters in the south of Gaul, perhaps in the neighbourhood of the modern Rousillon, whence he could continue his march in the beginning of spring. From Livy's account we see, that, at this time, the Arvernians had the supremacy in Gaul, and that, owing to their intercession, Hasdrubal met with no resistance to his progress. It is said that he marched in two months as far as his brother had in five.<sup>16</sup> This, however, must be understood of the distance between the Pyrenees—for there he had been

<sup>14</sup> According to Appian his forces consisted of 48,000 foot, 8,000 horse, and 15 elephants.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxvii. 39.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Annib.* 52.

in winter quarters—and the Italian foot of the Alps, whereas his brother had set out from Carthago Nova.

The Romans on hearing of Hasdrubal's movements were greatly terrified, and made enormous exertions. Hannibal was, no doubt, informed of everything, but did not expect his brother so early, since Hasdrubal had set out on his march very much sooner than Hannibal had anticipated. Hannibal, in the course of years, had probably received more reinforcements than are mentioned by Livy; but his veterans had nearly all disappeared, and he had only Italicans over whom, however, he had perfect control; he was therefore now obliged to carry on the war according to the Roman system. His present object was by perpetual marches and counter-marches in Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium, to draw the Romans from one point to another, as if he had been playing at chess with them: and in this he perfectly succeeded. Had Hasdrubal been like his brother, he would have made no delay; but he hoped to be able to gain possession of Placentia, which would serve him as a safe place of arms. It is almost inconceivable how this town, surrounded as it was by Gallic tribes, could maintain itself. In his unsuccessful siege of it, Hasdrubal lost a great deal of time, and it was particularly unfortunate, that the letters which he sent to his brother fell into the hands of the Romans, who were thus made acquainted with his whole plan. The Romans kept Hannibal surrounded by three armies, none of which, however, had the courage to offer him battle; their main force was sent against the Gauls. Hasdrubal did not intend to march through Etruria, but along the Adriatic towards the frontiers of Apulia where his brother was stationed; he was opposed by the commander-in-chief C. Claudius Nero. M. Livius Salinator had been sent to Rimini with the Volones and two legions of allies, in all six legions; but he retreated before Hasdrubal as far as Sena Gallica, and would have retreated as far as the Aternus in Picenum, had not Claudius, venturing on an undertaking which is one of the boldest and most romantic in history, hastened to his colleague whom he met near Sena. Hannibal was certainly not uninformed of his brother's approach, as is incontrovertibly shown by his march to Larinum; but he was not in a position to storm the Roman camp. Hence Claudius could march to his colleague with the flower of his troops. Hasdrubal who had

been ready to attack Livius, perceived by carefully observing the advancing Romans, that the condition of their horses, arms and clothes, betrayed a long march, that they were different from the troops of Livius, and that accordingly the latter had received reinforcements. During the night, Hasdrubal's attention was excited by hearing the military music play twice, and he concluded from this circumstance that there must be two consuls, although the Romans had endeavoured to deceive him, and had not extended their camp. He therefore wished to make a round-about march: hitherto he had evidently followed the straight road along the Adriatic; he had crossed the Metaurus, and now wanted to recross it, and proceed towards its source, to march along the Apennines, and thus to evade the Romans, or to occupy a defensive position behind the river Metaurus; but his guides ran away, and he was unable to find the fords by which he had crossed the river. It is probable that there had been heavy rains, since otherwise the Metaurus might have been forded in any place without difficulty; for, in ordinary circumstances, the water at most reaches up to a man's breast. While he was thus marching along the banks, and was worn out by fatigue, he was attacked by the Romans. The battle was conducted in a manner worthy of the son of Hamilcar, and of the brother of Hannibal; the Iberians and Libyans fought like lions: but Rome's star demanded reparation for Cannae. Hasdrubal fell, and the greatest part of his army was cut to pieces, not the whole army as Livy says. Those who escaped, owed their safety only to the fact that the Romans were too fatigued to continue the pursuit. According to the account of Appian (from Polybius or Fabius), a part of the Celtiberians fought their way through to Hannibal, which is very credible, as it does not contribute to the glory of the Romans, and is therefore not likely to have been invented by them. The surviving Gauls returned to their own country. This undertaking thus turned out a complete failure. The Roman army quickly returned, and Hannibal had not, in the mean time, ventured to undertake anything. Claudius ordered the head of the Barcine hero to be shown to the outposts of Hannibal, and thus the first news of the defeat was conveyed to him. This event closes the third period of the war.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxvii. 460, foll.; Polybius, xi. 1, foll.: Appian, *De Bell. Annib.* 52.

## LECTURE LXV.

AFTER Hasdrubal had led his forces into Italy, the Carthaginians had still two armies in Spain, one under the command of Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and the other under the command of Mago; but they were driven back as far as the shores of the Atlantic. Scipio, in that and the following year, continued the war against them; and it soon became evident that Hasdrubal, the Barcine, had been the soul of all the undertakings of the Carthaginians; for after a succession of battles, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo left Spain and went to Africa. At Gades, a city pretending to be equal to Carthage, though it was subject to her, a treacherous plot was formed to deliver up Mago to the Romans; but it was discovered and frustrated: the magistrates were enticed to come out, and were put to death.<sup>1</sup> But Mago now received orders to withdraw, and he accordingly embarked, and led the remainder of his forces to the Balearian islands, which seem to have refused obedience. He soon afterwards went to Liguria, endeavouring to establish a power there, with which he might support Hannibal, and attack the Romans in Etruria; for this country, which had been faithful to Rome until then, began to shew somewhat of a refractory spirit, which alarmed the Romans with fear of a rebellion. When the nations of Spain perceived that they were given up by the Carthaginians, and that they were making their last efforts only to extort from them the means for carrying on the war in other quarters, they refused obedience, and endeavoured to expel the Carthaginians. The town of Gades, which was all the more exasperated on account of the severity shown towards it, abandoned the cause of Carthage for ever. A treaty was concluded with the Romans, which in some accounts is ascribed to an earlier date than the narrative of Livy allows us to suppose. But it is not improbable, that the tradition of an earlier treaty with the Romans may be a politic forgery of the Gaditanos themselves, by which they ascribed to themselves the merit of having shewn a friendly disposition towards the Romans, even immediately after the arrival of Scipio. The Carthaginians were now completely driven out of Spain.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxviii. 37.

Scipio remained in that country during the years 545 and 546. But the Romans could not look upon their possession of Spain as secure; for they offered to the nations which had calculated upon freedom nothing but their own dominion, which was perhaps even more oppressive than that of the Carthaginians, since the latter employed mercenaries, whereas the Romans only by way of exception took small Celtiberian bands into their service. The Romans, moreover, took vengeance on some towns which had violated their alliance with Rome, or had treated them cruelly. At this time there occurred some horrible events, the consequences of the fanaticism of bravery, which at times became a real madness. One of these occurrences is the defence of Illiturgis and Astapa, from the latter of which towns all men capable of bearing arms made a sally, and fought to the last, while those who remained behind murdered the women and children, and set fire to the town, in which they destroyed themselves.

While Scipio was engaged in regulating the province, which as yet was confined to Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia, an insurrection broke out among the Spaniards.<sup>2</sup> Few of the Spanish states were republics. Most of them were governed by princes: two of them, Mandonius and Indibilis, after a long connection with the Romans, had imbibed a fearful hatred of them. Here, too, we see the national character of the Spaniards, such as it has shown itself at all times, liable to sudden rage against foreigners, whom at all times they wanted to make use of only as instruments. These events are remarkable also in other respects, being the first traces of a sentiment which shows its full development at a much later period—I mean the tendency of the Italian allies to place themselves on an equality with the Romans. The accounts of these occurrences in our historians are not complete, and evidently do not explain the main point. Scipio was severely ill, and it was reported that he was dead. An army of 8000 men was stationed at Sucro, consisting of Italian allies, and not, as Livy says, of Romans. These allies resolved to make themselves masters of Spain, and to establish an independent state. The first pretext of the rebellion was the arrears of their pay, which, although it was derived from their own funds, was yet

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xxviii. 24, foll.; Polybius, xi. 25, foll.; Appian, *De Reb. Hispan.* 35, foll.

paid to them more irregularly than to the Romans. They chose an Umbrian and a Latin of Cales for their leaders, and gave them the title and the ensigns of Roman consuls, a fact mentioned by Zonaras, but passed over by Livy. In general they began to feel their own importance, and saw that, although they were not inferior to the Romans in war, they were disregarded by them on all occasions. The two consuls undertook the command, and entered into an understanding with the two Spanish princes: in short, the affair was of a very serious nature. But when the report of Scipio's recovery arrived in their camp, they immediately lost their courage, and his personal character exercised such an influence, that they gave up all thoughts of an insurrection, and spoke only of reconciliation. The deep cunning of Scipio deceived them: he persuaded them that, in reality, justice was on their side, that he would give them their pay, either as a body, or to every one separately at New Carthage; and, in order to inspire them with full confidence, he sent the trusty garrison of Romans out of the town. The rebels, therefore, believing that they would find Scipio alone in it came in a body; but the columns which were marching out received orders to halt at the gates. The leaders of the insurgents were invited to the houses of several distinguished Roman officers, and were arrested in the night: in the morning the others assembled in the market place without their arms, to receive their pay. The Roman garrison then returned in arms, and compelled the rebels to submit to the will of Scipio. He addressed them, explaining what punishment they deserved, but as he could not expect any advantage from excessive severity, he contented himself with putting to death thirty-five of the most guilty; the others received their pay and were pardoned. The continuation of the war against the Spaniards was easy; the two Spanish princes obtained pardon, on taking an oath that they would remain quiet.

These were Scipio's last actions in Spain; but, before he returned to Rome, he had ventured upon the romantic enterprise of paying a visit to Syphax, king of the Massaesylians, or Masasylians, who inhabited the eastern and part of the western portions of Algeria, and whose capital was Cirta.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxviii. 17 foll.; Polybius, vii. 19.—The geography of these districts under the dominion of Carthage is most obscure.—N.

Syphax was not tributary to Carthage, but in that state of dependence in which we always find the princes of a barbarous nation when connected with a very wealthy, civilised, and powerful neighbouring state. He served them for money, and acknowledged their supremacy without resistance ; and, as has always been the case with the barbarians in those countries, he was sometimes quite the subject of Carthage, while at another time he revolted from her, and soon afterwards again became reconciled with her. When Hasdrubal was in Spain, Syphax was at war with Carthage, made overtures to the Romans in Spain, and requested the Scipios to send over some Roman officers, that he might learn from them the art of conducting war in the manner of the Romans. But peace was concluded with Carthage, and these transactions were not followed by any results<sup>4</sup>, Syphax remaining neutral. Scipio was now induced, by his invitation, to cross over to Africa, and to enter into an alliance with him; for Scipio had, from the first, entertained the very just opinion, that the Carthaginians ought to be attacked in Africa. At the court of Syphax, Scipio met at a banquet Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, who had arrived there as ambassador from Carthage. The conduct of Syphax towards the Romans had, undoubtedly, no other object than to prevent the Carthaginians becoming too powerful, and to obtain from them as much money as possible. Surely, we have every reason to wonder, that Scipio was not sold to the Carthaginians for some enormous sum.

Everything was now finished in Spain, and Scipio returned to Italy, where, however, he obtained no triumph, because he had not been invested with a curule office during the war; but all honours were shown to him. He was still pro-consul; he had been aedile<sup>5</sup>, but not praetor, and he now offered himself as a candidate for the consulship. The *lex annalis* was already in force, and he had not yet attained the age prescribed by the law. But all the restrictions of the *lex annalis* were wisely set aside for the time that the war lasted, and Scipio was made consul by the unanimous votes of all the centuries<sup>6</sup>, for no other person enjoyed such a degree of popularity. The nation longed to see the end of the war, and all expected that he would bring it about. That the Roman aristocrats did not

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxiv. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxv. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxviii. 38.

want to put an end to the war, in order to be able to multiply the number of their consuls, is according to all appearance, nothing but one of those foolish opinions, by which the majority of people are so easily misled. I have myself heard persons express similar opinions. When Louis XVI. was executed, I heard very intelligent men say, that the emigrants had prevailed upon the Convention to pronounce the sentence, in order to call forth the general indignation of Europe against the republic. Absurd as this opinion was, we cannot wonder that a similar one became current among the Romans. Scipio was the idol of the people, but was opposed by the nobles of both orders, whose rallying point was old Fabius.<sup>7</sup> It was a party like that which, according to Livy, existed at Carthage against Hannibal; but we must not be unfair towards it. Fabius was then, probably, about eighty years old, and was at the head of the aristocracy for several reasons; perhaps because like every old man who sees his glory fading, he was inclined to look upon rising young men with unfavourable eyes. Scipio, himself, also may have appeared to the Romans as an inconceivable character, just because he was an extraordinary man; and many may have feared lest his success might make him rash and hazardous like Regulus, while others thought that he might be led to overturn the constitution. We may easily see that this suspicion was quite unfounded, so far as Scipio's personal character was concerned; but there is a passing remark<sup>8</sup> that it was intended to make him consul and censor for life. If this had been done, he would have been king, although it could not have been done peaceably under the circumstances of the time; but it shews that that mistrust was not without foundation. Hence the senate which had to determine the amount of troops and supplies, formed a decided opposition: Scipio endeavoured to obtain Africa for his province; but they gave him Sicily without any other troops than those stationed in the island. They thus refused him the means of transferring the war to Africa; but the more the senate opposed him, the more vehemently did public opinion, not only in Rome but in all Italy, express itself in favour of Scipio. He was told that, with the forces in Sicily, he might go over to Africa, if he thought it useful to the republic.<sup>9</sup> But

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxviii. 40, foll.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 56; Valer. Max. iv. 1. § 6; but according to both passages it was intended to make him consul and *dictator* for life. <sup>9</sup> Livy, xxviii. 45.

nothing at all could be done on such a condition; and he demanded permission to increase his forces at least by enlisting volunteers, who would be no burden to the senate. When persons praise the perseverance of the Roman senate during this war, its conduct towards Scipio, which nobody can think very praiseworthy, ought not to be kept out of sight. The senate in this instance behaved in the same manner towards Scipio, as the senate of Carthage acted towards Hannibal. We can well understand, that the irritation produced by the nobles must have been the more provoking, in proportion to the enthusiasm which the other party shewed for Scipio. These disputes brought Rome nearly to the point of losing all the advantages which it had gained.

We now see Scipio's personal influence. Italy was visited by famine and epidemic diseases; and Rome herself was so much worn out, that the voluntary exertions which were made on her behalf must excite our admiration. The towns of Etruria and Umbria made extraordinary efforts; although, in point of duty, they were bound to little or nothing at all; they had suffered less than Rome, which was quite exhausted, and the Romans had strictly kept to the letter of their treaties with those countries. They now exerted themselves, as if they had had to carry on a war for their own safety. A part of the Umbrians built a fleet; Arretium gave Scipio arms for 30,000 men, and also money and provisions; great numbers of men who had already served their time, as well as of young men, came from the Sabines, Marsians, Picentians, and other tribes, and offered to serve as volunteers in the army of Scipio. Thus a great army and a fleet were soon ready to follow him to Sicily, contrary to the expectations and wishes of the senate. He went to Sicily, and thence made an expedition against Locri, which town he took from Hannibal. On the whole, however, the year passed away without any important event, either because the Roman general forgot his duties under the beautiful Grecian sky of Sicily, and in his intercourse with the enlightened Greeks at Syracuse, or because he was occupied with preparations. It is not quite clear what kept him so long in Sicily. The expectations entertained of him were disappointed in the highest degree; it had been believed that he would cross over to Africa as soon as he had finished his preparations; and now it was reported that he

lived quite like a Greek at Syracuse. Commissioners were therefore sent over to inquire into the state of affairs, and to depose him if the charges should be well founded; but he made such an impression upon the commissioners that in their report they stated, that he was by no means wasting his time, but was engaged in completing his preparations.

Hannibal had foreseen the issue of the war immediately after the battle of Sena; but he did not lose his courage, thinking it his duty to make the Romans insecure in their own country as long as possible. But he could not defend the extensive territory of southern Italy, and accordingly evacuated Apulia, Messapia, the country of the Hirpinians, and the greater part of Lucania, so that he was confined to its south-eastern part, and to Brutium. There he remained during three campaigns with a perseverance which Livy himself could not help admiring: in that confinement he resembled a lion surrounded by hounds, and whoever attacked him there paid dearly for it. He was obliged to recruit and provide for his army, and at the same time to detain the Romans so as to prevent them going to Africa, while he himself lived among nations whom he reduced to despair by the most enormous demands upon them. Yet he succeeded in all this without exciting even a thought of insurrection or violence against him, notwithstanding his inability to pay or feed his army, which was suffering from famine and diseases. Croton was his head quarters and place of arms. In this way the war was continued, until the Carthaginians recalled him to Africa. The Romans were continually limiting his territory more and more, by taking one place after another.

In the year after his consulship, 548, his imperium having been prolonged, Scipio, as proconsul, had assembled a considerable fleet, and sailed to Africa in 400 transports, escorted by 40 quinqueremes. Had the Carthaginians had their ships of war together, they ought to have frustrated Scipio's expedition; but this does not seem to have been the case, for otherwise their inactivity would be unaccountable. The ancients themselves did not know how many troops Scipio took with him: but we may suppose that he had about 16,000 foot and several thousand horse. The timid party at Rome trembled, as they imagined that the last resources of the state were now going to be lost. In three days Scipio reached Africa, and landed in

the neighbourhood of Utica, at a head-land near the mouth of the river Bagradas, which, like nearly all the rivers flowing into the Mediterranean, has pushed its mouth forward, the ancient one having been blocked up by sand. Shaw, in his "Travels," has described the point very accurately; it bore the name of *Castra Cornelii*<sup>10</sup> as long as the Roman empire existed, and may be recognised to this day. It was a barren head-land, a sloping beach of gravel on to which the ships had to be drawn. Here Scipio encamped and fortified himself, making excursions in the neighbourhood.<sup>11</sup> Syphax had, in the meanwhile, been entirely gained over by the Carthaginians, having married Sophonis (in Hebrew, Zephanja), or according to Livy Sophonisbe, the daughter of Hasdrubal, Gisgo's son. Scipio was met by three armies, one Carthaginian under Hasdrubal, and two Numidian ones under the command of Syphax and Masinissa. Masinissa, although a barbarian, has a great fame in history; he was hereditary king of the Massylians, a people on the frontiers of modern Tunis, at the foot of the mountains; he stood to Carthage in the relation of a vassal, and had served her in Spain, where he had formed connections with the Romans, to whom he was very favourably known, as connected with Scipio by ties of hospitality, as we see from Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, where he appears as a venerable old man. At Carthage he had received an education superior to that of other barbarians<sup>12</sup>, and in his later years, he must evidently have been conversant with the Greek or Latin language. His life was marked by great changes of fortune.<sup>13</sup> The African princes were thoroughly faithless; and his fidelity towards the Romans, which was much praised, arose solely from the circumstance, that it was his object to enrich himself at the expense of Carthage, and that he was supported in this by the Romans. According to the accounts of the Romans he was faithlessly treated by the Carthaginians; but however this may be, this much is certain, that while he served under the Carthaginians in Spain, he had always kept up secret negotiations with the Romans. His son, who stood in different relations to Rome, conducted himself, during the third Punic war, in a manner which was injurious to the Romans. The romance that Masinissa was in love with Sophonis, and that she was nevertheless

<sup>10</sup> Caesar, *De Bell. Civil.* ii. 24; Orosius, iv. 22.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxix. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 10.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxix. 29, foll.

given in marriage to Syphax, was probably invented to excuse his faithlessness to Carthage. It seems that when he was in Spain he received money from the Romans, for he returned to Africa and revolted from Carthage. At the time of Scipio's arrival in Africa, we find him again as the ally of the Carthaginians, and operating, together with Hasdrubal, against the Romans. Scipio, however, renewed his former connexions with him, and Masinissa promised to desert the Carthaginians, but that, before taking that step openly, he would procure the Romans some material advantages. This fraudulent conduct shews that, in a moral point of view, Masinissa was no better than a common barbarian: he was a base traitor, who deserves the hatred of every honest man. His whole life was an uninterrupted series of treacheries against Carthage. It was he who now led out the Carthaginians to an expedition which he had planned with Scipio.<sup>14</sup> Scipio lay in ambush, fell upon the Carthaginians, and Massinissa went over to the Romans.<sup>15</sup> This was a serious loss for Carthage, for a great number of Carthaginian citizens were slain. The Carthaginian general, who was taken prisoner, was exchanged for Masinissa's mother. Syphax, in the meantime, presumed to come forward as mediator between the Carthaginians and Romans, which of course led to nothing, as he proposed that every thing should remain in *statu quo*, and that Scipio and Hannibal were to withdraw from Italy and Africa. But the attempt was nevertheless useful to Scipio, who thereby obtained time to establish himself in Africa.

After this Scipio blockaded Utica, but without success. Syphax and Hasdrubal took the field against him: it is unknown whether their camps were open or fortified, though the former is more probable. They consisted of straw-huts and tents built of branches, which in the climate of Africa must have become as dry as touchwood.<sup>16</sup> Scipio suddenly attacked them by night, and showed the wretchedness of their military discipline. He succeeded in penetrating into the camps, which were set on fire; and the conflagration produced such confusion, that the fugitives allowed themselves to be slaughtered like sheep. The two armies dispersed, and Syphax now abandoning the Carthaginians, withdrew to his own dominions:

<sup>14</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 13 and 14.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxix. 34.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, xxx. 3; Polybius, xiv. 4.

such is the general custom in the east, where all desert him who is deserted by fortune. Masinissa now came forth with claims to the throne of Syphax, and many Africans declared themselves in his favour. Masinissa even made a campaign against him, and Laelius completed the undertaking: Syphax was defeated and taken prisoner. Masinissa followed up his victory, and took possession of the capital of Cirta, afterwards and still called Constantina. Every one knows the tragic fate of Sophonis<sup>17</sup>: Masinissa found her at Cirta, and immediately married her, without asking the consent of the Romans. But Scipio demanded that she, as a Carthaginian and an enemy of the Romans, should be given up; but Masinissa, to save her from such a fate, sent her poison, and she made away with herself. A part of the dominions of Syphax was given to his son<sup>18</sup>; he himself was sent to Italy and adorned the triumph of Scipio; he died at an advanced age at Alba, in the country of the Marsians.<sup>19</sup>

Carthage was in the greatest difficulties. The people were convinced that their forces were insufficient: they were indeed successful in an attempt upon the Roman ships; but that was their only successful undertaking during the three years of the war in Africa. Hannibal and Hanno received orders to come to Africa. The report of this was no doubt agreeable to the Romans; but as it was uncertain whether it would be possible to transport the armies, the Carthaginians at the same time commenced negotiations for peace with Scipio. Here we see what injury the annual change of the magistrates might have done to the Roman republic. Scipio, who had now been pro-consul for three years, may have thought, and with justice, that if he should be obliged to resign his command to the consul of the year following, Ti. Claudius Nero, his successor would reap the fruits of his labours—that this did not actually happen is surprising enough—and he therefore endeavoured to accelerate the end of the war. The conditions which he proposed to the Carthaginians were hard indeed, but yet tolerable in comparison with what were imposed afterwards, for the issue of the war with Hannibal was still very uncertain.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxx. 12 and 15; Appian, *De Reb. Pun.* 27, foll.; Diodor. *Fragm.* lib. xxvii.

<sup>18</sup> Appian, l. c. 33; Livy, xxx. 44.

<sup>19</sup> Livy, xxx. 45; Polybius, xvi. 23. There are several pedestals on which we read the name and history of Syphax: a proof that there must have been several statues of him, for the pedestals are unquestionably genuine.—N.

He recognised the independence of Carthage, but demanded that the Carthaginians should confine themselves within the Punic canal<sup>20</sup>, surrender all their ships with the exception of thirty, probably triremes, give up Spain, as they had before given up Sicily and Sardinia, and deliver up all Roman prisoners and deserters. Respecting the sums of money which were demanded of the Carthaginians to defray the expenses of the war, the accounts, as Livy says<sup>21</sup>, differed greatly: the fact, that late Greek authors give us exact numbers—Appian mentions 1500 talents—proves nothing, for they are taken from the different statements, between which Livy does not venture to decide. A great quantity of corn also is mentioned. The ruling party at Carthage were determined to conclude peace on these terms; but the restless and mutinous population opposed the peace unconditionally and furiously, though they themselves were unwilling to shed their blood. They were in despair, declaring it a disgrace that after so long and glorious a struggle they should admit themselves conquered, especially as Hannibal, the idol of the people, was still in Italy. The government, however, succeeded in getting a truce concluded, during which ambassadors were sent with full powers to Rome, to obtain the sanction of the senate and people to the peace. There the peace was accepted on condition that Hannibal should quit Italy. When the ambassadors returned, and the Carthaginians at the same time heard that Hannibal was returning with forces sufficient again to take the field against Scipio, those people who had done least before, were now vexed that steps had been taken to conclude a peace. Such people generally appear in history in a false light: in this instance they were contemptible, if compared with the noble spirit of Hannibal. He recommended the peace, but the riotous and turbulent popular party at Carthage raved and stormed against it, trusting that the gods would come to their assistance. These were the sentiments of the majority. The peace had been agreed to on both sides, but it had not yet been confirmed by oath. In the meanwhile there arrived a large convoy with provisions for Scipio, but while trying to land its cargo, it was scattered by a storm, and as Carthage had long been suffering from famine, the restless party insisted on taking

<sup>20</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pwn.* 32. This canal is unfortunately unknown.—N.

<sup>21</sup> xxx. 16.

possession of it by force. They embarked in a tumultuous manner, and captured the Roman ships which had cast anchor in full reliance on the truce. When Scipio sent ambassadors to remonstrate against such proceedings, they were insulted, and the Carthaginian magistrates had great difficulty in getting them on board their ships in safety. But even here they were pursued and attacked, and some of them lost their lives. This was a violation of the law of nations similar to the murder of the French ambassadors at Rastadt in 1799, when many persons believed that the government had given secret orders to murder them. But this was a mere conjecture and can never be proved. All hopes of peace had now vanished, and the Carthaginian ambassadors received orders to quit Rome.

Mago, after leaving Spain, had landed at Genoa, which he took, and had tried to change Liguria into a Carthaginian province, just as the Romans in Spain had extended their sway from a single place. But his progress in the Apennines and Alps among the many small but obstinate native tribes was insignificant. He received, indeed, re-inforcements and money, but his resources at first were very small, though he continued to oblige the Romans to make efforts against him. On one occasion he defeated them in the country of the Insubrians, so that if he had not been re-called, he would certainly have placed them in great difficulties. He now embarked, but died of the wounds which he had received in that engagement. Hannibal, who had been strictly ordered to return, had in the meantime safely landed at Adrumetum, and had brought with him from Brutium all who could be induced to follow him: he left the country almost uninhabited. All the Italican and Roman deserters who were willing to serve under him were enlisted as soldiers—and they were men whom he could trust, for a peace with the Romans would have been death to them,—and it is not improbable that they had some influence in the breaking-off of the negotiations with the Romans. It is inconceivable why the Romans did not exert all their powers to destroy his fleet. His army consisted of about 40,000 men. Scipio was really inclined to make peace; for against Carthage itself the Romans could undertake nothing, and Scipio had as yet conquered none of the other fortified towns, though he had made himself master of several open places, but the Carthaginians were resolved once more to try their fortune.

## LECTURE LXVI.

THE war was brought to a close in Africa, according to Cato in the year 550, according to Varro 553. When Hannibal saw the true state of affairs, he endeavoured to continue the negotiations for peace; for he foresaw the impossibility of carrying on the war successfully; and he was convinced that, if the last battle should be lost, the Carthaginians would be obliged to accept a peace which would render it impossible for them ever to recover. Peace, therefore, appeared desirable to him as well as to Scipio, who had every reason for fearing lest his adversaries at Rome should take the command from him, and appoint a successor. The terms which Hannibal offered, were not satisfactory to the Romans, as he demanded for Carthage the sovereignty of Africa, and merely ceded to the Romans all the countries conquered by them; but declined to yield any thing else. Scipio demanded nothing more than the conditions agreed to before, and a trifling indemnification for the injury done to the convoy. But the negotiations were broken off through the folly of the people of Carthage; for as their invincible general was within their walls, they believed, what he himself neither could nor did believe, that everything was gained; and they would hear no more of peace.

These events led to the decisive battle of Zama in 550. Here too, Hannibal, as is attested by Polybius, showed the qualities of a great general: he drew up his army in three divisions; the foremost consisted of a mixture of foreign mercenaries from the most heterogeneous nations; behind these were drawn up the Carthaginian citizens, who took up arms only in cases of extreme necessity, but were forced to be brave by their actual circumstances; behind these were the Italicans whom he had brought with him, and who formed a considerable corps of reserve. Eighty elephants were stationed before the front line, and the cavalry on the wings. This was the only battle in which he made use of the elephants; but they had ceased to be formidable to the Romans. The latter were drawn up in their usual order, hastati, principes and

triarii; but Scipio, instead of forming his cohorts into maniples, arranged them in échelons or columns, side by side<sup>1</sup>; in the large intervals left between the columns, as well as in front of the lines, he placed the light-armed troops, that they might attack the elephants with their missiles, if they should approach, and with their javelins, if they should penetrate into the open spaces. The Roman and Numidian horse were placed on the wings. The issue of the engagement shows that this cavalry, was now, at least in quality, superior to that of the Cathaginians, as the latter was soon routed. The plan as to the elephants was partially successful; as most of them, when frightened by the light troops of the Romans, escaped through the open spaces, though some threw themselves sideways upon those who attacked them with their javelins. The contest then began between the hastati and the Carthaginian mercenaries, who, after a brave fight, retired upon the Carthaginian phalanx standing in their rear, but were driven back by them against the Romans, so that they were cut to pieces between the two. The hastati, however, were thrown back by the Carthaginians; Scipio allowed them to retreat, and directed the principes and triarii to move obliquely towards the wings, so as to attack the flanks of the Carthaginians. This plan was perfectly successful: the Italicans alone fought with the courage of despair, but the whole of the Carthaginian cavalry was routed, and the Romans threw themselves upon the rear of the Carthaginians; whereupon the flight became so general, that the army was almost completely annihilated. Hannibal himself escaped with a small number to Adrumetum.

After this battle was lost, the only thought which occupied the minds of the Carthaginians was to make peace. The great Hannibal himself, chiefly conducted the negotiations. It was, however, a piece of great good luck for the Carthaginians, that Scipio himself, for reasons which I have already mentioned, was desirous to bring the war to a close. The terms, however, which he now offered, were much harder than those which he had proposed before. While the first treaty allowed them to have thirty triremes, their number was now reduced to ten; they were to keep no elephants for purposes of war, and those which they had were to be surrendered; 10,000 Euboean talents were to be paid by instalments in the

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxx. 33; Polybius, xv. 9.

course of fifty years, that is 200 every year; 150 hostages were to be given and to be chosen by the Romans themselves (this was a hard case, considering how badly hostages were treated by the ancients), and all prisoners and deserters were to be delivered up to the Romans. Carthage, however, retained her independence; the towns and countries which she had possessed in Africa before the war were to remain subject to her, but it was vexatiously demanded that Carthage should prove what she had possessed. Among the deserters were the unhappy Italicans, especially Bruttians, who had fought in the army of Hannibal. Whether all were put to death, or sold as slaves, is unknown, for Livy passes over this part of the treaty, which is mentioned by Appian<sup>2</sup>, and must consequently have been spoken of by Polybius. The Carthaginians were further obliged to recognise Masinissa as king of Numidia, within the limits fixed by the Romans, and to conclude a passive offensive and defensive alliance with the Romans, who thus shook off all obligations on their own part. The Carthaginians pledged themselves to undertake no war in Africa, without the sanction of the Romans, out of Africa no war at all, nor to enlist mercenaries in any part of Europe, and to provide the Roman army then in Africa with all that was necessary for the space of six months. Some of the foolish people at Carthage spoke against these terms; and it was on this occasion that Hannibal seized one Giugo, and dragged him down from the elevated place where he stood, amidst the cries of the multitude that their rights as citizens were violated. Hannibal saved himself only by declaring that, having left Carthage at the age of nine years, and having spent thirty-six years abroad he was not acquainted with its manners and customs.<sup>3</sup> He then urged the absolute necessity of concluding peace, of which, in fact, every sensible man must have been convinced. The intelligent among the Carthaginians saw that the peace was unavoidable, and that matters would never have come to this had they supported Hannibal at the right time.

After the peace was concluded and sanctioned at Rome, the Roman army returned to Italy. All the armed ships of the Carthaginians were taken down into the sea and set on fire. Thus ended the second Punic war which had lasted sixteen

<sup>2</sup> *De Rebus Pun.* 54. Compare Livy, xxx. 37; Polybius, xv. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xxx. 37; Polybius xv. 19.

years; the rivalry of Carthage was gone, and Rome made immense booty.

It was undoubtedly the first object of attention to the Romans to heal the wounds which had been inflicted upon the Italicans. Many of the inhabitants of southern Italy were punished; their lands were confiscated, and no small number of colonies were founded in those districts, perhaps rather with the intention of providing for impoverished Romans, than to secure the possession of the country. The veterans who had served in the army of Scipio, received settlements in Apulia and Lucania<sup>4</sup>: this is the first instance of provision being made for veterans; if we had the second decad of Livy, we should perhaps know earlier instances, but they would certainly be only isolated ones.

Much might be said respecting the consequences of this war, although little is mentioned in our historians. The prices of everything had risen to an unnatural height, and the middle classes must have been exhausted by the constant and heavy contributions which they had been obliged to pay. And the result of this must have been, that the separation between the rich and the poor became more marked than it had ever been before. Not long afterwards, indeed, there appears a state of things completely at variance with the spirit of the earlier Romans.

Scipio was the first Roman who received the honourable title of the Great, as Siganus has shewn<sup>5</sup>: in the Fasti this is overlooked, but Polybius<sup>6</sup> expressly calls him ὁ μέγας. It is an interesting fact, that towards the end of the war the Romans raised a public loan which was to be paid back by three instalments;<sup>7</sup> but the difficulties during the Macedonian war were so great, that the last payment could not be made in any other way than by grants of land. Livy has very much neglected the internal condition of Rome, but we cannot enter upon it here. Concerning the state of intellect and literature I shall speak hereafter, when I have reached the end of the war with Antiochus.

Immediately after the battle of Cannae, Philip III. of Macedonia had sent ambassadors to Hannibal, and had concluded a

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxxi. 4, whose words, however, are: Decreverunt Patres, ut M. Junius, praetor urbis, si ei videretur, decemviros agro *Sanniti Appuloque*, quod eius publicum populi Romani esset, metiendo dividendoque crearet.

<sup>5</sup> *Animadv. histor. c. 1.*

<sup>6</sup> xviii. 18, xxii. 12, foll.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxix. 16.

treaty with him, the document containing which fell, by chance, into the hands of the Romans<sup>8</sup>; there was, indeed, no reason for keeping it secret, as it could not have remained concealed, at least not for any length of time. This treaty, as preserved in Polybius, is certainly genuine; for it is written in a quite peculiar form, which is not Greek, but is undoubtedly an example of the style in which the Carthaginians drew up such documents. Neither of the contracting parties had undertaken any important obligations towards the other. As regards the advantages granted to Philip, Hannibal promised him that, in case of his being victorious, he would compel the Romans to give up their possessions east of the Adriatic: that is, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, the colony of Pharos, the Atintanians, a people of Epirus, the Parthinians, an Illyrian tribe, and the Illyrian town of Dimalus; all of which were to be given to Philip, who conceded that Italy should be under the supremacy of Carthage. Had Philip then been what he was at a maturer age, the alliance might have become dangerous to the Romans. But the latter displayed all the heroism and perseverance which distinguished them during this whole period, and sent out a fleet under the command of the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus, to protect Illyrium and to create in Greece a party against Philip.<sup>9</sup> The war began in the year 537 or 538—as Laevinus was not consul, the exact year cannot be ascertained,—and ended in 548. On the part of the Romans it was badly conducted, but no less so on that of Philip, although he had to make but small exertions against a few places to expel the Romans, and he might easily have made himself master of all the districts mentioned in the treaty; in short, he conducted the war in a manner which might make us inclined to consider his power very different from what it afterwards actually proved to be. Had he given to Hannibal only 10,000 Macedonian auxiliaries, he might have inflicted a severe blow upon Rome; but he was too vain.

At the time when the war broke out, Philip was perhaps not more than twenty or twenty-one years old. When his father Demetrius II. died, he was left a child under the guardianship of an uncle, or rather an elder cousin, Antigonus Epitropus, who had the nickname of Doson. This man

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxiii. 33, foll.; Polybius, vii. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxiv. 40; Justin, xxix. 4.

shewed a conscientiousness which, considering the character of those times, excites our astonishment,—for he was *faithful*, and as anxious about the education of his ward as about his rights; and as Philip at first appears not only as a young man of great accomplishments, but of an amiable disposition, we must infer that his guardian bestowed equal care upon the formation of his character, as upon the development of his mind. But there was something vicious in the nature of Philip, which led him soon to rid himself of the watchful eye of Antigonus and to spend his time, like an eastern youth, in voluptuousness. Yet he possessed high abilities; he had decided talents as a military commander, great courage, and the power of using and increasing the resources of his kingdom, which became more particularly manifest after his peace with the Romans. After having lost a part of his dominions, he availed himself so prudently of his circumstances, as to make the Romans themselves contribute to increase his power. Hence, he left to his son the kingdom in a more prosperous condition than it was in when he succeeded to the throne; for the Macedonian empire had fallen into decay under Antigonus Gonatas. The Aetolians had risen, and the Achaeans had emancipated themselves. Under his successor, Demetrius, the empire had been still more reduced; and from this state it did not recover till the last years of the guardianship of Antigonus Doson, whose efforts were aided by the high treason of old Aratus, who, disgracing his glorious life, had sacrificed the freedom of his country, and, from personal and national vanity, had given up Corinth rather than establish the freedom of Greece by a union among the Peloponnesians, which would have secured to Cleomenes the influence and power he deserved, and without which the Lacedaemonians could not join the Achaean league. In the beginning of his reign, Philip, in conjunction with the Achaeans, carried on a war against the Aetolians, in which the latter lost a considerable part of their importance: some of their fortified places in Thessaly fell into the hands of the enemy, and the respect which they had until then enjoyed in Greece began to sink. They were obliged to conclude a disadvantageous peace; but retained their independence. At the time when Philip entered into the alliance with Hannibal, Greece was in the enjoyment of peace. Thessaly, with the exception of the Aetolian part, Phocis, Locris, Euboea, together with Chalcis,

Corinth, Heraea, and Aliphera, were in favour of Macedonia, and had Macedonian garrisons. The Achaeans, nominally free and allied with Macedonia, were in reality in a state of dependence upon their allies. The same was the case with the Boeotians and Acarnanians. The Aetolians, on the other hand, were free, and had still a large territory, which comprised, besides Aetolia Proper, the country of the Ozolian Locrians, of the Dolopes, and the greater part of Phthiotis. Lacedaemon was then harassed by one revolution after another: it was governed by a nominal king, probably a son of Eudamidas, but soon afterwards Machanidas usurped the government. Philip was allied with the Eleans, Messenians, and Lacedaemonians. Rhodes, with its great maritime power, was connected with Macedonia by treaties and ties of friendship. The kings of Syria at this time governed western Asia, but Caria, Samos, the Hellespont, Chersonesus, the towns on the southern coast of Thrace and the Bosphorus, belonged to Egypt; Chios, Lesbos, and Byzantium formed a free confederacy of cities. Rhodes was free, powerful at sea, and on friendly terms with Rome, although no actual connection existed between them. A war had been carried on between Syria and Egypt, which was terminated by a peace, in which Egypt retained Coesysria, but lost the northern fortresses of Phoenicia. Now, while all the countries east of the Adriatic were thus restored to peace, the attention of the Greeks was directed towards the Romans. Athens, in its state of impotence, was connected with them by friendship, but kept aloof from all political activity.

It might have been thought that Philip, at the head of such an extensive empire, and with such warlike nations at his command, would have been able to gain important advantages over the Romans, but he made no efforts: in the beginning of the war there were only little skirmishes. Philip, however, conquered Atintania and the Ardyaeans who were under the protection of Rome, and occupied the northern part of Illyricum. About the fourth year of the war the Romans concluded an alliance with the Aetolians<sup>9</sup>, and unfortunately for unhappy Greece, they now became more enterprizing in those parts. They sent, it is true, only one legion, consisting in reality of the epibatae of their ships; but they had a fleet in the Grecian seas, which was a matter of considerable importance, because

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxvi. 24; compare 26, and Polybius, xi. 6; xxiii. 8.

the Macedonians had scarcely any fleet at all. Through the Aetolians, the Romans became acquainted and were enticed into friendly relations with Attalus I. of Pergamus, who from his small dominions had conquered Lydia, and ruled over a rather extensive and rich principality. The Roman fleets, under Laevinus and his successor P. Sulpicius Galba, were a true curse to unfortunate Greece. In the treaty with the Aetolians, it was stipulated that all places (Livy says only those between Aetolia and Corcyra), which should be conquered by their united forces, should be treated in such a manner, that the towns and the soil should belong to the Aetolians, but the inhabitants and all their moveable property to the Romans, who might sell them or carry them away, just as they pleased. In discussing the question whether Polybius, in his judgment of the Aetolians<sup>10</sup>, is just or not, we ought to remember this ignominious clause, for it shows incontrovertibly what they were. After the Lamian war, it is true, they deserved praise, but afterwards they proved that they were barbarians in their manners, as well as in their ways of thinking, although they may have partially spoken the Greek language. The deplorable consequence of their treaty with the Romans was, that when the Roman fleet appeared on the coast of Greece, and Dyme, Oreus, and Aegina were taken, the Romans sold all the inhabitants as slaves. The Aetolians, however, were unable to maintain possession of Dyme and Oreus, and it was only in Aegina that they held out<sup>11</sup>: they sold this important island with its harbour to Attalus for thirty talents.<sup>12</sup> Such shameful conduct roused the indignation of the Greeks against the Aetolians and Romans, and increased the popularity of Philip. As the Romans left the Aetolians without support, Philip and the Greeks penetrated into the heart of their country, and took vengeance for the ravages they had made on the sea coast. Thus the Aetolians, abandoned by the Romans, concluded a very disadvantageous peace, the terms of which are not known<sup>13</sup>, and Philip made considerable conquests.

Two or three years afterwards,—the chronology in Livy is here very uncertain,—perhaps in the year 548, the Romans also, through Tib. Sempronius, concluded a peace with Philip,

<sup>10</sup> In such passages as ii. 8, foll. 45, 49; iv. 3, 67; ix. 38, and many others.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, xi. 6, xxiii. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxvii. 29, foll.

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxix. 12; Appian, *De Reb. Maced.* 2.

the terms of which again conceal great disadvantages.<sup>16</sup> The fact was, that the Romans, in order to obtain peace, gave up Atintania, which belonged to them, and allowed Philip to establish himself in Epirus. Atintania was, in itself, an insignificant district, but very important on account of the pass of Argyrocastro, by which Philip obtained a free communication between the country subject to Rome and Epirus, which was then a republic. The Ardyaeans were likewise left to Philip; but the Romans concluded this peace, in the hope that, before long, an opportunity would offer for recovering what was now lost. This is one of the few instances in which the Romans gave up a part of their possessions; and it ought to have been remembered, by those who reproached Jovian when, in order to save his army, he ceded to the Persians a tract of country: people then cried out, as if such a thing had never before occurred in the history of Rome, though Aurelian had given up Dacia to the Goths, and Hadrian had sacrificed the eastern conquests of Trajan,—not to mention the peace with the Volscians in the earliest times.

---

## LECTURE LXVII.

AFTER having concluded peace with Rome, Philip entered into alliance with Antiochus the Great of Syria, against Ptolemy Epiphanes, who had succeeded his father (the contemptible Ptolemy Philopator) when a child five years old. From the time of Philadelphus and Euergetes, the Egyptian kings had been in possession of extensive territories and fortified places on the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor, as far as the coast of Thrace; Lycia, at least, was under their dominion. As under Ptolemy Philopator the kingdom had fallen into complete decay, and as his young successor was growing up under an unworthy guardian, Antiochus and Philip availed themselves of these favourable circumstances to deprive the young king of his possessions in Caria, and on the coasts of Asia and Thrace. Ever since the formation of the Alexandrine kingdom, Egypt had been in friendly relations with Rhodes, and it was greatly for the

<sup>16</sup> Livy and Appian, *ll. cc.*; Justin, xxix. 4.

interest of the Rhodians to entertain such relations; hence they defended Epiphanes. But their power was not sufficient against Macedonia and Syria, especially as the wretched government of Egypt did nothing, but left the whole burden of the war to their allies, the Rhodians, Byzantium, Chios, and Attalus of Pergamus. Philip and Antiochus, therefore, gained their end; Philip conquered for himself the whole coast of Thrace; Perinthus, Ephesus, and Lycia, came under the power of Syria, and the Egyptians lost all their possessions in those parts, although the allies of the Egyptians had been somewhat successful in a naval engagement near Chios. Philip had now reached the highest pitch of his greatness; and even the Cretans, with whom the Macedonians had never before had any influence, now called upon him to mediate in their behalf.

The distress inflicted upon Athens, afforded the Romans a welcome pretext for renewing the war with Philip. Athens was at that time utterly decayed, desolate, and impoverished; but it had, nevertheless, hitherto enjoyed a kind of independence: it had been, for upwards of twenty-five years, in friendly relations with Rome, having concluded an alliance with it after the first Illyrian war, and honoured it with the right of isopoly.<sup>1</sup> The Romans may have received this isopoly with a smile; but the city still continued to enjoy, from the recollection of early times, such a renown, that this present, at least on their part, was by no means ridiculous. Pausanias relates that, among the cenotaphs of those who had fallen in battle, there were also some for those who had fallen in three triremes in distant countries, as allies of the Romans; but he does not state the time. It is not likely that this was a fiction of the Athenians; and the period to which those cenotaphs referred is probably the second Illyrian war, the Athenians being cunning enough to see that, by sending a few ships, they might win the favour of the Romans. During the first Macedonian war, they wisely remained neutral. In the last years of the Hannibalian war, hostilities broke out between them and Philip. The murder of two young Acarnanians, who had entered the temple of Demeter at Eleusis during the celebration of the mysteries, induced the Acarnanians to call Philip to their assistance, in taking revenge on the Athenians. Philip, who had long been wanting to get possession of Athens, was delighted at the opportunity, and

<sup>1</sup> See p. 58.

ravaged Attica up to the very walls of the city most cruelly: all the temples in the territory of Athens were demolished, and even the sepulchral monuments were destroyed. The complaints of the Athenians were carried to Rhodes, to Attalus, and in general to all the allies of the suddenly broken-down kingdom of Alexandria, which, under Euergetes, had enjoyed such a degree of prosperity; but their hopes were chiefly based upon the Romans. At Rome, long discussions took place as to what should be done.<sup>2</sup> The senate and the ruling party, whose desires and ideas of Rome's power already knew no bounds, did not hesitate for a moment to declare war against Philip, wishing, at the same time, to indemnify themselves for what had been sacrificed in the late peace with him; but the people, who were utterly exhausted, wished for rest, and when the proposal was first brought before them, it was rejected.

It is one of the greatest errors to believe that a constitution remains the same as long as its forms continue unaltered. When changes have taken place in the distribution of property, in the social condition, in the sentiments and the mode of life of a nation, the nature of its constitution may become quite the reverse of what it originally was, even though not an iota may have been altered in its form. It may at one time be democratical, and at another it may, with the same forms, be aristocratical. We moderns pay too little attention to such internal changes, although they are among those points which we must endeavour to ascertain, and without which history cannot be understood. The constitution of the Roman republic was at that time quite different from what it had been, although no formal change had been made in it. That remarkable and strange ascendancy of the oligarchy of wealth already existed, and the multitude which has no judgment and no will, decreed what in reality it did not wish. This state of the constitution is manifest during the seventh century on a hundred occasions; and in these transactions about the war with Philip, we see one of its earliest and most remarkable symptoms. It was a great misfortune that, after the second Punic war, there was not some great man of sufficient influence to examine the constitution, and to regulate its spirit in accordance with the actual state of things; for if, after immense exertions, the issue of a long disease is left to chance, without

<sup>2</sup> Livy, xxxi. 51, foll.

the application of remedies, a great state must necessarily come to ruin.

The Romans now with much zeal sent ambassadors to Philip to demand reparation for the Athenians, and to request that he would put an end to all hostilities against Rome's allies, to whom Ptolemy also belonged. Philip saw clearly that this was only a pretext to bring about a war, and must have seriously regretted that he had not better availed himself of the Hannibalian war. The second war against Philip was decreed in 552. The consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, who had carried on the war in those parts before, and had been the scourge of Aegina, Oreus, and Dyme, was entrusted with the command. Philip remained on the defensive, especially at first. The war must have been declared at a very late season of the year, for it did not actually commence till after the end of the consulship of Sulpicius. Livy<sup>3</sup> erroneously places the beginning of it in the year of the consulship of Sulpicius Galba, according to which date, no place would be left for the consulship of P. Villius Tappulus. Villius appeared on the scene of action only for a very short time towards the end of his consulship.

The Aetolians were then very much reduced, but independent and hostile to Macedonia: they possessed Aetolia, a part of Acarnania, the country of the Aenianes, the Ozolian Locrians, the greater part of Phthiotis, the country of the Dolopians, a part of southern Thessaly, and Thermopylae; they were connected with Lacedaemon and a number of distant places in Elis and Messenia; but they had been sinking for the last thirty years. In Peloponncsus, the Achaeans had Achaea, Sicyon, Phlius, Argolis, and Arcadia, but in point of fact they were quite dependent on the Macedonians, and under their protection against Aetolia and Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians were much confined within their ancient country and had lost their old constitution: they had no ephors and probably no senate, being governed by the tyrant Nabis, one of the greatest monsters in history. The Messenians were separated from the Aetolians and Achaeans, and hostile to the latter; the Eleans were independent and allied with the Aetolians; the Boeotians, enjoying only a nominal independence, were under the supremacy of Macedonia; Corinth, Euboea, Phocis, and Locris were nominally allies of Macedonia, but in reality had

<sup>3</sup> xxxi. 33, foll.

to obey it. Thessaly was considered as a state united with Macedonia. The family of the Aeacidae in Epirus had been extirpated; and the remnants of the people hemmed in by the Aetolians formed a republic, sometimes under Aetolian, sometimes under Macedonian influence. On the main-land of Greece, Athens survived as a mere name standing apart from all associations, and was the object of Philip's hatred. The Acarnanians were not among the real subjects of Macedonia, but were united with it only by their common hostility to the Aetolians. The Cyclades had formerly been under the dominion of Egypt, but their condition was now undefined. Crete was independent, but torn to pieces by internal factions, between whom the Cretans invited Philip to mediate. Chios and Mitylene were free, and Rhodes great and powerful. Byzantium too was free, and allied with Chios and Mitylene: they had taken as little part as possible in the disputes of the other states, but were now (especially Chios) drawn into them and were allied with Attalus. As far as intellect is concerned, the Greeks were in a state of complete decay; at Athens, schools indeed still existed, but poetry was extinct, and even the art of oratory, the last flower of the Hellenic mind had disappeared from Greece and established itself among the Asiatic nations, which had become Hellenised without possessing the great qualities of the Greek nation. Most towns were only shadows of what they had been, and there were few which had not been destroyed several times. Corinth was one of the fortunate exceptions, and hence had become the most flourishing of all Greek cities. The Achaeans, ever since Aratus had delivered up his people to Macedonia in his opposition to the Lacedaemonians, stood in a relation of perfect clientship to the former. During this connection, which had existed for nearly twenty years, they had had many causes for exasperation, but they were on unfriendly terms with their neighbours, and the most that their patriots desired was to change their dependence on Macedonia into an attachment to it, but none thought of independence. Many, moreover, were agitated by feelings of indignation against the Romans, who had cruelly ravaged many of their towns. The Aetolians felt inclined to undertake the war, but could not make up their minds. A misunderstanding had arisen between them and the Romans, they reproaching the Romans for having held out to

them unfounded hopes, and the Romans complaining of not having been supported by them in the Illyrian war.

During the first campaign of Sulpicius, in the year 553, the Romans gained little or nothing: the undertaking failed altogether, for they had, as it were, taken the bull by the horns, attacking Macedonia from Illyricum. Philip remained on the defensive. Illyricum, as far as Scutari, is a country similar to Franconia: it has many hills of a moderate height, but many parts are almost perfect plains. On the eastern frontier, however, lofty mountains, which branch out from Scardus or Scodrus, rise up and occupy the western part of Macedonia, and range southwards as far as Pindus and Parnassus. These mountains, high, broad, cold, and barren, are at the present time scarcely inhabited at all, and even the valleys between them are almost uninhabitable.<sup>4</sup> Sulpicius attacked the Macedonians in these mountains. There the Romans found all circumstances unfavourable; almost the whole population consisting of Macedonians was hostile, except the Orestians in Epirus; and they everywhere suffered from want of provisions. However much historians may have disguised the fact, or been ignorant of it, he was completely thwarted in his undertaking. He therefore retreated, and spent the winter in the fertile country of Lower Illyricum, in the neighbourhood of Apollonia and Epidamnus.

T. Quinctius Flamininus, who undertook the command as consul in 554, was wiser: he immediately conveyed reinforcements across the Adriatic, and altered the mode of action. The Macedonians this time also had fortified the passes in the mountains on their frontier, and remained on the defensive; their main camp was near Argyrocastro, where the river Aëus flows<sup>5</sup> through a narrow defile between two limestone mountains, one of which stretches towards Pindus and the other towards Acroceraunus<sup>6</sup>: both were wild and impassable. Here the king of Macedonia was encamped.

<sup>4</sup> Those mountains, the highlands of Macedonia, were the original seats of the earliest Macedonians, who had formerly been governed by feudal princes of their own, dependent on Philip; but they were now completely united with Macedonia.

<sup>5</sup> Thus we must read in Plutarch's life of Flamininus, instead of Apsus.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxxii. 5. Compare Polybius, ii. 5; Plutarch, *Flamin.* 3. This is still, and ever will be, the true road from Illyricum into the interior of Epirus, the ancient *fauces Antigoneae*. Part of the road runs along the bank of the river, and is cut out of the rock.—N.

Meanwhile the Aetolians, with whom the Romans had renewed their alliance, threatened the frontiers of Thessaly<sup>7</sup>, though without undertaking anything of importance. It was of great consequence to the Macedonians to prevent their actually attacking Thessaly, and uniting their forces with the Romans. Philip succeeded in effecting this by the energy with which he maintained his ground near Antigoneia. Villius too had, as proconsul, pitched his camp in that quarter; but Flamininus, who found him there, was convinced of the uselessness of an attack upon the front of the Macedonians. The Romans, probably, hoped that the Aetolians would compel the Macedonian army to change its position, for otherwise we cannot understand their encamping in those districts.

Flamininus, who now undertook the command, was a distinguished man, and was elected consul, even before his 30th year, through the confidence of the people in his personal character. He is a proof of how false are the notions of those who imagine that the Romans did not try to make themselves familiar with Greek literature till a later period, for Flamininus is expressly praised for his Greek culture. His conduct towards Greece cannot, it is true, be justified in all respects; but he was irritated, his noble endeavours to win the approval of the Greeks being thwarted, by the ingratitude of the partially degenerate nation. Had the Greeks been able to accommodate themselves to their actual circumstances, they would have escaped much that was distressing to them. Flamininus was convinced of the necessity of trying to drive the Macedonians from their position, and he gained his object through the faithlessness which, in those times, was the prevailing characteristic of the Greeks: he entered into negotiations with an Epirot chief of the name of Charopus, whom he bribed with money and promises; he sent to the consul a man by whose guidance he might evade the mountain pass.<sup>8</sup> A detachment of 4000 Romans was accordingly sent to follow the guide along unknown paths. The Romans not trusting their guide, kept him in chains, but no treacherous attempt was made; and having made a long circuit, they reached, on the third day, the heights in the rear of the

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxxii. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxii. 11; Appian, *De Reb. Mace.* 4. Most passes can be evaded; and on this account they have lost their importance in civilised countries. If the pass of Antrodoco near Naples could not be evaded, it would be impossible to attack Naples.—N.

Macedonians. This was the day fixed upon for the attack, and at sun-rise, when the preconcerted signal was given, the consul attacked the front lines of the enemy, but was beginning to sustain great loss, when on a sudden the Macedonians discovered that the Romans were on the heights in their rear, and that in a few minutes their retreat might be cut off. Flamininus now attacked the enemy with double vigour, while the other Romans fell upon the rear of the Macedonians, who were seized with a panic and fled; so that the Romans at once became masters of Epirus, and the gates were thrown open to them everywhere. Philip retreated across Mount Pindus into Thessaly. Flamininus did not pursue him, but first wished to avail himself of his position for the purpose of driving the Macedonians out of Greece; an expedition into Thessaly, however, was not followed by any great results. At Ambracia he joined the Aetolians, and then took up his winter quarters in Phocis, where he laid siege to the fortress of Elatea.

A fleet of King Attalus and the Rhodians, united with that of the Romans, was stationed during this campaign in the Aegean. It entered upon several undertakings, which however led to nothing but the devastation of Greece. Thus Chalcis, once a flourishing town, was plundered and laid waste. Corinth and Megara had before been given up to the Macedonians, and Philip had unceremoniously retained Orchomenos, although it should have been restored to the Achaeans; but at the commencement of the second war with Rome he gave it back to them. Had Philip at this juncture given up Corinth also to the Achaeans, they would probably never have been induced to abandon his cause; for they entertained an implacable hatred of the Aetolians, and it was only this hatred that led them to the otherwise disgraceful amity with Macedonia. They were, however, indignant at the Romans also, on account of the ravages they had made in Greece during the first Macedonian war. But now when Philip was unable to defend himself, and all the country as far as Thermopylae was in the hands of the Romans, the Macedonian party among the Achaeans, which was still very great, could not venture to come forward; and a discussion took place as to the necessity of entering into an alliance with the Romans. At the congress of Sicyon, which was attended by the ambassadors of Rome, their strategus, Aristae-nus, appealed to the feelings of many, persuaded them to give

way to reasonable considerations, set forth Philip's acts of injustice, and carried a decree, though not without great opposition, by which the alliance with Philip was given up, and a treaty was concluded with the Romans. The Achaeans were promised that the places taken from them by Philip should be restored, and that Nabis and the Aetolians should abstain from hostilities against them. It was no longer possible to guide the nation by enthusiastic eloquence and lofty feelings, as had been done by Demosthenes; what was now required was prudence. The Achaeans were not a warlike people, even at the time when Philopoemen did his utmost to inspire them with a warlike spirit. The war with Macedonia was troublesome to them; for although the Macedonian garrison at Corinth was very small, yet it might by sallies do great injury to the neighbouring places in Peloponnesus; nay, the general, Philocles, to whom Philip had given the command of Corinth, made himself master even of Argos, the greatest among the Achaean cities.

The Boeotians were in the meantime taken by surprise and compelled to join the Romans. They were wavering; for after having borne the Macedonian yoke for 140 years, they thought it impossible that that power should now be broken. It was almost entirely by cunning that Flamininus succeeded in inducing them to enter into the alliance with Rome, for in the year 555 (his imperium having been prolonged to him as pro-consul) he appeared before the gates of Thebes, and demanded to be admitted, in order to negotiate with them within the walls of the city. He was accompanied by his troops, and as he was entering with them, the Boeotians decreed the alliance with Rome, which under these circumstances was a mere farce.<sup>9</sup>

One hundred and twenty-five years had elapsed since the death of Alexander the Great. The proud waves had subsided, and all things had assumed a different aspect: the Greeks no longer considered themselves as a nation destined to govern, but saw in the Macedonians their natural protectors against the Gauls, Scordiscans, Thracians, and Dardanians, to resist whom they felt that their own strength was insufficient. They had become accustomed to look up to the court of Macedonia, and had derived no small benefit from the gold which flowed from that quarter: in short, it had become a natural feeling

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxxiii. 1 and 2.

with the Greeks to resign the supremacy to the Macedonians, who were no longer looked upon as barbarians: the court and the well educated classes in Macedonia spoke Greek as their mother tongue; and at Pella, Greek was unquestionably spoken just as much as the Macedonian idiom, so that, in reality, the difference between Macedonians and Greeks had become effaced.

Before the commencement of the new campaign, and when the Achaeans had already declared against Philip, the latter tried to negotiate, but refused to evacuate the whole of Greece, as was demanded by the Romans, and resolved again to try his fortune in war. He had become far more skilful in the course of his government; the negotiations were broken off, and in the year U.C. 555, the hostile armies advanced towards each other. Thessaly was now the natural scene of the war. Philip had exerted all his strength, and if it is true that he made a general levy, the small number of troops brought together proves that Macedonia must have been in a fearful state of desolation, in consequence of the ravages made there by the Gauls; but the statements on this point do not seem to be quite correct, for even with a moderate population, it would have been easy to raise an army of 100,000 men. Flaminius seems to have had few or no other allies besides the Aetolians, who, if our accounts may be relied on, amounted to not more than a few thousand foot, and from 400 to 500 horse.<sup>10</sup> The whole army of Flaminius is said to have consisted of 26,000 men, and a small number of cavalry. The campaign was opened at an early season of the year: and as the harvest in Thessaly takes place about the middle of June, the battle of Cynoscephalae must have been fought in the course of that month, for the corn was ripe, but not yet cut<sup>11</sup>, so that in their foraging excursions the soldiers had only to reap it. The Romans and Macedonians approached each other at a spot where only a line of small hills (Cynoscephalae) separated the two armies. This was at the boundary of the Thessalian plain, where the hills of Phthiotis gradually descend into Thessaly Proper. Here the vanguards of the hostile armies met unexpectedly, each believing the other far away, and both wishing to take up their quarters where they might find

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxxiii. 3; Polybius, xviii. 4; Plutarch, *Flamin.* 7.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, xviii. 3; Livy, xxxiii. 6.

provisions and the corn ripe. Both were on their march to Scotussa. It had been raining the day before, and in the morning there was such a thick fog, that the hills on the right and left of which the armies were marching were hardly visible. The Macedonians wanted to ascend a height, which the Romans happened to have occupied. Philip had no inclination to fight, and the Roman commander too would have preferred another locality, this being too open, but the force of circumstances rendered the battle necessary. Three days had passed away before the battle began, and the Romans were already on the heights when the Macedonians arrived, but being only few in number, they were repulsed until reinforcements came up. This happened on the left wing of the Macedonian army. The two generals had perceived how near their armies were to each other, and quickly sent reinforcements. The Romans being supported by the Aetolians, had the advantage on the hills, which led the Macedonians to make the engagement a general one; but the Romans who were opposed by the whole of the left wing of the Macedonians, were driven from the heights; and this success had such an effect upon the Macedonians, that the king was obliged to give battle, for fear of discouraging his soldiers. He therefore arranged them in the most appropriate manner, but was obliged to take possession of the hill, which was ill suited to the Macedonian masses, whereas the elastic arrangements of the Romans enabled them to avail themselves of such a position with advantage. The description of the battle in the fragments of Polybius is masterly.<sup>12</sup> The left wing had made a considerable advance, and pressed the Romans down the other side of the hill. The right wing of the Macedonians rushed with great vehemence up the hill, to which the left wing of the Romans had in the meantime advanced, so that this part of the Macedonian army was soon routed. This victory was owing to the Aetolian cavalry, and it also pursued the fugitives; but on the left of the Romans, which faced the dense masses of the Macedonian phalanx, the victory was undecided. For a time they could not resist those masses of at first nine, and afterwards sixteen men in depth, where the hindmost lines were protected, and pressed forward with their Macedonian lances (*σάπισσαι*). The Romans, however, made

<sup>12</sup> xviii. 5, foll.

half a move to the right, and drove the Macedonians on the other side up the hills, whence they had come. In this position, in which the phalanx could not move, the victory was decided. The Romans no doubt owed it chiefly to the cavalry of the Aetolians; for it was they that broke through the phalanx. According to Polybius and Livy, at least 8000 Macedonians were slain, and 5000 taken prisoners.<sup>13</sup> Philip saved his life with difficulty; the Macedonians gave the signal for a capitulation by raising their sarissae; but the Romans not understanding this symbolic action rushed upon them, so that most of them were cut to pieces, and the others taken prisoners. Philip fled to Larissa, and thence to Tempe. He had led his whole army into the field, and had committed the great mistake of not leaving any troops in reserve; he therefore immediately began to negotiate with the Romans; and after a few fruitless attempts a truce was concluded, during which he was to send ambassadors to Rome, to provide for the Roman army, and to pay down a contribution towards defraying the expenses of the war.

The Romans were the more inclined to make peace, as they were no longer on good terms with the Aetolians; the feeling of estrangement may perhaps have existed even before this campaign; but, after the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Aetolians plundered the Macedonian camp, and this gave rise to disputes, and to most vehement ill-temper on the part of the Aetolians. The Romans had taken part in the battle with far greater numbers than the Aetolians, but the Aetolian cavalry had certainly decided the victory; and at the beginning they had kept up the fight on the hill, so that the Romans were enabled to retreat in good order. These points were evident, and thus the Aetolians, even if they had not been a vain people, had just reason for ascribing the victory to themselves; but this they did in a manner which greatly offended the sensitive Flamininus. Hence immediately after the battle he endeavoured to curtail their advantages. The Aetolians, in their conceit, placed themselves on a footing of equality with the Romans, and felt hurt when the latter claimed higher authority for themselves than the Aetolians thought fit to concede. The Aetolians behaved in such a deplorably mean spirit towards Rome, that nothing short of the foolish and conceited character

<sup>13</sup> Polybius, xviii. 10; Livy, xxxiii. 10; Plutarch, *Flamin.* 8.

of a southern nation can account for it. Wherever such a state of feeling exists, the fruits of it are the greatest ingratitude and hostile malice towards allies.<sup>14</sup> The Aetolians wanted to turn the happy issue of the war to their own advantage and aggrandisement, but of this the Romans would not hear; for their policy was to restore the Greeks in such a manner that the separate nations might balance one another, without any one of them being predominant; nor was it their wish to destroy Macedonia. The Aetolians, on the other hand, insisted upon the Macedonian dynasty being expelled, in order that they themselves might be able to take the government into their hands. Throughout Greece, the Aetolians were celebrated in songs as the conquerors, and the Romans with their consul were spoken off only as auxiliaries. It was, without doubt, immediately after these events, that Alcaeus, the Messenian, wrote his beautiful epigram on the victory of Cynoscephalae, in which he speaks with contempt of thirty thousand Macedonians, who were slain by the *Aetolians and Latins*.<sup>15</sup> For this insolence, Greece had to pay dearly. Any other general, who was not actuated by that love of the Greeks which Flamininus cherished, would have regarded such conduct very differently. Flamininus indeed, was too sensitive, and he ought to have despised such things, considering that he had the glorious mission to deliver Greece; but the Romans were by no means just towards the Aetolians, and according to previous agreements, the latter had a right to claim back all the places which Philip had taken from them. The Romans now decided against them; and while they retained for themselves some of those places or annexed them to other states, they allowed others to remain independent. All this was not done without provocation; but it completely infuriated the Aetolians. Peace was concluded with Macedonia in the year 556, on conditions which were very humiliating to Philip; for he was obliged to give up all his possessions out of Macedonia,—this kingdom, however, was far more extensive than the ancient kingdom of

<sup>14</sup> The Spaniards, down to this day, have no feeling of gratitude towards the English who were their deliverers; they boast of the battle of Salamanca, as if they had conquered the French, although it was the English who gained it for them, and they themselves lost only one man.—N.

<sup>15</sup> It is preserved in Plutarch, *Flamin.* 9.

Macedonia, for it extended as far as the river Nestus, and comprised a part of Thrace, and many Illyrian and Dardanian tribes;—he had to give up all the towns in Greece, and the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor (the latter countries ought to have been restored to Ptolemy, but they obtained a nominal independence); to surrender all his ships of war, with the exception of five and his royal galley; to keep no more than 5000 soldiers as a standing army; to pay 1000 talents, by instalments, in ten years; and to give hostages to the Romans, and among them his own son Demetrius.<sup>16</sup>

After various expectations, hopes, and resolutions, the Romans made a noble use of this peace. It would be unfair to inquire into their motives;—it may be that they wished to deprive Antiochus of every advantage—but whatever their policy may have been, Quintius Flamininus, at least, seems to have acted from very pure motives. All Thessaly, the countries south of Thermopylae, and the three fortresses, Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias were occupied by the Romans. The question now was what should be done? There were not wanting men who were unwilling to sacrifice a momentary material advantage for the sake of a noble and generous reputation, and who insisted upon keeping possession of those three fortresses, and some others, in order to keep Greece in a state of submission. Flamininus opposed them, and carried his plan, so that Corinth, whose citadel remained for the present occupied by the Romans, was restored to the Achaeans at once. This was the more noble, as not only the Aetolians, but even the Achaeans, with Philopoemen at their head, considered themselves quite equal to the Romans, so that Flamininus had to exercise great self-control to succeed in carrying out his noble design. It was fortunate for the Greeks, that in mind and education he was a Greek, a fact which is also attested by the inscriptions on the presents he dedicated in the temples.

The decree of the senate was to be proclaimed on the day of the Isthmian games; and the Greeks, according to their different dispositions, entertained different expectations. An enormous multitude of people assembled at Corinth, and Flamininus ordered the decree of the senate, by which freedom was granted to all the Greeks, to be proclaimed in the theatre. This

<sup>16</sup> Polybius, xviii. 27; Livy, xxxiii. 30; Appian, *De Reb. Macc.* 2.

noble moment of enthusiasm afforded Greece a happy period of fifty years. Fifty years is a short time in the history of the world though too long for a man to descend into the grave without having experienced misfortune. But the sad experiences of an earlier period have often been rewarded by an old age full of joy.

The Aetolians alone did not rejoice, nor did Nabis of Lacedaemon. The alliance with him is a foul spot on the honour of Rome: he had stipulated to retain for himself Argos, which he had caused Philip to sell to him; but Flamininus afterwards gladly seized the opportunity to annul the alliance, and make war upon him. Livy is very minute in this part, having Polybius for his guide, to whom these events must have been of particular interest. The tyrant was not, indeed, wanting in skill during the war; but he would have been subdued, and Sparta taken, had not Flamininus, probably in obedience to his instructions, followed the unhappy policy which led him not to wish to deliver Greece from this source of anxiety, in order that the Achaeans might be obliged to exert themselves, and to require the aid of Rome. A great part of Laconica, the district of the modern Maina, was separated from the dominion of the tyrant, and constituted as an independent state, inhabited by the ancient perioeci; the Achaeans received Argos, and Nabis was obliged to pay a war-contribution of 100 talents at once, and 400 more within the space of eight years, and to give his son as a hostage. This state of things did not last long. In the absence of Flamininus, the Achaeans availed themselves of a tumult in which Nabis was slain, for the purpose of uniting Sparta with the rest of Peloponnesus, which was disagreeable to the Romans, but could not then be altered.

The Romans pledged themselves to evacuate the two fortresses of Chalcis and Demetrias, as soon as the affairs with Antiochus should be settled. They constituted Thessaly, together with Phthiotis, as an independent republic; and the Orestians, who formed a part of Macedonia Proper, but had revolted, received a republican constitution, though it seems to have been united with Thessaly, as I conclude from the list of Thessalian generals. Euboea, Locris, Acarnania, Boeotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Elis, Messenia, Lacedaemon, and Athens, were proclaimed free states; the rest of Peloponnesus and Megara became Achaean. But, although the Romans thus proclaimed

themselves the deliverers of Greece, yet they gave the towns of Oreus and Eretria to Eumenes, the son of Attalus—he seems to have sold Eretria afterwards,—and left him in possession of Aegina.<sup>17</sup> The Athenians received the islands of Paros, Scyros, Delos, and Imbros. Down to the time of Sulla, the Romans always shewed a particular favour and respect for the Athenians, and never have the Muses been more kind towards any nation than towards the Athenians.

---

### LECTURE LXVIII.

IF, in relating the history of Rome, we were to follow the standard of the ancients, we could have little hope of attaining our end within the time allowed for these lectures; for all that I have hitherto related is contained in about thirty-three books of Livy, which constitute only a small part of his whole work. But the constitution of Rome, which is to us the most important part of her history, has been growing, and fully developing itself before our eyes; and the wars, which have any moral or artistic interest, are over. Henceforth, we have only masses to consider. I shall relate, at full length, the history of the destruction of Carthage, and of the Cimbrian war; but why should I enter into the detail, for instance, of the battle of Magnesia, in which rude and undisciplined masses of barbarians fought against the Romans? Livy's history, from the time which we have now reached, down to where it broke off, formed more than three-fourths of the whole work, though it comprised a period of not more than about 215 years. We may follow just the opposite course, and condense our narrative as we proceed further.

During the Hannibalian war, the Insubrians had remained quiet, and, with the exception of the first years, had taken no part in it, partly because they were not provoked by the Romans, and partly because the scene of the war was generally too far away from them, and they kept up little intercourse with Hannibal; but they now rose, and the Romans had to

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xxxiiii. 30 and 34.

dread them the more, because an enterprising Carthaginian general, of the name of Hamilcar, who had remained behind from the army of Mago, disciplined the Ligurian and Gallic armies, in order that he might thus be enabled to inflict some severe wound upon the Romans. The Insubrians were very different from the Boians; the former submitted after a few campaigns; but the Boians held out with great bravery for more than nine years, in the course of which the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona were entirely destroyed, for they knew that it was the intention of the Romans to annihilate them; and they accordingly fought with the courage of despair. We see from Pliny, that they had vanished from the face of the earth at the time when Cato wrote.<sup>1</sup> The fate of this people is very remarkable: the towns which they once inhabited in Gaul proper were scarcely known in after-times. On their emigration from Gaul, one branch had marched into Italy, and another to the countries on the Danube. It was probably in the Cimbrian war, that this latter branch was extirpated, whence the name of the country *Desertum Boiorum*<sup>2</sup> (Bohemia), which was subsequently occupied by the Marcomannians. According to Cato, the Boians in Italy had consisted of 120 tribes (*tribus*), which, in his days, had ceased to exist. It is not more than seventeen or eighteen years ago that jurists, writing on the *Lex de Gallia Cisalpina*, wondered why the Boians were not oftener mentioned in history; but they forgot that the Gauls south of the Po were completely extirpated by the Romans in the war which followed the second Punic war. The Romans then established colonies in those districts, with very extensive territories, such as Bologna, Modena, Parma, and Lucca. Even in the time of Polybius, those districts still had scarcely any population, and afterwards became peopled only by degrees. The Julian law united Cispadana politically with Italy. The Celts on the northern banks of the Po had no connexion with the Romans.<sup>3</sup>

At the close of the war against Philip, the Aetolians shewed themselves not only ungrateful towards the Romans, but they were most vehemently exasperated<sup>4</sup> at not having received the rewards which they expected for their services; and this feeling

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* iii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* iii. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Respecting the war against the Boians, Insubrians, etc., see Livy, xxxii. 30, foll.; xxxiii. 36, foll., xl. 38, xlii. 7, foll.

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, xviii. 28.

did not by any means subside afterwards. They were right in some respects, but wrong in others: they made too great pretensions; while the Romans did not act fairly in refusing to surrender to the Aetolians the towns of Phthiotis. But I am convinced, that even if there had been no real ground of complaint, the Aetolians would have moved heaven and earth, in order to drive the Romans out of Greece. They accordingly now turned their eyes towards Antiochus, who quite undeservedly bears the surname of the Great. The dynasty of the Seleucidae is poorer in great men than any other of those which became established in the various kingdoms of the empire of Alexander. Seleucus, the first, was the most distinguished among them, though even he can scarcely be called a great man; but the majority of his successors were unworthy and degenerate Orientals, even before the Ptolemies became so. Antiochus is surnamed the Great, merely because his reign was a happy one. In comparison with the other princes of the same name of his dynasty, as Antiochus Soter, and the contemptible Theos, his grandfather and great grandfather, Antiochus was indeed eminent, for he restored the kingdom which had been left to him by his brother Seleucus in a state of considerable dissolution, but without doing any really great thing, as he exerted the comparatively extensive resources of his empire against cowardly enemies. He did not meet with any great difficulties; and those he did meet with, he did not overcome like a great man. He might have called himself *εὐτυχής*, for previously to his war with the Romans, his monarchy was larger than it had ever been under the kings of Syria: it extended from the Hellespont to the frontiers of India, and comprised Phrygia, Cilicia, Syria, Palestine, Coelesyria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Media, Persia, and all the country as far as Sidgistan and Cabul. He concluded treaties with Indian chiefs, and had immense treasures: but with all this he had no military power, and his kingdom was not superior to that of the former kings of Persia. Asiatic effeminacy prevailed throughout; and his strength had never been tested. The descendants of the Macedonians and Greeks, in their numerous colonies in Asia, which had been established by Alexander and Seleucus, had become just as unwarlike as, at a much later period, the Pullan or descendants of the Crusaders, who were held in the greatest contempt by the natives,

and had adopted all the vices of eastern nations, without any of their virtues. As Antiochus was in possession of nearly the whole extent of the Persian empire, he was considered in the East as the *μέγας βασιλεύς*, and in Europe as the formidable enemy of the Romans; the Aetolians, therefore, hoped to derive great benefits from him. He was a haughty and presumptuous man.

I have already mentioned that he entered into an alliance with Philip, against the young king of Egypt. The Romans had then entered into negotiations with him, which, however, led to no results. This was one of the many steps which the Romans took in venturing upon a thing without dreading failure. Antiochus was now in Asia Minor, and fancied that he might easily extend his dominion over a part of Europe. The countries which Philip had taken from Egypt, and which, in his peace with Rome, he had been obliged to give up, were in a defenceless state, and overwhelmed by Thracians—just as the Britons were by the Picts and Scots,—and they therefore called Antiochus to their assistance. This invitation was flattering to his vanity; he accordingly interfered in the disputes in Chersonesus, and restored Lysimachia which had been destroyed by the Thracians. But the Romans, wisely employing a vague expression, declared, that they would not suffer him to overstep the natural boundaries of his empire, and called upon him to restore the Greek towns in Asia to freedom, that they might enjoy the same benefit which had been granted to the European Greeks. This was the arrogant demand of a people anxious for war. Antiochus refused to do so, and the negotiations were thus continued for four years, during which he fortified Lysimachia and Chersonesus as bulwarks in defence of Asia. He also equipped a fleet for which he had the greatest resources, having taken from the Egyptians the coast of Phoenicia, and also possessing Cilicia and Pamphylia. In Greece the Aetolians looked up to him, but the Rhodians were decidedly hostile, being in alliance with Egypt, and with Rome on a friendly understanding which was almost equal to an alliance.

Antiochus' residence was not permanently at Antioch; he had then raised the splendid city of Ephesus to the rank of his capital. Hannibal was at that time with Antiochus, who had received him with the greatest distinction. Hannibal had

spent the first years after the close of the second Punic war in his native city, and did not despair of the possibility of its recovery. Soon after the peace, he showed himself as great as he had been in war. He was appointed *suffetes*, a title which we find in the book of "Judges," signifying the head of the state in time of peace. In this capacity he, by his ability, restored the authority of his office, which had ceased to be of great importance, the government of Carthage being already greatly paralysed by the democratic element. He attempted to do away with abuses of every description, and to reform the constitution of his country.<sup>5</sup> Hannibal's reforms in the financial department were extraordinary; for he found a great deficit, and in order to prevent the ruling men from enriching themselves at the cost of the nation, he introduced a system of economy, and revealed the abuses which had been carried on: in short he bestowed new life and happiness upon his native city. The party of traitors, however, whose interests he thus opposed, and which then existed at Carthage, as in all other contemporary states, set all their engines at work against him, until he found himself compelled to quit his country. Their object was to gain power for themselves by sacrificing their country to the Romans, whom at last they endeavoured to excite against him. The Romans began to silence their own sense of justice, by arguing, as Livy beautifully says, that they had made peace with the Carthaginians, but not with Hannibal. Rome had long ceased to be a conscientious state; its moral greatness, which in former times had not been a mere fancy, was gone, and just when they had it in their power to be just, they violated all laws of honour and virtue. They had repeatedly complained of Hannibal, and now they sent ambassadors to demand that he should be surrendered as a conspirator. This step, if we may believe Livy, met with the utmost opposition on the part of the great Scipio, who declared such conduct to be unworthy, nay, disgraceful. Hannibal, being informed of the fate which awaited

<sup>5</sup> When we read in Livy (xxxiii. 46) that Hannibal reformed the *ordo judicium*, we must not conceive these *judices* to be the same as the *suffetes* among the Jews, who are always called *βασιλεῖς* by the Greeks: they were, undoubtedly, no other than those whom Aristotle calls the One Hundred, or the One Hundred and Four, and whom he compares to the ephors of Sparta. They seem to have had a great resemblance to the state-inquisition of Venice, which, although quite distinct from the organism of the state, yet had the right to interfere in state affairs.—N.

him, and before the Carthaginians had come to any resolution, which perhaps might have been extorted from them by his enemies, fled to Antiochus of Syria.

When Hannibal saw the condition of the Syrian army he was terrified; for the great bulk of it consisted of barbarians. It was only partially adapted to the Macedonian tactics, and internally as corrupt and cowardly as it had been under the Persian dominion. There were only some portions of the army from which anything could be expected. His plan was worthy of him: he advised Antiochus to direct his main attention to the fleet, and by means of it to transfer the war to Italy, it being his intention that the picked troops and those whom he himself hoped to assemble, should embark and land in the south of Italy, which was still exasperated against Rome for the vengeance she had taken. The fleet was not to touch Greece, in order to avoid provoking Philip, who was rather to be allowed to domineer there, and to increase his power by allying himself with Egypt. Antiochus was at first greatly astonished at finding that Hannibal thought so little of the monarch of so great an empire, as to consider it necessary for him to form alliances for the purpose of undertaking a war against Rome. Little-minded persons naturally rejected such a plan; and it was determined to transfer the war into Greece, where the Aetolians were the king's allies, and to try to gain over Philip. The Achaeans were firmly attached to the Romans; and matters could not be so easily arranged with the king of Macedonia; for on the one hand, Philip could not forgive Antiochus for not having supported him in his last campaign, and on the other hand Antiochus wished, in case of his being successful, to make himself master of Greece and Thrace: an alliance between the two kings would certainly have succeeded in weakening the Romans considerably. But the nonsense which the advisers of Antiochus mixed up with everything, rendered this plan perfectly impracticable; they wanted not only to negotiate with Philip, but at the same time to frighten him. Therefore, at the very moment when it was of the highest importance to gain the good-will of Philip, a pretender who gave himself out to be a descendant of Alexander the Great, and had lived among the Acarnanians in Epirus, was received at Ephesus as the legitimate ruler of Macedonia; it being believed that thereby a revo-

lution might be brought about in that country. This was childish. The opinion of Hannibal, who dissuaded the king from the war, was approved of by only a few who were not blinded by pride and vanity, as Antiochus himself was. Hannibal was looked upon as a traitor, and the wretched king, with his wretched advisers, went so far in their folly as to believe that the great Carthaginian maintained a secret understanding with Rome. In this belief they were strengthened by a piece of cunning on the part of the Romans, which could not mislead any but bad persons. Scipio had been sent to Asia to conduct a last negotiation with Antiochus; he and Hannibal knew each other personally, and two great men naturally set aside the consideration that they had been enemies in the field: they were not mere instruments of states, but two great moral powers standing face to face, which had fought and concluded peace with each other, not as individual men. In such circumstances, truly great men conceive a mutual love. In this instance, the former rivals became intimate, and Hannibal offered hospitality to Scipio, who declared that he would accept it, if Hannibal were not dependent upon an enemy of Rome. This conversation, in which Scipio may not have been as open as Hannibal, was made cunning use of by Scipio, and may perhaps have contributed to render Hannibal suspected. Had Antiochus been a wise man, he would have had nothing to do with the blind fury of the Aetolians, or he ought at least to have convinced himself of the real extent of their power; but he imagined that they were a great nation.

After many and fruitless discussions, Antiochus resolved to follow the pressing invitations of the Aetolians, but the preparations were made in so clumsy a manner, that he had only 10,000 men to embark. The Aetolians expected an innumerable army, and had also described to the king their own power as much greater than it really was, so that he was greatly astonished at finding that they had scarcely 4,000 men, and a few hundred horse. Antiochus landed at Demetrias in Thessaly<sup>6</sup>, which, after the departure of the Roman garrison, had fallen into the hands of the Aetolians. He made himself master of Phthiotis, went to Euboea, and took the fortified town of Chalcis: it would seem as if fate had wished to justify the unwillingness with which the Romans had entrusted these places to the Greeks, who did not know

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxxv. 43.

how to conduct themselves. Thence he entered Boeotia) where his arrival was hailed with joy<sup>7</sup>), Phocis and Thessaly. The last-named country had been constituted, by the Romans, as a republic, but had never known how to govern itself; and during its long dependence on Macedonia, it had lost all power of self-control. Magnesia and Phthiotis were separated from it, and formed into an independent state. Antiochus was well received on both sides of Mount Oeta, and extended his power there. This was a critical moment; for had Philip joined Antiochus with energy, the Romans might have been driven back as far as Illyricum. But his attention was turned away by the Romans, and he himself saw that the war had been commenced in so senseless a manner, that not much success could be expected; he had not yet recovered enough strength, and foresaw that, if the issue should be unsuccessful, he himself would have to suffer most. He might expect, by delaying to join the Syrian, to see the Romans crush the Aetolians, who were hostile to him, while his own position did not become worse; and then he might wait patiently until the Greeks should begin hostilities against the Romans. Philip, therefore, only took possession of Demetrias, one of the three strongholds of Greece, which secured to him the dominion over Thessaly. There must have been a secret treaty with Rome about this place, for thenceforth it remained in the hands of the Macedonians, down to the overthrow of their kingdom, without a demand being ever made for its evacuation. Magnesia likewise became incorporated with Macedonia.

A bitter feeling between the Romans and Achaeans had manifested itself, even in the war of Nabis: the Achaeans mistrusted the Romans, because they had not yet withdrawn their garrisons from Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias. At the time when Antiochus, of whose power the Greeks entertained most exaggerated notions, was approaching, the Romans were wise enough to withdraw those garrisons. Other Greek states also gradually deserted Rome, and there existed everywhere a Roman and a Macedonian party. Flamininus now stained his reputation by allowing the faction devoted to him and to the Romans to murder the head of the Macedonian party in Boeotia, and by protecting the murderers against the justice of the law. The friendship of the Achaeans towards Rome was only

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, xx. 4.

of a negative nature, inasmuch as it was repugnant to their feelings to make common cause with the Aetolians.

The eyes of both Antiochus and of the Aetolians were now opened to the delusion under which they had been labouring in regard to each other. In these difficulties, Hannibal, who had been an evil prophet from the beginning, was looked to for help. It is one of the most distressing things that can happen to a great man, to be asked for his advice in dangerous moments which he has foreseen and foretold, and which would have been averted had he been listened to. But, as there was no other way left, Hannibal's advice, to enter into an alliance with Macedonia, was now followed with the most ardent zeal<sup>s</sup>, but quite in vain; for Philip had already concluded an alliance with the Romans. This was an immense advantage to him, though he valued the acquisition more, inasmuch as it afforded him the means of ruining the Aetolians with the help of the Romans. Antiochus now no longer ventured upon any great undertaking; but, by the advice of his courtiers, he intended to employ the winter in making further preparations in Asia. Meantime, the consul, M.'Acilius Glabrio, arrived with a fresh army, increased by Macedonians, in Thessaly, where he was opposed by only 10,000 men of Antiochus, and a few Aetolians. The latter were stationed near Heraclea, while Antiochus occupied Thermopylae, which was now to be defended by Macedonian Asiatics. That the memorable pass could be evaded, unless the road across mount Octa also was occupied, was generally known. The Romans made a gallant attack. M. Porcius Cato and his friend L. Valerius Flaccus, were commissioned to take possession of the two heights commanding the pass. The latter was unsuccessful; but Cato took the heights, and, together with the fugitive Aetolians, penetrated into the camp of the enemy, while M.'Acilius defeated the Syrians in front: the whole army of Antiochus took to flight, and the king himself escaped to Chalcis, where he had passed the preceding winter in the enjoyment of Asiatic luxuries, and childish festivities. But he soon quitted this place also, and leaving only a small garrison behind, returned to Asia Minor; his fleet also retreated before a Roman one which had recently arrived: in short, the king acted as if the war had been at an end. The great Antiochus now abandoned himself to sensual pleasures, and ordered an army to be raised

<sup>s</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxix., Exc. de Virt. et Vitiis*, p. 574.

from all Asia, which was to be so numerous as to render hopeless any resistance on the part of the Romans.

M. Acilius Glabrio now directed his arms against the Aetolians who were left entirely to themselves. Heraclea and Lamia, two towns on the Thessalian side of Thermopylae belonging to Aetolia Epictetus, were besieged, the former by the Romans, the latter by Philip, probably according to the secret article in his treaty with Rome, above alluded to. The siege of Heraclea, where the main force of the Aetolians was stationed, was carried on systematically and with great energy; the town was taken by assault; the garrison and the citadel surrendered at discretion.<sup>9</sup> All the fair prospects of the Aetolians had now vanished, for it was more than probable that Antiochus would never return to Greece. What saved them was the wish of the Roman generals to conclude this difficult war in the mountains against a poor people, and to cross over to the rich countries of Asia; and the policy of the Romans, which was to prevent Philip attaining his purposes of aggrandizement, also prevented the utter ruin of the Aetolians. When, therefore, Lamia was on the point of surrendering, the Roman consul, although the town had no doubt been promised to the king, sent a message to him, ordering him to raise the siege, on the ground that the consul had concluded a treaty for Lamia. Thenceforth Philip took no part in the war, and confined himself to extending his dominions towards the west, by conquering Athamania and the Dolopians.

The Aetolians would have been extirpated, had not the Romans had reasons for preserving them. The Romans now appeared before Naupactus, and laid siege to it. The town would have been taken had the Romans acted with the same energy as at Heraclea; but they carried on the siege with the wish to spare the enemy, and the Aetolians having in the meantime gathered all their scattered forces, the Romans withdrew from the place.<sup>10</sup> The war came to its close with the siege of Ambracia<sup>11</sup>, which then belonged to the Aetolian state. The peace was concluded by the consul M. Fulvius; and the Aetolians obtained tolerable terms, for they had only to pay a contribution of a few hundred talents<sup>12</sup>, to recognise the supremacy of Rome, and to promise to support

<sup>9</sup> Livy, xxxvi. 24, foll.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxvi. 35; Plutarch, *Flaminia*. 15.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 5.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 11; Polybius, xxii. 13.

her in war. Ambracia was saved, and passed peaceably into the hands of the Romans. Cephallenia was taken by the Romans and destroyed; Acarnania had previously fallen into their hands. The siege of Ambracia is one of the most ingenious in all ancient history, and its defence does honour to the Aetolians, whose wars are, on the whole, not glorious: for that small people, forsaken by all the Greeks, and led by no great man, now defended itself with extraordinary bravery. I have here somewhat anticipated the time, for the siege of Ambracia took place in the year 564. Rome had thus secured all the landing places along this coast, and had opened to herself all the roads into Greece.

---

## LECTURE LXIX.

AFTER Antiochus had left Europe, he defended himself only with his fleet against the Rhodians, and the ships of Attalus and Eumenes, among which there were only very few Roman vessels. With regard to the Romans, he was as much at ease as if he had been secured from them by an impassable gulf<sup>1</sup>; and it was Hannibal alone who induced him to keep possession of the Hellen<sup>o</sup>pont. This he did, but no more; for he thought it sufficient to prevent the Romans from attacking him in his own dominions. An engagement of some importance took place in which the king's enemies gained some advantages; but afterwards the fleets separated, and that of the Rhodians was disgracefully deceived by the Syrians, taken by surprise, and defeated. M. *Æmilius Regillus*, a Roman admiral, was already approaching with a Roman fleet. How little the sea was the element of the Romans may be seen from the fact, that immediately after the Punic war they had given up their fleet, for they never kept one unless they really wanted it. Hence we find them at Myonnesus with not more than from eighty to ninety ships, half of which, at the least, belonged to the Rhodians, who were by far the best sailors of those times, and still showed a freshness like that of the best age of Greece. The fleet of Antiochus was furnished almost entirely by the

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxxvi. 41.

Phoenician towns<sup>2</sup>, and was under the command of Hannibal, but it was nevertheless unable to join another division of the king's fleet. A battle ensued off Myonnesus, in which the Romans and their allies gained a decided victory. The fleet of Antiochus was almost entirely destroyed, and the remaining ships escaped into two ports on the coast of Caria. The victory was gained by the Rhodians, but at the same time by fire, for the Rhodians had engines on board their ships, by means of which they threw fire upon those of the enemy. This probably resembled the substance which in later times was called Grecian fire: to judge of it from the manner in which the Greek historians speak of it, it was not thrown with rockets, and was certainly something inextinguishable and not generally known. This naval victory decided the war. On the advice of Hannibal, Antiochus had endeavoured to keep possession of Chersonesus, which is connected with Thrace only by a narrow neck of land a few miles broad. On it was situated Lysimachia, a strongly fortified place, whence strong walls ran to the Melas Colpos and the Propontis, so that on the land side an entrance could be forced only by a siege. A landing might have been effected at several points, but the Syrian fleet might and ought to have prevented it. If Antiochus had wished to keep on the defensive, he would have been unassailable in Asia. But his blindness was so great that he removed Hannibal from his court and sent him to Pamphylia, because he hated him as the man who reminded him of former counsels which had not been followed. It is possible that by occupying Chersonesus he might have protected Asia, although he could not have done so for any length of time; but the madness was, that the king evacuated it without making even an attempt to defend it. The rich stores there which were intended for a long campaign were given up to the Romans, and the garrisons were withdrawn from all the towns. He deceived either himself or his subjects with the thought that he could defend himself behind the Hellespont, but that coast too he gave up on the approach of the Romans, and withdrew into Lydia. In like manner the Persians did not prevent the troops of Philip from crossing; for it is a fact not generally known, that Philip had already commenced the war against Persia,

\* The Phoenician towns, so powerful in the time of the Persians, appear to have wholly lost their importance.—N.

and had led his troops into Asia before Alexander came to the throne.<sup>3</sup>

L. Cornelius Scipio and his friend C. Laelius were consuls in the year 562, and it was at this time that they quarrelled. Laelius aspired to the command of the army in Asia; but the great Scipio, who had been the best friend of Laelius in private life, by his influence, which was still unbounded in the republic, succeeded in inducing the senate to confer the command upon his brother; but Lucius Scipio would nevertheless not have obtained it, had not his brother offered to serve as legate under him; for he could not become consul, the law requiring that there should be an interval of ten years between two consulships of the same man, being at this time strictly observed. P. Cornelius Scipio had in the meantime been censor, and his extraordinary influence was clearly seen on this occasion, for Lucius was a very insignificant person, and was elected only for his brother's sake, as on a former occasion the great Fabius Maximus had procured the consulship for his son, and then served under him as legate. As soon as the Roman fleet reached the coast of Asia, and while the Scipios were yet in Macedonia, there came ambassadors from Antiochus, expressing the wish of their king to restore peace, and his desire to know the terms; he offered to give up Chersonesus and to recognise the freedom of the Asiatic cities, Smyrna and Abydos, which had been taken by the Romans, and to bear half of the expenses of the war. These terms, offered by a prince who confessed himself to be conquered, were not accepted by the Romans. Scipio declared that they would have been accepted at the time when Antiochus had not yet evacuated Chersonesus, but that he must now submit to his will. The Romans advanced through Macedonia and Thrace by very difficult roads, but were assisted by Philip, whom they rewarded by giving up to him the possession of the Thracian coast towns. When they had crossed the Hellespont, P. Scipio was taken ill, a thing which often happened to him. He could not accompany the army, and was obliged to remain at Elatea, an Aeolian city. This prevented all operations, and Antiochus availed himself of the respite for commencing fresh negotiations, which however led to nothing. Scipio proposed moderate terms, but they appeared intolerable to the pride of the Syrian

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xvi. 91; Justin, ix. 5.

king. A son of the great Scipio, we know not how, had fallen into the hands of the Syrians, and was treated by them with much distinction. The ambassadors first offered to restore him to freedom; but Antiochus, who hoped to obtain thereby the desired peace more surely, sent him back to his father at once, and without ransom.<sup>4</sup> This, however, did not produce the desired effect; and as it was impossible to come to any terms, the decision was left to a battle. Scipio wished to avoid a decisive engagement until his recovery; Antiochus, on the other hand, was anxious to fight. The two armies met on the frontier of Lydia, near Magnesia, at the foot of Mount Sipylus. That country is intersected by moderate hills, and is one of the finest in the world, like all the coast-districts of Asia Minor, in contrast to the barren countries of the interior, which are exposed to frequent injury by volcanic agency. The Romans had only one consular army—the other was still engaged against the Aetolians—that is, two legions with the corresponding number of allies, a few thousand Achaeans, and some auxiliaries from Eumenes, who ruled only over Pergamus, and some Ionian and Mysian towns; the whole scarcely amounted to 30,000 soldiers. The Syrian army consisted of 80,000 men; the main force was drawn up like a Macedonian phalanx, probably composed of nations from all countries: it was a motley host of Asiatics. But there were among them some Macedonians, descendants of the troops of Alexander, who, however, were already mixed with the Asiatic population. Antiochus had, besides, peltasts with Greek armour, and a number of Asiatic nations, of whose armour neither Livy nor Appian tell us anything. During three days the armies advanced towards each other, and on the fourth the battle was fought. The immense army of Antiochus outflanked the right wing of the Romans, whose left wing rested upon a stream which had no depth. The Syrian army consisted of the phalanx, phalangite reserves, cavalry, elephants, and war-chariots: the elephants made no impression upon the Romans, who had learnt to despise them; and they themselves had African elephants, of which, however, they made no use, because, unlike the African lions, they were much weaker and more timid than the Indian ones. Even the masses of the

<sup>4</sup> Livy, xxxvii. 34, foll.; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxix. *Excerpt. de Legat.* vi. p. 620.

Macedonian phalanx, which at Cynoscephalae had given the Romans so much trouble, and which for a moment seemed to render the issue doubtful, was soon overwhelmed. On another point Antiochus drove the Romans back to their camp, but was then repulsed. The operations of the phalanx were frustrated by the wretched disposition which the king had made. His army was at first drawn up in a number of small masses with intervals between them; and instead of being kept in that order and employed, they were allowed to draw together, from fear, into one immense mass, a thing which in extreme danger could be available only in a plain, whereas there, on uneven ground, it gave rise to the greatest confusion, and the light armed troops of the Romans were enabled with their javelins and slings to make such an impression upon them, that all dispersed in flight and confusion. The attempt which was made at first to use the scythe-chariots against the Romans had been equally unsuccessful, the Romans dispersing them by their skirmishers. These scythe-chariots were an Asiatic invention, but occur also among the Celts, especially in Britain: when they were used the horses were frightened. The defeat of the Asiatics was so complete, that it was impossible to reassemble the remnants of the army. The loss of the Romans is said to have been very small<sup>5</sup>; and this indeed is probable enough, for the soldiers against whom they fought were not better than those whom Alexander had defeated at Arbela. The king fled through Phrygia, and sent Zeuxis as ambassador to Scipio to sue for peace, consenting to accept any terms, however humiliating they might be. Scipio was delighted to be able to conclude peace: it is possible that L. Scipio, as was subsequently stated in the accusation against him, received presents on that occasion; but there is no need for such a supposition, as nothing was so desirable to a Roman consul, as to conclude peace before the arrival of a successor. A preliminary treaty was granted to Antiochus, on condition that he should pay down immediately 500 talents for the truce, during which all the other articles should be settled at Rome, 2500 talents after the treaty should have received the sanction of the senate and people at Rome<sup>6</sup>, and 12,000 additional talents by instalments of 1000 a-year. Antiochus was

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xxxvii. 44.

<sup>6</sup> It is only accidental that this point is not mentioned afterwards.—N. See Livy, xxxviii. 38.

further to give twenty hostages, and among them his own son; to give up to the Romans all the countries west of Mount Taurus—that is the whole of Asia Minor, with the exception of the two Cilicias to the north of Mount Taurus. The river Halys was to be the boundary. He had accordingly to give up all that he possessed in Phrygia, and it was afterwards disputed whether Pamphylia also was comprised under that head. Livy and the fragments of Polybius throw no light upon this question, and the geography of those countries is on the whole very obscure; but as far as I understand Appian, Pamphylia did not remain under the dominion of Antiochus, nor was it given to Eumenes, but remained independent between the two. He had further to pledge himself not to interfere in the affairs of Europe without the consent of the Romans; not to carry on war against nations allied with Rome, unless he were attacked; to give up all ships of war except ten, and even his triremes, keep no elephants, and raise no mercenaries in countries subject to Rome; pay a separate sum of money to Eumenes; and, lastly, to deliver up Hannibal and some other men whom he had received at his court (this latter point was a mere pretence to smooth over the demand for the surrender of Hannibal); but they escaped. This treaty was signed in the year 562. The peace was not definitively concluded till some time after.<sup>7</sup> A single battle in a war rashly undertaken led to this humiliating peace! It is inconceivable how a prince concluding such a peace could be called the Great, and yet he still had a mighty empire, as large as Germany, France, and Spain put together!

In the spring of the year after this, Cn. Manlius Vulso, the successor of L. Cornelius Scipio, anxious for an opportunity to undertake something from which he might derive fame and wealth—a desire which is henceforward the prevailing characteristic of the Roman generals—made a campaign against the Galatians, or Gallo-Graeci, in Phrygia.<sup>8</sup> In the time of Pyrrhus these Gauls had penetrated through Macedonia into Greece as far as Delphi; afterwards they went eastward to Thrace: but whether they were, as the Greeks relate, induced to do so by fearful natural phenomena, or were attracted by

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 38; Polybius, xxi. 14, xxii. 26; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxi, *Exc. de Legat.* ix. p. 621; Appian, *Syriac.* 39.

<sup>8</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 12, foll.; Polybius, xxii. 16, foll.

reports about the delightful countries of Asia is uncertain. Many remained in Thrace and ruled over the country; but others, 20,000 in number, crossed over into Asia in two divisions, the one going across the Hellespont, and the other across the Bosphorus, and their enterprise was facilitated by the feuds of the Asiatic princes. There they settled on the northern coast, in the territory about Ancyra, in Phrygia, just, as at a later period, the Normans did in Neustria. They inhabited thirty-three towns, in a country which, though it seems to have been destined by Providence to be one of the most flourishing and happy in the world, is now, under the despotism of barbarians, like an accursed desert. They consisted of three tribes, bearing the strange names of Trocmi, Tolistoboi, and Tectosagae. The first two seem to have been formed during their wanderings, for they are not mentioned elsewhere. They united with the Bithynians, where two small kingdoms were growing up. The Bithynians were Thracians settled between Nicomedia and Heraclea: during the time of the Persian dominion, they were governed by native princes, and after the dissolution of the Persian and Macedonian empires, the latter of which had always been least consolidated in Asia Minor, they extended themselves and acquired considerable importance. Nicomedes, their king, took those Gauls into his pay, there being then only 10,000 armed men among them, defeated his rival, and founded the Bithynian state, which gradually became Hellenised. From that time the Gauls sold their services to any one who might seek them, and made the whole of western Asia tributary to themselves. Their history is yet in great confusion; but it can be cleared up, many materials existing for it. They were defeated by Antiochus Soter, whereupon they withdrew into the mountains, whence they afterwards burst forth whenever circumstances allowed them, and all the neighbouring nations paid tribute to escape their devastations. But when the war between Ptolemy Euergetes and Seleucus Callinicus, and afterwards that between the former and Antiochus Hierax broke out, they showed themselves thoroughly faithless, selling themselves sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other, and were the scourge of all Asia, until, to the amazement of every body, Attalus of Pergamus refused to pay tribute, attacked and defeated them, a fact which can be accounted for only on the

supposition, that through idleness they had become quite effeminate and unwarlike, like the Goths whom Belisarius found in Italy. They never entirely recovered from this blow, though they still continued to exercise considerable influence, for Asia was always divided; and although Antiochus was staying in those countries, he was too much occupied to turn his attention to them, and would not, moreover, have been able to protect that part of Phrygia bordering on the district inhabited by the Gauls. Hence they still levied tribute far and wide, and after the fall of Antiochus, the Asiatic nations dreaded lest they should be unable to defend themselves. This gave Cn. Manlius an opportunity of undertaking a campaign against them, and to come forward as the protector of the Asiatics against the Galatians. His demand that they should submit had been answered by those barbarians with a *stolida ferocia*, and he accordingly marched through Phrygia, and attacked them in their mountains, without, however, extirpating them. They continued in those districts, and preserved their Celtic language for a remarkably long period. We find it even in the time of Augustus; but they too became Hellenised, and in this condition we find them at the time of St. Paul.<sup>9</sup> The campaign of Manlius Vulso against them was most desirable to the inhabitants of Asia Minor; but on the part of the Romans, it was very unjust, for Manilius Vulso undertook it contrary to the express will of the *decem legati* who followed him to Asia. The war was brought to a close in two campaigns, but the Romans derived no advantages from it, except the booty and perhaps a sum of money which was paid to them; for the countries between western Asia and the districts of the Galatians were not subject to the Romans, but only allied with them. The Galatians suffered so severe a defeat, that from this time forward they continued to live in quiet obedience to the Romans.

The Romans now distributed their conquests. Eumenes, who until then had been quite an insignificant prince, was now made a great king, and received an independent kingdom,

<sup>9</sup> St. Jerome says, that he heard the same language in Phrygia as at Treves; but this cannot be referred to the Galatians, and St. Jerome probably saw Germans who had settled in Phrygia at different times, especially Goths in the reign of Theodosius. It may be looked upon as an established fact that Treves was German, and it is not likely that the Gallic language maintained itself in Asia down to so late a period.—N.

comprising Mysia, Lydia, Phrygia on the Hellespont, and Great Phrygia (the two were afterwards comprised under the name of the kingdom of Asia, and its inhabitants were called Asiani), and Ionia, with the exception of Smyrna, Phocaea, Erythrae, and a few other Greek maritime towns, which were constituted as republics<sup>10</sup>,—a kingdom for which he might be envied by many a European king; but it was weak on account of the Asiatic effeminacy of the people. The Rhodians also were not forgotten, for they received Lycia and Caria, with the exception of Telmessus, which, no one knows why, was given to Eumenes. This was an immense acquisition for a small republic; for Caria and Lycia were wealthy and excellent countries, from which they might derive very large sums of money. With the ancients, taxes were very heavy; the principal tax was the land-tax, amounting to one-third of the produce. By such taxes, the Rhodians acquired great wealth, which they employed partly in military preparations, and partly in embellishing their city, which was already one of great splendour. The Rhodians deserved, indeed, to possess such rich countries, for they were a thoroughly respectable people, who, as the Romans themselves owned, had not the *levitas Graecorum* but a *severitas disciplinae* equal to their own.

Before I proceed to give you an outline of the state of morality and literature among the Romans, I have to mention the death of P. Cornelius Scipio, which is obscured by various contradictions. It is a remarkable instance of the manner in which false and impossible tales have crept into the annals of those times, so as to make it hopeless for us to attempt to arrive at a positive conviction as to what is historically true and what is mere fiction. Contradictory occurrences, and such as took place at different times, are here put together. What Livy<sup>11</sup> mentions from the speech of Tiberius Gracchus, must be looked upon as something more than the narrative of an annalist. There is no doubt that, at one time, Scipio was called upon by the Petillii before the senate to answer to the charge of having received from Antiochus sums of money, and of not having given to the republic an account of what he had gained in the course of the war.<sup>12</sup> This kind of accu-

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, xxii. 26, foll.; Livy, xxxviii. 39; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. xxix; *Erc. de Legat.* x. p. 621; Appian, *Syriac.* 44.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 56.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 54. foll.

sation is one of the earliest that we find among the Romans. The consuls had full right to dispose of the *manubiae* and the money exacted from a conquered enemy in what manner they pleased. They might distribute them among their soldiers, or make them over to the treasury of the republic; but they were obliged to be prepared to give an account of the manner in which they had acted; and to demand such an account was considered by the people as their constitutional and inalienable right. L. Scipio had given no account; and when called upon to defend himself against certain suspicions, he sent for his account-books, and caused them to be read before the senate; but his brother snatched them from his hands and tore them to pieces, declaring it to be unreasonable that as he and his brother had so much enriched the state, he should be taken to account for the trifling sum of about a million of drachmae, that is, 36,000*l.*<sup>13</sup> The fact that Scipio could speak of such a sum as a trifle, shews how high the standard of property must have been even as early as that time. But this act of P. Scipio did not remain without its consequences. A charge was also brought against him of having been bribed by Antiochus; when he was summoned to appear before the tribunes, he proudly said that the day was ill suited for litigation, since it was the anniversary of the day on which he had conquered Hannibal at Zama, and when they were accustomed to offer sacrifices in the Capitol, adding, "Let every one who has the good of Rome at heart follow me!" He was accompanied by the whole people; the tribunes alone are said to have remained behind<sup>14</sup> This charge may have been the one to which allusion was made in the speech of Gracchus, where it was stated that Gracchus himself had intended to arrest L. Scipio, but that P. Scipio on hearing that the praetor Terentius Culleo was going to conduct the trial, hastily returned from Etruria, and rescued his brother from the hands of the constable. And P. Scipio too was accused, because *animos plus quam civiles gerebat*. He had not expected such a charge, and it may be that he then withdrew into voluntary exile to Liternum, a Latin colony, or *colonia maritima*, between Cumae and Minturnae, or he had previously resided there. This much at least is certain, that he passed the last years of his life away from Rome. The belief that he lived

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 55; Gellius, *N.A.* iv. 18, vii. 19; Diodorus, *Exc. Vatican.* p. 78, foll. ed. Dindorf.

<sup>14</sup> Gellius, *N.A.* iv. 18.

at Liternum as an exile, and not from choice, derives support from the circumstance that before his death a different person was *princeps senatus*; such an exile was easily effected, and if he settled there as a citizen of Liternum, he thereby renounced his Roman franchise. It was during the time when he lived at Liternum that he is said to have betrothed his daughter Cornelia to Tib. Gracchus; but if we consider the age of her sons, it seems more probable that the engagement did not take place till after Scipio's death.<sup>15</sup>

L. Scipio, with his quaestor and legate, was declared guilty of having appropriated to himself the sum stated in the accusation: he did not become an *addictus*; but his property, when confiscated by the state, is said to have been insufficient to make up the sum. It would be rash to infer from this that he was innocent, since he might have squandered the money in the mean time.

After the first Punic war, the number of the tribes had been increased to thirty-five, a large portion of the Sabines having obtained the full franchise, of whom two new tribes were formed, the Quirina and the Velina. This happened nearly sixty years after the last increase, so that a considerable stagnation in the development of the state had already taken place. About the same time, and probably even before the first Punic war, many towns were raised to the rank of prefectures with the Caerite franchise. During the Hannibalian war there were four praetors; but before it was brought to a close their number was raised to six. Spain now became a province like Sicily, or rather was divided into two provinces, *Hispania Citerior*, and *Ulterior*, into which two praetors were sent. Southern Italy had likewise, in consequence of the Hannibalian war, received the administration of a province, and retained it for some time after: the praetor governing it, resided no doubt at Tarentum, or in Bruttium. Gaul was not yet *redacta in provinciae formam*, so that no praetor was sent thither. The greatest change—the one most deeply affecting the state, and which was followed by permanent consequences,—was caused by the desertion of many Italian nations to Hannibal. They were punished, and the places which had belonged to them were deprived of all the privileges of the Italian allies; some were treated like conquered towns; their territories became state property, or were left to the inhabitants only on

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 57.

a precarious tenure; others which submitted were generously spared. This happened to a great number of places in Samnium and Apulia, which were severed from their communities. Those which had remained faithful, probably retained their ancient constitution; the Lucanians, for example, no doubt continued to elect their own praetor, as they had done in the Hannibalian war; but all the Lucanian towns who had revolted were separated from them. The Bruttians, who had been most persevering in their revolt, lost their whole constitution: they ceased to be allies, and became *dediticii*; they had to furnish persons who performed servile duties, and all their landed property was confiscated. It is uncertain whether they had previously been in the same condition as the Samnites and Lucanians, though it is probable that they were treated as foreigners, being descended from Greeks: but they had after all been in an honourable condition, from which they now fell. Tarentum lost all its rights, but continued its forlorn existence within its walls, until it gradually dwindled away. This change among the allies, rendered it more difficult than it had previously been for those who remained to perform their duties towards Rome. The revolt, moreover, had created a lasting feeling of bitterness between Rome and many Italian nations. The allies became still more exhausted through the practice which now arose, that many, availing themselves of the right of isopoly, settled at Rome, or in the Latin colonies. A portion of the latter had neglected their duty, twelve out of the thirty not having furnished any contingent during the expedition of Hasdrubal; and now that circumstances permitted it their rights were curtailed. The effects of the Hannibalian war were never effaced. The Samnites, Apulians, and Lucanians had even previously suffered very severely; Etruria alone enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. In the last years of the war a state debt is mentioned, which was paid by three instalments; but the Macedonian war had so much drained the public treasury that the third instalment was paid in domain lands. The Roman people themselves had suffered to the core. The war had carried off an immense number of men; and as the census nevertheless shews no falling off, it is a proof that in the mean time many strangers, especially freedmen, were admitted as citizens; whence, the body of Roman citizens is henceforth something quite different from what it had been.

Those who had held out during the war, were for the most part quite impoverished. In Livy's narrative this distress is not visible at all; but we know from other sources, that Rome was almost constantly visited by famine and epidemics. The property of many families was situated in the Falernian district and in Campania, which countries were completely devastated. Others who had possessed estates in the revolted countries, had lost everything, so that this war destroyed the whole of the national wealth. The Greek towns, Croton and others, were never able to recover. Another consequence was, that the soldiers remained in arms for years, and that the legions became a standing army. This continued after the war, and the soldiers gradually became accustomed to look upon themselves as a permanent order of men, which they had hitherto never been, as the legions had been disbanded every year, and newly formed in the next. This guarantee for the duration of republican freedom was destroyed through the Hannibalian war; and thus we have here the germs of the subsequent ferment. Vast estates had been acquired by the extensive confiscations, and were in the hands of the nobles, both patrician and plebeian, as no one now exercised any control, the Licinian law having ceased to be applied.

The history of Scipio is very instructive, for it shews how the state was hastening towards its dissolution. No one thought of the republic being in danger, and the danger was indeed as yet far distant; but the seeds of dissolution were nevertheless sown, and its symptoms were already beginning to become visible. We hear it generally said that, with the victories of the Romans in Asia, luxury and all the vices which accompany avarice and rapacity, began to break in upon them. This is indeed true enough, but it was only the symptom of corruption, and not its cause: the latter lay much deeper. After so many years of destructive and cruel wars, during which the Romans had been almost uninterruptedly in arms, the whole nation was in a frightful condition: the poor were utterly impoverished, the middle class had sunk deeper and deeper, and the wealthy had amassed immense riches. The same men who had gloriously fought under Scipio, and then marched into the rich countries of Asia as hungry soldiers, now returned with exorbitant and ill-gotten riches—the treasures extorted from conquered nations. They had no real

wants, and did not know how to use the quickly acquired riches. In regard to the great men as well as to every thing else, things assumed a different character: the sad moment of complete degeneracy is preparing; the generals appear like robbers, and carry on wars only with a view to booty and plunder; the exceptions were very few. The nobles were haughty towards their allies: formerly a Roman magistrate travelling through Italy put up at the house of his friend (*hospes*), but it now became customary everywhere to receive such travellers with pomp. The games were exhibited on such a scale as to require immense fortunes; in the year 580, there were no less than 150 gladiators at a funeral solemnity. The officers and nobles had now opportunities to satisfy their desires with splendid buildings and luxuries of every kind, and to fill their houses with costly furniture, carpets, plate, etc. The Romans had grown rich, but the immediate consequence was a brutal use of their riches. Agriculturists are excellent men, so long as they live in favourable circumstances, but when they acquire wealth on a sudden, they exhibit a striking proof of how difficult it is to make a rational use of it. A similar instance occurs in the history of Ditzmarsch, where several years ago corruption became general at a time when, after some years of scarcity, the people acquired wealth by extraordinary sales of corn; but soon afterwards they were again reduced to poverty. Thus, the Romans who had accumulated immense wealth, and did not know how to use it, began to addict themselves to gluttony. Hence it came to pass, as Livy says<sup>16</sup>, that cooks who had before been the most despised class of slaves, now became the most expensive. The Roman pontiffs, as we see from their bills of fare in Macrobius, rivalled in their eating and drinking the canons of modern times.<sup>17</sup> Before this time the Roman consuls had lived like simple peasants, but now exorbitant sums were spent upon Greek cooks: gluttony and the most disgusting vulgarity took the place of former frugality. The Athenians lived frugally at all times, and the Greeks are on the whole a frugal nation; the Italians, on the other hand, can be frugal; but at times, when they are let loose, they indulge in brutal intemperance.

Although the form and appearance of the Roman constitution

<sup>16</sup> xxxix. 6.

<sup>17</sup> Sat. ii. 9; Horat. Carm. ii. 14. 26, foll. with the notes of the commentators.

continued to be democratical, yet the nobles could do anything with impunity. I need only remind you of L. Quinctius Flamininus, the brother of Titus, who, merely to afford his favourite the pleasure of seeing a man struggling in the agonies of death<sup>18</sup>, slaughtered a man of Gallic origin who implored his assistance either against an unjust verdict, or because he, being a hostage, had been insulted—a crime more horrible than that of the Sultan who called in a man and ordered him to be beheaded, in order that his painter might have something frightful to paint. Cato ejected him from the senate. Although the Romans were, in general, much more conscientious than the Greeks, and although Polybius, fifty years after this time, places them very far above his own countrymen, still embezzlement of the public money, extortions from the allies, and acts of violence and wantonness of every description, are henceforth of quite common occurrence. This is the state of things which we see in the fragment of Cato's oration *De Sumtu Suo*<sup>19</sup>, the gem in the collection of Fronto, who made the extracts for the emperor Antoninus Pius: the passage shows that at the end of the sixth century, it was the general supposition that public functionaries seized every opportunity to enrich themselves.

All the differences between the two estates had ceased, the only distinction being that between nobles and non nobles, the patricians, as an order, had lost their importance. The last distinction according to which one of the consuls should always be a patrician, entirely ceases at the time of the war against Perseus, as the patrician families had almost become extinct. In regard to the praetorship, the distinction had been abolished; for the aediles alone it still continued. But it was nevertheless very difficult for a plebeian who was not noble to rise in the state; it was only now and then that a *novus homo*, like Cato, forced his way up; and the whole nobility seem to have been united as one man to oppose such intrusions.

The city on the other hand became very much embellished, and splendid buildings were erected; the courts of justice had formerly been held in the open air, as among our ancestors; but now basilicae were built: the name is derived from the στοά

<sup>18</sup> Livy, xxxix. 42.

<sup>19</sup> Fronto, p. 149, ed. A. Mai, Rome, 1823. Comp. Meyer, *Fragmenta orationum Romanorum*, p. 30, foll. 2nd edit.

*βασιλική*, under which the *βασιλεὺς* sat at Athens; it was a combination of threefold porches, in which the judges assembled in the open air, but under cover. Cato was the first who built a basilica (*Porcia*) in the Forum: by and by several others were erected; afterwards they were surrounded by walls, and when the Christian religion was introduced at Rome, that form was regarded as the most suitable for Christian worship, as the different stoae might be assigned as distinct places, men and matrons assembling in the two side porches, while the clergy occupied the central one. The high altar and the seat of the bishop were near the spot originally assigned to the tribunal. Hence the name *basilicae* has been transferred to all Christian churches, though their construction might be quite different. The building materials were still of ancient simplicity, and their style the ancient Tuscan or Doric: no marble was as yet used.

Cato was at this time the most remarkable man, a man of the good old times, in the true sense of the word. His name of Priscus is expressive of his Latin origin from Tusculum. Rome perhaps never produced another genius of so singular a kind.<sup>20</sup> The Romans at that time acquired all scientific refinement through the medium of Greek literature: but Cato formed an exception, for although, at a late period of his life, he acquired that language, and made himself acquainted with the literature of the Greeks, yet in reality he despised the Greeks, and his peculiar mode of thinking, his style and language, are pure old Roman—a circumstance which shews that it was not absolutely necessary for a Roman to be imbued with the spirit of the Greeks, in order to be a great man. He displayed his immense powers in the most various ways<sup>21</sup>: he was a great general, a great statesman, and orator,—in his censorship he highly distinguished himself,—an excellent agriculturist: in short, an active man in all the affairs of human life, and indefatigable in his exertions for the good of his country. He was, moreover, a man of considerable learning, and restless in collecting materials: as a prose writer, he was excellent in his way, but harsh and rough. There was no polish in anything he did, nothing that was

<sup>20</sup> His biography, by Plutarch, is excellent; for it is a subject which he could comprehend without a knowledge of the constitution, and without deep political insight: all that it required was the conception of an individual character, in which Plutarch is a great master.—N.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, xxxix. 40.

merely put on: all was with him the gift of nature, nothing the result of artificial training. Livy, without wishing to attach any blame to him—for he loved him—playfully describes his conduct towards Scipio by the words *qui vivo eo allatrade ejus (Scipionis) magnitudinem solitus est.*<sup>22</sup> His peculiarities were those of a man of humble origin, who, being endowed with immense energy, by it forces his way through endless difficulties; he could not live at peace with the noble and the wealthy, for they and their acquired manners were disgusting to him in the highest degree, and to combat what was repugnant to him was the natural turn of his mind. With regard to the conduct which he required of every one to shew towards the state, we cannot charge him with affectation: it arose from the purest convictions. L. Valerius Flaccus, his colleague in the censorship and tribuneship, was the only man who agreed with him in sentiment; he hated everything that was ornamental or elegant, hence his patriotism clung especially to the past: he considered his contemporaries as degenerate; his *beau ideal* lay a hundred years behind him, and his happiness consisted in ancient simplicity, economy, and austere morality. Cato had the nature of a lion, and was active with unremitting zeal. At the age of eighty-six, he carried on a great law-suit; and at the age of ninety, accused Servius Galba. He was a Roman in the fullest sense of the word, and was bent upon seeing the sovereignty and grandeur of his nation firmly established; but was inspired with an extraordinary love of justice. Although he did not like the Greeks, yet he defended the Rhodians, and in like manner protected the Lusitanians against the faithlessness and extortion of Galba, as well as all those who were helpless or friendless. He is one of the greatest and most honourable characters in Roman history: he resembles the great men of Germany of the sixteenth century, in whom that which we call rudeness was nothing but the peculiar manner of the time. Respecting the other Romans of that age, who are usually called great men, I have nothing to say: there is not one among them who deserves the name of a great man.

In the earlier times the strength of Rome consisted in her free peasantry, but this class of her population was gradually losing its importance and influence. One of those levies which the late wars had required must have ruined many entire families.

<sup>22</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 54.

Another change which had lately taken place, and which could not remain without political consequences, was the importance which capital had acquired. Ever since the end of the first Punic war, when the Romans gained possession of Sicily, we find capitalists engaged in enterprises and speculations to increase their moveable property; and this spirit was encouraged by the facility and impunity with which they could pursue their objects in the provinces. Usury was indeed forbidden by the Roman law, as it was in later times forbidden by the canon law; but such a law is unnatural, and of no avail, for, in defiance of the canon law, various ways were devised, which enabled capitalists to take interest with impunity; and similar methods were resorted to at Rome, where capitalists did business with foreigners, or substituted other names for their own. The canon law imposed no restrictions on the Jews, and the Roman law did not extend its protection to the Italian allies, or to freedmen; so that a thousand ways were left open to evade the law. In the provinces the spirit of usury found no obstacles at all. The *Publicum Romanum* had been immensely extended, and portions of it were let out to farm, such as the mines of Spain, the tunny-fisheries on the coast of Sardinia, the tithes of Sicily and Illyricum, and other countries; large sums of money were thus put into circulation, and the profits made by these things were as great as those made in modern times by speculators in paper securities. Whenever, for instance, a war contribution was to be raised, the *publicani* were immediately ready to offer the money at an interest of at least 12, but sometimes 24, or even 36 per cent., and the governors of the provinces took good care that such debts were paid. Thus, there began to be an enormous circulation of money, of which, not a trace had previously existed. This is the manner in which the class of *publicani* was gradually formed. Distinct traces of them are found in Livy as early as the second Punic war<sup>23</sup>, although it was not until the century following that they acquired their notorious importance, when they form a parallel to the money-dealers whom the eighteenth century produced.

According to the common account, the Great Scipio died in the year 569, in which also Hannibal put an end to his life by poison, because the Romans very dishonourably required

<sup>23</sup> Livy, xxiii. 48 and 49; xxv. 3 and 4.

Prusias of Bithynia to deliver him up to them. Eumenes stood in a servile relation to the Romans: his extensive and wealthy dominions were so unwarlike that the small state of Bithynia was formidable to him; the latter also extended its power, and acquired a large portion of Phrygia on the Hellespont. In this war Hannibal conducted the undertakings of Prusias; and the Roman ambassadors forthwith demanded his surrender. When Hannibal saw that he could not escape anywhere, he took poison and died. This demand of the Romans is one of the disgraceful acts of those times; and it is unpardonable in T. Quinctius Flamininus that he allowed himself to be made use of for such an object.<sup>24</sup> But virtue and the sense of honour were rapidly vanishing from the Roman republic, and its condition was already most deplorable. However, even in their best period they would not have been more generous towards an enemy like Hannibal, as is clear from the example of C. Pontius in the war against the Samnites.

---

### LECTURE LXX.

THE current ideas respecting Roman literature are no less one-sided than those respecting the early intellectual condition of the Romans. We must not imagine that, previously to their conquests in Greece, they were as ignorant of Greek literature as, for instance, our ancestors were previously to the revival of letters, or that they had no literature of their own. It is certain, indeed, that the Romans did not possess any such distinct class of literary men as there existed in Greece; but with regard to their knowledge of Greek literature and poetry, we have the strongest possible evidence that the Romans, and the Italian nations in general, were intimately acquainted with them at a very early period. In the ancient works of art of the Etruscans and Oscans, we find representations of subjects from the ancient Greek fables, and of Greek persons, although, in passing through the mouths of the people, the names of these persons had sometimes undergone peculiar changes. Instead of Odysseus, for example, we find Ulixes, which seems

<sup>24</sup> Livy, xxxix. 51, foll.; Appian, *Syriaca*, 11.

to have been a Sicilian form<sup>1</sup>; instead of Ganymedes we find Catamitus; instead of Laomedon, Alumentus, and others. These and similar instances prove that Greek myths were generally known in Italy.<sup>2</sup> But to understand them must have been difficult for the Romans, especially for the Sabines and the original inhabitants of Italy, whose religion was not a mythology, but a real theology; for their divinities were *voivouera*, and their mythical legends referred only to subordinate divinities; their great divinities consequently were destitute of those attributes which gave life to the poetry of the Greeks. Among the Pelasgians and Latins, on the other hand, there was a greater resemblance to the elements of Grecian mythology and poetry, which struck root also among the Romans through the medium of the Sibylline books, and the oracle of Apollo, so that Greek mythology and poetry soon became intelligible to them. From the end of the first Punic war, the poetry of the Greeks spread very generally through the medium of the Latin language, though in Rome itself, it probably excited less interest than in other Italian towns. The theatre of Tusculum, which, if we may judge from the foundations discovered in the orchestra, cannot have been erected later than the second Punic war but in all probability was built much earlier, presupposes the performance of dramas, whether of Greek or of native growth.

The *atellanae*, which we meet with as early as the close of the fourth century, are an evident proof of a fresh vein of national poetry. I believe the statement to be correct, that they were extempore productions, like the poetry of the improvisatori of modern Italy, and they were certainly not confined to the Romans. As the *atellanae* present to us a kind of national comedy, so the *praetextatae* were very old national tragedies.<sup>3</sup> I believe we are not mistaken in thinking that there was some connexion between these *praetextatae* and the solemn funeral processions, in which the masks of the dead, who had *curules majores*, were carried about with all the emblems of their dignity, by persons of the same stature; but even independently of this connexion, we may believe them to have been very ancient. There is no mention of any

<sup>1</sup> An allusion to him occurs in a temple in Sicily (Plut. *Marc.* 20.)—N.

<sup>2</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 310, foll.

<sup>3</sup> Compare vol. i. p. 520, note 1150.

praetextatae earlier than those of Attius. But the fact of his having composed them according to the rules of art, and in a poetical style, is a proof of their existence previously to his time.

The translation of Greek poetry into the Latin language was a great and most important step. Livius Andronicus is called a Tarentine captive, probably for no other reason but because he was confounded with M. Livius Macatus, who maintained himself at Tarentum.<sup>4</sup> The interval between his alleged departure from Tarentum, and the time when he appeared before the public with his dramas, seems to be too long, unless we suppose him to have spent only his early childhood at Tarentum. The accounts respecting him are very uncertain, for in the early times, the personal character and circumstances of bards were generally neglected, and the Romans in particular paid little attention to the history of the lives of their early poets. At a later period, they began to compile historical information concerning them; but the most incredible things were put together, as we see even in the biographies of Plautus and Terence. To judge from his fragments, it seems that Andronicus had not acquired any mastery of the Greek forms. He translated the *Odyssey*, which, from its relation to Latium, had greater attractions for the Romans than the *Iliad*<sup>5</sup>: he does not, however, seem to have translated the whole of the poem, but to have made an abridgment of it in the national Italian rhythm, and not in a Greek metre. The great poem of Naelius was likewise in the Saturnian rhythm. All that Livius wrote besides his *Odyssey* are tragedies, which, like the *atellanae*, were not performed in permanent theatres, but on a kind of scaffolding in the Circus.

Besides the great historical poem of Naelius, in which he combined the latest history of his country with Greek mythology; he treated, e. g., of the mythus of the Gigantes; he wrote both tragedies and comedies, as we must infer from the titles. That he was a great poet, we may believe on the assertion of Cicero<sup>6</sup>, who had in reality no taste for the old national poetry of his countrymen. In the latter period of his life, Naelius was persecuted; for considering that he had not the full franchise, he had been too bold, and had insulted the

<sup>4</sup> See Livy, xxvii. 34, and xxiv. 20.

<sup>5</sup> It is a very just idea, that Circæ was connected with Circæti, which is in fact the ancient form of the fable.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Brutus, c. 19.

Metelli, who availed themselves of the circumstance of his being a Campanian, and threw him into prison.

When Naevius was an old man, Plautus, one of the greatest poetical geniuses of antiquity, was just entering on his best period. He shews his great talent in his bold and free, though somewhat singular manner of dealing with his characters. He takes Greek pieces with Greek *dramatis personae*, and treats them with a perfect irony. He does not translate from the Greek; but the Greeks, in his plays, speak, act, and are witty, as Romans would be; and there occurs in them nothing that could have been foreign to the Romans. All his personages display those peculiarities of character which distinguished the aerarii, who formed a lower order in the population of Rome, and consisted chiefly of freedmen and strangers who had become naturalised, but could not rise to the rank of free Roman warriors. The scenes are laid at Athens, Epidamnus, or Ephesus, and the names of the persons are Greek; but we are reminded every moment that we are in the very heart of Rome. He also has Greek characters; for the parasite is, I believe, a Greek and not a Roman character. What makes Plautus such a wonderful poet is, that on the slippery ground which he had chosen, he always shews the most extraordinary skill in hitting the right point. His language is no less admirable than his poetical skill. If we compare his language with that of his predecessors, we find it greatly altered, enriched, and refined, which is a proof that the language had been much cultivated even before his time; had this not been the case, the language of Plautus would certainly have been very different from what it is. We have fortunately the opportunity of comparing his language with that of a *senatus-consultum* of the fifth century<sup>7</sup>, and that of the tomb-stone of Scipio Barbatus, which present considerable differences.

Livius Andronicus was the client of one Livius. Naevius was a Roman citizen, a *municeps Campanus*, and lived at Rome, though only with the rights of an aerarius; but as regards Plautus, it is not even known whether he was a Roman citizen—he had perhaps not given up the franchise of his

<sup>7</sup> If Niebuhr alludes to the *Senatusconsultum de Bacchanalibus*, we have here a “*lapis memoriae*.” Instead of the word *senatusconsultum*, we must probably read *inscriptio*, or some such word, as Niebuhr was no doubt thinking of the *columna rostrata*.

native place. He is said to have been poor; but I do not believe the story, that he gained his living by working at a hand-mill.

Ennius was a gentleman, a Roman citizen, and belonged unquestionably to one of the tribes. He was somewhat younger than Naevius, and lived on terms of great intimacy with Scipio, Fulvius Nobilior, Laelius, and the principal men of the republic, and was not only much esteemed personally, but was the first who made the Romans esteem and honour men of literary occupation. Among his fragments there are some very excellent specimens of his poetry, though his subjects were not of a lofty nature. He seems to have been weak in comedy and to have despised it—a rare saint! but in epic poetry he was very respectable. Some of his poems were written in the national Italian rhythm, for instance, his *Sabine Women*<sup>8</sup>, and also his *Saturae*. But, on the whole, he followed his own method; the metres of Plautus are not altogether Greek, and although they often coincide with the Greek ones, still we cannot say that he borrowed them. The measuring of syllables according to length and shortness, is Greek; the Romans did not measure with the same exactness, not having the fine ear of the Greeks. The latter have their pure iambic and trochaic metres, but the same metres with some modifications, were national among the Romans also, as the anapaests are among the modern Greeks, and all metres among some Slavonic nations. I believe that the senarius is as little peculiar to the Latin language as it is to our own, and that Plautus merely adopted it from the Greeks as Ennius adopted the hexameter. The introduction of this latter verse produced at Rome the same revolution in poetry as in Germany; and the hexameters of Ennius are nearly as awkward and imperfect as the earliest German hexameters. They have sometimes no caesura at all, and sometimes wrong ones in the fourth foot, which renders them altogether unsatisfactory. I must confess that, much as I like the *numeri* and *sales* of Plautus, I cannot be pleased with the hexameters of Ennius. Ennius wished to try all the Greek metres, with the exception of the really lyric ones, and constructed them with more accuracy than the earlier dramatists; for the senarius has more measured syllables and became more firmly established; but

<sup>8</sup> Jul. Victor, p. 224, Or., with the note of A. Mai.

between the verses of Ennius and those of Virgil, we find the same contrast as between the metrical forms of the poetry of Klopstock and those of Count Platen Hallermünde. The ancient metres have a great many peculiarities, such as the entire suppression of short syllables: *ego*, for instance, is used like *io*, as one syllable, and *accipito* is made a dactyl—peculiarities which are as yet by no means well understood. Ennius is less original than either Naevius or Plautus; but he does not deserve the contempt with which Horace speaks of him. He was a native of Calabria, belonged to a Hellenised people, had received a Greek education, and the Greek language was his second mother tongue. Having learned Latin as a foreign language, it is no wonder that he wished to introduce Greek forms into Roman poetry. The literature of the Romans was at this time very brilliant in comparison with that of the Greeks; for the best Alexandrian period was over, and, when Livius Andronicus began his career, Callimachus was either already dead or near his end. Eratosthenes was more of a versifier than a poet. Antagoras<sup>9</sup> and Aratus were dead: in short, Greek literature was fast dying away, whereas at Rome it was thriving with extraordinary vigour; and would have done so still more, if Ennius had not made the foreign influence so predominant. For some time, however, the Romans held out against it.

Pacuvius was somewhat younger than Ennius, and a son of Ennius's sister. He well deserves the name of the deep-thinker. Pacuvius followed Aeschylus and Sophocles as his models, and despised Euripides, which is a very characteristic feature, and one by which he placed himself in opposition to the taste of the Greeks of his age.

How familiar the Romans were with Greek literature may also be seen from the works which were written immediately after the second Punic war. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius wrote the history of their country in the Greek language. Fabius is often mentioned, but no one, not even Dionysius, has ever objected to him that his language was barbarous or unreadable; nay, the very fact that Dionysius carried his history down only to the commencement of the first Punic war shews that, in his judgment, Fabius was for the subsequent period all that could be desired: at the same time, however,

<sup>9</sup> Fabricius, *Bibl. Graec.* iv. p. 461.

he saw that for the early times of Roman history, Fabius was not satisfactory. A contemporary of his was Acilius. Subsequently we still find many other Romans who wrote historical works in Greek; the great Scipio wrote the history of his wars in the form of a letter to Philip of Macedonia<sup>10</sup>; in like manner his son-in-law, P. Scipio Nasica wrote the history of the war against Perseus<sup>11</sup>; and Aemilius Paullus engaged Greek grammarians, rhetoricians, painters, and drawing-masters, to instruct his sons.

---

### LECTURE LXXI.

DURING these rapid and complete changes in all the forms of private and public life, the Romans were not inactive in extending their dominion; for while their state was in process of dissolution, they did not know what to do except to conquer. The evil had taken such deep root, that it would have been hardly possible to produce any change; but nothing whatever was done towards effecting a cure, and demoralisation increased at a rapid rate.

The Ligurian war<sup>1</sup> is not only insignificant, in comparison with others, but extremely obscure, on account of our want of an accurate geographical knowledge of the country. It has some resemblance to the present undertakings against the Caucasian tribes. The Apennines are not, indeed, as high as the Caucasus, but they offer the same advantages for their inhabitants to defend themselves. The Ligurians were ultimately annihilated, which is always the unavoidable fate of such nations, when a powerful state is bent upon their destruction. The Ligurian tribes extended in reality as far as the river Rhone; but as the Romans were chiefly concerned in securing the frontiers of Etruria, they made themselves masters only of the territory of Genoa. The wars did not extend beyond the river Varus, or the frontiers of Provence, for the hostilities against the Salyes in the neighbourhood of Massilia belong to a later period.<sup>2</sup> The Ligurian tribes defended themselves and their poverty with such resolute determination,

<sup>10</sup> Polybius, x. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Polybius, xxix. 6.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xxxv. 8, foll.

<sup>2</sup> To the year u.c. 631. See Appian, *Gal.* 12.

that the Romans, who could not expect any rich spoils, aimed at nothing short of extirpating them, or expelling them from their mountains. The consuls, P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus, therefore transplanted 50,000 Ligurians into Samnium, where Frontinus<sup>3</sup> as late as the second century of our own era, found their descendants under the name of the Cornelian and Baebian Ligurians. The war was brought to a close before that against Perseus. It was especially for the purpose of exercising control over Gaul that the high road of Flaminus, which went as far as Ariminum, was now continued, under the name of *via Flaminia*, as far as Placentia, and that the whole country south of the Po was so much filled with colonies, that the Celtic population disappeared.

Ever since the successful campaign of Scipio in Spain, the Romans had endeavoured to establish their dominion firmly in that country; they had sent thither one, and sometimes two praetors, and kept regular troops there. From the second Punic war, or perhaps even from the time of Pyrrhus, one legion seems to have been stationary at Tarentum, and another in Sicily; and now we find two legions stationary in Spain. This system of keeping stationary troops altered the character of the wars of the Romans, and had a decided influence upon all their civil relations. In former times the legions had always been disbanded at the end of every campaign, and new ones were formed. This method had the advantage, that every Roman passed through his time of military service and then returned home, so that the soldiers were never separated or distinct from the citizens. Now things became different. The legions stationed in Spain, for instance, remained there for a number of years, married Spanish women, and became estranged from Italy. When therefore such legions were disbanded, many soldiers would remain in Spain, unwilling to return to a country to which they had become strangers. The Roman dominion in Spain extended over Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia, as far as Sierra Morena, for in the wars with the Celtiberians, the latter pressed forward through the countries of their neighbours. The object of the Romans in these wars therefore was not so much to extend their dominions as to secure what they had; but at the end of the second Punic war their authority seems to have become somewhat unsettled,

until it was re-established in his consulship, 557, by Cato, who won the hearts of the Spaniards by his justice. It is indeed surprising to see that a Roman general with humane feelings was always able to win the affections and confidence of those tribes, and to establish the authority of Rome for a time, until fresh acts of injustice provoked their resentment. The people of Spain always shewed themselves in a noble light. But Cato succeeded not merely by his justice and bravery, but also by his cunning, which was a prominent feature in his character as well as in that of the Romans generally from the earliest times. The Spanish towns were strongly fortified, for the Spaniards were a civilised nation, and to conquer them was a matter of great difficulty. These fortifications became the occasion of a general war. It is said that Cato sent circulars to the magistrates of seventy or eighty towns, with the command not to open them before a certain day fixed by him. These letters contained, for each town, the command to raze its walls to the ground on that day, and the threat that, in case of disobedience, the town would be besieged, and its inhabitants reduced to slavery. Each town obeyed, imagining that it alone had received such a command; and before the stratagem was discovered, the towns had already made considerable progress in the destruction of their fortifications.<sup>4</sup>

In the year 575, the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the son of that Gracchus who had distinguished himself in the war against Hannibal by his brilliant victory over Hanno, and had found a glorious death, and the father of the two unfortunate brothers, went to Spain. He is the same who had deeply lamented the fact that P. Scipio tried to place himself above the law, but still would not allow him to be punished like any other citizen. Subsequently Scipio selected him for his son-in-law. The hostile feeling towards the Romans had spread even among the Celtiberians, who occupied the countries from the sources of the river Ebro, as far as the frontiers of La Mancha, Andalusia and Valencia, and inhabited chiefly the eastern part of New Castile, the western part of Aragon, and the provinces of Soria and Cuença. They had in reality never been subject to the Carthaginians, and their mercenaries had served in the armies of both the

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 41. Compare Livy, xxxiv. 17.

belligerent parties. They were now involved in a war with the Romans, who wished to reduce them to submission. The more difficult this undertaking—the Celtiberians were the bravest among the Spaniards—the more was it incumbent on the Romans to subdue those countries. But Tib. Sempronius Gracchus concluded a peace with them, the terms of which we know not, but they were so fair and reasonable, that those nations who had no wish to carry on the war, afterwards whenever the Romans adhered to the terms, always looked upon them as the greatest blessing that they could have implored from heaven.<sup>5</sup> The whole family of the Gracchi is distinguished for its extraordinary gentleness and kindness, qualities which were, on the whole, foreign to the Romans. This peace was the means by which Gracchus gained a hold on the affections of the natives of Spain. Had his successors kept to the terms of the peace, the Celtiberians would have been allies as faithful and useful to the Romans, as the Marsians and Pelignians. But other generals were extending the Roman dominion in the western parts of Spain: the Vaccaean, north of the Tagus, and the Lusitanians must have been subdued between the years 570 and 580. Their submission, however, did not last long, on account of the extortions of the Roman generals.

In the meantime, a new storm arose in the East. Philip of Macedonia did not live to a great age; at his death he may have been about sixty years old, and he made excellent use of his long reign to strengthen his kingdom. His expectations respecting the war against Antiochus had not been realised, though his circumstances had been greatly improved by the acquisition of Demetrias and a part of Magnesia, by means of which he encompassed Thessaly. The Dolopians had continued to be subject to him, although they were separated from his kingdom, and he was also in possession of Athamania and the Greek towns on the coast of Thrace (Aenos, Maronea, Abdera, and others), which he had first taken from the Egyptians, then given up, and at last re-occupied during the war against Antiochus. The Romans allowed this state of things to continue for some time, but then they began insidiously to undermine his empire. They supported Amyntander, who expelled the Macedonian garrisons from Athamania<sup>6</sup>, and

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xl. 47, foll., xli. 3, foll.; Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 43.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xxxviii. 1—3.

they readily listened to the ambassadors from the Thracian towns and the Thessalians, who complained of Philip's aggrandisement, and had been stirred up by the Romans themselves<sup>7</sup>, although they must have been convinced that he had no other object but to strengthen himself until he could restore his former power; for in all he did, Philip was too cautious to violate the treaty. Eumenes, who wanted to obtain possession of the towns on the Thracian coast, in order to extend his dominion as far as the frontiers of Macedonia, was particularly hostile to Philip. The latter, on hearing of the meeting of many ambassadors at Rome, sent his son Demetrius, who had formerly lived among the Romans as a hostage, and consequently had great connections there. These negotiations led to no results, the Romans at that time always acting with cruel insidiousness; and the affairs of Macedonia were to be settled by Roman commissioners. Everybody in Macedonia was afraid of doing any thing which might be displeasing to the Romans. The commissioners were received by Philip with feelings of great exasperation; but he yielded in what he could not help, merely with a view to gain time. Misfortune had taught him wisdom. He had conducted the first war with Rome, from which he might have derived advantages with laxity, and as a matter of secondary importance; and he had undertaken the one carried on directly against him with so little preparation, that by a single defeat he lost every thing. But ever since the year 555, during the last eighteen years of his life, he had been making constant and serious preparations, and he, as well as the Romans, acted faithlessly. When the Roman army returned from Asia, he instigated the Thracians to fall upon them and take possession of their baggage, while he endeavoured to secure himself as much as possible against any attack that might be made on him. The Romans, on the other hand, endeavoured to deprive him of his possessions, and he therefore strove to make himself as unassailable as possible. Not being allowed to keep ships of war, and being exposed to constant attacks at sea, he formed the plan of entirely abandoning the maritime towns which had no considerable fortifications, and of drawing the population into the interior of Macedonia. He directed all his attention to the

<sup>7</sup> Livy, xxxix. 24, foll., 33, foll.; Polybius, xxiii. 4—6, 11—16; Appian, *De Rebus Mace.* 4, p. 516, foll. ed. Schweigh.

increase of his finances, and with this view established settlements in Thrace.<sup>8</sup> The working of the Macedonian mines was carried on with double zeal, and the arsenals were filled with arms; he also formed settlements of Thracians in the desolate towns of Macedonia. At the same time he kept up negotiations with foreign powers, and comparatively disregarding the impotent kings of the East, formed friendly connexions with the Thracians, especially the Getae and Bastarnae. The latter dwelt in Dacia, the modern Moldavia and Wallachia, and were inclined to abandon their abodes, because the Sarmatians, on the Dnieper, were at that time constantly pressing forward. Philip endeavoured to persuade those tribes to seek new homes in Italy—a plan which, seventy years later, was carried into effect by the Cimbri.<sup>9</sup> Such an undertaking on the part of the Thracians would have been the only means of giving the Roman power a shock; but the negotiations with those tribes, in which considerable progress had already been made, were interrupted by Philip's death. Had those nations actually invaded Italy, Philip would have been sure to gain considerable advantages; for the Romans were generally hated, and deserved to be hated. Of virtue and honesty towards foreign nations, not a trace was left among them; and of justice, which had formerly been the very foundation of their religion, they had no longer any idea. Among the many things for which they drew well-deserved hatred upon themselves, we must mention here the intrigues by which, both in free states and within the families of princes, they contrived to gain over to their interest the most contemptible persons; who, encouraged by, and relying on, the protection of the Romans, could venture to do anything. By such means, they created within the royal family of Macedonia, an enmity between the heirs to the throne,—Demetrius and Perseus<sup>10</sup>: the former was the younger son of Philip by his legitimate wife; the latter the son of a concubine. Demetrius had spent some time among the Romans as a hostage, and they had gained possession of his mind by holding out to him the hope of succeeding to the throne of his father, and by the promise that they would recognise him and not Perseus.<sup>11</sup> After years of horrible accusations and plots against Demetrius, Perseus at length succeeded in inducing his father to poison Demetrius.

<sup>8</sup> Polybius, xxiv. 8; Livy, xl. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Justin, xxxii. 2. Polybius, xxiv. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Livy, xxxix. 35.

<sup>11</sup> Livy, xxxix. 53.

How far Demetrius may have gone to favour the scheme of the Romans, or whether he was actually guilty of anything more than a mere transitory unjust thought, cannot be ascertained. According to the morals of the time, we cannot suppose that Demetrius was quite guiltless; but it is certain that the charges against his father and Perseus, of which we read in Livy<sup>12</sup>, are very much exaggerated, and that the account of the manner in which Perseus calumniated him and seduced his father to murder him, beautiful as it is to read, is rather romance than history.

Philip died soon afterwards, in the year 573. It is perhaps one of those unjust suspicions which hang over so many things, when Livy<sup>13</sup> calls the death of Philip *peropportuna Perseo*, insinuating thereby that his death was brought about by Perseus. Why should not Philip, at his age, have died a natural death? How could he have conceived the idea of excluding his son, who was certainly not an idiot, from the succession, and of fixing upon Antigonus, his cousin, a son of Antigonus Doson, as his successor? All this is highly improbable. Philip is said to have died of a broken heart at the wrong he had done to his son Demetrius. He left his kingdom to his son Perseus, stronger and more powerful than any one could have expected at his accession, and still less after his disadvantageous peace with Rome.

Perseus<sup>14</sup> is one of those characters of which it is difficult to give an idea; one of his prominent features, however, was avarice. This vice was his ruin; he could not separate himself from the treasures with which he might have raised a formidable power against the Romans. When he promised subsidies to foreign nations, his avarice did not allow him to abide by his word.<sup>15</sup> In his wars he was undecided and wavering, which arose, it is true, partly from the nature of the

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xl. 23.

<sup>13</sup> xl. 57.

<sup>14</sup> The name Perseus has been the subject of much discussion. Schneider (*Ausführliche Grammat. der Lateinischen Sprache*, vol. i. part 2, p. 71, foll.) has a whole chapter about the declension of it, but has not found the simple solution of the question. All Greek names terminating in *eis*, had in old Latin the termination *es*, and formed their genitive case in *i*; for example, *Piraees*, gen. *Piraci*, not *Piraei*, as we sometimes find it written in a barbarous way. In later times, however, Perseus falls under the third declension, but the genitive is *Persi*, as if the nominative were *Perseus*. The accusative is *Persem*. I have never met with the form *Persum*, although of *Piraeus* the accusative *Piraeum* sometimes occurs.—N.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, xliv. 26. Compare Polybius, xxviii. 8.

circumstances, but partly also from his own peculiar character. He was not a general, for he had no calmness or composure in moments of pressing danger. But we must nevertheless say of him this much, that so long as circumstances were not harassing or perplexing, and so long as he could act according to his own plans, he was always skilful in choosing the right way of proceeding. Respecting his courage, the ancients themselves are not agreed in their opinions. In the first year of his reign he tried to gain popularity among the Greeks, and he was most successful in his endeavours; for he won the Achaeans, Boeotians, Acarnanians, Epirots, and Thessalians, one by one, and even the Rhodians, and other islanders.<sup>16</sup> During this period he concealed his avarice; he was even generous, dispensed with tributes, pardoned those against whom justice had pronounced her severe judgments, and opened Macedonia as an asylum to unfortunate and exiled Greeks. In short his popularity rose to such a height, that the Greeks looked upon him as a prince in whose power it was to restore the Macedonian empire, and to drive the Romans away from the eastern shores of the Adriatic. There were however two parties in every town, a Roman and a Macedonian one; among the Achaeans there even arose three, a Roman, a Macedonian, and a patriotic one, which last was hated by the two others. Thus Perseus came into Greece, and was received with enthusiasm, as the Roman government became every day more oppressive. He also negotiated with Carthage; but matters had already come to that point, that even a general coalition could not have effected much; for although Rome's moral power was weakened, yet it had preserved that of a wealthy state, being able to hire and arm troops in distant countries.

The Rhodians were not bound to the Romans by any treaty, and therefore could, without violating any obligation, enter into friendly relations with Perseus. He married a Syrian princess, the daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes<sup>17</sup>, who is accurately described in the Bible<sup>18</sup>, and in the fragments of Polybius, as a mad tyrant and a frantic man, who however displayed considerable energy. Perseus hoped to find a useful ally in him. A sister of Perseus was married to Prusias.<sup>19</sup> The

<sup>16</sup> Livy, xli. 23, foll., xlvi. 5. Comp. Polybius, xxvi. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Livy, xlvi. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Maccab. i. 6. 1; ii. 1. 14, foll., 9. 3, foll.

<sup>19</sup> Livy, xlvi. 12.

negotiations with the Bastarnae were continued, and new ones were entered into even with the Illyrians. These connexions excited the suspicion of King Eumenes, and his fear lest he should fall a prey to Prusias and Antiochus if Perseus should be successful against the Romans, for Perseus held out the kingdom of Pergamus as a sort of bait to the other powers, which they might divide among themselves as a fair spoil. The natural consequence was, that Eumenes brought complaints against Perseus before the Romans, who listened to his suggestions, and took up the complaints against the Macedonian king, as well as those against the Rhodians. The small tribes of Thrace, which were oppressed by Perseus, justly or unjustly, were likewise encouraged to bring complaints against him, and the Carians and Lycians, who preferred being independent to paying heavy taxes to the Rhodians, were stirred up to complain of the latter.<sup>20</sup> In order to weaken the Rhodians, the Romans, whose policy was completely Machiavellian, gave to the Carian and Lycian towns the most favourable though undecided answers, and thus rendered the Rhodians more and more disaffected. One party among them however was attached to the Romans, and had yet power enough to prevent an open declaration of hostilities. The Rhodians were thus kept quiet at the beginning of the war with Perseus. Eumenes himself went to Rome, and was splendidly received; the Romans even thereby intending to show their hostile feeling towards Perseus, who however remained quiet, having been called the friend and ally of the Roman people, and his ambassadors having been received and honoured with presents.

Perseus therefore had reason to hope that, unless he himself broke the peace, the Romans would leave him alone. But in the meanwhile, an attempt was made at Delphi to assassinate Eumenes on his return from Rome.<sup>21</sup> The devising of such a plan for getting rid of an enemy is just what might have been expected of Perseus, although he afterwards positively denied having had any share in the attempt. It may be that the whole affair was merely a wretched farce of Eumenes, to give the Romans a handle for commencing the war; but it is almost too bad to suspect such a thing without evidence. The Romans required Perseus to deliver up some persons who enjoyed

<sup>20</sup> Polybius, xxvi. 7; Livy, xli. 6; compare xliv. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Livy, xlii. 15, foll.; Appian, *De Rebus Maced.* 2. p. 521, ed. Schweigh.

his especial favour, and who were suspected of being the instigators of the attempt. His refusal caused the outbreak of the war, which did not last quite four years, from 581 to 584. The turn it took was quite different from what the Romans had anticipated; for they imagined that it might be brought to a close by a single campaign, like the first war against Macedonia, and that against Antiochus. The war itself, however, came very opportunely for them, for their wish was to overthrow the kingdom of Macedonia; and not merely this, but to place all the relations of those eastern countries upon a different basis, to remove the treaties by which they were restrained, and to introduce an altogether new order of things.

But Perseus began the war with extraordinary resources. Macedonia had for the first time enjoyed a peace of 25 years, and was in a prosperous condition, so that Perseus, independently of his allied troops and 4000 horsemen, had an army of 40,000 foot. As the last books of Livy are mutilated, we cannot form an accurate notion of one part of the operations, and are left in ignorance of their exact connexion. Considering the disproportion of the forces of the belligerent parties, the war lasted very long: but the fact is, that the Roman general conducted it extremely ill; and military talent seems to have been very much on the decline among the Romans at that time. P. Licinius Crassus appeared in Thessaly, where Perseus came to meet him<sup>\*\*</sup>, and gained a considerable advantage over the cavalry of the Romans, who had many killed and taken prisoners. The king had conceived the mad hope that, by resolute conduct, he would obtain more favourable terms. His calculation, however, was wrong, for the Romans were faithful to their maxim, not to lay down their arms until their enemy was subdued. Negotiations were immediately entered into by the king; but the Romans demanded entire submission to whatever the senate might decide. A battle was then fought in Thessaly, near Sycurium, in which many Romans were slain, and still more were taken prisoners. This victory threw such a lustre around Perseus, that all Greece was on the point of joining him. The Roman fleet, it is true, was a great advantage to the Romans, and a curse to many of the Greek coast-towns. It was now, indeed, opposed by a

<sup>\*\*</sup> Livy, xlvi. 55, foll.

Macedonian fleet, which was more effectual than had been anticipated; but that of the Romans was superior. With the exception of a few leading men, such as Charops in Epirus, who had been educated at Rome, and boasted of being able to speak Latin, Lyciscus in Aetolia, and Callicrates in Achaia, all the Greeks were in favour of Perseus, and against the Romans. Rational men among the Greeks, such as Polybius (who no doubt hated the Romans as cordially as his father Lycortas, but their hatred was different from that of the ignorant multitude) and Philopoemen, wished indeed that the issue of the war might be such as to enable Perseus to maintain himself; but very few had confidence enough to act in reliance upon such an issue. The great mass of the people, however, fancied that it was impossible for Perseus not to conquer the Romans; and after the successful battle in Thessaly, all their heads were completely turned, so that the Greeks indulged in every kind of insolence towards the Romans.<sup>23</sup> We have seen a similar state of feeling in Germany, where a general exasperation against the dominion of the French was manifested, just at the time when their power had reached its height; and whenever the French sustained a trifling loss, some people were foolish enough to imagine that their power was on the decline, and to indulge in the most insulting language against them. Such was not the feeling of men like Polybius or Philopoemen, although they cannot surely have been deceived as to the personal character of Perseus.<sup>24</sup> Afterwards, when Polybius lived among the Romans, he resigned himself to his fate, saw the good in their character, and became reconciled to them. The state of affairs at that time, is quite clear from the fragments of his history. It was the hostile feeling towards the Romans which led the Greeks to their own ruin. On every occasion they gave vent to it; and such occasions occurred frequently. The Romans, therefore, likewise looked upon every Greek as an enemy, and acted with the greatest cruelty; the praetor Lucretius made himself particularly notorious. A number of maritime towns were taken, and destroyed or burned to ashes, and the inhabitants were carried away as slaves by the consul A. Hostilius Mancinus. Haliartus and Coronea, in Boeotia, were reduced to ashes. Had Perseus made good use of circumstances and pressed the consul, the

<sup>23</sup> Livy, xlii. 63.

<sup>24</sup> Polybius, xxviii. 10.

whole country east of the Adriatic would have been in a state of rebellion; but he was undecided, and confined himself to a small plan which he had devised, and in carrying out which alone he could be active; he was incapable of the grand undertakings which were necessary for the overthrow of the Roman empire. Thus he entered into the deceitful proposals of the Roman consul to conclude a permanent peace, during which Crassus withdrew from a perilous situation, whereupon the negotiations were of course broken off. In like manner, when Marcius Philippus was afterwards opposing Perseus in Thessaly with insufficient forces, he offered him a truce, which was to be followed by a peace; whereas it only gave the Romans time to send reinforcements to the consul. In the third year of the war Perseus was particularly fortunate; he even drove the Romans out of Macedonia into Illyricum, and yet had time enough to protect his kingdom against the attacks of the neighbouring Dardanians.<sup>25</sup>

---

## LECTURE LXXII.

IN the third year of the war, Perseus evacuated Thessaly, but kept possession of Magnesia and withdrew to Pieria, a tract of coast extending from Mount Olympus to the gulph of Thermae, where his army took up its winter-quarters. Tempe alone was occupied by one of his generals. There the Roman consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, made a bold attempt, for being stationed at the entrance of Tempe, at the foot of Mount Olympus, and not being able to force the entrance, he endeavoured to evade it, and tried with immense exertions to cross the vast mountain of Olympus with his troops, so as to pass round the Macedonians.<sup>1</sup> The latter not expecting such boldness, thought themselves quite safe. It was not without incredible difficulties that the Romans arrived at the northern foot of Olympus; and here they found themselves in a position where they might have been cut to pieces. The whole undertaking deserves censure; for if Perseus had had his wits about him, the Roman

<sup>25</sup> Livy, xlivi. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, xliv. 6, foll.

army might have been completely destroyed. But he left Dium, after having set fire to a portion of it, evacuated Pieria, and retreated to Pydna. The Roman general himself, after having advanced as far as the river Ascordus, finding his situation perilous, returned to Dium and thence to Phila. The Macedonians, emboldened by this apparent flight advanced again. The advantage, however, which the Romans derived from this undertaking was, that Tempe was evacuated by the Macedonians.

Some decisive step, however, had now become necessary. Public opinion became more and more changed respecting the issue of the war, although the Romans made slow progress, like the progress of a besieging army; but the Greeks were undecided in the highest degree, some relying upon others, hoping that a coalition would be formed against the Romans, and that fortune would turn against them. As they had reached their highest point, it was believed that they must fall, as all the states of Greece had fallen. The Rhodians thought that the time had now come for shewing that they were independent. They were highly exasperated against the Romans, and hoped to see them defeated, in order to be able firmly to establish their own authority in Lycia and Caria; but they too were disappointed in their expectations. The relation subsisting between Perseus, Prusias and Antiochus had lately gained more strength: Antiochus however had less zealously interfered in the affairs of Europe, but availed himself of the opportunity of recovering Egypt. As therefore he did not threaten Asia Minor, Eumenes began to feel more secure; he even altered his whole policy, and thought it more advisable to support the interests of Perseus than those of the Romans. Secret negotiations were commenced, which, however, could not remain concealed long in such a demoralised age, and the Romans never forgave Eumenes this apostasy. The Bastarnae, too, with whom Perseus had long been carrying on negotiations, were now in movement<sup>2</sup>, and Genthius, king of the northern part of Illyricum (his kingdom and genealogy cannot be accurately defined, though his country seems to have been the modern Upper Albania) with the capital of Scutari (Scorda), was likewise allied with Perseus. Genthius was not a powerful prince, but would still have been a formidable neighbour

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, xxix. 2; Livy, xliv. 27.

to the Romans, if he had resolutely declared himself in favour of their enemies. But both the Bastarnae and the Illyrians expected subsidies from Perseus. On this occasion, the Macedonian king shewed his contemptible character; for, after having promised Genthius 300 talents, he sent him only ten, and kept back the rest, declaring that he would send them in a short time; but the fact was, that he wished to deceive Genthius, for he could not prevail upon himself to part with his money. Genthius, not suspecting Perseus to be capable of such meanness, threw, at his instigation, the Roman ambassadors into prison, so that now he had no longer any choice between Rome and Macedonia. In like manner, it was an unpardonable mistake that Perseus did not send the Bastarnae into Italy, according to the grand scheme of his father.

In the year 584, L. Aemilius Paullus, the son of him who had fallen at Cannae, was made consul for the second time. The Romans were convinced of the necessity for increased efforts to bring the Macedonian war to a close, and provided him with the means of attaining this object. The Rhodians had unfortunately for themselves, attempted to mediate between the Romans and Macedonians, in a manner which had offended the former. The war disturbed their commerce, and they did not by any means wish to see the Romans victorious, as they owed their independence to the equipoise between the several states. They came forward rather impetuously, pledging themselves to induce Philip to conclude peace; but the Romans, however heavily the war weighed upon them, did not wish for peace, and the language of the Rhodians was offensive to them. The Rhodians felt that at home they were powerful and respected by their neighbours, so that whenever opinions were divided on any subject, it was in their power to give the casting vote, as had been the case in the war against Antiochus. Such circumstances are always very deceptive; and in this instance they made the Rhodians forget the enormous disproportion between their own power and that of the Romans.<sup>3</sup> The language which they used towards the Romans was not what it should have been, but their wish was to save Macedonia from destruction.

Perseus opened the last campaign without any additional forces, except those of Genthius, who continued his hostilities

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, xxix. 4; Livy, xliv. 14.

against the Romans. The king had taken his winter quarters in Macedonia, and when the Romans broke up, he retreated before them behind the Cambunian mountains; a lofty range which separates Thessaly from the coast land of Macedonia, one of the most beautiful countries in the world. But this time too the mountains were evaded; the lofty and broad Olympus, the tops of which are covered with almost perpetual snow, lies between the Peneus and Pieria. Tempe, which formed the main pass, was fortified. There were indeed many other roads across Olympus; but most of them were fortified in such a manner that Paullus thought that no advantage would be gained by an attack. He discovered, however, a path leading right across one of the highest summits of the mountain, which, owing to its inaccessible nature, was less strongly guarded: thither he sent young Scipio Nasica the son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, with 8000 men, to march round the enemy's camp. This undertaking would not have succeeded, if Perseus had been a great general: but he who attacks always has advantages; the insurmountable height was passed, the Macedonian army found the Romans in its rear; the advanced corps were beaten by Scipio Nasica, and Perseus was obliged to change his position. He now drew up his army behind Pydna, with a deep mountain torrent in his front; for through that narrow coast land, a number of deep torrents flow down mount Olympus parallel to one another into the sea, and behind each torrent lines had been drawn up, in order to resist the Romans at every step, if they should penetrate through Tempe. Meantime the Romans had crossed the mountain opposite the left wing of the Macedonians, so that those lines on the banks of the torrents were useless, and the Macedonians were obliged to throw themselves behind the last, in the neighbourhood of Pydna. The Romans were thus in Pieria, the country of Orpheus, and this was a great step gained; but the Macedonian forces were yet entire. The decisive battle, in which the Macedonian kingdom found its inglorious end, was fought near Pydna. In the space of a single hour, the whole army of Perseus was defeated: the infantry was cut to pieces, and the cavalry escaped in a disgraceful manner, but without any considerable loss. The loss of the Romans was trifling; some say that they lost only 91 men; others, that they lost 100. The former is a statement of Posidonius,

a man who was not favourably disposed towards Rome: he is not the celebrated Posidonius, but a contemporary of this war who wished to justify Perseus.<sup>4</sup> The king had now no confidence in any one, or any thing, for his country was exhausted in the extreme; and the great fault of the Macedonians was faithlessness towards their princes in times of need. He fled, and, escorted by some Cretans, endeavoured to save himself with his remaining treasures, as if it had been possible to find any place where they could be safe. He therefore offered to his companions a part of his treasures, but in the madness of his avarice he soon repented; so that when at Amphipolis he got some breathing time, he cheated them out of what he had promised them. All the towns opened their gates to the Romans. If Perseus had wished to save his life as a free man, he might have gone to his allies in Thrace, and thence to some of the Greek towns on the coast of the Euxine, which could have had no motive for delivering him up to the Romans. But he acted like a blind man, and went to Samothrace, to seek an asylum in its inviolable sanctuary, which he may have considered all the more safe, because certainly the worship of the Penates at Lavinium and the worship of Samothrace were of the same kind. As a private person he would indeed have been safe here, but it was foolish to expect that under the present circumstances, the Romans would leave him there; but his chief motive was to save the beloved money which he had taken with him. He found however that he was surrounded by traitors, and after he had put one of them to death, the others deserted him. He now wished to embark for Crete, or according to others, for Cotys in Thrace; but the captain, whom he had already paid, deceived him.<sup>5</sup> His eyes were now opened; he saw that his fate might be like that of Pausanias, as the Roman praetor had already come to seize him or starve him to death. A cowardly love of life induced him to surrender to the Roman admiral Cn. Octavius, and he, like Genthius, was reserved to adorn the triumph of his conqueror.

L. Aemilius Paullus, who now set about regulating the affairs in the East according to the instructions which he had received from Rome, made a cruel use of his victory, if we may judge from our own feelings of humanity. One hundred and ten years

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *Aemil. Paul.* 19.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, xlvi. 6.

after the war with Pyrrhus, the Romans took vengeance on Epirus, which had become involved in the fate of Pyrrhus. Its inhabitants were divided, and some had declared in favour of Macedonia. There was no national feeling among them; although they may not have observed the treaties which bound them to Rome, yet the cruel vengeance taken by the Romans cannot be justified. The Roman soldiers took up their quarters among the Molossians, and here scenes took place like the massacre of Glencoe, in Scotland, though not with so much cunning: but in both cases a massacre took place in the midst of a population which believed itself to be in perfect safety.<sup>6</sup> The inhabitants of seventy places, occupied by the soldiers, were first commanded, under penalty of death, to deliver up all their gold and silver (which amid ordinary plundering might have been lost or destroyed to a great extent), and immediately afterwards, the soldiers in all the places fell upon the devoted people. 150,000 men are said to have been sold as slaves, or put to death; and their towns to have been destroyed. This is horrible, and shows the degenerate condition of the Roman people, because in their own state there was no equipoise, but only an unbridled multitude. Servitude deprives man of half his virtues, but perfect freedom to do what he pleases, creates double vices: in the possession of the sovereignty of the world, the Romans thought that they might do anything. After such cruelty, which was perpetrated at the command of L. Aemilius Paullus, we cannot possibly with Plutarch, reckon him among the number of great and virtuous Romans. His mode of acting would have been cruel enough even in the course of a war; and I cannot see the reason why many persons call Aemilius Paullus a mild and humane man. It was in a similar manner that he acted in Boeotia; and throughout Greece the party which favoured the cause of the Romans received Roman soldiers to crush their opponents, and they raged with real fury. In Aetolia where the Roman party had the upper hand, it committed an act which almost surpasses all belief: among other things they broke into the senate-house, and the senators suspected of being favourable to Macedonia, were put to death instantaneously, at the request of the leading men of the Roman party, who received a Roman garrison

<sup>6</sup> Livy, xiv. 34; Plutarch, *Aemil. Paul.* 29; Appian, *De Rebus Illyr.* 9; Polybius, *ap. Strabon.* vii. p. 322.

commanded by A. Baebius.<sup>7</sup> This dreadful policy was extended to the Achaeans also, among whom the party of Perseus had been less strong than the one which had endeavoured to maintain their dignity, which had been insulted by the Romans. The latter had kept none of the treaties with the Achaeans. They had admitted ambassadors from separate places, and even encouraged people, as in Lacedaemon and Messenia, to come forward with accusations against the Achaeans, whereas according to the treaty, the ambassadors of the whole confederacy alone should have been listened to. It was evident that the Romans were anxious to disturb the unity of the people, for they demanded that the exiles should be recalled. There was among the Achaeans a traitor, Callicrates, who had sold himself wholly to the Romans, and was so detested and accursed by his countrymen, that they dreaded to approach him or to touch his garments; but the more he was despised, the deeper he sank in his baseness. After the victory over Perseus, there appeared ten Roman commissioners in Greece, and two of them, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, came among the Achaeans, declaring that among the papers of Perseus, there had been found clear evidence of the treachery of several distinguished Achaeans, and requiring the Achaeans to pass a decree, that all those who had been supporters of Perseus should be put to death. The Achaeans gave a very appropriate answer, requesting the Romans to name the offenders, that they might be tried, and punished according to law. But the Roman commissioners refused to condescend to this, and insisted upon a decree being passed pronouncing death on the Macedonian party in general, before they would bring forward a list of them. When the Romans were pressed further, they declared that all those who had been strategi were guilty. One man, Xenon, who had been *strategus* himself, now rose, and declared that he was so convinced of his own innocence, that he would willingly submit his case not only to a court of his own countrymen, but to the Romans themselves. This offer came opportunely for the Romans, and they immediately got Callicrates to make out a list of upwards of one thousand persons, who were to quit their country and go to Italy, to be tried. Some of them made their escape, and were at once declared to be convicted criminals who

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, xxx. 14; Livy, xlvi. 28 and 31.

might be put to death wherever they should be found. The others, on their arrival at Rome, were not placed before a court of justice, but were distributed as hostages in the municipia of Etruria. Seventeen years after this event, not more than 300 of them were alive.<sup>8</sup> One among these Achaean hostages was Polybius, the historian: his condition, however, was soon improved, as he became acquainted with the great Roman families, and Aemilius Paullus selected him to give his sons a Greek education. From this time forward it is difficult to say what belongs to Roman and what to universal history.

Macedonia was nominally declared free. No Roman proconsul was sent out to undertake its administration, and the taxes were reduced to half the amount which had been paid to the kings<sup>9</sup>: an instance which proves that the Romans levied tribute even in those countries which were not constituted as provinces. The country was cunningly divided into four republics, and in such a way that tribes naturally connected together were severed from one another, and were annexed to a republic with which they had no natural connexion; the connubium and commercium were abolished: a truly Machiavellian policy. The object of this measure was to destroy all national feeling in each of the four states<sup>10</sup>, and yet the Romans acted as if they were really giving to those people a republican constitution. Each state obtained a synedrion; and under the pretext of removing those who were dangerous to this new equality, they expelled all persons of rank and distinction from the country. The advantage of this arrangement soon became visible in the insurrection of the Pseudo-Philip.

The triumph of Aemilius Paullus was the most brilliant that had yet been celebrated, on account of the immense treasures which adorned the procession. The biography of Paullus by Plutarch is well worth reading, and the account of his triumph is very instructive: he brought with him nearly two millions of our money. From this time we must date the great wealth of the Romans, but the condition of the people grew worse and worse: the cancer of poverty spread further every year, and the number of beggars increased, while one class of the population accumulated enormous riches. Moral corruption also began to show itself at Rome, and sometimes

<sup>8</sup> *Pausanias*, vii. 10. 2. <sup>9</sup> *Plutarch, Aemil.* 28. <sup>10</sup> *Livy*, xlv. 29, foll. 32.

we meet with series of the most monstrous offences; nay, even before the war against Perseus, Roman history has recorded some horrible crimes, with almost incredible ramifications. At the beginning of the seventh century, two of the most distinguished Roman ladies, the wives of consulars, were accused of having poisoned their husbands, and were put to death by the decree of their own cousins.<sup>11</sup> The republic grew richer in the same proportion as the inner or moral condition of the people became worse. During the war against Perseus, taxes had still been raised; but they were afterwards abolished, though I believe, that they were again resorted to during the Social war, when everything was changed into money, a circumstance, of which I have no doubt, though it is not mentioned anywhere. Most writers<sup>12</sup> speak as if the spoils of Macedonia had been so ample, as to render contributions for war unnecessary. But those spoils were deposited in the public treasury, and it was rather the continual revenues derived from Macedonia, Illyricum, and other countries, which rendered it now superfluous to impose any direct taxes. Indirect taxes, such as tolls, duties, etc., continued to be paid, and some of them were very high, at least in later times. The peculiarity was that they were raised, like customs duties, in a number of ports, while in the interior of the country everything was circulated free of duty.

After the destruction of the kingdom of Macedonia, there remained only the Rhodians, who had provoked the Romans by their pride; and the Romans, wishing to overthrow their power also, declared war against them. When the Rhodians saw that there was no possibility of escaping, they descended to the lowest humiliation to conciliate the Romans. Those who had actually rendered themselves guilty by keeping up a correspondence with Perseus, facilitated the negotiations of their country by putting an end to their own lives, so that only corpses were delivered up to the Romans. Others fled from their homes, but finding no asylum anywhere, they likewise were at length compelled to bring their wretched existence to an end. Polyaratus and Dymon unfortunately were really guilty; they were exiled and fell into the hands of the Romans,

<sup>11</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, 48.

<sup>12</sup> Plutarch, *Aemil. Paul.* 38. Compare Cicero, *De Off.* ii. 23; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxiii. 17.

who now took from the Rhodians the places which they had before given to them, nay even those which they had possessed long before. Stratonicea had belonged to them for the last seventy years. It was not without great difficulty that the skill of the Rhodian ambassadors and the interest which Cato took in the Rhodians, averted the war; but they had to submit to the hardest conditions. They lost Caria and Lycia, with the exception of the nearest places on the coast, so that they did not even retain their most ancient possessions in those countries. Thus the Rhodians who had so long been on terms of friendship with Rome, had to congratulate themselves for obtaining an alliance in which they acknowledged the sovereignty of Rome and promised to support her in her wars.<sup>13</sup> Within their own country, however, they retained their independence, and confined themselves to their small but beautiful island. In this they showed their good sense; and by their commerce they continued to enjoy general estimation.

The war against Perseus was followed by a period down to the beginning of the third Punic war, so barren of important events that Polybius, when he made a second edition of his history, after the destruction of Corinth<sup>14</sup>, wrote the intermediate period, from the Macedonian war to the taking of Corinth, merely as an introductory sketch to the subsequent history, which formed a work quite distinct from his earlier history, and was connected with it only by the slight sketch of that intermediate period.<sup>15</sup> I shall follow his example, and relate only that which is necessary to fill up the gap.

One of the points which must not be overlooked is, that at the close of the sixth century the Romans began to attack the Gauls in the Alps.<sup>16</sup> Soon after the war against Perseus they protected the Massilian colonies of Antibes, Nizza, and other towns, against the Ligurians.<sup>17</sup> The whole country round Genoa was already subdued by the Romans, whose object was

<sup>13</sup> Livy, xlv. 10 and 25.

<sup>14</sup> The first edition of his history ended with the destruction of the kingdom of Macedonia and its immediate consequences, the reconciliation of the Rhodians with Rome, and the carrying away of the Achaean hostages.—N.

<sup>15</sup> This peculiar view respecting the work of Polybius which Niebuhr repeatedly expressed (vol. iii. p. 42), is perhaps to be understood in this manner: he makes the first edition go down to the end of the 30th book, and considers the remaining books as the later addition.

<sup>16</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, 46 and 47.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, xxxiii. 4.

gradually and as occasion offered, to make themselves masters of the whole coast as far as Spain (601). In the East about the same time, they endeavoured to subdue the Dalmatians, and to gain possession of the country extending from Zara to Ragusa. They succeeded indeed, but their conquests were not lasting. They were successful in Corsica also.

The guilt of the kings Prusias and Eumenes differed in degree, the former being related to Perseus by marriage, the latter having been faithless to Rome. Prusias excited the indignation of his contemporaries by his contemptible conduct, for he appeared at Rome in Roman dress, his head shaved, and wearing the cap of a freedman, and prostrating himself on the ground in the senate house he declared himself a freedman of the Romans. He gained his end, inasmuch as the Romans did not curtail his dominions, but he was obliged to give his son Nicomedes as a hostage, and by him he was afterwards to be overthrown. Eumenes was forbidden to come to Rome, and his brother Attalus implored for him the mercy of the Romans.

About the same time, Antiochus was carrying on war against the two minor princes of Egypt, Ptolemy Philometor and Euergetes II. (Physcon), and their sister Cleopatra. Coelesyria was lost, and their possessions comprised only Egypt, Cyprus and Cyrene. Antiochus Epiphanes tried to make himself master of these countries, and was successful. He had advanced as far as Memphis, and, as almost all the Egyptian towns were unfortified, his victory was certain; Alexandria alone might have resisted. But the Romans would not allow him to acquire such an extensive empire, and sent the celebrated embassy of M. Popillius, who, with his staff, drew a circle around the king and compelled him, before quitting the circle, to declare that he would evacuate Egypt. The Romans now acted as mediators between the two princes, giving to the younger, Physcon, Cyrene and afterwards Cyprus also, and to the elder the rest. Physcon at first became reconciled to his brother; but they afterwards disagreed again. The detail of these transactions does not belong to Roman history.

At that time the Parthians also began to extend their power. The country east of the desert and the ancient Hyrcania, the coast-land of the Caspian Sea, had been taken possession of by them. Media, Susiana, and Persia too, did not remain long in

the hands of the Syrian kings (until 620), and thus were laid the foundations of the great Parthian empire. In 630 the Parthians had already taken Babylon.

In Spain the wars still continued and were conducted with the greatest energy, especially against the Celtiberians. If the other Spanish nations had co-operated with the Celtiberians, they might have been able to repel the Romans and confine them to the coast, as they could not have sent very numerous armies to Spain. But this was not done, for the Spaniards did not feel the necessity of a national union, and the Lusitanians were quite satisfied, provided they themselves were left in peace. The Celtiberians were likewise desirous of peace, and the Romans succeeded in gradually gaining tracts of country from them, especially the district of Cuença in the south, and parts of Lusitania and Estremadura. In the west they advanced towards the Vaccaæans and Salamanca. The Lusitanians were an ingenious and able people, but they had not yet got a general such as shortly afterwards arose among them. All these tribes, as well as the Celtiberians, would willingly have recognised the supremacy of Rome, and have strengthened her military power, had the Romans only been inclined to make peace on tolerable conditions. But this was not their object; they wanted to reduce Spain to perfect submission and rule over it. What they promised they did not perform; and hostilities always began afresh on the arrival of a new general, so that no one could place any confidence in the Romans. In this manner the time was approaching, when a new and grand historical drama was to commence.

During this period there are no changes in the constitution, which ever since the first Punic war remained outwardly the same. A few laws were passed, and a few attempts made to remedy the prevailing evils, but without effect. In this manner arose the *lex Voconia*, forbidding the practice of making women heirs, and of leaving legacies to them, except in the case of a father having an only daughter, and no son. This regulation respecting an only daughter (*επικληνός*) arose out of the gentile relations, because such a daughter, as in Attica, was obliged to marry a member of her gens, so that the property remained in the gens. This law, however, shows that the spirit of family was already becoming extinct. Cicero in his work "*De Re Publica*," judges incorrectly of it, according

to the notions of his own age. The deterioration in the minds and feelings of the Romans, however, had already gone so far, that a single law like the *lex Voconia* was no longer able to check the evil. Matters were then as they were in England forty years ago, when a general and wisely planned legislation might have stopped the downward tendency of the state; but such suitable and thorough reforms are of extremely rare occurrence in history: fate leads states to their downfall, and I foresee that within fifty years England will experience a complete political change.<sup>18</sup> At Rome a few laws were passed against the wishes of certain individuals, but everywhere loopholes were found, by means of which they were evaded. The *lex Aelia et Flavia* was another important law; but when and how it was passed is very uncertain. It is usually regarded as a single law; but from Cicero it appears probable that there were two, and they must have been of great importance. The substance of what it enacted, at least so far as it is known, was that the tribunician transactions with the people should be liable to be interrupted by the auguries: a proof that the ancient forms still continued to be respected. As we, of course, regard the whole system of augury as an imposition, this measure appears to us a mere extension of priestly deception, and we wonder that such a thing could happen in an enlightened age. But it was to be a mere form: the power of the tribunes had reached a fearful height; and as the augurs were now authorised to state what signs might stop the proceedings of the assembly convened by the tribunes, no one believed that those signs were sent by a supernatural power, but they were regarded as only means in the hands of the optimates to check the tribunes. By the *lex Hortensia* the tribunes had acquired the power of passing laws without the sanction of the senate; and now the augurs, one-half of whom were patricians, and the other half plebeians, though from the most distinguished families, might prevent such resolutions, and limit the otherwise unbridled power of the tribunes. The form of the new law is certainly offensive and unworthy, the augurs being obviously obliged to deceive, but its object to create a counter-tribuneship in matters of legislation was highly desirable. This law is mentioned only by Cicero, and Clodius abolished it.

<sup>18</sup> This remark was made in 1826, that is, previously to the carrying of the Roman Catholic emancipation.

Among the occurrences which show to what degree matters had become changed at Rome, it must be mentioned that, in the year 600, one tribune, or the whole college, ordered the consuls to be imprisoned for having acted unfairly in levying troops.<sup>19</sup> Such a decree of the tribunes is so foreign to the ancient constitution, that this occurrence alone suffices to show the complete change that had taken place, and that then no confidence could be placed in a man's personal conscientiousness. Formerly those bound to serve in the armies were selected singly by the consuls, and people had borne this from the earliest times. At first all were taken, afterwards only the most able, and those who had already been trained in war. As the legions now were always stationed for a long time in distant provinces, the duties of military service became more oppressive, and many tried to get exempted by favouritism, the tribunes preventing any individual whom they favoured from being enlisted. Moreover, as the empire had become very extensive, levies must have continued to present greater and greater difficulties, the men having to appear in person. The selection of soldiers was now abolished, and the general conscription was arranged in such a manner as to make the lot decide upon a man's duty to serve, after which excuses or reasons for exemption might be brought forward. This was not a change for the worse; but the tribunes at the same time demanded that each of them should have the right to exempt ten of the individuals drawn by lot, and as the consuls opposed them they were imprisoned.<sup>20</sup> The necessity of making enactments against bribery had become even more pressing before the end of the fifth century. They were directed against venality, for the constitution of the centuries had been changed, and attempts at bribery had become possible. Whether the *lex Cornelia de ambitu* is that of Cornelius Cethegus, or of Sulla, cannot be determined, although the former is generally looked upon as an established fact; but it is certain that a law *de ambitu* was enacted as early as the year 570, a fact which has become somewhat better known from the Milan scholia on Cicero.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 48.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 55.

<sup>21</sup> *Schol. Bob.* in *Orat. pro Sulla* (Orelli's Cicero, vol. v. pt. 2, p. 361.) The reading in Livy, xl. 19, is very doubtful, whence the belief that the law may have originated with Sulla. Others refer this Cornelian law to the consul Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (4. u. 595), and quote Livy, *Epit.* 47, in support of their opinion.

## LECTURE LXXIII.

THE outbreak of the third Punic war had long been prepared by the relations existing between Carthage and Masinissa. The peace with Rome lasted for upwards of fifty years, during which the Carthaginians did not give the Romans a single reason for complaint, nor do the Romans themselves mention any. We must suppose that this interval was a time of prosperity for Carthage, for after it we find the city very rich and populous; and it is not difficult to conceive that the obstacles which prevented the maritime nations of the East from entering upon extensive commercial enterprises, were of great advantage to the Carthaginians. During the wars between Egypt and Syria, for instance, the Carthaginians, who were neutral, were allowed to sail and trade where they pleased. The energy of the Carthaginians being prevented from exerting itself abroad, was directed towards their internal affairs, and towards the increase of wealth. But still so long as that state of things lasted, in which they were kept in a sort of minority, their national character and their constitution seem to have fallen into decay. The government was weak, and the anarchical ascendancy of the people, according to the remarkable statement of Polybius, was an old evil, yea older than at Rome, and I believe that Carthage had become a wild democracy, and was in a state of total dissolution. A power like that of the consuls at Rome had long ceased to exist at Carthage, and that of the senate too was very much limited. An eastern people governing itself as a republic, without those institutions which in Greece and Rome formed a check upon democratic extravagance, could not but become completely lawless. What we positively know is but little, and we can only here and there catch a glimpse of the real state of things among the Carthaginians.

The great outward cause of their sufferings was ever and anon Masinissa. It is not improbable that he may have received secret instructions from the Romans; but, even if this was not the case, he was convinced that, however glaring his acts of injustice might be, the Romans would not declare against him. The Carthaginians endured everything with extraordinary forbearance, in order not to give Rome any occasion for

making war upon them, for they clearly saw that their bright and happy days were gone, and they resigned themselves to their melancholy fate. And this is the only reasonable course that can be adopted under such circumstances; though a nation must not cease to be aware of the heavy sacrifice it is making, or forget the fact that it is unhappy; for, as soon as this feeling is gone, demoralisation, baseness, and cowardice, step into its place; and I am rather inclined to believe that, at least to a certain extent, this was the case with the Carthaginians.

The disputes began not long after the close of the second Punic war. Masinissa made impudent claims to the most ancient Phoenician settlements, the rich coast of Byzacene, which the Carthaginians had possessed from the earliest times. Polybius says, that that district belonged to the Carthaginians as early as the time of the Roman kings. This was indeed so audacious a demand, that the Romans did not dare publicly to declare in favour of Masinissa. Scipio Africanus went over as Roman commissioner and arbitrator, and the circumstances were so clear, that he could not possibly decide the dispute in favour of the king; but, with an unpardonable policy, he declined pronouncing a verdict, so that the Carthaginians and Masinissa remained in their hostile position towards each other, and the former must have been convinced that any active resistance would involve them in a war with Rome. They were accordingly obliged to keep on the defensive. Their situation was as unhappy as that of the states with which Napoleon had made peace to prepare their destruction, he himself giving the lie to all truth. It was unfortunate for Carthage, that Masinissa reigned upwards of fifty years after the peace of Scipio; and throughout his life, he managed his connexions with Rome so skilfully, that the sad condition of Carthage became worse and worse.<sup>1</sup> Matters thus came to such a pitch that, at last, a war broke out between the Carthaginians and Masinissa. The exact time at which this took place is one of those points which cannot be accurately determined; but I am not inclined to place the event as near the outbreak of the third Punic war as is commonly done.<sup>2</sup> The territory of Carthage then embraced

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Pun.* 68; Livy, xlvi. 23. foll., compare Zonaras, ix. 15.

<sup>2</sup> In several good copies of the MS notes, the reading is "probably later than is usually believed; it must have been shortly before the outbreak of the last war with Rome." The editor mentions this, because no reasons are given to decide either one way or the other; but the statement in the text seems to be the more

the modern Tunis and the western part of Tripoli, the interior of which had been in the possession of Masinissa even before this time. By his constant conquests, he had become one of the most powerful rulers of that period, and was much stronger than Carthage. Had the Carthaginians taken up arms at a proper time, they would perhaps have been able to keep him at a distance: but this was neglected. They had assembled a considerable army under a general Hasdrubal. Their previous misfortunes had not made them more warlike; they did not do what Machiavelli wished to be done for his native city, and had not yet come to the conviction that they must rely upon their own valour, and at the same time lighten the burdens of their subjects. The evil of their military system had not been removed, and their armies still consisted of mercenaries; they had the additional misfortune of having an unskilful general. Hasdrubal marched out against Masinissa with an army of 50,000 men; and, although the battle was not decidedly lost, yet he considered himself conquered, and retreated without securing his communication with Carthage. He was accordingly cut off, and began to make proposals of peace, which Masinissa haughtily rejected, and refused to allow the surrounded Carthaginians to depart until, being driven to extremes by famine and distress, they gave hostages as a security for their keeping peace, undertook to pay 5,000 talents within fifty years, and acknowledg'd Masinissa's usurpations. When the defenceless men who had been deprived of their arms, departed, Galussa, Masinissa's youngest son, fell upon them and cut them nearly all to pieces. Although Masinissa had the hostages in his possession, he demanded that the peace should be observed, and even complained to the Romans, saying that the Carthaginians did not intend to keep it. The Romans, as usual, sent commissioners, who, with a truly diabolic spirit, deferred giving any decision, but instigated Masinissa. They sent their reports to Rome, informing the senate of the great resources which Carthage still possessed; for the Carthaginians seem to have made great preparations for several years before the war with Masinissa broke out. They had, it is true, no ships of war, but they were abundantly supplied with materials for building a fleet; their arsenals were filled with arms and timber: they were, in fact, fully prepared,

---

correct, since, according to the common opinion, the war of Masinissa is placed very near the outbreak of the third Punic war.

and that with the greatest justice, since they were under no restrictions in this respect by their treaty with Rome. The Romans required them to destroy or deliver up their timber; and while the subject was discussed in the senate, old Cato perpetually repeated his advice to destroy Carthage—a blindness hardly conceivable in so wise a man. The sovereignty of the world had given to the Roman senate an importance which formed a compensation for the loss of its influence in the internal affairs of Rome through the ascendancy of the democratic element; and the senators began more and more to feel that they were kings. In regard to Carthage, the senate was divided into two parties: the one, actuated by a blind hatred, thought that Carthage must be destroyed, feeling that Rome was the object of universal hatred; the other party was headed by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who, like many others, seems to have clearly perceived the condition of Rome. Opinions were divided, however, as to the remedy which was to be applied, some thinking that help was impossible, and that accordingly they must live quickly, and enjoy the shortness of life—a man of this kind was Cato; others, like Nasica, thought that the evil might at least be retarded in its progress by outward remedies, because a thorough reform was perhaps impracticable. A small party which afterwards came forward, with Tib. Gracchus at its head, wanted to attempt a radical cure by strong means. Whether Nasica's policy towards Carthage arose from a love of justice also, is uncertain; but it is at any rate possible that the son of the man who was called the *Best* wished to be just: certain it is, however, that his opinion was not adopted. It was determined to destroy Carthage. When Masinissa had defeated the Carthaginians, and it was thought that the object might now be easily attained, the Romans took the Carthaginians to account for their war with Masinissa, as if it had been a violation of the existing treaty, although it had been only an act of self-defence. The Carthaginians, broken-hearted, sent one embassy after another, imploring the senate to say what they had to do to maintain peace; but they were deceived by equivocal answers, and assurances that nothing should be undertaken against them<sup>3</sup>, if they would but endeavour to make reparation to Rome. Resistance seemed so hopeless, that extreme humiliation on the part of Carthage was necessary. Peace prevailed in all the rest of the world, and Rome was undisturbed.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Pto.* 74, foll.; comp. Polybius, xxxvi. 1, foll.

In 603, the consuls M. Manilius and L. Marcius Censorinus led two consular armies, consisting, it is said, of 80,000 foot and 4000 horse, among whom there were perhaps many other troops besides those of the Italian allies to Sicily. They landed at Lilybaeum, where the troops were organised, and where the last Carthaginian ambassadors were directed to apply to the consuls, who had full powers to treat with them. The Carthaginians saw indeed that their destruction was aimed at, and that nothing remained for them but to defend themselves to the last; but yet their ambassadors appeared before the consuls, who declared that the senate did not wish to encroach upon the freedom of the Carthaginian people; that they should retain their freedom, if they would submit to the orders they might receive; but, as they had so often violated the peace, as it was known that they had made large preparations, and as they were divided into so many parties, the consuls desired to have some security; and for this purpose they demanded that, within thirty days, 300 children of the noblest Carthaginian families should be delivered up into their hands as hostages. These children were sent over to Sicily by their parents, in heart-rending despair.<sup>4</sup> Carthage had no friend in all the world. Even her most ancient allies became faithless; and Utica, without having any grounds for complaint, but despairing of the fate of Carthage, had thrown itself into the arms of the Romans, and had been received by them contrary to the treaty with Carthage. After the Romans had, in this manner, secured the submission of Carthage, their army crossed over to Africa, and landed, partly at Utica, and partly at the place where Scipio had been encamped (*Castra Cornelia*). The Roman consuls now took a military position, and informed the Carthaginian magistrates, that they were ready to treat with them on anything that had not been settled previously. When the Carthaginian ambassadors appeared before the consuls, they were told that the Romans had information about all their proceedings; that, contrary to the treaty, ships had been built; and that their arsenals were filled with arms intended to be used against Rome: that, therefore the Carthaginians must deliver up all their arms, men of war, and artillery; for, they said, as Rome was able to protect them, and as the peace with Masinissa was sanctioned, there was no reason for Carthage to

<sup>4</sup> Polybius, xxxvi.2.; Appian, I.c. 76.

possess arms; and all the preparations that had been made could have no other object than to make war against Rome. Hard as this command was, still it was obeyed. All their arms were conveyed in 1000 waggons under the eyes of the commissioners into the Roman camp. On their landing in Africa, the Romans had demanded corn for their army, and they had received it from the stores of Carthage, which was thereby brought to the verge of famine. The Carthaginians now believed that they had satisfied the Romans in every respect. But when the ambassadors had their last audience, they were led through the lines of the Roman army, before the tribunal of the consuls, and were told that the government of Carthage had shewn its good-will indeed, but that it had no control over the city, and that Rome could not be safe, so long as it was fortified; the preservation of peace, therefore, required that the people should quit the city, give up their navy, and build a new town, without walls, at a distance of ten miles from the sea-coast. When the ambassadors attempted to remonstrate against this demand, the consuls replied, that they had promised safety to the people and not to the walls, that the former should suffer no harm, and that they might live away from the sea as well as the Romans. This announcement produced the highest degree of despair among the ambassadors. Their last desperate request was, that before the return of the ambassadors, the consuls should allow the Roman fleet to appear before Carthage, to intimidate the city. This was not treason, but the suggestion of despair; for the ambassadors foresaw that, on their return to Carthage, they would be exposed to the fury of an enraged people; and some of them, who had formerly advised their countrymen to be moderate, had not the courage to return, but remained with the Romans. Those who did return refused to give an answer to the people who had come out to meet them, and with tears reported the answer to the senate. The indignation and fury which this news excited in the city of Carthage were so great, that the people determined to perish in the ruins of their city. All the gates were instantly shut, and all the Romans and Italicans, who happened to be there, were seized and tortured to death.<sup>5</sup> This the consuls had not expected. They were, according to the Roman standard, men of cultivated minds and good education; but,

<sup>5</sup> Polybius, xxxvi. 5.; Appian, l. c. 92.

distinguished as Manilius was as a jurist, he was incapable of commanding an army. They themselves may have thought the fate of the unfortunate city so terrible, that their hearts ached, and that they did not carry out their design with vigour. Had they immediately appeared before the city, they would have taken it, and there would have been less misery; but they remained in their camp, expecting that the Carthaginians would surrender. This whole transaction with Carthage was a cursed and diabolical undertaking.

The city, situated on a peninsula, was protected on the land side by a treble wall, three miles in length, forty-five feet in height, and twenty-five in thickness (in ancient times arsenals had been there); but on the side along the bay of Tunis, it had only one somewhat lower wall. The Romans, who expected to find a defenceless population, attempted to storm both walls. But despair had suggested to the Carthaginians means of defence on both sides; and they repelled the assault. Everybody was engaged, day and night, in the manufacture of arms, with enormous and unexampled exertions. The women gave their hair to make ropes for the catapults; slaves were liberated and all the walls were guarded. Hasdrubal, whom they had been obliged to send into exile on account of his conduct, carried on a war against Masinissa, independently of Carthage, with an army of 20,000 fugitives, and ravaged the open country. The sentence of his banishment was now repealed, and he was made general of the Carthaginian forces out of the city.

This war was not decided until the fourth year after its commencement. The history of it is so distressing, that it is painful to me to think of, much more to relate. There can be nothing more heart-rending than this last struggle of despair, which was necessary, and yet could not end otherwise than in the destruction of Carthage. I will not, therefore, enter into the detail. At first, one might rejoice to see the Romans, with their great forces, fail in their attempts: the awkward consuls were defeated by despair. We do not know who had the command in the city, but it defended itself bravely: outside of it there were two generals, Hasdrubal and Himilco Phamaeas. The manner in which the latter carried on the war, relieved his native city by various diversions, and supplied himself with provisions, bears great resemblance to that of

Francesco Ferrucci, during the siege of Florence by the emperor Charles V., in the years 1529 and 1530: he accomplished a thousand brilliant feats, until he fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who, acting like the French in the Tyrol, hung him. But Himilco Phamaeas, who displayed great military talents, shewed in the end how great the moral corruption of his country was, and that he lived in an age in which all sense of honour had become extinct. For, after having accomplished things which were really brilliant, and which ought to have induced him to remain faithful, he entered into negotiations with the Roman consul: declaring to his own friends that the fate of Carthage was decided; that every one's duty was to take care of himself; that, for this reason, he would conclude a treaty for himself; and that he would assist any one who would not identify his own fate with that of Carthage.<sup>6</sup> Some thousands, with their officers, followed his example, and went over to the Romans. This was a great misfortune for Carthage. The Roman senate did not blush to honour this traitor with magnificent robes, extensive estates, money, and other things. Hasdrubal twice defeated the Romans, who had raised the siege and retreated into the country. An attempt of their's on Hippo likewise failed. It now appeared as if fortune would turn in favour of Carthage.

Masinissa again shewed himself to be a vulgar eastern traitor; he does not deserve the praise of the Romans, who call him *socius fidelissimus*: he was in reality a profligate and unprincipled oriental sultan. Hitherto his fidelity to Rome had been natural enough, for he owed his greatness to his connexion with Rome; but he now began to think that it would be better for him if Carthage were saved, than if it were destroyed; for he was very cunning, and foresaw that if Carthage became a Roman province, he could extort nothing from it. This however was not all: he also knew that the Romans, according to their maxim, *bella ex bellis serere*, would one day attack his kingdom also; that if Carthage existed no longer, there would be no motive for the Romans to spare him; and he was conscious, moreover, that his friendship towards the Romans was not so enthusiastic as to give him a claim on the permanence of their favor and indulgence. Mistrust arose between him and the Romans: he sent them no troops, but

<sup>6</sup> Appian, l. c. 108.

only asked what they demanded. The Romans, perceiving the offensive nature of his conduct, replied that they would let him know in due time; to which he answered that he would wait for their orders. Subsequently they did ask for his assistance, and it was granted. He even began to negotiate with Carthage, wishing that it should throw itself into his arms unconditionally.<sup>7</sup> Those who are acquainted with the history of the East, will remember many parallels to his conduct.<sup>8</sup> The Romans consequently found that he was anything but inclined to support their undertaking. Had the Carthaginians submitted to Masinissa, or his son Gulussa, he would unquestionably have come forward as their protector; and it is not impossible that the Roman dominion in Africa would then have been broken. It was folly in the Carthaginians not to do so; but the state of the open country may have prevented them.

The attacks upon Carthage now ceased, and the two consuls confined themselves to carrying on the war against Hasdrubal and Himilco; but Hasdrubal completely defeated the consul Manilius, so that he was obliged to retreat with his army to Utica. In the following year, 604, the consuls L. Calpurnius Piso and L. Mancinus went to Africa, and conducted the war very unskilfully. Hasdrubal encamped a few days' march from the town, in a strong place called Nepheris, and all attempts to dislodge him failed. It is astonishing to find that the Carthaginians, without a fleet, had the sea open, and received their provisions by sea. The slow progress of the war, in which the Romans took only a few towns, excited astonishment throughout the world. Just at this time a rebellion broke out in Macedonia, under a pseudo-Philip. The Spaniards also conceived fresh hopes; and shortly after, Achaia also rose against the Romans. This state of general excitement, which extended deep into the interior of Asia, must have suggested to the Carthaginians the hope that Nemesis would intervene, and make Rome herself the victim of her ambition.

The Romans felt the more ashamed, as their disgraceful

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 94.

<sup>8</sup> The pasha, e.g., who had at first instigated the sultan against Ali Pasha of Janina, afterwards found that it was more to his own interest that Ali should not be overthrown, but merely weakened.—N.

conduct towards Carthage must necessarily have been felt by them; and hence the discontent with their generals was very great. In the year B.C. 605, P. Cornelius Scipio was made consul. Public opinion distinguished him above all his contemporaries. We generally call him Aemilianus, a name which he never bears in the classical age. Analogy and the *usus loquendi* frequently differ very widely, and such is the case here, for according to analogy he might have been called Aemilianus. He is called *P. Scipio, Paulli filius*, and Cicero always calls him so; the name Aemilianus in the Fasti is an invention of later times<sup>9</sup>: I am so strongly convinced of this, that I would unhesitatingly declare any passage of Cicero to be spurious if the name occurred in it. Scipio has a great reputation in history, which however, in my opinion, is not altogether well deserved. He was, it is true, a very eminent general and a great man; he did many a just and praiseworthy thing; but he made a show of his great qualities; and Polybius, his friend and instructor in military affairs, who in other respects loves him very much, shews in his narrative quite clearly that the virtues of Scipio were ostentatious.<sup>10</sup> Things which every other good and honest man does quietly, Scipio boasts of, because they are not common among his own countrymen. We feel ashamed of the age in which such things are related as if they were something extraordinary. He had received varied information from Polybius who had especially instructed him in strategics. What distinguishes him besides his military ability is an unflinching political character: he belonged to those who wished, by all means, to maintain the state of things such as it actually was. He felt comfortable in it, and everything which existed had in his eyes an indisputable right to exist, and he never asked whether it was right or wrong in its origin, or how detrimental its injustice was to the republic itself. Even where he saw the deplorable condition of the state, and knew the evil consequences that would result from it, he nevertheless persisted in upholding the actual state of things; but he perhaps thought that any attempt at reform would shake the republic to pieces. I know many good and

<sup>9</sup> In the current editions of the Capitoline Fasti, the name Aemilianus in the year 618 (619), seems to be genuine; in Cicero, *Philip.* xiii. 4, we also find *Aemiliano Scipioni*.

<sup>10</sup> See *Fragment. Peiresc.* 89.

honest men of a similar disposition, who oppose reforms where they ought to be made. The younger can in no way be compared with the elder Scipio, who was a thorough genius, and felt that he was above his contemporaries. Notwithstanding his great love for the people, he hated the individual who placed himself on an equality with him: his absence of prejudice bordered on thoughtlessness, whereas the younger Scipio was an artificial man who wanted genius. His education was much more perfect than that of the elder Scipio, for he possessed all the knowledge of a highly cultivated Greek, and lived on terms of intimacy with such distinguished men as Polybius and Panaetius. He allowed himself to be employed by his countrymen in two fearful destructions which were revolting to his feelings, but he did not do all he could to prevent them: the elder Scipio would not have destroyed Carthage. Subsequently his conduct towards Tib. Gracchus, his brother-in-law, deserves severe censure: he then joined a thoroughly bad party, supporting it with his influence and power, whereby he made himself odious to the people, as is seen at his death<sup>11</sup>; but we must at the same time acknowledge, that he was a very distinguished general at a time when Rome was not rich in military geniuses.

---

### LECTURE LXXIV.

CICERO has bestowed his special favour on this second Scipio. We sometimes feel a similar interest in a person in history or literature, if, on placing ourselves in his circumstances, we discover that we are one with him; we then come to feel with him and in him, and thus assign to him a character different from that which he really possessed: and the position of Scipio is indeed somewhat similar to that of Cicero. Although the *lex Villia annalis*<sup>1</sup> was otherwise strictly observed, and although

<sup>11</sup> The introduction to the *Somnium Scipionis* cannot be looked upon as historical; even the statement that Scipio first went to Africa as tribune of the soldiers under Manilius and Censorinus is not correct: it is one of Cicero's historical blunders.—N.

<sup>1</sup> The *leges annales* which existed in the time of Cicero had been framed by Sulla; but in the time of Scipio the *lex Villia* (Livy, xl. 44) was unquestionably in force.—N.


Scipio was yet very young, still when suing for the aedileship, he was made consul by the unanimous desire of the people, and without him the war would have been protracted a long time.

Carthage, as I have already remarked, was situated on a peninsula, but did not occupy the whole of it, as has been erroneously inferred from the statement<sup>2</sup> that it was 23,000 paces in circumference.<sup>3</sup> The whole peninsula seems to have been surrounded by a kind of rampart, as is now known from the excavations made by J. E. Humbert. The town has been so completely destroyed by the Romans, that no buildings are found above the ground, but foundations of buildings are still visible. The ancient city of Carthage lay between the treble wall running across the isthmus, and a line dividing the peninsula into a western and an eastern part.<sup>4</sup> On the neck of land, the city, as already remarked, was protected by a treble wall. Next to it was Bozra, the citadel, somewhere about the centre of the place occupied by the city. Whether a portion of the space assigned to the city was distinct from the rest and bore a particular name is not known, but seems to me probable enough. The north-eastern part of the peninsula was called by the name of Megara; and in this district it was difficult for

<sup>2</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 51. Compare Strabo, xvii. p. 832.

<sup>3</sup> This opinion has been refuted by the researches made on the spot by Colonel Humbert, a sincere, open, single-minded, and straightforward soldier, who was for several years in the service of the Dey of Tunis. The result of his investigations have not yet found their way into books, but his drawings and papers fell into the hands of a real adventurer, Camillo Borgia, a nephew of Cardinal Borgia, who had great talent for drawing. He abused the confidence which Colonel Humbert had placed in him, by copying his drawings, and giving them out as his own. What I here say is known to many, but in Germany no one is aware of it.—N.—The work of Camillo Borgia, as far as I know, has never been published; but the learned Dane, Estrup, saw the MS. at Naples after the death of C. Borgia, and made some use of it for his work "Lineae Topographicae Carthaginis Tyriæ," Hafniae, 1821. By Humbert himself we have, "Notice sur quatre cippes sépulcraux et deux fragmens, découverts en 1817 sur le sol de l'ancienne Carthage," à la Haye, 1821.

<sup>4</sup> Plan of Carthage:—



forces to land, the coast being steep; it is now called El Marsa. On the south-western side was the port-town.<sup>5</sup> The harbour of Cothon was artificially made with a narrow entrance, and consisted of several basins, like the docks in London. From the road, ships passed into the commercial docks, and thence by a canal to the arsenal, which was situated on an island and strongly fortified. Round these basins were buildings with the equipments for each ship. This port-town was of later origin. In the course of time a large suburb had been formed in Megara or Magalia, the situation of which cannot be accurately determined; it consisted of many gardens, but was likewise surrounded by a wall. When C. Gracchus, and after him Julius Caesar, endeavoured to restore the city, they heeded the curse that lay on the ancient site, and built the Roman Carthage in Megara, by the side of the ancient city<sup>6</sup>, as may be distinctly seen from the Roman antiquities found there. Of Carthaginian antiquities nothing but tombs have been discovered, which cannot, of course, surprise us, for it was outside the city.

Appian is our only detailed authority for this war, and fortunately he has here copied Polybius, for otherwise he is below all criticism. But even as it is, his accounts, as well as those of Zonaras, are very obscure and unconnected. From them we only see that Scipio landed in front of the peninsula, established himself there, and took the suburb; so that Carthage was confined to the old town and its ports. Even in the year before Scipio's consulship, L. Mancinus had discovered a spot on the northern side of Megara, where an army might land and establish itself.<sup>7</sup> After this was taken, Scipio began to besiege the city itself with all his energy: it was useless to attack Carthage on the land side where it was protected by the treble wall, and he therefore directed his attacks against the southern side. The Carthaginians soon began to suffer from scarcity of provisions, and a famine would unquestionably have compelled them to submit; but, in the meantime, the Carthaginians summoned Hasdrubal to the city, and he formed a fortified camp on the isthmus; but when the suburb was taken,

<sup>5</sup> See Livy and Strabo, *ll. cc.*; Appian, *De Rebus Puc.* 95, foll.; Polybius, i. 29; Orosius, iv. 22.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, *L. c.* 136; Plutarch, *C. Gracchus*, 11, *Jul. Caesar*, 57; Livy, *Epit.* 60; Dion Cassius, xlivi. 50, lli. 43; Pausanias, ii. 1. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *L. c.* 113.

he was seized with a panic, and threw himself into the city; whereupon the Romans took possession of his camp, so that Carthage was now quite surrounded. Bithyas, another Carthaginian general, who had remained in the interior of the country, with the greatest resolution and indefatigable exertions, succeeded in carrying into the city, convoys of provisions, through the midst of the awkward ships of the Romans.<sup>8</sup> In order to prevent the repetition of such boldness, Scipio had recourse to stopping up the mouth of the harbour; this was easy because the bay was very shallow, and he succeeded so completely that the whole bay is now a swamp, though this is partly the result of the mud and sand which are driven thither by the current from the Syrtes. Its extent can now be recognised only from the nature of the ground, as in Italy the port of Trajan is recognised in the place called Porto.<sup>9</sup> From this dam Scipio, by means of engines, endeavoured to destroy the quay of the harbour. The desperate struggles of the Carthaginians to prevent this almost surpass conception; yet the greatest thing they did was, when they perceived that they would soon be shut up, they set about digging a new passage out of the harbour, through the narrow neck of land by which the harbour was separated from the sea; and that they secretly built in their arsenal a fleet of 50 triremes, with which they sailed through the new passage into the sea, to attack the Roman fleet. The Romans were so perplexed and confused at this sight, that Polybius (in Appian) is quite right in thinking that, if the Carthaginians had attacked them at this moment, they might have destroyed the Roman fleet entirely, for the Romans had entirely neglected their navy. But here we see the same thing that we so often meet with in the history of man: after their superhuman exertions their resolution failed; they hesitated for a few days; and while the Romans were preparing themselves to meet a serious attack, the Carthaginians irreparably lost the fruits of their labour. The Romans, who had renounced the sea, prepared their ships as well as they could, and the Carthaginians were repelled chiefly by the Graeco-Asiatic ships of Sida, which fought in a peculiar manner. Four of these small ships of Sida cast anchor, turned upon them as upon an axis, and thus defended themselves against the attacks of the Carthaginians. The others followed their

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *L c.* 120.

<sup>9</sup> Pliny, *Epist.* vi. 31; Rutilius, 237, &c.

example, and the Carthaginians were obliged to retreat. When on the following day the Carthaginians again sailed out, great confusion arose within the channel, which unfortunately had been made too narrow; as the ships were hurrying out of the port, many of them were thrown by the Romans against the quay, and the fruit of their enormous exertions was destroyed. It is sad to see how every thing was lost through the unhappy chance of a single moment. Scipio now took possession of that part of the harbour which was destined for merchant-ships, and proceeded thence through the canal till he reached the arsenal. One part after another of the city was thus taken; and as the Carthaginians saw that the arsenal could not be defended, they first, perhaps too hastily, set fire to it, and then to the store-houses of the ships.

The Romans were now in possession of both harbours; and Bozra, the citadel, which was on that side not protected by walls, became the object of the contest. The treble wall on the isthmus, however, was not yet in the hands of the Romans. The struggle which now commenced is similar to that of Saragossa in Spain in 1808. The three main streets, leading from the harbour to the centre of the citadel, were lined with rows of houses, of from six to eight stories in height, and with flat roofs; all these houses, as we may imagine, were of solid structure<sup>10</sup>; and those streets seem to have been the seats of wealth and of the old families. Even in the description we recognise the gradual formation of the city. The houses were conquered one by one, by breaking through the walls from room to room and from house to house; for the means of blowing up the houses, which were used at Saragossa, were then unknown. The struggle was at the same time carried on upon the flat roofs of the houses; when the soldiers had fought their way up the stairs, and driven the unfortunate inhabitants out of the last flat, bridges were formed from the roofs across the streets. The overwhelming forces of the Romans rendered the victory certain. In addition to all this, a complete famine raged in the city, and the living fed upon the bodies of the

<sup>10</sup> As regards architectural beauty, we must consider Carthage as a city like the fine towns of Greece, or like Rome; but Carthage was built on a more grand and magnificent scale; in confirmation of which we need only remember that the streets were constructed according to artistic rules, which were unknown to the Greeks. The first construction of regular streets is ascribed to the Carthaginians, and I believe, with justice.—N.—See Isidorus, xv. 16 § 6.

slain, yet no one would hear of surrender. Hasdrubal moreover, had treated the Roman prisoners with such cruelty, that no one could have thought of it. After one part of the city had been taken with much bloodshed, the Romans stopped and set fire to the houses; while the Carthaginians retreated before the flames, the Romans pulled down the houses, and thus formed an immense heap of ruins against the wall and the citadel. The frightful description of this conflagration is evidently taken from Polybius, the unfortunate eyewitness of the atrocities there committed. The soldiers purposely buried the wounded who were yet alive, under the ruins. Amid this unspeakable misery, the Romans penetrated into the old town, and every one now tried to save his life; the priests with emblems of truce came out, imploring the conqueror to spare their lives. Scipio issued a proclamation, that the lives of those who would come out, should be safe. Thus the remaining population, 50,000 in number, came forth; only the Roman deserters, with Hasdrubal and his family, withdrew to the highest point of the citadel, a great sanctuary which is called *'Ασκληπεῖον*.<sup>11</sup> Hasdrubal was base enough to beg of Scipio to save his life, which was readily granted, that he might adorn the triumph of the Roman general. But his wife, standing on the pinnacles of the temple, gave vent to her indignation at this cowardly act of her husband, and threw herself with her children into the flames. Her example was followed by the deserters. Thus perished Carthage, after it had existed for nearly seven hundred years; and Scipio was master of a bloody heap of ruins; but many things must have been preserved, as he took from the temple many Sicilian monuments, which he sent back to Sicily. The senate had not destroyed Capua nor Tarentum; but Scipio was obliged by its will to destroy Carthage; he now completed the work he had commenced by drawing a plough over the site, the symbol of its destruction for ever, and the departing army left behind nothing but the most perfect desolation, amid which sixty years later Marius was sitting. The captives were treated more or less humanely; most of them were sold as slaves, some were put to death; a few of the more illustrious persons experienced a better fate, being distributed among the towns of Italy: among these last was Bithyas. The life of the unworthy

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 130; Strabo, xvii. p. 832.

Hasdrubal was spared by the Romans, whose ancestors had put to death the great C. Pontius. A part of the territory of Carthage was given to the kings of Numidia, the three sons of Masinissa, who was dead, and the rest was constituted as a Roman province, governed by a proconsul or praetor.

At this time a war, which had in the meanwhile broken out in Macedonia, was already concluded, and the fall of Achaia was near. As regards the Macedonian war, it is almost impossible to conceive how a whole nation could allow itself to be imposed upon in such a manner. The Pseudo-Demetrius in Russia was, according to the best historians, not by any means an impostor; and the only reason why he was not recognised was the fact that he had become a Roman Catholic while he was educated in Poland, and that he had adopted European manners. Sebastian of Portugal, although there is not that amount of evidence in his favour which there is for Demetrius, was probably the unfortunate prince himself.<sup>11</sup> But the Pseudo-Philip of Macedonia was a real impostor, probably a Thracian gladiator, whose name was Andriscus, and to whom it occurred, no one knows how, to give himself out as the son of Perseus, to whom he probably bore some resemblance. Such impositions are not uncommon in Asia, and during the middle ages a few instances occur in Europe also. The war broke out as early as the consulship of Scipio (Carthage being destroyed by him when proconsul), and perhaps even the year before. The Pseudo-Philip first appeared in Macedonia, where he found some followers; but, being unable to maintain himself, he went to the court of Demetrius, the king of Syria, who delivered him up to the Romans.<sup>12</sup> Demetrius was just the person to commit such an act, for he had every reason to restore, if possible, his relations with the Romans, having only just escaped punishment from them. After the death of his brother, Antiochus Epiphanes, he had fled from Rome to secure his succession. The Romans had sent commissioners into Syria, because they had learned that the Syrians, contrary to their treaty, kept elephants, and had built more ships than they were allowed. One of these commissioners was killed during an *emeute* at Laodicea, and Demetrius only averted the vengeance of the Romans by sur-

<sup>11</sup> Lessing, in his *Litteraturbriefe*, has excellent discussions on this subject, although it is one which, properly speaking, he was not familiar with.—N.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 49.

rendering the guilty persons and killing the elephants. Under these circumstances, it was natural for Demetrius to deliver up Andriscus. At Rome, the adventurer was so much despised, and so carelessly watched, that he found an opportunity to escape. After the triumph of Aemilius Paullus, it was well known that Perseus and his sons were kept in captivity at Alba, on lake Fucinus, in the country of the Marsians.<sup>13</sup> The king survived his cruel fate only two years; he had clung to life so childishly, that he would not avail himself of the suggestion of Aemilius Paullus to make away with himself. He was probably killed by having been perpetually disturbed in his sleep. His elder son died in the same manner, and the younger lived in extreme degradation; the latter was a person of good talent, he learned Latin, and gained his daily bread by acting as scribe to the municipal council of Alba. Beyond this we know nothing of him.

When Andriscus appeared in Thrace, whither he had fled from Rome, and where the Romans were already feared or hated, numbers of people gathered round him, by whose assistance he was enabled to enter Macedonia, where he immediately issued a proclamation declaring himself the son of Perseus. The Romans being engaged against Carthage had no army in those parts, so that the impostor had only to conquer the Macedonians, whom he defeated on the eastern bank of the Strymon. To the great amazement of all, he crossed this river, and gained a second victory over the Macedonians, after which they all submitted to him. His success was extraordinary; and he assumed the diadem under the name of Philip. Macedonia must at that time have been in rather a wretched condition; for, after establishing the farce of a republic, the Romans had transplanted the noblest Macedonians to Italy; and as the rest of the population were very credulous, and had from ancient times been used to kingly power, Andriscus made the most astonishing progress. He then invaded Thessaly, where he likewise found followers, and which would have been inevitably lost, had not Scipio Nasica, who happened to be there, assembled the contingents of the Greeks, and repelled Philip. At that time, therefore, the Greeks were still faithful. Andriscus was in reality a tyrannical man.<sup>14</sup> Polybius in one of his fragments

<sup>13</sup> Polybius, *Excerpt. Vat. lib. xxxiv.—xxxvii. p. 79*, ed. Lucht.

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxxii. p. 590*.

calls him ἀνὴρ στυγνός.<sup>15</sup> But he nevertheless knew how to make people respect him. His exertions were extraordinary, and he even ventured to carry on the war against the Roman praetor, P. Juventius Thalna, whom he defeated, and then again entered Thessaly. The affair had now assumed a serious aspect, and the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus was sent against him with a considerable army, which he increased with auxiliaries. Metellus landed on the coast; and the position of the usurper was particularly difficult, from the circumstance of Macedonia being in some parts accessible by sea. The Achaeans, however, were beginning to shew a rebellious spirit, and the prolongation of the war would have been followed by an insurrection. After several engagements, Metellus drove the pretender out of Thessaly. Philip retreated to the neighbourhood of Pydna, where Perseus had been defeated, and being followed by Metellus, the decisive battle was fought. The Macedonians being superior in numbers, dispersed to make a predatory excursion; Metellus availed himself of the opportunity, and Philip was completely defeated. But the conquest of Macedonia in this insurrection was not as easy as formerly, for many places defended themselves, because they anticipated worse treatment. It must have been on this occasion that Pella was destroyed: Dion Chrysostom<sup>16</sup>, in the first century of our era, speaks of it as a town in ruins. At present it lies buried under mounds of earth, which indicate its site; and the most interesting remains of ancient art might be discovered there; but the present condition of Europe affords little hope of soon seeing any investigations made there. Andriscus was taken prisoner in Thrace, whither he had fled after the battle, and was put to death. Macedonia became a regular province, and thenceforth a governor seems to have been annually sent to it. The few privileges which the Macedonians yet possessed, were taken from them.

Had the Achaeans clearly known what they wanted, they would have exerted themselves at the time when Andriscus rose against the Romans; but imprudence led them into follies which could not have any beneficial consequences. The history, or rather the explanation of the decline and fall of Achaia, is foreign to my plan; but I may make a few observations, to give you some notion of the state of things there. Although

<sup>15</sup> *Excerpt. Vat.* p. 85, ed. Lucht.    <sup>16</sup> *Orat.* xxxiii. p. 12, foll. ed. Reiske.

it cannot be denied that the causes which brought about the downfall of Achaia were disgraceful to the Achaeans, yet that downfall was followed by circumstances which rendered the condition of the survivors more deplorable than it had been before, and this excites our sympathy for them. That degenerate people, moreover, still contained many excellent men. The Romans had long since resolved upon the destruction of Achaia; and through the instrumentality of traitors, especially Callicrates and Andronidas, they exercised unlimited influence there. Hence there arose many causes of disturbances; and when those traitors had established themselves, they too were no longer as willing as they had been to promote the objects of the Romans. The whole mischief resulted from the unfortunate act of violence committed by the otherwise excellent Philopoemen, who is justly called the last of the Greeks. He entertained, from his infancy, a deadly hatred of Sparta, and ever since Cleomenes had destroyed his native city of Megalopolis, his chief object was to subdue Sparta. He availed himself of the war of Rome against Antiochus to compel Sparta to join the Achaean league, and to adopt the customs and forms of the confederacy; for among the Achaeans, such an amalgamation took place, although it does not occur in other similar confederacies of antiquity. Achaia then comprised the whole of Peloponnesus, and formed a confederation of states, which was as irrational as our unfortunate German confederacy, in which the pettiest prince has, in reality, as important a vote as the state on which the safety of Germany depends. It also resembled the American confederacy previously to the constitution of Washington, when Delaware, for instance, with its 70,000 inhabitants, was on an equality with Virginia, which had a population of half a million.<sup>17</sup> It was this irrational constitution which ruined the Achaean league. Elis was a great city and country, and Laconia, even without its maritime towns, was larger than all Achaia proper. The latter had only twelve towns, some of which were surely not more important than Sinzig on the Rhine, yet each of these towns had the same vote as Sparta.<sup>18</sup> Some modifications, it is true, were made to render this state of things

<sup>17</sup> A similar state of things is found in the history of the Dutch republics, where Holland, which formed more than one-half of the population, and paid 58 per cent of the taxes, had the same number of votes as Zeeland, which paid only 3 per cent.—N.

<sup>18</sup> Compare vol. ii. p. 29, foll.

bearable. A second point was still more revolting: as Sicyon had adopted the Achaean *vóμιμα* (which was quite right), so also Sparta was obliged to abolish the laws of Lycurgus, to which the people were so much attached; and a few years before the war against Perseus, they had been compelled to adopt the Achaean *vóμιμα*. Spartans at this time can hardly be spoken of, there being only Lacedaemonians; the former had disappeared, and the population of the city, consisting of the descendants of perioeci and neodamodes, had acquired under Cleomenes the full franchise under the name of Lacedaemonians. These Lacedaemonians had adopted the laws and the *ἀγορὴν* of Lycurgus, and this was with them a point of ambition. It was therefore a great cruelty on the part of Philopoemen to compel them to give up those laws, for the new constitution interfered with the whole business of daily life; and the Achaean laws, moreover, were such that not very much good can be said of them; and whatever may be alleged against the Spartan order of things, still it trained able warriors. Hence the Lacedaemonians tried to get rid of that hateful connexion, and this attempt was followed by long negotiations. At the beginning of the 7th century the Achaean constitution was still in force; and a Lacedaemonian Menalcidas was even strategus of the Achaean league.

About this time unfortunate quarrels occurred between the Oropians and the Athenians, the former of whom bought the assistance of Menalcidas for ten talents. This aid came indeed too late; but still he extorted from them the stipulated sum, and although he had previously promised a part of it to Callicrates, he afterwards kept the whole for himself. The charge which Callicrates now brought against him, was the cause of all the misfortune of Achaia, for Menalcidas exerted himself to separate Sparta from the confederacy; and he succeeded. During the negotiations which were carried on at Rome in consequence, both Menalcidas and the Achaean ambassador deceived their constituents, each bringing forged decisions from Rome. This happened during the most unfortunate period of the third Punic war. When Lacedaemon declared itself independent of the confederacy, a war broke out between it and the Achaeans, in which the former was worsted. Menalcidas was a wretched general; and the Lacedaemonians were so hard pressed, that they were obliged to make a treaty

by which the Achaeans gained all they wanted. Menalcidas made away with himself, and the Lacedaemonians again joined the Achaean league.

The Romans had not been able to decide what course to pursue; but when in the year 605 they clearly saw that Carthage would fall, they spoke in a different tone to the Achaeans; and they now took a step which they had undoubtedly long before made up their minds to adopt. The Achaeans had committed an act of direct disobedience, and had thereby provoked the vengeance of the Romans, although during the insurrection of the Pseudo-Philip they had remained faithful and assisted the Romans. But it may have been the very prosperity of Achaia that induced the Romans to destroy it. The extent of Achaia at that time cannot be accurately ascertained, but it seems to have comprised the whole of Peloponnesus and Megara; and although Attica, Phocis and Locris did not belong to it, yet even more distant places were connected with the league by isopolity, such as Heraclea near Mount Oeta, and Pleuron in Aetolia. The Roman commissioners C. Aurelius Orestes and his colleagues, who appeared at Corinth, declared it to be the will of the Roman senate that Lacedaemon should be independent, and on the ground of the disorders arising from the combination of so many heterogenous elements, they demanded that all those places which had not been united with Achaia at the time of the treaty with Philip, but had belonged to his dominion, should be separated from the confederacy; these places were Corinth, Orchomenos in Arcadia, Heraclea and Pleuron<sup>17</sup>; whether Elis and Messene were likewise included in the number, is unknown, because Appian's information is too scanty, but the *Excerpta* of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus will probably yet throw much light upon this period. The portions to be given up formed about one-half of Peloponnesus, and comprised the most important towns. The Achaean council assembled at Corinth would not listen to the whole of this message, but ordered the doors to be thrown open and the people to be summoned to witness the crime of the Romans.<sup>18</sup> The rage of the people was unbounded; and

<sup>17</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 51; Pausanias, vii. 14; Dion Cassius, *Fragm. Ursin.* 165; Justin, xxxiv. 1; Polybius, xxxviii. 1, foll.

<sup>18</sup> We often find in Roman authors the expression that Corinth was destroyed *ob pulsatos legatos*. The verb *pulsare* is not correctly explained in our

the Roman ambassadors returned to their lodgings without receiving any answer; the people dispersed in the town and attacked the Lacedaemonians; all the houses, not excepting those of the Roman ambassadors, were searched, to see whether any Lacedaemonians were concealed in them. Aurelius Orestes, the chief of the ambassadors, was resolved to take vengeance; but the Roman senate was not inclined to inflict punishment at once.

---

### LECTURE LXXV.

THE Roman senate did not trust its allies, and again sent commissioners, so that by submission the Achaeans might have saved themselves. But the demand of the Romans was a glaring injustice. Roman history during this period is unfortunately full of atrocities and arbitrary proceedings against foreign nations; there is henceforth nothing pleasing in it. We can only seek for instruction, for just at the time when it loses its moral interest, the whole history of antiquity is swallowed up in it; and whatever part of universal history does not come under the history of Rome is so unimportant, that it is not worth being studied. The Achaeans could hardly hope to induce the Romans to desist from their demands; they ought to have submitted to necessity; and it was madness on their part to set themselves against it. In such circumstances, those persons who use the boasting language of patriotism mislead their nation, and are themselves the most outrageous tyrants, but those who preach submission are looked upon with contempt. The case of the Achaeans was similar to that of the unfortunate Jews in their last struggle against the Romans described by Josephus, where those who pretended to be the advocates of liberty were the most furious tyrants, though they were considered as patriots ready to sacrifice every thing for their country. I refer you, by way of

---

dictionaries, for it does not imply that the ambassadors were actually beaten: *pulseare* in its technical sense means in general to insult an ambassador, to treat him in a manner contrary to the laws of nations; even an improper *appellatio* of an ambassador, by which his dignity was violated, was called *pulseatio*.—N.

illustration, to the prophet Jeremiah, who justly complains that it was the false prophets who led the people to senseless undertakings. Such was the case among the Achaeans: those who spoke of independence were not the men who had the best intentions; the real patriots were those who advised their countrymen to keep peace.

The insult which had been offered to the Roman ambassadors did not call forth immediate revenge, for Rome was yet engaged in the wars against Macedonia and Carthage; but it was kept in reserve, and embassies went to and fro between Rome and Achaia. Callicrates, the traitor, who had been at the head of the Roman party, had completely sold himself to the Romans. After his death the Achaeans were under the influence of Critolaus and Diaeus, the most furious opponents of Callicrates, who were literally madmen, exhorting the Achaeans to the most determined resistance against Rome. If they had given the matter but a moment's thought, they would necessarily have seen that it was impossible to stand against the Romans, even if the Homeric gods themselves could have come to their assistance. Critolaus kept the Roman ambassadors in a state of ignorance. The Achaeans assembled only twice a-year; Critolaus summoned one of these assemblies, promising to introduce the ambassadors, but sent a secret message to all not to come, and then declared that according to the laws of the league, no new assembly could be convened till after the lapse of six months. The Achaeans now began their warlike preparations: we can hardly conceive the folly of so little and insignificant a people imagining that they could hold out against the Romans. They had for the last fifty years been under the protection of the Romans, and during that period they had only occasionally carried on petty warfare; for the greater part of that time they had been inactive: they had no standing army, but only a militia, which had yet to be trained. They had spent their happy time very ill in indulging in sensual pleasures, and had neglected to prepare themselves for the evil day that was coming. From the newly discovered fragments of Polybius, we see that they had not anticipated the possibility of a danger that might threaten their very existence; and a moral depravity, which it is distressing to contemplate, had spread very widely among the Achaeans. After several discussions for and against, they

had the wantonness to declare war against the Romans. The Boeotians and Chalcidians, who were as thoughtless as the Achaeans, joined them.<sup>1</sup> The Aetolians did not follow their example, perhaps because they were glad to see their rivals embark in an undertaking in which they could not but fail. Critolaus led a small army towards Thessaly, probably hoping to find the Pseudo-Philip still able to hold out against the Romans, who would thus have been shut up between two hostile armies. He had imagined that Macedonia would continue the war, and that Thessaly would perhaps join him immediately on his arrival; but before he reached Thermopylae, the fate of Macedonia was decided. In Heraclea, at the foot of Mount Oeta, which had before joined the Achaeans, but in compliance with the command of the Romans had renounced the Achaean confederacy, there was still an Achaean party. A corps of Achaeans which had already passed Thermopylae, and was besieging Heraclea, hastily fled back to the main army, as soon as Metellus arrived with his forces; and joined Critolaus who had not yet reached Thermopylae. Experience indeed had shewn that the pass could be evaded, but the recollections of the place might at least have invited the Greeks to a glorious death. But the worst they could do, they now did, in hastily breaking up to march to the Isthmus. As soon as Metellus had heard of the invasion of Thessaly, he hastened from Macedonia to meet the Achaeans. Near Scarphea<sup>2</sup>, he encountered their rear, and created such a panic among them that they were scattered like chaff before the wind.<sup>3</sup> Critolaus himself vanished from the field of battle, and it is highly probable that he may have sunk with his horse in the marshes on the sea coast.<sup>4</sup> Story-tellers seem to wish, by this mysterious statement, to mark him as the evil demon of Greece. After the Achaeans were thus completely routed, the Romans entered Boeotia; and a detachment of 1000 Arcadians, who had not advanced further than Elatea in Phocis, but were now retreating in consequence of the news of the battle, fell

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, vii. 14; Livy, *Epit.* 52; Polybius, xl. 1, foll. The Chalcidians were perhaps afraid of losing their recently-recovered independence; these circumstances are obscure.—N.

<sup>2</sup> Some MSS of 1829 have Thonium in Locris, probably a momentary slip of the tongue.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, vii. 15; Vell. Pat. i. 11; Livy, *Epit.* 52; Polybius, xl. 3, foll.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, vii. 15, 3. Compare Livy, *Epit.* 52.

into the hands of the Romans in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea, and were all cut to pieces. The distressing state of Greece at this time is well described in the fragments of Polybius, which also shew how greatly he has been wronged by the reproach of a want of feeling for the woes inflicted on his country, for all he says is the expression of the most unspeakable grief.

Metellus advanced towards the Isthmus. All the inhabitants of Thebes quitted their city and sought refuge on the heights of Cithaeron and Helicon. Metellus after taking the city shewed a humane disposition and a wish to spare the Greeks, for he pitied them; but it was of no avail: he could not act as he wished, partly on account of the conduct of the Greeks themselves, and partly because Providence had decreed their destruction. What had happened at Thebes was repeated in nearly all the other towns, for no one thought of defending himself. The Roman fleet in the meantime sailed round Peloponnesus, and landed some troops near Patrae in Achaia, who ravaged the country in the most barbarous manner, for it was every where impossible for the Achaeans to defend the coast. The contingents of those districts were thus prevented from marching to the Isthmus, and endeavoured to defend their own towns; but in vain. Diaeus, who was now strategus of the Achaeans, had enlisted all the slaves capable of bearing arms, and yet his army consisted of not more than 14,000 men, although Achaia had enjoyed peace for half a century; this small number shews the high degree of both the moral and the political misery of Greece, a country in which every thing is so easily restored, and in which wealth and abundance flow from ever inexhaustible sources. He was encamped near Megara; but on the approach of Metellus, he retreated towards the Isthmus. The Achaeans ought now to have made peace, for Metellus was of a noble nature and had the good of Greece at heart; he even offered to negotiate, but Diaeus, a man perfectly mad and without conscience, who ought, like Papius Brutulus, to have put an end to his life now instead of afterwards—for in that case, it would have been easy for the Achaeans to obtain a favourable peace, in which the several states of the confederacy would have retained their independent existence—fancied that he was able to defend the Isthmus: he rejected all proposals of peace, and his faction

predominated at Corinth. Before Metellus reached the Isthmus, Mummius hastened to take the command of the army; he was not of as gentle and humane a disposition as Metellus, for all that he sought was laurels for himself and booty for the Romans. He tried to arrive before Metellus had concluded peace, for the latter, although a plebeian like Mummius, yet belonged to a family which had long been in the possession of curule offices; he was a *nobilis*, and would probably have prevailed upon the senate to sanction the peace; Mummius, on the other hand, was a *novus homo*, and not aristocratic. The Achaeans were successful in one cavalry engagement, and this so dazzled them that they provoked the Romans to a battle, in which they were so speedily and so completely defeated, that there was no possibility of facing the enemy again. The impregnable Acrocorinthus ought to have been defended; but while the whole army in its flight passed by Corinth, seeking shelter in the mountains, the entire population of Corinth, who saw their own defenceless condition, fled towards the Arcadian mountains. The city and citadel were abandoned, and no one remained behind. On the third day after the battle, Mummius thinking it impossible that the people should have quitted the city without attempting to defend it, ordered the gates to be broken open, and convinced himself that the place was deserted. Thus the Romans took possession of Corinth and began to plunder it.<sup>5</sup> Corinth possessed the most splendid works of art, which were either carried away or destroyed, and the town itself was reduced to a heap of ashes: the honesty of Mummius was that of a barbarian. All the Corinthians were sold as slaves; Thebes and Chalcis were likewise destroyed; respecting other towns, it is uncertain how they were dealt with. In the time of Pausanias<sup>6</sup> Thebes was only a small village within the Cadmea. The population of the whole of Peloponnesus would have been sold into slavery, had not Polybius, through his friend Scipio, induced the senate to make some fair regulations. Greece became a Roman province, and only a few places as Sparta and Athens, which had taken no part in this war remained *liberae civitates*. The real province was Achaia, and the other Greek countries formed only an appendix to the province, which was governed by the praetor of Achaia. Phocis and Boeotia were obliged to pay tribute, a thing which

<sup>5</sup> Pausanias, vii. 16.

<sup>6</sup> ix. 7. 4.

they had never done, even under the rule of Macedonia. They received, moreover, a uniform constitution, in the formation of which Polybius had a share, and which is said to have much contributed to the recovery of the people; but the Greeks were paralysed, no one being allowed to have landed property in a state of which he was not a member; all *συντήρησα* of the nations were abolished; all the *concilia*, and probably the *commercium* and *connubium* between the several places also, were forbidden. The territory of Corinth was made *ager publicus Romanus*. During this distress of Greece, Polybius fulfilled the bitterest of duties: he returned to his country to obtain, by his mediation, tolerable terms for those who survived, and to save many a relic dear to his feelings. He thus obtained the restoration of the honours paid to Philopoemen, whose name the Romans hated<sup>7</sup>. The lot of Polybius was that of a physician who has to make a desperate cure on his own wife or children. Love indeed inspired him, but that very love causes such an operation to rend the heart far more painfully than if a stranger performed it. Such courage is more than heroism: to endure such things in the country where he had formerly lived in happiness, not to despair in the midst of general despair, and then to induce tyrants to be moderate, and in the end to gain a certain object after all,—these are characteristics of a great man. The author of a petulant essay on Polybius, which appeared several years ago, has only exposed his ignorance by not acknowledging the true greatness of Polybius. All concessions that were in any way favourable to Greece, were obtained solely through his exertions.

The wars which had been carried on in Spain for many years may be divided into great periods: the first comes down to the end of the second Punic war; the second extends from that time to the peace of Sempronius Gracchus, the result of which was, that the Romans became masters of Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, the western part of Aragon and the east of Castile, and acquired a kind of supremacy over the Celtiberians. In one of the articles of this peace, the Spaniards had pledged themselves not to build any more towns. But, at the close of the sixth century, when the Celtiberians extended the circumference of their town of Segeda, for the purpose of

<sup>7</sup> Polybius, xl. 8, foll., *Excerpt. Vat.* p. 89, ed. Lucht.

concentrating themselves in it, the Romans, referring to that article of the treaty, interfered, and a fresh war broke out, which lasted for nearly four years<sup>6</sup>, and may be called the first Celtiberian war, as it was in reality confined to the Celtiberians, who consisted generally speaking of four tribes. The Romans, with their much superior forces, at first made progress, but, on many occasions, they were fairly beaten. The small tribes in the mountains of Old Castile and western Aragon were of a thoroughly heroic character; the Arevaci, however, were the most important of them. Formerly they had no doubt been dangerous to their neighbours, but now all their efforts were directed solely to the maintenance of their independence. The Romans, however superior in their forces, were unable to bring about a final decision, and fortune was so little favourable to them that it seemed as if Providence wished to remind them of Nemesis, as a slave is said to have reminded his conqueror while celebrating his triumph. The consul M. Claudius Marcellus, the grandson of the Marcellus who had been five times consul during the period of the second Punic war, was a man of ancient Roman virtue and of great humanity, who honoured and respected those people who were struggling for nothing but their freedom. He therefore endeavoured to intercede for them, and procure them a peace on equitable terms. But the Roman senate maintained that it was incompatible with the dignity of the republic to conclude a peace with an inferior nation, and that the Celtiberians must submit to their discretion before anything could be said about peace. Marcellus, therefore, seeing no other way of putting an end to the war, and abhorring the miseries which might be inflicted on the Celtiberians by a cruel successor, managed to gain their confidence. It is remarkable to see the extraordinary power which personal qualities always had over the minds of the Spaniards, and how they gave their full confidence to one general, while there were others whom they would not trust on any condition. They followed the advice of Marcellus, who concluded a very reasonable peace and received hostages. The hostages, however, were sent back, and he merely obliged them to provide a number of horsemen to serve in the wars in Spain, and perhaps also in Africa. For the present the war was thus concluded. Other generals, however, such as L. Lucullus who succeeded Mar-

<sup>6</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 14.

cellus in Spain, behaved quite differently. Lucullus had flattered himself with the idea that he could subdue the Celtiberians, which he was now prevented from doing by the peace of Marcellus. He accordingly stirred up a war against the Vacceans who lived in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, and conducted it with varying success, though owing to the want of unity among the Spaniards, the Romans gradually made some progress.

About the same time, another war had broken out in the south of Lusitania.<sup>9</sup> The Lusitanians did not inhabit the whole of Portugal; they extended only a little north of the Tagus, occupying the southern part with the exception of Algarbia, and were allied with the Bettones in the Spanish part of Estremadura. They were a nation of robbers and very different from the Celtiberians, who were a serious, conscientious and just people; and the Lusitanians were therefore just as troublesome to the ancient Spaniards as the Romans; but they had hitherto been without any such great leader as the one who soon afterwards appeared among them. On one occasion when they had robbed the Roman subjects in Andalusia, a war was commenced against them, which the Romans carried on in a very horrible manner, as was their custom during that time. A specimen may be seen in the fate of Cauca. Lucullus had promised to pardon that town, on condition of its surrendering its arms; but when the people, trusting his word, had done so, they were all massacred. It was this faithlessness which rendered the resistance of the Spaniards so desperate. The Lusitanians were excellent as light troops, and very troublesome to the Romans by their predatory excursions; but there is nothing to excuse the conduct of the Romans towards them. The Romans under Ser. Sulpicius Galba were victorious, and a portion of the Lusitanians, who sought for mercy, gave hostages, surrendered their horses, and were willing to submit to any terms that might be dictated. The consul, declaring that he knew them to be forced to war by distress, promised to transplant them and give them settlements in a fertile country. Sulpicius Galba, who made this promise was a distinguished rhetorician and jurist, of one of the first patrician families, the pillar and light of the aristocracy; yet by his conduct he forfeited his own honour and that of his ancestors. He ordered

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *De Rebus Hispan.* 56, foll.

the Lusitanians to encamp in three divisions at some distance from one another, and after having treacherously induced them to surrender their arms, under the promise that they should be restored to them in their new country, he ordered all of them to be massacred.<sup>10</sup> One of those who escaped on that occasion, was Viriathus, a man who caused the Romans to do penance for that act of treachery, by a war which lasted for several years, in which the Romans covered themselves with disgrace. It may be that this cruelty did not arise from Galba's savage nature alone, but in part also from the fact that he could not trust the sincerity of the Lusitanians. But however this may have been, honest old Cato brought a capital charge against him for this crime; and Sulpicius Galba would have been condemned to death had he not implored the mercy of the people by producing his own young children and those of his cousin.<sup>11</sup>

Out of this war, in which Galba had disgraced the name of Rome, arose that against Viriathus. If, as we read in an epitome of Livy<sup>12</sup>, he carried on the war against the Romans for fourteen years, we must suppose that he had acted a prominent part in the Lusitanian war. In the earlier part of his life, he had been a common shepherd and a robber,—two characters which, in the south of Europe, are commonly united, and are so to this day in Italy. He had sworn to take vengeance on the Romans, and now roused his countrymen to revenge. He put himself at the head of a small band of his former comrades; for Spain, from the character of the nation, has always been the scene of guerilla warfare, for which the Spaniards are most adapted through the nature of their country and their own individuality; with them, lawful order goes for nothing, whereas a man's personal influence is all-powerful. Viriathus was regarded as the hero of the nation, and enjoyed unlimited confidence. He rarely ventured upon a pitched battle against the Romans; his method of carrying on the war consisted in lying in ambush, in cutting off supplies, evading the enemy, and in quickly dispersing after a defeat. If I were to relate to you how he wore out the Roman armies, how he was present every where with his light cavalry, dispersed the Romans, and then

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Hispan.* 59, 60.

<sup>11</sup> Suetonius, *Galba*, 3; Valer. Maxim. ix. 62.; Cicero, *De Orat.* i. 53, *Brutus*, 20, *pro Murena*, 28; Pseudo-Ascon. in *Divinat.* p. 124; Livy, *Epit.* 49.

<sup>12</sup> Lib. 54 in fine.

conquered them one by one, and how many Roman generals he defeated—more than one of them lost his life,—the narrative would be attractive and interesting indeed, but my time does not permit me to do so. Suffice it to say that he maintained himself against the Romans for a period of eight years (605-612); the Romans met him with superior forces, but he always evaded them, and then suddenly appeared in their rear, surrounded them on impassable roads, took their baggage and destroyed them in detail. In this manner, he made himself master of the whole country, the inhabitants of the coasts of Andalusia and Valencia, who had always been the most unwarlike, alone being subject to the Romans, and fast becoming Latinised. There Viriathus appeared as an enemy; but the country with which he was peculiarly familiar, and which looked upon him as a friend, extended from Portugal through Estremadura, as far as Aragon: in this territory, he moved about with extraordinary rapidity with his light cavalry and infantry, and the Romans rarely gained any advantage over him. In the end, they found themselves compelled to conclude a formal peace with him, in which they recognised him as *socius* and *amicus populi Romani aequissimo jure*, as if he had been a king *aequo jure* with themselves. It was contrary to Roman principles to conclude such a peace, by which Viriathus and his people became quite sovereign. The peace was honestly meant on his part, but it was not kept by the Romans: it was violated the very next year. The proconsul, Q. Servilius Caepio<sup>13</sup>, like all the Roman generals of that time, was anxious only for a triumph and booty; he accordingly stirred up the war afresh, and was treacherously authorised by the senate to injure Viriathus wherever he could. The war thus re-commenced while, nominally, negotiations were carried on. Some Lusitanian traitors offered to murder their own leader. They went into his tent, where, finding him asleep, they cut his throat, and before any one suspected his death, they returned to the Romans to receive their blood-money.<sup>14</sup> For the Lusitanians, it only remained to bury him (612), and they did so with an enthusiasm which has become celebrated in history: the friends of the great man fought with one another on his tomb, until they fell. This self sacrificing act of the friends of Viriathus forms a singular contrast to the general character of the

<sup>13</sup> Appian, *L. c.* 69 and 70.

<sup>14</sup> Appian, *L. c.* 74.

Lusitanians, for we frequently meet with instances of the most malicious treachery, and we shall form a tolerably correct notion of them, if we compare them with the modern Spaniards, who still shew the same character in many things. But although the modern, as well as the ancient Spaniards—the Celtiberians must always be excepted—are distinguished for their love of money, still their treachery is oftener to be ascribed to their fearful party-spirit than to their avarice. The Spaniards seem to act on the principle, that friendship is mortal, hatred immortal. They never become reconciled to those with whom they have once quarrelled; and this feature appears both in ancient and in modern times. Their mode of warfare is likewise the same as it was of old; for they have never fought a battle in the open field, except under the command of a Hamilcar or a Hannibal; and in modern times under a Gonsalvo de Cordova who formed the Spanish line, or an Alba under whom it was still excellent; but they are excellent in petty warfare, and in the defence of fortified places: in the lines, they are good for nothing.<sup>15</sup> There are many other features besides, which the modern Spaniards have in common with their ancient forefathers. Perperna could not maintain himself in Spain against Pompey, nor could the successors of Viriathus against Caepio. Unless a general inspire the Spaniards with confidence in his own personal qualities, they have no confidence in themselves. The Lusitanians now carried on the war under several generals, but none of the successors of Viriathus was as great as he, none being able to command personal confidence. D. Junius Brutus Gallaicus concluded a peace with them, and they accepted the offer to settle in a district of Valencia as a kind of Roman colony, where they founded a town of the name of Valentia. In this very mild climate, they soon lost their warlike spirit. It is remarkable to see with what facility this Brutus made conquests in the north-west of Spain, and the north-east of Portugal; in modern times, too, those people have shewn little perseverance, except against the power of the Moors. He was the first Roman who advanced into the country of the Callaeci, across the river Minho.<sup>16</sup> This expedition was, it is true, merely transitory, but it left a deep impression; the permanent subjugation of those countries did not take place till a later period.

These conquests, which shed so great a lustre upon Rome,

<sup>15</sup> Comp. above, p. 69, foll.

<sup>16</sup> Florus, ii. 17; Livy, *Epit.* 55.

belong to the time in which the wars against the Celtiberians were carried on so unsuccessfully. The Celtiberians were divided into several small tribes, the more important of which were the Belli, Titthi, and Arevaci. We are not able to give a satisfactory account of the constitutions and condition of the people of Spain; but it is evident that the Celtiberians must have had a republican constitution, and were not governed by kings like the nations in southern Spain. But although the Celtiberians had a national constitution, still their important cities seem, like the towns of Greece, to have had an independent political existence. The Arevaci had two great towns, Termanitia or Termestia, and Numantia. The Celtiberian wars began in the year 609, and ended in 619 or 620; if we consider the comparative insignificance of the people that held out in these wars, their long duration is almost inconceivable. At first most of the Celtiberians were in arms, but gradually one place after another fell off. Numantia was stronger than Termanitia, although the number of its soldiers did not amount to more than 8000<sup>17</sup>; and in the course of the war even this number decreased, so that during the blockade only 4000 were left. It was situated in a very rough district, amidst rocks and mountain torrents, in the neighbourhood of the modern Soria. The longer this war lasted, the more formidable it became to the Romans. They twice concluded a peace, but broke through it each time, till at length Scipio Africanus was appointed once more to torture to death a brave people.

---

## LECTURE LXXVI.

We are generally inclined to believe that the ancient Spaniards were barbarians, but if by this name we understand savages, they were certainly not barbarians. The Turdetani were civilised at a very early period<sup>1</sup>; they had an alphabet similar to that of the Libyans, and their coins are infinitely better than those of any European nation during the middle ages. We have also ancient inscriptions, of which however no rational interpretation has yet been given, and which can be explained

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 76.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, iii. p. 139.

the age prescribed for the consulship by the *leges annales*. There seems to be some misunderstanding in Appian<sup>8</sup>, unless a law existed absolutely forbidding the same person to be invested with the consulship twice. When Scipio set out to extirpate the small people of Numantia, he took with him many recruits, allies and volunteers from all parts of the world, Numidians as well as men from the far East. All offers of the Numantines were rejected. Scipio found the army in a state of great disorder; and it was not without difficulty that he succeeded in introducing a better discipline among his troops. They amounted to 60,000, and with them he marched against Numantia. The town was surrounded on three sides by the river Durius, and was therefore situated on an isthmus, which was strongly fortified. After having driven the Numantines into their town, which was only three miles in circumference, he surrounded it with a line of pallisades, and a double rampart, as the Spartans had done at Plataeae. On these lines he established balistae, by means of which the Romans endeavoured to keep the despairing Numantines at a distance, it being their object to destroy them by hunger, and they therefore took all possible precautions to prevent provisions being introduced into the town. For a time the Numantines received sacks of flour by the river Durius; but in order to render this impossible, Scipio threw into the river long beams, which were armed with saws and darts, and being fastened to the banks, they floated both above and below the town, which the rafts with provisions could thus no longer reach. How long this fearful blockade lasted we cannot say. All attempts of the Numantines to break through the Roman fortifications failed. On one occasion, however, some men succeeded in a bold undertaking, forcing their way to the distant town of Lutia, where they met with such admiration of their courage, that several hundred young men offered their assistance, and a general insurrection seemed on the point of breaking out. On this occasion Scipio acted in a manner of which we cannot think without a shudder, but which shews what kind of man he was. To follow the Numantines to Lutia was his duty, but he committed the atrocity of cutting off the hands of about four hundred young men who were brought before him as friends to the cause of

<sup>8</sup> Comp. Livy, Epit. 56.

the Numantines. After the Numantines had consumed all their provisions, after they had for some time been living upon the corpses of their enemies and their own friends, and had experienced all the horrors and miseries such as we have seen inflicted upon Missolonghi, they at length wished to surrender. Scipio demanded that they should lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. The Numantines then begged for a truce of three days to consider the proposal. This time they employed, especially the persons of the higher classes, in destroying their wives and children, that they might not fall into the hands of the Romans; and the slaughter which they made among themselves was so great, that on the third day only a small number came forth from the town, in such a condition that their faces shewed scarcely any traces of human features. Scipio selected fifty for his triumph, who were afterwards probably beheaded, and the rest were sold as slaves<sup>9</sup>; but they are said to have been so infuriated that some made away with themselves, and others killed their masters, so that in a short time not a single Numantine was left. According to some authors all the Numantines had put an end to their lives, before the Romans entered the city; but this statement is unhistorical.<sup>10</sup> Numantia vanished from the face of the earth, and was never rebuilt by the Romans. The day of punishment for the awful deed was not far distant.

Even before the fall of Numantia, a servile war had broken out in Sicily, the particulars of which belong, properly speaking, not to a history of Rome, but to that of Sicily. This insurrection had its origin in the decrease of the population of the island, where, in consequence of the numerous wars, famine and plagues had raged in the same degree as in Germany during the Thirty-years' war. Hardly twenty-four years had passed after the conclusion of the first Punic war, when the second broke out, and completed the devastation of Sicily. Its state of desolation was like that of Ireland after the peace of Limerick in the reign of William III. Many of the conquered places had been razed to the ground, and whole districts had become *ager publicus*, which were occupied by speculators, and formed into extensive estates. They were chiefly used as pasture land, just as in the time of Arcadius and Honorius, when, as we see from the Theodosian Code, Calabria, Lucania

and Bruttium were almost entirely changed into vast pasture lands. The proprietors were partly Siceliots and partly Romans, who kept large flocks of cattle, and whose herdsmen formed gangs of robbers.<sup>11</sup> Immense numbers of slaves were kept on these estates<sup>12</sup>, thousands of them being often together on the same property. Formerly slaves had been rare, comparatively speaking; but, after the destruction of so many towns, we hear of vast multitudes of them, and they were sold in the markets for a mere trifle. Imagine the three Punic wars, the war in Syria about the inheritance of Antiochus Epiphanes, the numerous pirates along the whole coast of Cilicia, the ravages in Achaia, Macedonia, Africa, and Spain; and remember that, in poor countries, men were always carried away, and sold as slaves—and you will be able to form a tolerably correct estimate of the number of slaves.<sup>13</sup> The slaves in Sicily were treated very cruelly, being obliged to cultivate the fields in chains. Among them there were of course many able men from all countries, who deserved quite a different fate, and could not but be thirsting after the blood of their tyrants. A servile war thus broke out in Sicily; and we cannot wonder that a similar insurrection occurred at the same time in Greece. The cause was the same everywhere. Formerly agriculture had been carried on in Greece chiefly by freedmen, and it was not till now that it passed into the hands of slaves. The war lasted for upwards of three years; several Roman armies were completely defeated, and a consular army under Q. Rupilius was required to subdue the island in 620, for the slaves were masters of the strongest places, Enna and Tauromenium. Their leader was a Syrian of the name of Eunus, who like Jean François in St. Domingo, in 1791, assumed the diadem. The war was carried on with the same inhuman barbarities as are perpetrated in all servile wars, in the West Indies or North America. The devastation of

<sup>11</sup> The herdsmen in all parts of Italy, are still a degenerate race of men. I have frequently spoken with great respect of the Italians as husbandmen, but I repeat that the herdsmen are degenerate. In the state of Naples, the ecclesiastical states and Tuscany, there are but few; when they are not robbers themselves, they are the comrades and spies of robbers.—N.

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, xxxiv. *Eclog.* 2. p. 525, foll.

<sup>13</sup> It has been said that, in the slave-market of the island of Delos, 10,000 slaves were sold every day: but nothing can be more absurd than this; and from the account given by Strabo (xiv. p. 668), it is clear that he only meant to say, that on one particular day 10,000 slaves were sold.—N.

Sicily was completed by it; and thirty years later, the same circumstances produced the same effects. The detail is fearfully interesting, but, as I have already said, does not belong to Roman history.

During this time, Attalus Philometor of Pergamus, the son of Eumenes, had died, and with him the dynasty of Philetaerus had become extinct. The first princes of that family which had been raised by the Romans were, on the whole, clever men, and of a mild disposition, and the country flourished under them, although much may be said against their policy, if we take morality as our standard. But the last Attalus was a man of different character: his reign was tyrannical, and he himself was one of those contemptible miscreants whom we meet with only in the history of the East, where a little natural perversity is easily carried to the highest pitch, as in the case of Sultan Ibrahim. In the East, men sometimes take a delight in what is most unnatural and disgusting, and thus become true incarnations of a base and satanic nature. Such a man was Attalus. The only art he occupied himself with, was that of cultivating poisonous plants; and what amused him most was, to get rid of his nearest kindred.<sup>14</sup> He died without issue, and left his whole kingdom to the Romans, who certainly would not easily have recognised any one else as his successor; for they looked upon his kingdom as their own property, which they had a right to dispose of, just as a master had the right of succession to the estate of his slave or his freedman who died without having made a will. The remarks of Florus<sup>15</sup>, therefore, on this affair are foolish. Rome thus acquired a new and extensively rich province, but possession of it was not obtained without bloodshed. There was a natural son of Eumenes, the predecessor of Attalus, called Aristonicus, who claimed the kingdom of Attalus as his lawful inheritance. According to eastern notions, such a man was not disqualified for succeeding to the throne, so that but for the will of Attalus he would have been the lawful heir. Soon after his brother's death, he took possession of the diadem without any difficulty, for the people of Pergamus dreaded the dominion of Rome, having become acquainted with the tyranny and robbery of the Roman praetors and proconsuls, who annually appeared among them. Many towns declared for him, while others which had

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus, xxxiv. *Erv. de Virt. et Vit.* p. 601; Justin, xxxvi. 4.      <sup>15</sup> ii. 20.

recently received their independence at the hands of the Romans, such as Ephesus, made preparations against him. As, however, there was no one in the world who could give him assistance, it is inconceivable how he could have the madness to believe that he would be able to hold out against the Romans, and how he found any support among the people of Pergamus. The neighbouring states of Cappadocia, Pontus and Bithynia were very small, and the last two utterly unwarlike; the Syrian kings too were near their end, and their whole attention was directed towards the East, where the Parthians were extending their power and had already conquered Babylon. Yet the war lasted much longer than had been anticipated. The effeminate inhabitants of the magnificent country of Lydia and Ionia carried on the war in some respects, with great resolution; and, besides them, Aristonicus had many Thracian mercenaries in his army. On the part of the Romans, the war was badly conducted, as their generals thought of nothing but enriching themselves, and turning everything into money, instead of making the proper use of their victories: they were, in fact, glad when a powerful and wealthy town revolted, because it afforded them an opportunity for plunder. The Romans had not only a consular army, but also troops from Bithynia and Pontus; notwithstanding which one Roman commander, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, was defeated and taken prisoner. This man has a reputation in history, and yet he had shown such revolting avarice, that the Asiatics took vengeance by maltreating his dead body: so easily a person might then acquire the reputation of an honest man! He died however with courage, for he caused himself to be killed. The war was at length brought to an end by M. Perperna, and M. Aquillius, who snatched the triumph out of the hands of Perperna. Aristonicus was taken prisoner at Stratonicea, and adorned the triumph at Rome.<sup>16</sup> The end of this, as well as of the Servile war, belongs to a later date than the year 619 which is the year of the tribuneship of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. The reduction of Sicily falls in the year 620, and the defeat of Aristonicus in 622.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Sallust, *Fragm. Hist.* lib. iv; Vell. Patrc. ii. 4.

<sup>17</sup> The *Annales* of Zumpt deserve to be recommended, and, with the exception of a few inaccuracies, they are satisfactory. For the early periods of Greek history, however, the work is not always founded on careful investigation.—N.

The province of Asia was now regularly constituted, but within narrower limits. Rome behaved generously towards the native princes. The dominion of Nicomedes was extended, and Mithridates of Pontus obtained Magna Phrygia, though not till the tribuneship of C. Gracchus, who seems to have spoken against the measure, since this unnecessary giving up of a country had probably been effected by Mithridates, through a regular purchase from the Roman commissioners.

The constitutional changes of this period are for the most part unimportant, the distinction between patricians and plebeians having ceased. In the year 622, we find for the first time two plebeian censors.<sup>18</sup> The first time that both the consuls were plebeians, had been in the year 580, a fact recorded in the Fasti, where we read *ambo primum de plebe*.<sup>19</sup> It is strange that Livy does not mention it; but circumstances had now so long been ripening, that no one thought of opposing the election of two plebeians. Dionysius says<sup>20</sup> that in his time there were no more than fifty patrician families left, which is not to be understood of gentes, but of families in the ordinary sense of the word; so that, for example, the Scipios, Cethegi, and Lentuli were considered as three families. My belief is, that at the time when the consulship was in the hands of two plebeians, the number of patrician gentes, whose members were invested with public honours, did not amount to more than fifteen. But these gentes were not taken into account, since the curiae, in which alone their influence could be exerted, had lost their political importance long before, and their influence was only that of separate families. Thus, in the Aemilia gens, we have only the Lepidi, Paulli, and Scauri; in the Cornelia gens, the families of the Scipios, Sulla, Lentuli, and Cethegi, etc. All the families of a gens, moreover, were not *nobiles*. Thus, the Claudia gens contained only one; and the Valeria gens, only that of the Messalae: in short, the patricians formed a very trifling number. The noble plebeian families, on the other hand, were very numerous, and constantly increasing. A very great majority of the senators were plebeians; and

A new and improved edition was published at Berlin in 1838, under the title "Annales veterum regnorum et populorum, imprimis Romanorum, confecti a C. T. Zumptio."

<sup>18</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 59.

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 70.

<sup>20</sup> Dionysius, i. 85. Comp. vol. i. p. 329.

ever since the end of the Hannibalian war, most of the praetors had been plebeians: among six praetors there was scarcely one patrician. Nor can this be regarded as anything extraordinary, for it was the natural consequence of circumstances. In the time of the Gracchi, we find patrician and plebeian families indiscriminately on both sides; App. Claudius, belonging to a family which had formerly headed the patricians against the plebeians, was the father-in-law of Tib. Gracchus, agreed with him, and carried into effect the laws enacted by him; whereas those who were most furious against the Gracchi, and most interested in defeating their measures, were all plebeians, with the exception of Scipio Nasica. The feuds between the two orders had been transferred to the *novi homines* and the *nobiles*. It is only the unlearned, though often ingenious historians of the eighteenth century, and especially those of foreign countries (Frenchmen), that were mistaken on this point, believing that these *nobiles* were patricians, although the change had been known ever since the revival of letters. At Rome, nobody thought any longer of a distinction between patricians and plebeians. This may account for Livy not mentioning the change, since, in reality, the distinction had altogether ceased. But the number of patricians was then still sufficient for the censorship; and hence forty years more passed before both censors were plebeians.

About this time, a change must also have taken place in the aedileship, which, until then, had been divided in such a manner, that it was held alternately, one year by patricians, and the other by plebeians; for the patricians had been less jealous about this office on account of its costliness.

Various other changes besides must have occurred during this period; they were not, indeed, of a legislative nature, but were manifested in the whole *habitus* of the Romans. Among these, I reckon the entire change in the character of the tribuneship. A tribune at this time was like a despot, with absolute power. A few years after the time of Gracchus, the tribune C. Atinius Labeo ordered the censor Q. Metellus to be thrown down the Tarpeian rock, because he had excluded him from the senate; and it was only with difficulty that he was saved from the hands of this tyrant by another tribune, on whom his relations called for protection.<sup>21</sup> Such wild acts of tribunes, which are

<sup>21</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 59; Cicero, *pro Domo*, 47.

not unfrequent during this period, prove that the tribunes themselves no longer knew what they really were. The same Atinius carried a law of great importance, that the tribunes of the people should be senators by virtue of their office, and that they should not be excluded from the senate on any other grounds than those on which other senators were excluded.<sup>22</sup> By this law, the senate would have become an entirely democratic and elective assembly; but, although Gellius supposes that this law remained in force, yet it cannot have been of long duration.

---

### LECTURE LXXVII.

THERE was a time when the name of the Gracchi was branded with infamy, and when they were looked upon as notorious only for their arbitrary proceedings, and as the ringleaders of a tyrannical faction attempting to interfere with other persons' property, and another time, when they had a celebrity which they themselves would have detested; but such opinions, as well as the old view of the agrarian laws, are now undermined; and, although the intricate nature of the *ager publicus* may not be universally understood, yet, in Germany<sup>1</sup>, the correctness of the results of our historical investigations is generally recognised<sup>2</sup>, and I do not think that there is any one who still entertains the old opinion about the Gracchi.

Tib. Gracchus was the son of the elder Tib. Gracchus, who had concluded the peace with the Celtiberians, by Cornelia, the daughter of the elder Scipio, who was given to him in marriage, not by her father, as Livy states, but by her relatives after her father's death. Both were known to be the most virtuous beings in that corrupt age: the good old times conti-

<sup>22</sup> Gellius, xiv. 8; Zonaras, vii. 15.

<sup>1</sup> With the exception, perhaps, of some obscure and isolated corner of Austria.—N.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii. p. 130, foll. Some Frenchmen still cling to their false prejudices; but in America my views have been adopted, as I see from a review of my History of Rome; the author, a remarkable man, states that there was not a person in the world to whom the notion that the Gracchi did not attack private property was not perfectly new when it was first promulgated by me.—N.

nued in them. Of twelve children three only survived, the two brothers, Tiberius and Caius, and a daughter who was married to the younger Scipio (*Pauli f.*). The sons were educated, under their mother's superintendence, by distinguished Greeks and a Campanian, C. Blossius, who had received a complete Greek education, and even wrote Greek poetry, for we now know that he composed comedies in the style of Rhinton<sup>3</sup>—a proof to what a degree Greek literature then flourished in Italy, as is in fact stated by Cicero. He was somewhat older than Tiberius whose teacher and friend he was; and a follower of the Stoic philosophy, which at that time was suited to the wants of all noble minds, and particularly to a nation like the Romans. As Tiberius, through the great favour of the people, advanced in his public career, having distinguished himself even at the taking of Carthage, where he and C. Fannius had been the first to scale the walls, he became quaestor, and in this capacity induced the Numantines to accept the peace of Mancinus. Its rejection by the senate exasperated him. It is unfortunate that the history of these times has come down to us only in hasty accounts at second or even third hand, especially by Appian and Plutarch; the latter wrote the lives of the Gracchi with feeling, but in perfect ignorance of the circumstances of the time, though the moral part of the account is beautiful. Both writers, however, often allow themselves to be misguided by the scandalous anecdotes of some now unknown author. Plutarch was thus led to believe that Tiberius' vanity had been offended by the rejection of the peace with Numantia; but in a mind like that of Tiberius we can surely find motives for exasperation in something very different. He had concluded the peace as an honest man, and to see it trodden underfoot in defiance of all good faith, must have irritated him against the rulers of the time. How a man of Gracchus' disposition must have felt it his duty to venture upon such dangerous political measures (*πολιτεύματα*), is best explained by the consideration of the servile war in Sicily; for there the real cancer in the general condition of the people manifested itself most clearly.

*Ager publicus*<sup>4</sup> was land conquered in war, and belonging to

<sup>3</sup> I know of no passage where this is mentioned. Does Niebuhr perhaps confound Blossius with Blaesus? for the latter is known to have written plays in the style of Rhinton.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. *Lect. on Rom. Hist.* vol. i. p. 192, foll.

the republic. The use of it was given either to Romans, or to natives, or to others, on certain conditions, viz., on payment of the tenth of the produce of arable land and of the cattle, of a *scriptura* for the use of pasture land in proportion to the number of cattle. The Licinian law had ordained that no one should possess more than five hundred jugers of it.<sup>5</sup> The occupation of such public land could indeed be transmitted from father to son as an inheritance, and it could be sold or disposed of in other ways; but the occupant always remained a precarious tenant, or a tenant at will, whom the owner, that is the republic, had the right to turn out, whenever it was thought necessary to apply such land to other purposes. When a person possessed more than the law allowed, he was liable to punishment, and the surplus was to be confiscated.

The manner in which the Licinian law was observed, was such as might have been expected under the circumstances. L. Postumius Megillus was punished for having employed the soldiers of a legion in the cultivation of an extensive tract of domain land<sup>6</sup>; and it is a well-known fact, that Licinius Stolo himself emancipated his son, that he might be able, in his name, to occupy a greater portion of public land than his own law permitted.<sup>7</sup> Everywhere persons possessed more than the legal amount, and the very fact that these lands were not property, but secured only by the *jus praetorium*, there being no jurisdiction in the districts where they lay, afforded to those who wished to enrich themselves, great powers to eject those who occupied small tracts of land. With us, in France, and in England, small pieces of land are worth much more than when united in large masses, but in the south, especially in Italy, large estates are far more valuable, so that there the number of small farms is continually diminishing, and all landed property becomes accumulated in a few hands. Down to the war with Pyrrhus, immense tracts of land had been acquired; and during the time of the Punic wars, the public domain was increased to an enormous extent. A great part of it was used for the foundation of colonies, or was assigned to the Roman allies; but, in this case also, the republic seems to have retained the ownership for itself. After the Hannibalian war, a number of colonies were founded, and extraordinary assignments were made to the veterans of Scipio only in Apulia, Samnium, and

<sup>5</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. iii. p. 413.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. iii. p. 52.

I believe also in Lucania<sup>8</sup>; since the time of C. Flaminius, nothing had ever been assigned *viritim* to all the plebeians, as had been done in ancient times.

A man who himself farms a piece of land which requires no capital can, of course, pay a much higher rent than a man who cannot farm it himself; for the latter requires labourers, whereas the former not only reaps the whole produce of the soil, but has not to pay any wages. I have a very accurate knowledge of the present system of agriculture in Italy, and am acquainted with large farmers, who have vast possessions, which they manage exceedingly well, but who are an abominable class of men, and must lead to the ruin of their country; although in some respects they have a title to praise, which is not sufficiently acknowledged. But I also know small independent peasants, the most respectable class of men in Italy<sup>9</sup>, and I very well remember one poor peasant of Tivoli, who was striving to recover his small estate from the hands of a usurer, and exerted all his powers to satisfy his noble pride in being an independent proprietor. On that occasion, I saw very clearly the value of wages, and how important it is for a family to have a piece of land which they can cultivate themselves without the employment of labourers. In Italy, the money is in the hands of the few, the nobles; and, in unproductive seasons, the peasant is obliged to sell or pledge his piece of land. During the middle ages, the number of these small proprietors was very great, but at present it is greatly reduced, and is ever on the decrease. In my inquiries at Tivoli, I learned that formerly almost every citizen had his hide of land; but that, in times of war, many had been obliged to sell their property; so that, fifty years ago, the number of small landed proprietors was five times, and 400 years ago fifty times, greater than at present. I can assert this the more confidently, as I have my information from the old statistical documents of Tivoli itself, drawn up in the fifteenth century.<sup>10</sup> Sonnino<sup>11</sup> has 4000 inhabitants, but the whole of its territory belongs to five or six individuals; the rest are beggars and robbers.

<sup>8</sup> In Livy, xxxi. 4, Lucania is not mentioned.

<sup>9</sup> With these sentiments, and those which follow, compare a letter of Niebuhr, in *Lebensnachrichten über B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. ii. p. 398, foll. where a more detailed description of the state of the Italian peasantry is given.

<sup>10</sup> Compare *Lebensnachrichten über B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. ii. p. 404.

<sup>11</sup> This name has been put in here by conjecture, for all the MSS. notes have Solino, a place which I cannot find.

It was exactly such a state of things as this which presented itself to Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. While the number of Roman citizens was increased every year by Italian allies, who obtained the Roman franchise, and more especially by freedmen, who, on the whole, bore the stamp of slaves, the number of landed proprietors decreased. The numerous small estates of former times were no more. During the Hannibalian war everything had become altered; for where, for example, a poor peasant was the neighbour of a rich one, the former had been compelled, during those times of distress and epidemic disorders among the cattle, to borrow money from his neighbour, and not being able to give security, he had undoubtedly to pay a high rate of interest. Now the son of such a peasant was, perhaps, serving in the legions, and if the father happened to be attacked by illness, he was obliged to engage labourers. In this manner he was reduced more and more, and if in the end he was not able to pay the interest, he was compelled to give up his land to his neighbour. In this and various other ways many a small estate had passed into the hands of the rich.<sup>12</sup> Such a change of property increases in its progress like an avalanche. The Licinian law had enacted that, on every one hundred jugers of the domain land, a certain number of citizens should be employed as free labourers or cottagers, in order that it might be cultivated by freemen and not by slaves.<sup>13</sup> But this enactment had not been observed, and thousands of slaves were employed on account of their cheapness, just as in Portugal, from the sixteenth century down to the time of Pombal, negro slaves were employed for the same reason; whence mulattoes are also found there. It is not improbable that the first idea of reform occurred to Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, when on his march from Spain he passed through Etruria, on the extensive estates in which he saw far and wide no free labourers, but numbers of slaves in chains<sup>14</sup>, while the freeborn Romans were reduced to beggary.

The population of Rome was becoming more and more a true populace, while in the country the number of the poor was increasing to an awful extent. It was a state of things like that towards which, unfortunately all Europe is, at present, hastening; but the difference is, that the Romans had it in

<sup>12</sup> Cato, *ap. Plin. Hist. Nat.* xviii. 6 and 7; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 41.

<sup>13</sup> See vol. iii. p. 16.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, *Tib. Gracch.* 8.

their power to remove the evil. Few Romans reflected upon the causes out of which it had grown; but many must have known that the misery would never have reached that height, if the Licinian law had been observed, if men had been appointed to watch over its proper execution, and if the newly acquired lands had from time to time been distributed, or their occupation been rightly conducted. Every one, like the king in Goethe's play, wished for a different state of things, but no one had the courage or will to undertake the reform. After the second Punic war it would not have been very difficult to accomplish the object. In the midst of great political shocks and sufferings, there occur moments which must be seized, and in which the disease can be overcome; but that moment had been neglected at Rome, and was now irreparably lost. Seventy years had now elapsed from the time of the Hannibalian war, and every one who contemplated the condition of the republic must have felt like a person who is suddenly placed before a yawning abyss. C. Laelius is said to have intended to interfere and to help, but afterwards to have given up the idea as impracticable. Hence he is said to have received the surname *Sapiens*, either in mockery, it not being prudent (*sapiens*) to put one's hand into a wasp's nest, or to indicate his real wisdom.<sup>15</sup>

All the great Roman families were concerned in these things, for there were surely few illustrious families which were not in possession of portions of the public domain exceeding by far the lawful extent of 500 jugers, or which did not keep upon them more than the legal number of a hundred large and five hundred small cattle. To offend these families was unavoidable, if the Licinian law was to be strictly carried into effect. But the law was perfectly clear, and might have been enforced with the utmost strictness; and if this had been done according to the letter, no one could have raised any objection, any more than at present a farmer of domains, though his ancestors have been tenants for many years, can object to the government when, at the expiration of his term, he is told that he must leave his farm, that his holding the land alone is considered detrimental to the state, and that it must be parcelled out and distributed among other tenants. But there was, on the other hand, a kind of equity to be observed, and as the law had so long been in abeyance, it

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, *Tib. Gracch.* 8.

would not have been fair to abolish all at once the old abuse, and thereby to injure many interests. The possessors might say: "Even C. Flaminius did not apply his law to domain land already occupied, but only to newly-conquered land, and he thus tacitly acknowledged the right of possession. Moreover, having advanced money to the state in the Hannibalian war, we received in return assignments of the *ager publicus*, which has thereby become our property." Since that time nearly a hundred years had again elapsed, and those lands had consequently been in the possession of a family for the period of a hundred, and other lands even of 150 or 200 years; and where they had not continued in the same family, they had been bought of them by others who never thought that these lands would be taken from them. Many might have said that they had acquired them *bona fide*; many also had received them in a desolate condition after having been ravaged and laid waste in war, and had, at great cost, cultivated and changed them into fertile fields or olive plantations, which require a long time before they bear fruit; others had spent large sums in erecting extensive buildings on those lands. The question therefore naturally arose, whether all these things should be sacrificed by the occupants.

No one can be more spotless in his sentiments than Tib. Gracchus was; even those who long after, blinded by party spirit, censured his undertaking, such as Cicero, whose noble heart always gains the upper hand where he has acquired a correct view of a subject, give him this testimony; Cicero calls him *sanctissimus homo*. The statesmen of antiquity were not the poetical natures which they are generally believed to have been; they had to pay exactly the same regard to circumstances as those of modern times. Tib. Gracchus clearly saw, that if matters continued to go on without improvement, absolute ruin would be the consequence, and that Rome would sink into despotism. Had he demanded that the letter of the law should be complied with, he would have acted with perfect legality; but it would, nevertheless, have been in the highest degree unfair. He therefore formed a different plan. The bill he brought forward enacted that no one should occupy more than 500 jugers of the domain land, and 250 jugers for each of his sons, who was yet in *patria potestate*. This, however, must have been limited to *two* sons, as I conclude from

the expression *ne quis plus quam MILLE agri jugera haberet.*<sup>16</sup> He further wished to enact that the lands thus recovered by the state should not be allowed to be sold, in order to prevent the wealthy Romans from sooner or later acquiring them again. Therefore, far from wishing to interfere with property, he endeavoured to raise a mere *possessio* into real property, which no one should be allowed to touch. Buildings erected on land, which according to this law was to be taken from the possessors, were to be valued, and the price to be given in money to the owner of the buildings. The only difficulty now remaining was this. Those who had purchased such lands and paid for them their actual value, lost their money. A man, for instance, who possessed 400 jugers, and bought 400 in addition with ready money, lost the value of 300 jugers. What should have been done in such a case? The state ought undoubtedly to have paid a moderate price for such lands, and then no one could have objected. And, indeed, this plan would not have involved any difficulties, for the number of those who possessed more than 1000 jugers cannot, after all, have been so very great, and certainly the vast public treasures could not have been applied in a better way. Five hundred jugers form a considerable estate (as much as seventy rubbii at present), and are even now considered in Italy a respectable property (I myself would not wish to have a larger one); in a fertile district, a person may derive from it a net income of 5,000 crowns, if it is well cultivated by a good tenant. The *sentina rei publicae*, or the poor—who were a burden to the state and a disgrace to the Roman people, for as they could not be excluded from the comitia, they sold their votes—might thus have been removed from the city, and made honest citizens, and in this manner the object of Gracchus would have been fully and completely attained. It is ever to be lamented that Gracchus did not adopt this course, which was absolutely necessary, whatever it might have cost the republic. Even this plan would undoubtedly have called forth vehement opposition on the part of the wealthy aristocrats, but certainly not that bitter exasperation which Gracchus had to encounter, and to which he fell a victim. There were many who felt how dangerous

<sup>16</sup> Thus I emend the passage in Livy, *Epit.* 53.—N. Comp. Aurel. Victor, *De Vir. illustr.* 64; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 9; *Hist. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 133, note 272.

was the disease under which Rome was labouring; but most of them considered its condition perfectly hopeless, and thought that it was impossible to interfere without calling forth a host of other evils.

Tib. Gracchus did not stop short here: he is said to have contemplated an extension of the Roman franchise<sup>17</sup>; but the accounts we have of this, as of all the other parts of the undertaking of Gracchus, are so obscure and incomplete, that we cannot take this for certain. From his actions, we clearly see that he was aware of the fact, that the middle class of citizens had vanished almost entirely, and that in order to restore that class, it was necessary to grant to the Italian allies the full rights of citizenship. A wise plan! This regeneration was quite in the spirit of the ancient laws: it aimed at reviving and extending the higher classes, just as of old the Licinian laws had given to the republic which was shrinking into an oligarchy, a new life, and commenced the second brilliant period in the history of Rome. There were in Italy thirty Latin colonies containing many citizens of great respectability, who could vote in the tribes of the Roman assemblies, and felt that their station was very nearly equal to that of the Romans. These Latins were in the position in which the plebeians had been about two hundred and fifty years before; nay, there existed in those towns much more intellectual culture than at Rome. It was the object of Tib. Gracchus to admit these to the full Roman franchise, and there can be no doubt that he also intended to give the *suffragium* to any *municipia sine suffragio* which may yet have existed.

The party of Gracchus contained many of the most distinguished men, who were certainly as great losers by his law as the Scipios; but they were nevertheless ready to support the noble cause. Even Appius Claudius, his father-in-law, who in most points shared the pride of his family, but in this respect resembled App. Claudius the Blind in his best moments; P. Mucius Scaevola<sup>18</sup>, the great jurist, who was consul that year<sup>19</sup>; P. Licinius Crassus, the father-in-law of Caius Gracchus, and others, saw the necessity, and encouraged Tib. Gracchus, although they

<sup>17</sup> Vellei Patere. ii. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch, *Tib. Gracch.* 8 and 9; Cicero, *Academ.* i. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Both the consuls of that year were plebeians, which shews the absurdity of French and Italian historians who speak of a struggle between patricians and plebeians.—N.

unquestionably occupied as much of the public domain as the opponents of Gracchus. It is difficult to describe the exasperation of the opposition party<sup>20</sup>, who violated even the laws of public decency; for men of distinction and champions of the oligarchs no sooner perceived that their interests were attacked, than they displayed all the greediness and avarice which we usually see only in persons without any education: they had recourse to excesses such as are generally committed only by the lowest of the rabble. It is one of the most revolting sights, when such men are guilty of conduct by which they place themselves entirely on a level with the populace—and such was the conduct of those oligarchs. No one had hitherto shewn any disregard to Gracchus or his family; he was the noblest among the young men of his time, and enjoyed among his countrymen the same degree of respect as among the barbarians. Every one acknowledged his virtues, and even those who had none themselves could not deny that he possessed virtues, or as they may have called them—follies. But all this was forgotten by his antagonists: they spoke of him as a rioter and a mutineer, who was actuated by the most abominable motives; and a coalition was formed against him. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica,—the grandson of him whom, in the Hannibalian war, the senate had called the best of the Romans, and the son of Scipio Nasica, who had likewise been called a pattern of a Roman, and had zealously exerted himself to preserve the manners of the olden times, who himself also was considered to be an honest man of the best kind, and in many respects may have deserved that title,—now conspired with the infamous Q. Pompeius. But still we cannot conclude from this fact that he was a thorough miscreant: he was only a man who had become hardened and intractable in his oligarchical pretensions, who saw his enemy in the light in which his interest placed him, who hated him, and wished to hate him with justice. The senate no longer had the power which the patricians had formerly possessed against the plebeians; it did not possess the ancient veto of the curiae; for, according to the Hortensian law, the bill of Gracchus did not require the sanction of the senate, but as soon as the tribes had passed it, its execution

<sup>20</sup> The whole opposition was confined to the senate, for the tribunes, with the exception of M. Octavius, and the assembly of the people, supported Gracchus—N.

could follow immediately. By a most strange anomaly, the tribunes could now be checked only by one another, the *veto* not existing where it was most necessary; the only means of crushing a bill was the tribunician *intercessio*. All, therefore, that the opponents of Gracchus could do was to incite his colleague, M. Octavius, against him.

In some Roman families we find certain sentiments, and opinions hereditary; and such opinions are more than mere political maxims. This is the case in all free countries, and is one of the talismans by which republican constitutions are preserved. A person born in a certain family, finds his political line of conduct, as it were, chalked out for him. Thus in England, every one knows to a certainty to what party a Russell belongs, just as the church in which we are born prescribes to us the views we have to adopt. There are also certain family characters, and all the Gracchi are distinguished for their mildness, their unaffected and sincere love of the oppressed, a feature which we can trace through three generations: we first find it in the Gracchus who was contemporary with the second Punic war, then in Gracchus, the censor, who married the daughter of the great Scipio, and lastly in his two unfortunate sons. To dwell on such characters as these is the more delightful, as they are seldom met with in Roman history: in our own days they seem to be quite extinct.

---

### LECTURE LXXVIII.

As there was no other way of preventing the agrarian bill of Tib. Gracchus being carried, than by inducing one of the college of tribunes to interpose his *veto*, the antagonists of Gracchus contrived to gain M. Octavius for that purpose. If the notion, that the tribunes originally belonged to a class of Romans different from the ruling party, is utterly groundless, it is still more so in regard to the times of which we are now speaking; nay, we may say, without any hesitation, that at this time the tribuneship was held almost exclusively

by such men as belonged to consular families, and that a plebeian very seldom obtained the consulship without having previously been a tribune. Thus the tribunes were just as much persons of distinction, as those who were invested with the highest magistracies; and it was by no means an extraordinary case that a man like Gracchus was among the tribunes. All *novi homines* passed through the tribuneship, and any plebeian, who had the opportunity of being raised to this office, was assuredly very glad to obtain it. M. Octavius belonged to a distinguished family, though perhaps not one of the first; as he would himself have been a great loser by the law of his colleague, the opponents of Gracchus prevailed upon him to put his *veto* upon the bill. We cannot say anything against Octavius personally; he had previously been a friend of Gracchus, but now gave way to party spirit. Gracchus offered to make good his loss out of his own property. But Octavius could not accept this offer without lowering himself. Gracchus then entreated and besought him to give up his opposition, but in vain. Octavius was bound by his word and obliged to act in the spirit of his faction,—the worst thing that a man can do in a party struggle. The question now was whether Gracchus should drop his bill which was calculated to save the nation, but was opposed by vice and avarice, merely because a man who had been his friend had sold his vote to a bad faction? or should he venture upon a step, which though contrary to the letter, was yet in the spirit of the constitution? He decided upon the latter course, and intimated to Octavius that unless he yielded, he himself would be obliged to proceed to extremes, and to propose to the people to deprive him of his office. This was indeed an irregularity, but Gracchus might have said in his own defence, that a tribune who was independent of the people was an abuse, and a still greater irregularity. Consuls had been deposed more than once; the people had surely the right to take away a commission from a man to whom they had given it; and it is an absurdity, if, in a republic, this right is not maintained. The tribunes had only the commission to bring proposals before the people, and surely a person who has received a commission may also be deprived of it. Gracchus was therefore in reality right, but as far as the forms were concerned, he over-turned the constitution. Yet it was a case, as he might have

said, in which necessity broke through all laws; and in order to act as far as possible with perfect justice, he offered that his own deposition should be put to the vote first. As Octavius persisted in his refusal, Gracchus, who saw that his object could not be attained in any other way, proceeded to carry his threat into effect. When seventeen tribes had already accepted the proposal, Gracchus again entreated Octavius either to desist from his opposition or to give up his office; but as Octavius still persevered, the eighteenth tribe voted, and his tribuneship was gone. Octavius wishing to produce a disturbance, did not leave the rostra, until Gracchus ordered him to be dragged away by force, an act which made upon the spectators, the odious impression which the senate and rulers desired. Gracchus had thus been driven by his opponents to an act of formal injustice, and those who had no feeling of right and wrong triumphed over him, as if he had really violated the laws of the constitution.

The agrarian law was now carried without opposition, and a permanent triumvirate was appointed, to see that the law was fairly carried into effect; it consisted of Tib. Gracchus, his brother Caius, and Appius Claudius. From the "Somnium Scipionis" we see that the *socii* and *Latini* joined P. Scipio, nay there are many statements which prove that they, like the senate, opposed the agrarian law. We can understand their reason for so doing only by combination; there are various ways of accounting for it, one of which is certainly the true one. Laws, unless it was expressly stated otherwise, did not affect the allies; this we know particularly in the case of the laws concerning usury. Now it is possible that the Licinian law had made no mention of the *socii* and *Latini*, and that, therefore, they, if they had the right of *possessio*, were not limited to the measure of 500 jugera. Wealthy persons may have acquired *latifundia* in distant parts by purchasing lands from the earlier Roman possessors; and such persons would now have been disturbed by the Sempronian law. This much is certain, that some share in the *ager publicus* had been granted to the *socii* and *Latini*; the Campanians, e.g. possessed an extensive *ager publicus*, which they can have obtained only as allies; and the Marsians had a share in the Apulian pasture lands. It is not probable indeed that Gracchus should have interfered with those possessions, but we cannot absolutely

deny it. It is more likely, that, for the present many places were left in possession of their *ager* on condition of their paying the legal amount of rent, but without the Roman people restoring to them on that account their property taken from them in war. If the latter was now taken from them, it was indeed hard for them. That they received compensation, we know positively, from the case of Carthage. The allies, thus, had the same interests as the wealthy Romans. But however this may have been, the allies felt hurt, and this afforded to the rulers a fair pretext, behind which they concealed their avarice, for saying that they were defending the rights of the Roman subjects; pretending that they were obliged to protect the subjects irrespective of their own interests. This hypocrisy deceived even a clear-headed man like Cicero, who is in a singular perplexity about this and similar relations: in his heart, he sides with the Gracchi, but through his acquired opinion, he decides against them, though with evident embarrassment. He is excused by the circumstances under which he wrote the books "De Re Publica" and "De Legibus." The opposition of the Latins caused great difficulties to Gracchus, for by combining with the allies, the optimates were enabled to take their stand against the popular party. Thus the oligarchy gained its victory through the support of the allies whom it afterwards most disgracefully sacrificed, almost in the same manner as the Irish Roman Catholics were sacrificed at the time of the Union with England.

At this time, as early as the beginning of the year, Attalus died; the constitution of the province of Asia forms an episode in the tribuneship of Gracchus, in which he again showed himself as a profound statesman, and acquired great reputation. In the bequest of Attalus, there were vast treasures, as is always the case with eastern princes, who, however much they may squander, always amass more. These treasures were brought to Rome, and Gracchus is often blamed for having proposed that they should be divided among the Roman people. But there was no wrong in this. As in the small cantons of Switzerland, every Roman citizen was a member of the sovereign body; the aerarium was ever increasing, the tributes yielding such an immense surplus of revenue, that the citizens had already been exempted from paying any direct taxes. Now as the great majority of citizens had sunk into

the deepest misery, the distribution was quite justifiable, especially as lands were to be assigned to them, and they required money to purchase the necessary implements. The triumvirs for the distribution of the *ager* had first to ascertain which lands belonged to the republic, and which to private persons, for many had been sold, and many in the midst of a conquered country, had been left to their former proprietors, so that the drawing up of an inventory was extremely difficult. The Romans had such registers as we have, registers of landed property, for the purpose of fixing the amount of taxation; but they were neglected, because Rome was the only seat of government, and there was scarcely any sub-delegation.

The time was now approaching when the tribunes for the next year were to be elected. The tribunes entered upon their office on the ninth of December, but for a long time past —we do not know when this custom began—the elections had taken place very early in the year, at the commencement of July, or at the end of June, the harvest time in Italy. The tribunes at that time always appeared in the senate, and took part in the discussions; and as Tib. Gracchus was there treated with the most vulgar and unbridled fury, it must have been evident to him, that if he should one day be without his sacred magistracy, he would be the victim of his opponents. He would, after the expiration of his tribuneship, still have been *triumvir agrorum dividendorum*, but he would not have been inviolable. He therefore offered himself, in accordance with the law, as a candidate for the tribuneship for the year following. This was the more agreeable to his enemies, as it was contrary to the existing custom. The custom may have arisen out of the mere circumstance that, for a long period, no tribune had held his office for two successive years; but in early times the re-election of the same man is by no means uncommon. When the tribe which had the *praerogativa* had elected him, and the second had given its vote the same way, the opposition party declared the votes to be illegal, and demanded of the tribunes to stop the election. Q. Rubrius, the colleague of Gracchus, who presided at the election, hesitated, not knowing what to do; and Mummius, the successor of Octavius, offered to take the place of the president, while the other tribunes demanded that the presidency should be decided by lot. These disputes occupied the whole day, which passed

away without anything being decided.<sup>1</sup> In the earliest times the plebes assembled in the Forum, but as early as the time of the Hannibalian war, they always voted in the area in front of the Capitoline temple. I have hitherto been unable to discover when this change was introduced. The votes, moreover, seem to have been given at this time *viva voce*, while formerly they had been given by means of tablets, a practice which was afterwards only restored by the *lex Cassia*, which therefore cannot be regarded as an innovation, as is usually done. Professor Wunder has clearly shown this. Let no one believe that it is possible to esteem Cicero more than I do; but I must nevertheless confess, that he has occasioned this and other errors respecting the constitution.

The events which occurred on that day convinced Tib. Gracchus that his life was in danger, and he went about among the people, like an accused criminal, with his only son, begging them to protect his and the child's life. It was his misfortune that the election took place at this season of the year, for the country people, who, at any other time would have flocked to Rome by thousands to support and protect him, were now detained by their labours in the fields. The population of the city was not only indifferent towards Gracchus, a great number of them having no interest whatever in the affair, but was under the most decided influence of the optimates. In this instance too we see how the constitution had become different from what it had been in former times, though not a single iota of the laws had been altered. When the territory of Rome did not extend farther than about fifty or sixty miles from the city, every one could come to Rome on extraordinary occasions, and the rustic tribes could be really represented by the *Romani rustici*; but after the assignments made by C. Flamininus some country-people lived at a great distance, as far as the Romagna, and it was impossible for them to come to the city to attend the assemblies. The constitution which had been originally framed for a city, thus became perverse and injurious.

The election was to be continued the next day, and the people assembled with a presentiment that blood would be shed. Tib. Gracchus himself was scarcely armed. The senate was assembled in the temple of Fides. When the people

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 14.

were assembled a tumult broke out, and the uproar became so violent that several benches were broken. The senate which was in the neighbourhood, on hearing of the commotion among the people, declared it seditious, and Scipio Nasica called upon the consul Mucius Scaevola to employ force. The latter appears in a doubtful light. According to most accounts he seems to have been favourable to Gracchus, but according to others he opposed him; if we suppose that he was a man of a weak character, who feared his faction, we may account for the contradiction. Nasica saw that a bold stroke would decide the matter, and accordingly called upon the senators to follow him; and on stepping out of the temple, all declared Gracchus guilty of high treason. The people withdrew before these illustrious men, and the senators took possession of every thing that could be used as weapons. There seem to have been scaffoldings all round the area (it is still customary in Italy to put up benches wherever there is anything to be seen), some of which broke down. A lie had been spread abroad, that Tib. Gracchus had appeared with the diadem, to get himself proclaimed king. No one surely believed in this impudent calumny, except perhaps a few foolish senators, and those whose interest it was to assert it.<sup>2</sup> Some of the people, who had no leader, and no clear notion of what they wanted, dispersed. The senators took the pieces of the broken seats, and attacked the few unarmed men who still surrounded Tiberius, and who did not venture to raise their hands against the senators. Tiberius fled down the *centum gradus* towards the Velabrum. There he slipped, and a common man, or one of the senators, or of the colleagues of Gracchus—for many claimed the honour—was the first who struck him on the head with a piece of wood, and as he fell down stunned, the murder was completed. A number of his followers shared the same fate, and their corpses were thrown into the Tiber. The body of the great Gracchus himself was washed ashore, and left to rot in the fields. He was not yet full thirty years old when he died. Many more were taken prisoners as his accomplices. The real persecutions, however, were carried on in the year following, by the consul, P. Popilius Laenas, in a manner worthy of the Inquisition, or of an Alba. Thousands were consigned to prison with or without a judicial verdict, though

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Tib. Gracch.* 19.

this Popillius was descended from a man who, in the time of Licinius, had been one of the greatest champions of liberty.<sup>3</sup> The cruelties of this monster may be read in Plutarch's life of Tib. Gracchus. One man was killed by being thrown into a vessel containing snakes. It is sad to find that even Cicero considers this Laenas an honourable man. There is one anecdote which I cannot leave unnoticed, and which refers to an event that must have taken place either then, or a few years before the consulship of Popillius Laenas, when the friends of Gracchus were summoned before an inquisitorial tribunal. The most intimate friends of Tib. Gracchus were not warriors or statesmen, but Greeks of cultivated minds, such as Diophanes of Mitylene and Blossius of Cuma. The latter was a Greek philosopher, for although the inhabitants of Cuma spoke the Oscan language, yet they were in reality Greeks. When he was summoned by the lictors to appear before the tribunal of the consuls, and was questioned about the connection between himself and Gracchus, he openly avowed that he was his intimate friend, and on being asked whether he had always obeyed his commands, Blossius answered in the affirmative, adding that Gracchus had never desired anything that was bad. At length he was asked, what he would have done if Gracchus had ordered him to set fire to the Capitol. Blossius replied: "Gracchus would never have given such a command; but if he had I should have obeyed it, for I am convinced that it would have been for the good of the people."<sup>4</sup> This answer of Blossius has been censured, but the fault was theirs who put such a captious question to him. He saw in Gracchus his own exalted self; and the word he spoke, does not disgrace him, but those who wrenched it from him. Blossius escaped, but afterwards made away with himself, that he might not fall into the hands of the tyrants. The persecutions of Popillius Laenas cannot be characterised in any other way than by saying, that they were the most horrible murders: all whom he put to death were pure and innocent victims.

It is remarkable that, notwithstanding their victory, the ruling party did not abolish the triumvirate. In the place of Tib. Gracchus, M. Fulvius Flaccus was elected; but the activity of the triumvirs was limited and nothing was done, for those who were called upon to produce the title deeds to their possessions,

<sup>3</sup> See vol. iii. p. 46, foll.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *Tib. Gracch.* c. 20.

either did not appear, or did not give in their declarations. But when the first fury had passed away, and the oligarchs saw that they were playing a dangerous game, they allowed the laws of Gracchus to stand, and for the sake of appearances, they appointed the consul Tuditanus, to settle the disputed points. But he, instead of deciding anything, led an army into the field, and the matter was deferred. Whether anything was actually done, cannot be decided. When Appius Claudius died, C. Papirius Carbo, a disciple of Gracchus, but, as usually happens in such circumstances, an unworthy one, was appointed in his stead. Carbo followed the footsteps of Gracchus, but with evil intentions. This is the misfortune of revolutions : the course of events carries away the good with the bad, if they take a part in them. A man of great distinction who had lived through all the terrors of the French revolution, but had kept his hands clean, once said to me: " You do not know what a recollection it is to have lived during a revolution: one begins the attack with the best, and in the end one finds oneself among knaves." Such times as the

French revolution are no longer to be feared, and centuries may pass before a revolution breaks out in Europe.<sup>5</sup> But in such times, it cannot be said impressively enough, that circumstances are often such as to draw the most innocent persons into the current, without their being aware of there being anything dangerous in it. Circumstances are often so fearfully complicated, that only those who, with an iron determination, regard nothing and fear nothing, are able to stand and see their way. In this manner honest men may continue to be the supporters of a government, which, without their knowing it, has already passed into the hands of knaves. We have now come to that period of Roman history, when the explanation of the mere forms of the constitution is no longer sufficient, but when the men themselves must be considered each by himself, each being a separate psychological problem. The spectacle which is presented to our eyes is that of men engaged

<sup>5</sup> This feeling of security and the firm conviction of Niebuhr, that no state of Europe had to fear a revolution are expressed in several of his letters published in the *Lebenenachrichten*. Hence his extraordinary surprise at the outbreak of the French revolution of July 1830. The writer of these lines very well recollects the day when the news of it reached Bonn. Niebuhr, who had read them just before entering the lecture room, spoke during the whole hour about nothing else but the circumstances which had caused the outbreak of that revolution.

in combat with one another for the spoils of the dead body of the state. Papirius Carbo was a man of great talent, a circumstance which often deceives us; but we must remember that a man may even be benevolent and affectionate, and may yet be in the power of the evil spirit. I have known persons who were all that is amiable and good, in times of peace, but who, under the influence of the demon of war, committed acts of which everybody would have thought them incapable. Carbo was a man of that character, so that the report of his having murdered Scipio is not at all incredible, although it may be false. Scipio may have died a natural death, for it is not unfrequent in southern countries that persons are said to have been poisoned, who are in reality carried off quite naturally by a sudden death, in an attack of putrid fever. But Scipio may yet have been murdered, for he had exasperated the people in the highest degree by conduct of which no one can approve.

Scipio was besieging Numantia when he received the news of the murder of his brother-in-law, and expressed his approval of it. When he returned to Rome, Carbo called upon him openly to express his opinion as to the justice of the death of Gracchus. Scipio gave an evasive answer, saying that it was just, if Gracchus actually intended to make himself king. This accusation was senseless, and Scipio drew upon himself general indignation. The oligarchs themselves were divided; those who had taken a part in the murder of Gracchus, were not on that account all friends of Scipio, but all stood in need of him; and it was flattering to his vanity to look upon himself as the protector of the Latins and allies. The death of Tiberius had by no means decided the question; it continued to be agitated with undiminished vehemence. Scipio intended to speak in the assembly against the carrying into effect of the Sempronian law, which was never abolished, as we see both from the original tables of the *lex Thoria* (A. U. 640—650), and from the few fragments of a later agrarian law. On the evening before the day on which he was to address the people, Scipio retired at an early hour to meditate upon his speech, but in the morning he was found dead in his bed. This sudden death excited a suspicion of murder; but strange to say, no investigation was instituted, although the ruling party must have had an interest in the inquiry. But it was perhaps

feared lest the result of it might implicate that very party<sup>6</sup>, e. g. Q. Pompeius or Metellus. Some even went so far as to accuse Scipio's wife, Sempronia, the sister of Gracchus, of having poisoned her husband. But all accounts are against the suspicion that he was poisoned. His body was carried on an open bier, and marks of poison would have been seen; if he died an unnatural death, he must have been strangled.

The period from the death of Tib. Gracchus, to the first tribuneship of C. Sempronius Gracchus, is marked by several attempts of both parties; for the question about the new distribution of lands could no longer be suppressed. Unfortunately the particulars are not recorded. It is a great pity that the sixth decad of Livy is lost. We know that even a tribune, M. Junius Pennus, made an enactment quite in the spirit of the oligarchy that the civic franchise should not be given to the Italian allies, but that they might retain their lands.<sup>7</sup> As however a wish for the franchise had once arisen among them, it could no longer be refused. In many towns of the Marsians, Samnites, and other nations of Italy, there were large, wealthy, and very illustrious families, whose morals were uncorrupted, or at all events superior to those of the Romans, and who, on their incorporation with Rome, would very soon have been superior to the Roman nobles: and yet they were excluded from the franchise, and not even tolerated in the city. A discontent spread among the allies, like that which we have seen produced in Ireland on the Catholic emancipation question. When they saw themselves deceived in every way, they entered into a conspiracy, which however is buried in obscurity. Even in the tribuneship of Tib. Gracchus, the subject had been discussed whether the franchise should not be given to the Latins, that is, to those Latin colonies which had not received it in 417<sup>8</sup>, especially Tibur and Praeneste, and perhaps also to the Hernican towns, but more especially to the colonies. These colonies consisted of Roman citizens and Italians of every description, who lived according to the Latin law, and had the first claim to the Roman franchise. Tib. Gracchus is indeed said to have thought of proposing a law to satisfy their wishes,

<sup>6</sup> In Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 10, however, we read—ἐντοπησαν γὰρ οἱ πόλλοι καὶ κατέλιπαν τὴν κρίσιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Γαίου φεβηθίντες, μὴ περικεῖται τῷ αἰτίᾳ τοῦ φόνου ἡπονημένου γένηται, which can hardly be referred to C. Gracchus.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 11; compare Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i, 21.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. iii. p. 140, foll.

but he probably deferred or never carried out this intention. They then supported the senate against him, and now demanded the rights of Roman citizens as their reward. We have unfortunately merely a few traces of the particular circumstances of that time, and can hardly conceive how Fregellae, the most flourishing of the colonies could be so mad as to think of compelling the Romans by force to grant its request. We find Fregellae in arms, but the other Latin towns took no part in the struggle, the colonies being scattered all over the country. The real Italian allies, who stood one degree lower, may have been malicious enough to rejoice at the inconsiderate conduct of Fregellae, for they did not always like to see the Latins acquiring such privileges, and the nature of their demands was quite different. Fregellae, which thus stood alone, was besieged, taken and destroyed by the praetor L. Opimius, so that not a trace of it is left, and heavy vengeance was taken on its inhabitans.<sup>9</sup>

---

### LECTURE LXXIX.

IT is a well attested fact, that in point of talent Tiberius Gracchus was excelled by his brother Caius, who was essentially different from him. The comparison in Plutarch between Agis and Cleomenes and the two brothers is very happy. We have, properly speaking, no specimen of the oratory of Tiberius; but of the speeches of Caius there are extant several fragments, which perfectly justify the praise bestowed on them by Cicero<sup>1</sup>, who could not be mistaken on this point, and who declares that he was the first who, in an old literature, appeared with a new language; just as in French literature, Corneille forms the transition from the old fashioned to the classical style. But still the language of C. Gracchus was no doubt much more old-fashioned than that of Cicero, or that of Sisenna; it bore however the character of a more modern age, being free from the stiffness and harshness of the earlier language. He was the

<sup>9</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 60; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 3; Vell. Patrc. ii. 6; Aurel. Vict. *De Vir. illustr.* 64; Asconius, *ad Pison.* p. 17, ed. Orelli.

<sup>1</sup> *Brutus*, 32.

first cultivated, polished, and elegant writer among the Romans. Scipio and Laelius were still surprisingly rough and harsh, and Tiberius perhaps even more so than Cato, as we now see from a hitherto unknown fragment<sup>2</sup> of a speech of Laelius, in an unpublished commentary on Cicero, discovered by Mai. It is further probable that Caius was more of a statesman than his brother; at any rate he displayed his talents more, the cause of which may have been the circumstance that his public activity lasted longer; for while the career of Tiberius did not extend beyond a period of seven months, Caius took an active part in public affairs for two years previously to his tribuneship, during the two years of his tribuneship, and also for six months after it. The statement that Caius owed his education and the development of his individuality chiefly to his excellent mother deserves full credit.<sup>3</sup> In the filial relation of the Gracchi to their mother, we see another trace of the humanity of their family; for this filial attachment is a trait rarely to be found among the Romans of this, or of any other period of their history. Amiable domestic relations are extremely rare among the Romans, though we have a few instances of them in the case of Horace and his father, and in that of Tacitus and Agricola, although Tacitus was unhappy in his own family.

Caius was driven by a sort of fatality into a path where certain destruction awaited him. Broken-hearted and deprived of all hope by the death of his brother, he was anxious to keep aloof from the high offices of state; he was, it is true, triumvir, but this could not be avoided, and he wished to act merely where he could do so without shaking or upsetting the actual state of things; but an inner voice did not allow him to follow his own inclination, although he plainly saw destruction before him. The eyes of his own countrymen, as well as those of foreigners, were fixed upon him from an early period. He had served for twelve years, and his unassuming behaviour when he was quaestor in Sardinia, and various actions which were anything but calculated to produce this effect, attracted the attention of the people towards him: for the young man who shewed the most perfect disinterestedness, was a silent reproach and an object of hatred to all. As the soldiers were

<sup>2</sup> That commentary is now printed in *Auctores Classici e Vaticanis Codd. editi, cura A. Mai, vol ii. Rome, 1828.* (*Scholia Bobiens. in Cic. Milon. c. 7, in Orelli's Cicero, vol. v. 2. p. 283.*)

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *Brutus*, 27.

deficient in warm clothing, and the senate, from avarice, refused to give the necessary money, Caius did not rest until he had collected in the province and elsewhere, the means of furnishing the men with warm cloaks. He also induced Micipsa, king of Numidia, to send over a cargo of corn. All this excited jealousy and hatred; and the Senate endeavoured to keep him in Sardinia, the climate of which was even then so unhealthy, that hopes were entertained that he would fall a victim to it. According to law, he was not obliged to remain there longer than one year; but the senate endeavoured to put off his election to the tribuneship, just as Charles I. refused to convoke parliament. But in these and similar cases, those who are in the possession of power only render things worse by their attempts to check the course of events. C. Gracchus, who had been three years in Sardinia, returned to Rome without asking for leave of absence. When he was brought to trial for this step, he was acquitted, as it was too manifest that it was only by intrigues that he had been kept at a distance. His defence of his conduct made such an impression, that not only the tribunes took him under their protection, but he was elected tribune for the following year, and that too under more favourable auspices than his brother; for among the extensions of the tribunician power, which a guilty conscience had induced the senate to sanction after the death of Tiberius, a plebiscitum had been passed, enabling a tribune who wished to carry a bill, to be re-elected for a second year. In the year 629, C. Gracchus entered upon his tribuneship. He was honest and pure like Tiberius; but passionate, superior to him in power, and more definitely conscious of what he wanted. In regard to the possession of the *ager publicus*, he had indeed, in the first instance, only to carry into effect the law of his brother, but he contemplated much more extensive reforms; for being tribune, he had as much legitimate power as the senate, and accordingly he did not come forward as a revolutionist. But was there any possibility of success? This was the question. In his own mind he was convinced that the matter might succeed: it is to be lamented that we do not know his entire plan, and that the most important points have come down to us in an extremely corrupt form. His legislation consisted of a number of single laws concerning the most different branches of the government and administration of the state. What we know of them is

enough to shew how little he was of a demagogue; they contain apparently the greatest contradictions, which vanish, however, when we have gained the right point from which to view them; there we perceive that he would not give himself up to any faction, but rather availed himself of the factions for the purpose of carrying his salutary reforms, offering to this party one advantage, to that, another, while he himself stood intact.

His first step naturally was to avenge the death of his brother and his friends. Nasica had gone with a commission to Asia, whence he never returned; but many others of his party were yet at Rome, and against these Caius directed his operations. He brought forward two bills: one enacting that those who had been deprived of an office by the people, should not be allowed to be candidates for any other: the second, that any magistrate should be liable to a capital charge, who had put to death a citizen without a formal sentence having been passed upon him<sup>4</sup>. The first of these bills was evidently aimed at Octavius, but C. Gracchus withdrew it at the request of his mother. The second, which was mainly directed against Popillius Laenas, was carried. But Laenas of his own accord quitted Italy<sup>5</sup>. These two laws were the *inferiae* on the tomb of his brother; but he did not stop here. The execution of the agrarian law had been decreed, and although things went on slowly, yet some progress was made, and Caius remained triumvir.

His subsequent legislation embraced every branch of the administration, and is of the most varied nature.<sup>6</sup> Those who infer from his legislation that he was a demagogue, are greatly mistaken: the laws themselves contradict such a view. The measure against which most has been said is that which ordered that corn should be distributed among the poor inhabitants of the city; that is that the *modius* of corn should be sold to them at the low price of three-fourths of an as, this being the fourth part of the usual price.<sup>7</sup> This was by no means a bribe, but an act of kindness to the poor who stood in need of it. In order to understand this law, we must remember that Rome received immense supplies of corn, and that its treasury was

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *C. Gracchus*, 4; Cicero, *pro Rabirio*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> We possess a beautiful fragment of the speech in which Gracchus brought forward this bill against Laenas; it is the beginning of the speech, and is censured by Gellius (xi. 13,) in a pedantic manner.—N.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, *l. c.* 5.

<sup>7</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 60; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 21; Cicero, *pro Sextio*, 25.

so well filled, that it was unnecessary to change the corn into money. At the time of the Social war, the treasury contained about sixty millions sterling. The best use that could be made of it was to benefit the people, that is, the sovereign, to which in reality it belonged, and a vast number of whom were as poor as the poor in our own days. What should such a population of free men do? Were they to beg? or should the state support them? The idea of the dignity of every individual belonging to a free state lies at the bottom of many things which occur in a republic; it is the duty of a republic to take care of its members, even of the most insignificant, and this is to a certain degree the case with the poor's rates in England. In a despotic state this idea has no meaning; but with a free and proud nation, it is a duty to provide for those members of the community who are unable to provide for themselves. The number of real paupers at Rome must have been immense. Many of them were not included in any tribe; others, such as the descendants of freedmen, belonged to the *tribus urbanae*;—and were these people to be allowed to starve? Both the Gracchi entertained the idea of turning as many of them as possible into industrious husbandmen; but this was not practicable in every instance, for many had no claims to portions of the public land, as the distribution of lands may have been made according to tribes. If, in our days, a part of the revenue of a capital town were set apart to pamper the poor, it would indeed be culpable, although capitals are in most cases more favoured in this respect than other towns. But C. Gracchus had no intention of giving away the corn for nothing; he only gave it at so low a price that, with some labour, the poor might be enabled to support themselves and their children. As he was a zealous, active, and creative man, he built large corn-magazines, the ruins of which were distinctly seen at Rome down to the sixteenth century, between the Quay, the Aventine, and the Monte Testacio; but no trace is now to be seen of those *horrea populi Romani*. I believe that it is from this time that we have to date the distinction between the *plebs urbana* and the thirty-five tribes. The chief elements of that plebs consisted of free Roman citizens of the lower orders.

Another law of C. Gracchus was proposed with the object of making the service in the armies easier.<sup>8</sup> The soldiers had

\* Plutarch, *L.c. 5.*

formerly been obliged to provide themselves with the necessary weapons, and a part of their pay was deducted, to defray the expenses of repairs and improvements. The republic was now so rich, and the treasury so well filled, that it was by no means a great sacrifice to provide the soldiers with clothes and arms from the public treasury. This law accordingly was carried by C. Gracchus. He also made new roads through Italy, improved those which existed already, and brought their construction to a degree of perfection which it had never before attained.<sup>9</sup> He gave a new impulse to the paving of streets, and it seems probable that it was owing to him that the great Roman high-roads acquired that excellence which we still admire in them; for he ordered them to be paved with basalt, which had hitherto been employed only in a small portion of the *via Appia*. These works gave employment to the poor who thus obtained the means of living.

All these measures were of an administrative nature, but he now proceeded to measures relative to the constitution. The senate, at that time, had the management of one of the most important branches of the administration, without being subject to any control. Even Polybius observes, that the great power of the senate in so democratic a republic, arose from two causes; first, from the fact that the finances were in its exclusive power, in consequence of which many were dependent on it in regard to their fortunes. All the revenues of the state, arising from tolls, mines, tithes, etc., were given to companies of rich persons to farm, and these again employed in their business persons of the lower or even lowest orders, who consequently were all dependent on the senate, which possessed the supreme management. We must not, indeed, imagine that every one thus employed, derived his income, as with us, from a public office; but in point of fact the result was the same, the state providing for a large number of its subjects. Hence Romans multiplied immensely in the provinces as *negotiatores*, and became the vampires of those countries. This was the first circumstance by means of which the small number of senators could maintain itself so safely. The second was the fact, that all those persons necessarily had their supporters in the senate itself, and that the judges in almost all important cases were senators, viz., in all those which did not affect real

<sup>9</sup> Plutarch, l.c. 7; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 23.

quiritarian property. It is a false though widely spread opinion, that there existed in ancient Rome a sort of trial by jury; but the fact is that such an institution did not exist till after the time of the Gracchian legislation. A case of *delictum manifestum*, in the early times, required no trial among the Romans; it was only necessary to establish the identity of the person, and the praetor at once applied the law. In other cases, both criminal and those civil ones which did not belong to the forum of the *centumviri*, the sentence of a single *arbiter* was required to enable the praetor to pronounce a final verdict. The complaint was brought before the praetor, who after thirty days appointed a *judex*; the latter proceeded according to certain forms; and from his verdict there was no appeal, for the ancient appeal to the people had been abolished, and it probably had never existed except in *judicia publica*. Ever since the beginning of the seventh century a number of law-suits, for which special quaestors had formerly been appointed to bring the cases before the popular courts, had been referred to ordinary court-days, especially the *actiones repetundarum*, that is, the charges brought by unfortunate provincials against their governors; for such cases, however, several *judices* were appointed; but whether there was only one or more, they were always senators, and this was a powerful means of strengthening the authority of the senate. These judges, however, were in the same predicament as those on whom they had to pass sentence. This was a source of corruption, and the most scandalous verdicts were pronounced, the judges making, in fact, a very lucrative traffic of their office, for a senator when appointed *judex* by lot, allowed himself to be bribed in the most disgraceful manner. No one denied this, and no one was ashamed of it; those who were not venal, were very few, and often acted only from prudent calculation. The power of bringing a charge against a governor was in truth much more detrimental to the provincials than beneficial, for the governors now not only endeavoured to enrich themselves, but had to spend large sums to bribe the judges, who again had no object in view except to enrich themselves. All feelings of honour had vanished<sup>10</sup>; the senators only asked "How many

<sup>10</sup> A striking analogy to this state of things is exhibited at Naples. Prince Canosa, a Neapolitan minister, a very eccentric but talented man, once said to me, that at Naples a man might have as many false witnesses as he could wish,

thousands will you give to obtain your acquittal?" It was evident that under such circumstances the state was hastening towards its downfall. A change had become necessary, and considering the facts of the case, that of Gracchus was no doubt the best, although it was actually followed by evil consequences. C. Gracchus, who knew very well that it must be a hard winter indeed before one wolf will seize upon another, turned his attention to the *equites*,—the order which now constituted, in some measure, a middle class between the senators and the lower people, although some of them possessed immense riches; consisting of citizens possessing more than 100,000 *denarii* (400,000 *sesterces*). Things had reached that point which we now see in France, where no standard of distinction exists except that of wealth. C. Gracchus saw in the *equites* a desirable equipoise to the senators. From what are called the people he expected nothing at all; for he well knew that they were no longer worth anything, and that to some extent they consisted of a populace just as corrupt as the Neapolitan lazaroni. C. Gracchus therefore sought a remedy in that portion of the population which consisted of the rich and wealthy, who had no interest in screening the sins of the rulers; he could, in fact, do nothing else. By the *lex Sempronia judiciaria* he composed the *judicia* of 300 *equites*, who were now to be the only judges, instead of the 300 members of the senate. There are, it is true, three different opinions on this point, but after the investigations of Manutius it can no longer be doubted that these 300 *equites* were to be the only *judices* from among whom in each particular case the single *judices* were taken by lot. At first this arrangement was very beneficial, for the new *judices* had no such extensive family connections as the noble senators; but on the other hand they were not fair judges for the provincials. The Roman farming companies, generally consisting of *equites*, had been guilty of acts of glaring injustice in the provinces, which were tormented by the governors also. The oppression of the latter now ceased; but the governors who wished to come to an understanding with the farmers of the revenue, might buy them over by

---

at the rate of a carolina (about sixpence) a-piece. When afterwards I asked a distinguished Neapolitan, whether this assertion was not unjust, he said that if a man would carry on this traffic on a large scale, he might obtain any number of false witnesses at a still lower price.—N.

allowing them to go beyond their contracts, and *e. g.*, to take one-fifth instead of one-tenth as tribute. If this was agreed upon, the equites, in their turn, secured impunity to the governors in case of actions for extortion being brought against them. This was an enormous abuse, but produced by circumstances; the condition of Rome and Italy, however, and in short of all parts of the empire in which the companies of farmers had nothing to do, was improved by the change.

This was like a clap of thunder upon the senators.<sup>11</sup> After an independent body of judges had thus been formed, Caius Gracchus substituted a committee of them in the place of the worthless popular courts, which thenceforward were called together only on rare occasions by way of exception; and extraordinary inquisitions ceased altogether. This law was in reality an encroachment upon the democracy, and in truth a very necessary one, for C. Gracchus knew the people, and saw what a wretched class of men they were.

In order to introduce some better blood into the thirty-five tribes, he proposed to bestow the Roman franchise upon the Latins, who consisted of the original Latin towns and upwards of forty colonies. They had been in existence for 300 years, and during the last two centuries they had become completely amalgamated with Rome in language and manners, and Gracchus probably intended to form them into new tribes. The other Italian allies, from the Marca Ancona down to Lucania in the south, nay all Italian places as far as the Alps, were to step into the relation in which the Latins had hitherto been<sup>12</sup>, that is, they were to have the right of voting in the assemblies, and thus to be prepared to become full citizens in about thirty or forty years. It may be that something was actually carried into effect, but we do not know what. The plan itself was so wise and useful that all intelligent Romans, who did not wish to see either the aristocrats or the democrats gain the upper hand, must have been rejoiced at it. In many Latin towns there were families of distinction, which would have settled at Rome, as in the time of Augustus the Asinii (who were Marrucinians), Munatii, and others did. Cicero expressly states<sup>13</sup> that, previously to the Social war,

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 22; Vell. Patrc. ii. 6; Tacitus, *Annales*, xii. 60. Compare Livy, *Epit.* 60; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 5.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 23; compare Vell. Patrc. ii. 6; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Pro Archia poeta*, 3.

Greek science and literature were more cultivated among the Latins than among the Romans. Therefore, instead of increasing the Roman people by freed-men and a low populace, C. Gracchus intended to add numbers of wealthy and well-educated Latins. I do not know of any wiser or more praiseworthy plan than this.

Many of his laws concerning the administration are either not known at all or known merely from slight allusions, but all those of which we have any knowledge are excellent. Ten years had passed away since Attalus had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people, and seven since Aristonicus had been conquered; but the affairs of Asia had not yet been settled, and the governors availed themselves of this neglect for the purpose of satisfying their avarice by plunder. C. Gracchus at length carried a law by which the province of Asia was regulated: this law is admitted, even by Cicero, to have been a model of wisdom.<sup>14</sup> Especial care was taken to arrange the farming of the public revenue in such a manner that the interest of the state was perfectly secured.

While C. Gracchus assigned lands to the people, and endeavoured to turn as many of them as possible into honest peasants, he did not by any means sacrifice the interests of the republic; for the tithes which the state had hitherto received from those lands were not abolished (according to a passage in Plutarch, which would otherwise have no meaning), so that the republic lost nothing. It was evident to him that Rome could be saved only by returning to her own principles, and he therefore imitated the ancient Romans who had renovated and, as it were, refreshed the people, by extending the franchise. He opened good prospects for the Italians who were to succeed to the privileges of the Latins, for he undoubtedly hoped that a peaceful development of the principle would lead to further and still more beneficial reforms. He even made proposals to change the manner of voting, by which the republic would not have consisted of the city alone, but would have comprised all Italy.

The senate had hitherto distributed the provinces at discretion, which had given rise to the most detestable system of bribery. The elections of magistrates took place at this time

<sup>14</sup> In *Verrem*, iii. 6. This is, as far as I know, the only passage in which Cicero speaks of this law, but he there says nothing in praise of it.

long before the close of the year, and the new consuls and praetors referred to the senate *de provinciis*, each applying for himself and trying to obtain that from which he hoped to amass most wealth; and the senate, on personal grounds, decided what commissions were to be given to the consuls or praetors. C. Gracchus now made the wise law, enacting that before the elections took place the senate should decide which provinces were to be given to the consuls or praetors<sup>15</sup>, so that the persons to whom they were to be given were as yet unknown; the division of the provinces was then made by lot, and only in a few instances by the senate, so that all favoritism was at an end. This law removed at once some of the most glaring abuses in the administration. There can be no doubt that it was Gracchus who enacted that the elections should take place so early in the year, in order that the year might not expire before the curule chairs were filled anew. This is one of the essential and permanent improvements effected by Gracchus; for we find it in force even seventy years after his death.

C. Gracchus passed his laws in the years 629 and 630, in both of which he was tribune. His tribuneship was less stormy than that of his brother, and his powers were much more extensive and undisputed. He caused himself and his friend M. Fulvius Flaccus, and probably also Q. Rubrius to be appointed triumvirs for the purpose of founding new colonies<sup>16</sup>, for he was a man of restless activity extending over all departments of the state; and this he was enabled to do by virtue of his tribunician power. He also founded a colony near the site of ancient Carthage, which provoked the hypocritical zealots, who said that that colony would one day be dangerous to Rome,—a most senseless thought, though some were foolish enough seriously to entertain it. This opportunity was very welcome to his enemies, and while he was thus quietly proceeding in founding several colonies, in which the Latins and Italicans were allowed to take part, the jealousy and exasperation of the aristocrats rose to the highest pitch, and the senate had recourse to a peculiar kind of stratagem. M. Livius Drusus, one of the colleagues of C. Gracchus, was prevailed upon to try to undermine his popularity. Here we have an instance

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, *pro domo*, 9; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 27.

<sup>16</sup> Vell. Patrc. i. 15; Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 8; Appian, *I. c.* 24.

in which it is clearly seen that the constitution of Rome was suited more for a city than for a whole nation. Livius endeavoured to outbid C. Gracchus in conferring benefits upon the people; he acted in the name of the senate and succeeded; for the masses never take the trouble to consider who the man is that offers them advantages; and in this instance, they were unable to recognise in the actions of C. Gracchus the purity and sincerity of his intentions. The majority of the inhabitants of Rome, whom I call Romans only with great reluctance, consisted of freedmen, and their children or grand-children, and they perhaps thought that Gracchus intended to buy and deceive them. As Livius held out to them the same advantages as Gracchus, or even greater ones, the multitude followed him, although they must have seen through his scheme. Such is the character of the Italians to this day; for if a man ventures to give them his advice on any matter, out of true sympathy and with the greatest possible disinterestedness, they will always indulge in the suspicion that he has some impure motive for doing so, and that he is a knave. This trait is common to all classes in modern Rome. I myself have seen a striking instance of it in the case of a citizen of a small town, who had a collection of coins which he wanted me to value. He, imagining that I wished to deceive him, immediately asked me for one which I wished to purchase three times its real value, although at first he would have sold me every one of his coins at one third of the price he now asked. Livius abolished the tithes of the lands distributed, and instead of the two colonies which Gracchus had contemplated, founded twelve, each of which was to consist of 3000 citizens.<sup>17</sup> The wealthy Romans had no objections to allowing this, since the only losers by the measure were the unfortunate old inhabitants, who till now had been only precarious tenants in the districts where their fathers had been conquered; and the wealthy had their estates only in those parts where the ancient towns had been destroyed. Whether these colonies were actually established may be questioned, but as those of C. Gracchus were, I do not see why those twelve also should not have been founded, and I conceive them to be the XII. *coloniae* of which Cicero speaks in his oration for Caecina.<sup>18</sup> They can have no connexion with the events in the Hannibalian war; for eighteen

<sup>17</sup> Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 9.

<sup>18</sup> c. 35.

colonies had remained faithful<sup>19</sup>, so that eighteen and not twelve must have obtained the advantage of the *commercium*. If therefore, as I think, these twelve colonies were not quite new ones, but twelve Latin towns which still had a large and unoccupied territory, so that a great additional number of citizens could find room in them, it is clear that these colonies may have obtained greater privileges than others. C. Gracchus saw that the thoughtless multitude followed the senate and its tools, whose sole object was to deceive them. There are two classes of men, the one consisting of those who are sincere and open, who seek and love the beautiful and sublime, who delight in eminent men, and see in them the glory of their age and nation; the other comprising those who think only of themselves, are envious, jealous, and sometimes very unhappy creatures, without having a distinct will of their own: they cannot bear to see great men in the enjoyment of the general esteem, but take a delight in finding out some foible in them. These latter, a set of men more fatal to mankind than original sin, rose against C. Gracchus: they ridiculed him as a *doctrinaire*, as a theoriser. He had enjoyed the general esteem too long, he was too spotless, too pure, and too glorious not to be an offence to many; for every one was reminded by his example of what he ought to be: it was the greatness of Gracchus which determined them to bring him down, just as the Athenian citizens voted against Aristides, because he was called the Just. It is not surprising to find that this disposition existed among his colleagues; and thousands of others wanted to make him feel that they entertained no gratitude towards him. When therefore the tribunes for the following year were elected, and he offered himself as a candidate, he was taken no notice of, but still remained triumvir. There is no necessity for supposing that his colleagues were guilty of falsehood to prevent his election; for it was only among the better part of the middle classes that Gracchus seems to have had many followers; but they had little political power, and the nobles among his friends were thoughtless persons.

<sup>19</sup> (Livy. xxvii. 9 and 10.) It has been proposed to read in the passage of Cicero xlii. *coloniarum*, instead of xii. *coloniarum*; but this conjecture cannot be admitted, xlii. not occurring in any ancient MSS.—N.—See Savigny, *Zeitschrift für gesch. Rechtswissensch.* v. 2. p. 237.

## LECTURE LXXX.

L. OPIMIUS, the destroyer of Fregellae, and a powerful supporter of the senate, was now raised to the consulship, which he had sought in vain the year before; for C. Gracchus, who then possessed the highest degree of popularity, and was convinced that the people would do anything to please him, once requested them to promise him something, and when the promise was made, he asked them to elect C. Fannius consul—none of whose ancestors had yet held this dignity—instead of Opimius,<sup>1</sup> just as in the ancient romance the ladies ask favours of King Arthur. Gracchus had thus incurred the implacable enmity of Opimius, and Fannius faithlessly deserted him, and made common cause with his adversaries, although it would have been difficult for Fannius to obtain the consulship without the support of Gracchus. Opimius again was a plebeian, and yet like Popillius Laenas, he sided with the nobles against Gracchus. The oligarchical party actually tried to find a subject for a quarrel. Gracchus was divested of the *sacrosancta potestas* of a tribune, and as his life was not safe, he was always surrounded by a number of friends. The measures of the senate displayed more and more their hostile spirit, and even the foundation of his colonies, which had been sanctioned by the senate itself, was to be suspended by a decree of the senate. This led to a discussion, and one of the tribunes, who had been appointed by the influence of the oligarchs, addressed the people assembled in front of the Capitol, and spoke against Gracchus. When the latter came forward to defend himself, they charged him with having tumultuously interrupted the tribune. Opimius, who was offering up a sacrifice, purposely sent one of his lictors ostensibly to procure something necessary for the sacrifice, and the man, pressing through the crowd of Gracchus' friends, insulted them by calling out "Make way, you bad citizens, for the good ones." A tumult arose, and the man was killed.<sup>2</sup> At the instigation of Opimius and the oligarchs the body was carried to the Forum, in order to produce some great and tragic scene, as if he had been a martyr.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 11.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 13. Compare Appian, *L. c. i.* 25.

in the good cause. The senate now, for the first time<sup>3</sup>, made a decree that the consuls should take care that the republic might not suffer any injury—a decree which invested Opimius with dictatorial power, because it was no longer customary to appoint a dictator, the curies having ceased to exist, and it being therefore impossible to observe the ancient forms. C. Gracchus took leave of his wife and children, and went with M. Fulvius to the Aventine, which had at all times been a place of refuge for the oppressed. Gracchus had not anticipated the misfortune, and his party was quite unprepared; he had no power to oppose the senate, and never thought of going to extremes; he could not make up his mind to shed one drop of blood. His friend and colleague, the consular M. Fulvius, a man of a bolder and more determined character, armed as many of the populace and as many slaves as he could, to defend himself. Their conduct was like that of Brutus and Cassius. The elements of the old plebeian movements no longer existed, and the populace of the city was in such a degraded condition that they had no sympathy for Gracchus, nor could he feel any for them. They abandoned him to his fate, considering him to be either a cunning politician or a fool, and were satisfied if the gifts which he had procured for them were continued. The consuls therefore had no difficulty; the only thing they had to do was to attack the Aventine with a small force. The city was either paralysed or indifferent. The fact that the equites, who owed their existence as a distinct class to Gracchus, and who from this time forward are mentioned along with the people, as *equites et populus*, acted the part of mere lookers-on, is at first sight rather surprising, but is easily accounted for by the fear which is so peculiar to wealthy persons whose property does not consist of land but of capital. There is, on the whole, no class of men more cowardly than that of mere capitalists, as we see in the history of Florence and of all other republics.

Gracchus sent to the senate to negotiate, but they required his party to surrender at discretion. The Aventine was feebly defended, and the *clivus publicius*, leading up from the Circus,

<sup>3</sup> This must be understood to mean that it was the first time after the abolition of the dictatorship (about the middle of the sixth century.) The formula *videant consules ne quid detrimenti res publica capiat*, is very ancient, and occurs first in A. u. 290. Liv. iii. 4.

was taken by storm. Fulvius Flaccus then sent his son, a fine youth, eighteen years old, to the senate to sue for a truce. The first time he was sent back; but when he came a second time, Opimius ordered him to be thrown into prison, and afterwards to be put to death. When the Aventine was taken, Gracchus himself was discovered in some house and slain. Gracchus leaped down from the steep precipice near the temple of Diana on the Aventine, at present the church of St. Alessio, in order to reach the Sublician bridge; but he strained his foot, and as no horse was to be had, it was only with great difficulty that supported by his friends he arrived at the bridge. His friends Pomponius and Laetorius, two equites of great wealth, acted differently from the majority of the wealthy Romans: they fought like Horatius Cocles at the bridge, and defended Gracchus against the pursuing enemy, until they were cut to pieces.<sup>4</sup> Gracchus in the mean time fled across the Tiber into a sacred grove (*lucus Furiarum*), which however afforded him no protection, for Opimius had promised to give the weight of his head in gold to any one who should bring it to him. Gracchus was soon overtaken, but it is probable that some faithful slave, or client, put an end to his life. Every one knows the horrible barbarity of Septimuleius of Anagnia, who, himself a stranger to all these disputes, filled the head of Gracchus with lead to increase its weight. Opimius put to death, during his consulship, more than 3000 persons, all of whom may be said to have been murdered.<sup>5</sup> Some of the friends and supporters of Gracchus may have escaped. The state of things was, on the whole, like that at Naples in 1799, and all those who fell as victims were men of distinction. The bloodshed continued for two years, and the murderers called themselves *boni homines, boni cives!* Some of those who had belonged to the party of Gracchus became apostates, and among them we find C. Papirius Carbo, who must have gone over very early, and who, after being raised to the consulship, defended Opimius against the tribune, Q. Decius, who accused him of having put to death Roman citizens without a trial.<sup>6</sup> Carbo, after having saved

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *C. Gracch.* 16 and 17; Appian, *I. c. i.* 26; Aurel. Victor, *De Vir. Illustr.* 65.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, *I.c.;* Orosius, v. 12.

<sup>6</sup> (Cicero, *De Oratore*, ii. 25, comp. 39; Livy, *Epit.* 61). It is curious to see how great the power and influence of tradition is in some of the tribunician families, and how the same characteristics appear through several generations,

Opimius, became the favourite of the oligarchs. But he soon found himself attacked by P. Licinius Crassus, a near relation and perhaps the brother-in-law of C. Gracchus, the same of whom Cicero speaks so often in his "Brutus," and in the masterly dialogue "De Oratore." He was a man of very great talent and genius, but as in most orators of the time, these natural endowments were not cultivated as they had been in C. Gracchus. Crassus too began his career with the popular party, but afterwards deserted it: he went over to the senate, and became the declared champion of the oligarchy. His apostasy, however, has nothing in it that is odious, and no blame can be attached to him for it. His coming forth against Carbo was the first blow which the victorious party received; his attacks were so severe, that Carbo put an end to his life by taking a solution of vitriol (*atramentum sutorium*).<sup>7</sup> All this was satisfactory to the feelings of those who still cherished the hope that a better time would come. But things remained as they were. The equites were very much intimidated, and the consequences of the independence of the judges had not yet become visible. But matters were brought to a crisis by the war against Jugurtha; for it was then that the baseness of the ruling party showed itself particularly; and hence Sallust with his fine tact chose it as the subject for description. But before I proceed to relate the history of that war, I must give a sketch of the extension of the empire.

I have not spoken of the foreign wars of the Romans during this period; and, as our time is very limited, I

---

or recur after the lapse of a long intermediate period. An analogy to this is seen in England, in the family of the Russells. As instances of it in Roman history I may mention the Maelii, Publili, Licinii, and Decii. A Decius is mentioned among the first tribunes, and it was a Decius who now had the courage to accuse Opimius. In the political condition of our country we can scarcely form a correct notion of such a principle; but in antiquity and in all free countries it preserves the identity of sentiment from generation to generation, and is the security for the identity of the political state of a nation. Where this principle does not exist, we may declare without hesitation that the line which runs through the nation is made of sand, and may break off any where and at any time; so that such a nation is a mere assemblage of individuals, but not a state with an hereditary constitution. I have mentioned this, because it is a thing so completely foreign to us, and because some of us might be inclined to look upon it as an enslaving principle.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, *Ad Famil. ix. 21*, says *cantharidas sumpsisse dicuntur*. Niebuhr here confounds C. Carbo with Cn. Carbo, a person of the same family, who when accused by M. Antonius, *sutorio atramento absolutus putatur*.

can now only just direct your attention to them. From the time of Tiberius Gracchus to that when the Jugurthine war broke out, the Spaniards had shewn but little hostility towards the Romans. The Balearian islands were taken by Q. Metellus, one of the four sons of Metellus Macedonicus, all of whom obtained the consulship. The Metelli were now the greatest among the illustrious plebeian families, and represented the pride of the aristocracy. They produced great characters; and all that can be censured in Metellus Numidicus, for instance, leaves his personal character untouched. The Balearian islands were conquered by one of his brothers, and another subdued the Dalmatians, who appear henceforward as subject to Rome<sup>8</sup>, so that now the Romans could avoid the Adriatic and go to Greece by land.

The Roman dominion in Gaul was likewise extended. Soon after the death of Tib. Gracchus, the Romans undertook the first campaign in Transalpine Gaul. They were masters of almost the whole of Spain and of Italy nearly as far as the foot of the Alps (Aosta did not belong to them); but in Gaul itself, in the country between the Alps and the Pyrenees, they had not yet attempted to gain a firm footing; all that they had done there consisted in their having, at the beginning of the seventh century, secured to the Massilians, their ancient allies, a tract of land along the coast, against the Ligurians. The first opportunity for establishing themselves there, arose in a war of the Salluvians or Salyans against the Ligurians. The Salluvians, who occupied the country from Aix as far as Marseilles, were defeated. They had obtained assistance from the Allobrogians, one of the greatest nations of Gaul, which occupied Dauphiné and Savoy, as far as Lyons. They too, having been defeated, applied to the Arverni. Ever since the Hannibalian war, the Arverni had the patronage, or, as it is called in the history of Greece, the supremacy over the greater part of southern Gaul; they were governed by kings, and were in possession of a splendid empire. In the time of C. Gracchus the Romans were engaged in a war against their king, Bituitus, and the Allobrogians, and gained signal victories, on the Rhone, near Vienne, under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus. Bituitus, about whose riches all kinds of tales have come down to us, tried to obtain pardon from the

<sup>8</sup> Livy, Epit. 60 and 62; Florus, iii. 8.

Romans, but the generals sent him to Rome to implore the mercy of the senate. He accordingly went to Rome without having come into *deditio nem*; but trusting in the honesty of the Roman rulers he was arrested, and spent the remainder of his life at Alba on lake Fucinus, where Syphax and Perseus had died.<sup>9</sup> After these victories, we must conceive the Roman province to have extended as far as Dauphiné; the Allobrogians, however, although they recognised the supremacy of Rome, were not subject to it. But Provence and lower Languedoc formed a real Roman province; and, although there was not always a praetor or a proconsul residing there, yet the whole administration was that of a province. The exact time when that country was actually constituted as a Roman province can only be guessed, as we do not possess the books of Livy in which he must have mentioned it. Aquae Sextiae was the first Roman colony beyond the Alps.

The first appearance of the Cimbri belongs to the year 638. After the subjugation of Dalmatia, the Romans attacked Croatia, and this is said to have provoked the Scordiscans. But it is more probable, that the migration of the Sarmatae stirred up the Scordiscans from the east; the latter now invaded Macedonia and Greece. This was one of the greatest calamities of the sixth and seventh centuries of the city, and belongs to the most fearful in the history of the world, inasmuch as in it were destroyed most of the beautiful remnants of antiquity. That period resembled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of modern times. In regard to Italy, this destruction continued until the period of Augustus, when material prosperity of a certain kind began to arise. The consul C. Porcius Cato was destroyed in Thrace by the Scordiscans; and Macedonia, Thessaly, and a part of Greece were inundated with swarms of barbarians. But by far the most important war of this period is that against Jugurtha. The description which Sallust has given of it is one of the best specimens of ancient literature in either language, and I am almost inclined to prefer it to his Catiline. But both works are peculiar phenomena in Roman literature: they are what we call monographies, which are otherwise unknown among the Romans, except perhaps Coelius Antipater's history of the Hannibalian war, of which,

<sup>9</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 61; Florus, iii. 2; Vell. Paternul. ii. 10; Appian, *De Reb. Gall.* 12; Eutropius, iv. 22.

however, we know nothing; the memoirs of Fannius were of quite a different nature. The books of Sallust are not written in the form of annals, the character of which he evidently tries to avoid: his intention was to write history in a compact and plastic manner. The works of Sallust are of such a kind, that the more we read them the more do we find to admire in them: they are true models of excellent historical composition. As regards the Jugurthine war I can do no better than refer you to Sallust's description of it.

When Masinissa died, he had regulated his kingdom, and entrusted Scipio with the execution of his will. He left his kingdom to his three sons, Gulussa, Micipsa, and Mastanabal. We must not in any way conceive those princes as resembling the chiefs of the tribes which now inhabit those countries, for Livy<sup>10</sup> expressly states that Mastanabal was well acquainted with Greek literature, so that he was not a barbarian. He was so far master of Greek that he wrote in it. We must also remember that, at the taking of Carthage, its libraries were given to those Numidian princes. These facts shew how wrong our notions are, if we consider the Numidians and all those tribes to have been barbarians. There can be no doubt that at that time, even the rude Thracians were not wanting in Greek civilisation, and at a later time we find it even among the Parthians. The civilisation of the Greeks had extended very widely, especially since the fall of the nation. The Numidians, like the Libyans, had an alphabet of their own, as we see from the monuments of several towns in those districts. Colonel Humbert found a bi-lingual inscription, Punic and Libyan, on the gate of a town; in Cyrene we find inscriptions in three languages, Punic, Greek, and one unknown tongue. In the desert of Sahara, among the Tuariks, the travellers Clapperton and Denham found an alphabet quite different from the Arabic, and I am convinced that it belongs to the Libyan language, which is still found in the Canary islands, throughout the desert, and in the oases as far as the Nile and the Barabras above Egypt. Denham<sup>11</sup> is too superficial to comprehend it; but it will be possible to read the Libyan inscriptions, as soon as we know the whole alphabet, of which Denham gives

<sup>10</sup> *Epit.* 50.

<sup>11</sup> I cannot answer for the correctness of this name, it being found in only one MSS. of the notes taken down in the course of 1826 and 1827, and written too in an indistinct manner.

only one letter. This subject will one day be completely cleared up.

Gulussa and Mastanabal died early; the latter left no legitimate children, but only Jugurtha, a son by a concubine; and thus the vast Numidian empire, extending from the frontiers of Morocco to the Syrtes, Leptis and Tripolis, fell into the hands of Micipsa alone.<sup>12</sup> He had two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal. Jugurtha, who from his childhood had excellent talents, and had always gained the affections of all who came in contact with him, attracted the attention of king Micipsa. But, when the latter discovered that the talents of his young nephew were far superior to those of his own sons, he was led by jealousy to send him to Spain, where Scipio was collecting troops from all countries against the Numantines, hoping that he would there terminate his career in the war against Numantia. But Jugurtha was spared by fortune; he distinguished himself, and became the intimate friend of Scipio<sup>13</sup>; he even demanded to be placed under Scipio's protection, that Micipsa might not murder him. Some noble Romans moreover tried to persuade him to cause a revolution, and provided him with money, as he had no prospect of succeeding to the throne in a legitimate manner, for after Micipsa's death the kingdom was to remain undivided. When Jugurtha left Spain, he received from Scipio a letter of recommendation to Micipsa, who was thus forced to become reconciled to him; and in his will he even placed him on a footing of equality with his own sons—probably in compliance with the wish of the Romans—and the three princes were to govern their empire in common. Hiempsal was proud and ferocious, and wantonly insulted Jugurtha as an intruder, though he was unable to cope with him in any way. As these princes could not live at peace with one another, they resolved to divide the kingdom; but Jugurtha, not satisfied with this, caused Hiempsal to be murdered. Jugurtha's character was like that of an Albanese, bold, audacious, cunning, and adroit; he had no notion of the sanctity of an oath, no honesty, no humanity: he was, in short, of a Satanic nature. He made an attempt on the life of Adherbal also, who, however, fled to the Romans. They, from their partiality for Adherbal, decided in his favour, and sent a commission

<sup>12</sup> Sallust, *Jugurth. 5.*

<sup>13</sup> Sallust, *Jugurth. 7.*

to divide the country between him and Jugurtha; but the latter bribed the commissioners so effectually, that in the division he obtained the most warlike and important part of the kingdom.<sup>14</sup> But he aimed at the whole; whence a war soon broke out. Adherbal at Rome implored the senate for assistance against the usurper. The senate at first thought his request quite just, but the ruling oligarchs, headed by Opimius, the murderer of Gracchus, declared for Jugurtha, for they were bribed, and prevented any decision being come to. Meantime Adherbal was besieged in Cirta. The Italians, who were with Adherbal, advised him to surrender, and tried to stipulate that his life should not be endangered; but Jugurtha cared little about this, and even gave vent to his rage against the Italians. Adherbal was in the greatest distress; but his complaints at Rome were fruitless in consequence of the influence of L. Opimius; for emissaries of Jugurtha were staying at Rome with large sums of money, and bribed every one. But when the condition of Cirta had reached the highest pitch of distress, some of Adherbal's friends escaped from the town, and carried the most mournful letters to the senate. A new commission was accordingly sent, but this again was bought over by Jugurtha, and returned without having effected the raising of the siege. Nemesis, however, induced Jugurtha not to keep his word to Adherbal, who surrendered and stipulated only for his life, any more than to the Italian and Roman *negotiatores* in Africa, who alone had supported Adherbal, and now likewise surrendered. He ordered them all to be killed, in order to satisfy his revenge. This was too bad, and even those who had hitherto espoused his cause were obliged to be silent. A Roman embassy arrived at Utica to take Jugurtha to account; but he evaded their summons in the most audacious manner: he deceived them and gained his object. The chief of these ambassadors was M. Aemilius Scaurus, a great man in Roman history: but we are, nevertheless, in the greatest difficulty respecting him. When in earlier years I read in Horace<sup>15</sup>,

Regnum et Scauros, animaeque magnae  
Prodigum Paullum, etc.,

I imagined that there must be in his history many things which I did not know, for I was not acquainted with anything

<sup>14</sup> *Sallust, Jugurth. 16.*

<sup>15</sup> *Carm. i. 12, 37.*

to justify such praise. As regards Horace, it is a surprising fact, that no one can be more ignorant of the history of his country than he is: he confounds e. g. the two Scipios, and although he ridicules Ennius, he had read so little of him, that he believes him to have sung of Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage.<sup>16</sup> It is at all events a great mistake of Horace to use the plural *Scaurus*, for the son of our M. Aemilius Scaurus, whom Cicero defended merely to confer a favour on his family, was a monster, and the Verres of Sardinia. This un-Roman spirit in Horace leads him to depreciate the great minds of the early Roman literature. He was a man of elegant and superficial education, and even in his knowledge of Greek literature is not to be compared with Virgil. Hence so many strange things in his odes where he had misunderstood the Greek. He took the forms of his odes from a few Greek lyric poets. When he speaks of Homer as nodding, he shews his ignorance; to Lollius he writes that he had again read Homer, though it was perhaps for the first time since he had left school. In other respects he possessed an excellent and far more versatile and fertile genius than Virgil, but the latter was more industrious and laborious, whereas Horace was idle, and always indulging in refined enjoyments. The contrast between the two poets is very striking, and would be a fine subject for an essay. What seems to speak in favour of our Scaurus, is the great veneration which Cicero entertained for him. Cicero considers it one of the most pleasing recollections of his youth, that at the age of seventeen he was introduced by his father into the house of M. Aemilius Scaurus, then a venerable old man, and formed the acquaintance of Mucius Scaevola, and all the great men of that age, who received him with distinction, because they recognised in him the future great man. He came among them with the desire peculiar to all noble minds, to attach himself to men more advanced in years than himself, and to purify himself through their influence. Thus he idealised those men, and this feeling remained with him throughout his life. Even as an old man he loved those men of his youth, and it is with this feeling that he speaks of Scaurus. Sallust is charged with malignity, but he is certainly not unjust when, full of indignation, he brands a man for ever.

<sup>16</sup> See Bentley on Horace, *Carm.* iv. 8, 17, who, however, for metrical reasons, expunges the line. Others believe that there is a gap in the passage.

Scaurus at the time at which he is described by Sallust, was on the verge of that period of life, when the active vigour for carrying on war is already weakened, but not that for managing a state. When he became old, and had extricated himself from the connexions into which he had fallen, feeling that he was a man who had belonged to a better age, and had to maintain a great reputation, it seems that outwardly he lived in an honourable and lawful manner. In this state Cicero knew and admired him. But if we look upon Scaurus as a man, without any such bias in his favour, we can say nothing without falling into the greatest contradictions, for at different times he is quite a different man. There are persons who at one time display a very honourable character, though at an earlier period of their lives they may have acted as very bad citizens, and as if they had no principles whatever. As instances of such men in the history of England, in the seventeenth century, we may mention Shaftesbury, and the patriots under Charles II., who at one time kept up a secret correspondence with Louis XIV., while at other times they were real patriots.<sup>17</sup> The fundamental features in the character of Scaurus were very great pride, decided talent, and inflexible party spirit. He was a great statesman, and during the last twenty years of his life seems to have acted, if not in a virtuous manner, yet with great consistency, so that, at least as far as appearance goes, he deserves the reputation which he has in history. That his conduct during the Jugurthine war, is not an invention of Sallust, is evident from the history itself. His conduct, at the time when he was one of the commissioners at Utica, was blameless, for he was particularly hostile towards Jugurtha. But after the death of Adherbal, things became too bad: the consul L. Capurnius Piso Bestia, wished to enrich himself by the war, and at any rate to conclude a peace, if he should be paid for it. At first, therefore, he made common cause with some honest people, who desired that Jugurtha should be punished. In this spirit he caused himself to be sent with an army to Africa at the same time when the second commission went out. The war was at first conducted

<sup>17</sup> I know a man who has a great name in history, and who at one time, it is true, with the consent of his government, did not scruple to appropriate advantages to himself with the utmost indelicacy, but who, at other times, has acted like a true political hero. Man is a changeable being.—N.

honestly, but negotiations were soon entered into; for Jugurtha contrived to persuade Bestia and Scaurus that peace would be far more advantageous to them than war. He remained in point of fact, in possession of his kingdom, but nominally submitted to the Romans. In order that the senate might sanction the peace, the *foedus* was changed into a *clientela*. Thirty elephants, money, a large number of cattle, and deserters were surrendered to them; but the whole transaction was a shameful masquerade, for the deserters instead of being sent to Rome, where they were to be executed, were allowed to escape, and the elephants were given back for money.<sup>18</sup> This treaty excited the greatest indignation at Rome, and C. Memmius, a bold tribune, came forward to expose the whole of the revolting proceedings.

---

### LECTURE LXXXI.

BESTIA's treaty with Jugurtha was so revolting and scandalous, that C. Memmius carried a decree that an inquiry should be made into those transactions; and L. Cassius, who was then looked upon as a man of the greatest integrity, was appointed to examine the state of affairs in Africa itself. Cassius was no doubt a man of high rank, a patrician<sup>1</sup>, but was unconnected with any faction; he was pure in a corrupt age, and hence denounced crime without regard to persons. His word was of such weight that Jugurtha, in reliance upon it, ventured to come to Rome to be tried. In Jugurtha's whole conduct, in relation to Rome, we see a singular wavering between boldness and a feeling of weakness. He was on the point of betraying his accomplices, to prevent which there was no other means than an abuse of the tribunician power: so C. Baebius, one of the tribunes, was bought over to forbid Jugurtha to speak in the assembly. The tribunician power had thus become strong for evil, but feeble for good. Jugurtha, encouraged by such proceedings, during his stay at Rome, murdered Massiva, a

<sup>18</sup> Sallust, *Jugurth*. 29.

<sup>1</sup> See *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 200, and *Hist. of Rome*, ii. p. 173, where the Cassi, after Sp. Cassius Viscellinus, are called plebeians; but the passage of our text belongs to the Lectures of 1826, and the other to the Lectures of 1828 and 29.

young Numidian, and a descendant of Masinissa, who was then staying at Rome, and who had been led by the consul, Sp. Albinus, to entertain hopes of succeeding to the throne of Numidia; Jugurtha escaped to Africa in safety, leaving his sureties behind him. The senate, however, now annulled the transactions with Jugurtha, though none of his accomplices were punished, and sent the consul Sp. Albinus with an army to Africa. He conducted the war in a slow and careless manner, and on returning to Rome to be present at the consular elections, entrusted the command to his brother Aulus, who allowed himself to be imposed upon to such an extent that he was surrounded by the Numidians. Jugurtha with his gold now worked upon the army, and not only strangers, but even Roman tribunes allowed themselves to be bought; then when all was prepared, Aulus was attacked, defeated and lost his camp; he was obliged to conclude a disgraceful treaty with Jugurtha, which however was not sanctioned at Rome.

As matters had gone so far, it was impossible to hush them up any longer. Q. Caecilius Metellus now obtained the command, and was provided with great military forces. Three quaestors were appointed to inquire into the transactions with Jugurtha;—they were equites, and did not form a popular court,—one of them was M. Scaurus, who according to the statement of Sallust<sup>2</sup>, was in danger of being implicated in the inquiry, but was so skilful as to contrive to get this office in order to conceal the part he himself had taken in former proceedings; he accordingly carried the investigations no further than was consistent with his own safety. Many of his accomplices, and among them Optimus who now had to atone for the murder of Gracchus, were condemned, and the whole party completely lost the public favour. It is inconceivable how Cicero could be mistaken about a man like Optimus; but in judging of a person we should never blindly follow others; those who then fell were assuredly all guilty. It is unfortunate that we do not know these *quaestiones* very accurately; but this much is certain, that by the disclosure of the bareness of the optimates, these people, who wanted to be looked upon as the best, received a blow from which they never recovered. The equites who were now the judices formed a decided opposition to the senators. From this moment the division

<sup>2</sup> *Jugurth. 40.*

began, which afterwards led to the civil war between the parties of Marius and Sulla. Respecting the internal history of Rome during this time little is known, and not even the names of those who were put to death by the sentence of the quaestors. That Optimus and Bestia fell is certain, but in regard to others little is known.

Metellus conducted the war for two years in a manner which deserves our greatest respect, although he made some mistakes; but many of his exploits are among the most brilliant recorded in history. For the details I refer you to Sallust. Jugurtha engaged in an open battle only once, and lost it. Metellus was the son of Metellus Macedonicus, and obtained the surname Numidicus. He is one of those characters that are easily misunderstood: we cannot say unconditionally that he was a nobleminded man, for although a plebeian, he was full of the prejudices and selfishness of the nobles. He had from his childhood entertained the conviction, that the government must be conducted in an honest manner. He patronised persons born in humbler stations, for he had great regard for real merit, but he required that they should put a check upon themselves and not strive after the highest offices. In this light we must view his relation to Marius, to whom he was at first favourably disposed; but as soon as Marius sued for the consulship, Metellus, in the blindness of passion, became his enemy. Men like Metellus are found to this day among the high nobility of England, who look upon the privileges of their own order as the first and most inalienable of all rights, and who when crimes committed by members of their own order are to be inquired into, step forward to gloss over the foul stains. These considerations make the remarkable character of Metellus quite clear: his personal character was quite blameless, but his pride did not permit him to be just. He rejected all the proposals of Jugurtha, employed the king's own Punic artifices against him, so as to oblige him to disarm, in order to purchase hopes which were not realised; and when Jugurtha actually wanted to escape, by making concessions, from the destruction which he clearly saw before his eyes, Metellus made demands which would have rendered him quite defenceless. Jugurtha again showed a mixture of pusillanimity and boldness, and an inability to accommodate himself to his circumstances. He wished to surrender himself to Metellus, having

already surrendered all his arms and elephants and 200,000 pounds of silver; but when the time came for delivering up his own person, he fled to the desert districts of Mount Atlas, although he had deprived himself of all resources.

The war however was protracted, and no one knew how long it would yet last, when the opinion became prevalent at Rome that it was the fault of Metellus that it had not yet been brought to a close, although no one had reason to doubt his virtue. He was incorruptible, disinterested, a great statesman and general, and his personal character was respected, but his pretensions were unbearable; and it cannot be denied that this trait in his character brought great sufferings upon his country, and that the immense irritation of Marius would never have been roused had not the whole party of the optimates set their engines to work to keep him down. The accounts of the ancients respecting the descent of Marius do not agree with one another: some represent him as a man of very low birth, others (*Velleius Paterculus*) raise him somewhat higher<sup>3</sup>; but it is quite certain that his ancestors were clients of a municipal family of Arpinum, which does not however imply that they were not free men. His name is Campanian, and consequently Oscan: it is probable, that his family removed from Campania to Arpinum, and there became clients of the Herennii. He was poor; but this did not do him any harm: and I also believe it to be true that he served at first as a common soldier, and that at a still earlier period he worked as a field labourer.<sup>4</sup> But his extraordinary genius must soon have become manifest, otherwise he would never have been able to rise so high; for it was a rare occurrence among the Romans, especially in later times, for a common soldier to rise above the rank of a military tribune, unless indeed he had the very best connexions. But Marius rose without them. He was early known at Rome as an able centurion, and when he offered himself for the military tribuneship, he was elected with great applause. At the time when he came forward as a candidate for the aedileship, he must have acquired considerable property; but he was unsuccessful. Soon afterwards, however, he obtained the praetorship, in which office he acted very honorably; but even then the oligarchs acted badly towards

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 3; Vell. *Paterc.* ii.11; Sallust, *Jugurth.* 63.

<sup>4</sup> See the passage of Juvenal, quoted in vol. iii. p. 11.

him.<sup>5</sup> He, however, maintained his ground against their charge of *ambitus*, which was at that time an every-day occurrence; for every one was accustomed to spend his money when he offered himself as a candidate for any office, and then to make the crime, of which he himself was guilty, a charge against his competitors. When Metellus went to Numidia, he made Marius one of his legates. It was at that time not very uncommon for a *homo novus* to rise to the office of praetor; and when Sallust<sup>6</sup> says that a *homo novus* had never before obtained the consulship, he is mistaken; for out of the six praetors, four usually rose to the consulship; and it was in this way that Fannius had been made consul. The children of a praetor, however, were not *homines novi*.

Marius, who at the time of the Jugurthine war must have been a man of my age (1829), about fifty years old, signalised himself greatly in the Roman army in Numidia. He was very superstitious, and here we find, for the first time, a superstition pointing to the East; he was always accompanied by a Syrian, probably a Jewish, prophetess, of the name of Martha, in whose counsels he had implicit faith.<sup>7</sup> Once, while he was offering a sacrifice, something had happened which, as he believed, promised him the highest honours of the republic.<sup>8</sup> Encouraged by this omen, he resolved to seek the consulship. This presumption was more than Metellus could brook, and he therefore tried to dissuade him from it, and to detain him in the camp, by throwing ridicule on his ambitious scheme. But, when Marius resolutely applied to Metellus for leave to go to Rome, the latter forgot himself so far as to say that he need not be in a hurry to obtain a refusal, and that he had better wait until his (Metellus') son could be elected as his colleague. The son of Metellus was a young man of about twenty, and had according to the *leges annales*, to wait twenty years longer before he was allowed to sue for the consulship. Marius never forgot this mockery: he was enraged and got his friends at Rome to exert their influence with the people in his favour. Metellus now for the sake of appearances yielded, hoping that Marius would arrive too late, as he did not grant him leave of absence till twelve days before the election. Marius, however, reached the coast with immense exertions; and a favourable wind enabled him to arrive at Rome before the day of election;

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Jugurth.* 63.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 17.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 8; Sallust, *l. c.*

he was received by the people with extraordinary favour, and was elected consul by a great majority.

It is unjust to call the Gracchi demagogues, but Marius deserves that name in the fullest sense. He flattered the populace, as others flatter men of influence, and took pleasure in appearing among them as one of their equals. He was not fit for the time in which he lived; for he had a peculiar kind of pride, which many circumstances tended to wound; this perpetual irritation exasperated him, and led him into his unfortunate career. Greek education and Greek literature were then as prevalent, and thought to be as necessary, as an intimate acquaintance with French literature was in my youth; and, if we recall to our minds that period of our own history, we may understand how great the demand for Greek literature must have been at that time. Cato learned Greek in his old age; but he did learn it, and was very familiar with the literature of his own country also. Marius did not, like him, cling to the earlier traditions, which were already beginning to disappear; he was undoubtedly acquainted with Greek, which was then quite necessary in society, but he despised it, as well as the literature which was then fashionable among the Romans, but which was unknown to Marius. He possessed great wealth, which can have been acquired only in war; and it is a remarkable characteristic of the times, that he was nevertheless considered as a man of incorruptible manners, as a *vir sanctus*; merely because he had not robbed the republic like the majority of his contemporaries; whereas, in the earlier times, Fabricius, Curius and others were thought *sancti*, because they possessed none of the luxuries of life. Marius' talents as a general were immense, and it was the consciousness of his superiority in this respect that bore him aloft. The opinion of the nation was not divided on this point. He was as great on the day of battle, as in the disposition of his troops and in the art of fortifying his camp; and in the management of a campaign he was unrivalled. He had few friends, for the prominent features of his character were bitterness, hatefulness, and cruelty; but he was, at the same time, the man whom Providence had sent to save Rome; his bad qualities were called forth by those who oppressed and provoked so extraordinary and distinguished a man. Metellus, when compared with Marius, was no more than an ordinary general, and in a

hostile encounter with him, he would have been instantly defeated; for Marius was an extraordinary man, of great foresight, and free from all rashness. At times when it was necessary to act, his energy knew no bounds; and he had at once the clearest possible insight into all the circumstances and relations of the case. His hatred of the optimates led him to bring many a charge against them, which, although really unjust, appeared to him perfectly just.

The tribunes of the people at Rome proposed that the province of Numidia, should *extra ordinem* be assigned before hand, and as the people unanimously agreed to this, Marius, after being raised to the consulship, received the command to bring the war against Jugurtha to a close. On this occasion, Metellus again shewed a mean spirit. Not being able to bear the sight of Marius, he departed to Rome in secret<sup>9</sup>, leaving the army to his legate Rutilius, an excellent man, who afterwards became the victim of party spirit, by joining the opponents of the optimates; for the democratic party as soon as it had gained the upper hand, showed itself just as bad as the oligarchic party had been before. Marius terminated the war in less than two years, showing on all occasions the greatest boldness and ability. Sallust describes this especially in his account of the siege of Capsa, how he dispersed the cavalry, etc. The Romans did not advance much beyond Cirta, and Jugurtha went to Bocchus, king of Mauretania, with whom he was connected by marriage, and who had at first assisted him in the war, but soon listened to proposals of the Romans, and by delivering up Jugurtha into their hands made peace with them. This took place after much deliberation, Bocchus hesitating for a long time, and wishing to detain Sulla, who conducted the negotiations. At length he gave up Jugurtha, who afterwards adorned the triumph of Marius. A part of Numidia was added to the province of Africa; but the greater portion remained an independent kingdom, the kings of which probably belonged to the family of Masinissa, but we do not know the particulars. Juba, in the time of the Caesarian war, was descended from the anonymous king who now succeeded. Bocchus was recognised as an independent sovereign.

The war against Jugurtha was thus concluded; and it was

<sup>9</sup> Sallust, *Jugurth.* 86.

high time indeed, for the republic required the talents of Marius in a war, compared with which that against the Numidian king was little and insignificant. The Cimbri and Teutones were expected on the frontiers of Italy, after they had cut to pieces the armies of Q. Servilius Caepio and Cn. Manlius. Marius, by the unanimous call of the nation, was appointed consul for the second time, contrary to the existing laws, which, on the one hand, did not allow a man to be made consul in his absence, and on the other hand, required that the same person should not be re-elected till after the lapse of ten years. Marius triumphed on new year's day, on which he also entered on his second consulship.

The Cimbri<sup>10</sup> were not real Gauls, but Cymri, of the same stock as that to which belonged the Welsh, the Basbretons, the early inhabitants of Cumberland (which derives its name from them, and where traces of the Cymrian language existed till about 100 years ago), and the whole western coast of England. Whether Ulster was inhabited by Cymri, is uncertain. The Picts of Scotland were likewise Cymri, and the Belgae also belonged to the same race; they were, to some extent, mixed with the Gael, but the Cymri must have predominated among them. In their great migration, in the fourth and fifth centuries, they went as far as the Ukraine, and under the name of Celto-Scythae, extended eastward as far as or even beyond the river Dnieper, where they were called Galatians.<sup>11</sup> But the whole question about these nations is one which we cannot settle with proper accuracy. Through circumstances with which we are imperfectly acquainted, but probably, by the progress of the Sarmatians or Slavonians, these tribes had been driven from their abodes, and threw themselves back upon their own kinsmen in Moldavia, Wallachia, Hungary, etc. They first expelled the Bastarnae, then the Scordiscans and Tauriscans; and, before the outbreak of the Jugurthine war, in A. U. 639, they appeared in Noricum, on the frontier of Italy, which extended in reality over Carinthia and Croatia, as far as the bay of Trieste—a district which was already inhabited by Gauls who were under the protection of the Romans, as is always the case with small tribes living near a powerful nation without being subject to it. The Cimbri,

<sup>10</sup> Compare *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 323.

<sup>11</sup> Compare vol. ii. p. 522, foll.; Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, i. p. 519, foll.

who remained behind, appeared on the middle Danube and in Bohemia, attacking the Boians, a kindred tribe, as well as foreigners, in order to acquire a territory to live in; but they were repelled. It must have been there, on the middle Danube, that they attacked all with whom they came in contact, and joined the Teutones. That the latter were Germans, as even their name indicates, is as certain as that the Cimbri were Cymri, or, more generally speaking, Gauls. Many Gallic words have a general affinity to the Cymrian, and yet the languages differ so much from each other, that the Cymri and Gauls do not understand one another, though both are comprised under the generic name of the Gallic nation. The Teutones may have been pushed forward, like the Cimbri, by the progress of the Sarmatians from the East. If what is related from Pytheas' travels is true, that he found the Teutones on the east coast of Prussia, it would seem probable that they were pushed forward by the Sarmatians from northern Poland. In Gaul they evidently appear as the companions of the Cimbri, and the names of the leaders of the two nations show that the one was a Gallic and the other a Germanic people; but whether the Cimbri and Teutones had already united their forces in Noricum, or whether their junction took place subsequently is unknown.

The Romans sent out an army to protect the Carnians under the consul Cn. Papirius Carbo<sup>12</sup>, probably a son of the Carbo who had put an end to his life when accused by L. Licinius Crassus; but he was defeated in 639, in the neighbourhood of Noreia, by the Cimbri, who seem to have fought alone there. The Cimbri, satisfied with this victory, did not follow it up by descending into Italy, either because they were overawed by the name of the Romans, or for other reasons unknown to us. What is surprising is, that they spread over the mountainous parts of Austria and Bavaria, to the north of the Alps, districts which were then inhabited by Celts, and whence they proceeded to Gaul. In the general state of dissolution, they were joined by the Tigurini, a tribe from Helvetia, and by the Ambrones. From what country the latter came is totally unknown; one might almost suspect that they were Ligurians from the Alpine mountains, but the question is an inextricable problem. The Cimbri with their associates now threw themselves into Gaul,

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *De Reb. Gall.* 15; Livy, *Epit.* 63.

like a horde of nomades, with an immense number of waggons loaded with women, children, and booty. These four tribes, sometimes united, sometimes separated, thus fell upon the civilised world. It is difficult to determine the places where they defeated M. Junius Silanus and M. Aurelius Scaurus<sup>13</sup>, for our accounts are incredibly scanty, as Livy is here wanting, and Zonaras could not make use of the seventeen books of Dion Cassius, which are lost. According to one statement, it might almost seem that in one of these battles the Romans had advanced as far as La Rochelle, between Poitou and the Garonne.<sup>14</sup> Another defeat was sustained near the lake of Geneva by the consul L. Cassius Longinus<sup>15</sup>, and the Romans had to purchase permission to depart by giving up half of their baggage. Thus defeat followed defeat. The Romans wished to protect the Transalpine Gauls, but all attempts failed. These ravages of the Cimbri brought, for the moment, infinite misery upon the Gauls. The whole country between the Rhone, nay we may say between the Rhine and the Pyrenees, was ravaged and weakened; and thus was prepared the way for the victories of Caesar, for the towns were taken and destroyed, and the inhabitants cruelly treated. Of all the Gallic tribes the Belgae alone made a successful stand against the Cimbri.

The greatest defeat which the Romans suffered in this war, was on the river Rhone, the year after the first consulship of Marius. The proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio and the consul Cn. Manlius undertook the war in that year with two consular armies. The number of the slain, which is stated to have been 80,000 Romans and Italians<sup>16</sup>, does not seem to be historical, unless we suppose that a great number of Gallic auxiliaries served in the Roman armies. The two consular armies, however, were totally annihilated.<sup>17</sup> The consequence was, that Marius, now again the only man on whom the nation fixed its hopes, was made consul for the second time; and even his political adversaries, seeing the very existence of the republic endangered, supported his elevation. It was fortunate for the

<sup>13</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 65 and 67; Florus, iii. 3; Asconius Pedian. in *Cornel.*

<sup>14</sup> Orosius, v. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 65; Orosius, v. 15; compare Caesar, *De Bello Gall.* i. 12.

<sup>16</sup> According to Orosius (v. 16,) Valerius Antias was the only authority for this number.—N. Compare Livy, *Epit.* 67.

<sup>17</sup> Dion Cass. *Excerpt. Vales.* p. 631; Florus, iii. 3; Eutrop. v. 1; Vell. Patere. ii. 12.

Romans that the Cimbri, after their great victory, turned to Spain, either because they dreaded the passage over the Alps, or because they shrunk from attacking the Romans in their own country. They now for a few years ranged over Spain, which the Romans were unable to protect, and the ravages which they made there were perhaps as great as those inflicted on the same country by the Suevi and Vandals, in the fifth century of our aera. Even places which surrendered to the barbarians, were treated in the most fearful manner. The Celtiberians shewed their usual bravery, and maintained themselves in their towns, preferring to feed on the corpses of their own citizens, to falling into the hands of the barbarians; while other places were taken and destroyed. This perseverance of the Celtiberians induced the Cimbri to give up the hope of conquering Spain, and to go back to Gaul.

The devastation of Gaul belongs to the time of the Jugurthine war under Metellus, and the expedition of the Cimbri into Spain, to the second and third consulships of Marius. For the ill success of their arms induced the Romans to confer upon him the consulship for the third time, and even his enemies supported him, seeing that there was no one else to save the republic. All the Roman armies were destroyed except that which came from Numidia. Marius therefore devoted the time of his second and third consulships to the forming and training of a new army. The elements of which the Roman armies consisted had degenerated with the social and political condition of the people: the population no longer consisted of a free peasantry, and armies could be raised only from a mass, which deserved no other name than that of a populace. The task of Marius, to make well disciplined soldiers out of such materials, was very difficult indeed, and one which he alone could accomplish, being himself an excellent soldier, and requiring every one else to be the same. The remnants of former armies were for the most part utterly demoralised, and the army which he formed, consisted of foul-hearted recruits of the very worst description, and of veterans whom he had brought over from Africa. That Marius was the originator of the great change in the Roman tactics which we see in Caesar, is a conjecture which has been expressed even before this time, especially by Colonel Guichard. The change can in fact have been the work only of a man who always made his arrangements

so as to answer present purposes. Until the time of Marius, and even as late as the Numidian campaigns, we find mention of the *principes*, *triarii*, and *hastati*; it is true, we have no great historical work in the Latin language relative to the period subsequent to Marius, but we have an accurate knowledge of the legions of Caesar, and in them we find neither *principes*, *hastati*, nor *triarii*; nothing but *pilani*; the lance had been disused, and only the *pikun* and sword were retained. The drawing up of the soldiers in maniples<sup>18</sup> likewise disappears, and the legion is drawn up in a line ten men deep, with a corresponding reserve; when an army is divided into corps, the disposition is not thereby altered; for the different corps, too, are not drawn up in maniples, *en échelons*, but in lines one behind the other. A legion is divided into sixty centuries, whereas in the earliest times it was divided into five cohorts, each cohort containing thirty centuries of thirty men each; and the legion is raised from 4,500 to 6,000 men. The light troops are kept separate; and the legion is no longer a brigade, but has become an extremely strong regiment, in which all the men have the same armour; and the cavalry is independent of the legion. Another very essential change for which Marius has been greatly censured is, that in levying an army he did not act in the manner which had previously been customary. Formerly all those who possessed less than 12,500, but more than 1500 ases, were employed only as a reserve; subsequently all men whose property came up to 1000 sesterces (400 denarii) were levied for the line, and those who possessed less were employed in the fleet; but Marius now took every able-bodied man, though he might be as poor as a beggar. According to the notions of the olden time, this was certainly a bad thing; for in the early times it was quite right to employ in the defence of their country only those who were expected to have an interest in the preservation of the constitution: but at that time, there were no standing armies; and as soon as these became customary, it was less hard for a person who had no property to remain for years in a province, than for the only son of a family which had property to do so. That which had formerly been right, had therefore now ceased to be so, in consequence of the change of circumstances. I may say in general, that, although I fully admit the heavy sins, and, if you like, the vices, of

<sup>18</sup> *Manipuli*, however, are mentioned in Caes. B. G. ii. 25.

Marius, yet I consider it unreasonable to speak of him, as if it had been a misfortune for the republic that he was born. There can be no doubt that he deserved his great reputation. His cruelties are not to be excused; but he was a great man, and it is our duty to try to understand and explain his sins. Two such different characters as Cicero and Caesar were very partial to Marius. Caesar, as a boy, was attached to him with his whole soul, his aunt Julia being married to Marius; and Cicero, in spite of his party, was proud of being a native of Arpinum and a countryman of Marius.

---

### LECTURE LXXXII.

ELEVEN years had now elapsed since the first appearance of the Cimbri, a proof of the rapidity of those migrations westwards which never had any bounds. Had the Cimbri been successful in Spain, it is very possible that they would have crossed over into Africa. Marius was obliged to raise an army as well as he could; the veterans from Numidia were the only soldiers that were not in a demoralised condition, and he accordingly was obliged to prepare the new soldiers for the war, by mixing among them the few victorious veterans. In his fourth consulship the army was ready to take the field. Even in his third consulship he was in southern Gaul, on the banks of the Rhone, probably on the frontiers of Provence and Dauphiné, between Arles and Avignon. He had chosen that district, as near as he could safely to the enemy, as the place for exercising his troops, which he had compelled to acquire extreme activity. Whoever was unable to bear the hardships perished; but the rest were all the better soldiers. As the Rhone, like all the rivers of the Mediterranean, fills up its mouth with mud and sand, he quickly formed a canal to keep up a free communication with the sea. In his fourth consulship he advanced as far as the confluence of the Isère and Rhone, expecting that the Cimbri and Teutones would return from Spain. It was generally believed that they would take the same road across the Alps as Hannibal had chosen; the

Gauls had of course forgotten their hostile feelings towards the Romans, and now looked upon them as their protectors. If it is true that Marius was obliged to have recourse to intrigues to obtain his fourth consulship, it is a bad sign, and shows the blindness of the oligarchy.

The barbarians, for reasons which we do not know, shewed no inclination to attack Marius. The Cimbri separated their troops from those of the Teutones, and marched round the northern foot of the Alps towards Noricum, in order to invade Italy from that quarter, while the Teutones remained in Gaul. The reason why Marius now retreated from Valence to Aquae Sextiae is not mentioned in our meagre accounts, like many other things connected with this war. The Cimbri passed by the Roman camp, jeering and mocking their enemies, and marched around Switzerland, for between the Pennine Alps and those of Trent there was at that period no practicable road for such hosts with their waggons. The only road was that over the Little St. Bernard, and this they could not take on account of the Romans. Some, however, may have gone across Mount St. Gothard and the Splügen. The Romans sent another army under the consul, C. Lutatius Catulus, to meet the Cimbri in the Italian part of Tyrol, in the neighbourhood of Trent: but in point of discipline this army was quite the reverse of that of Marius; just as Catulus himself was the very opposite of Marius in acquirements and accomplishments; for according to Cicero<sup>1</sup>, he was well acquainted with Greek literature, having even left his memoirs written in Greek, as was then customary with well educated men at Rome, for Latin prose had not yet been sufficiently cultivated by great authors, just as Frederic the Great wrote his memoirs in French. The loss of Livy's books on this period is irreparable, for we know absolutely no more of it than of the earlier centuries; and properly speaking, we know less of the enormous efforts made in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, than of the migration of nations, and of the struggles against the barbarians at the beginning of the fifth century of our era. Orosius is here our best authority, and sometimes we must be satisfied with Florus. All these epitomisers, however, Orosius, Eutropius, Florus, though full of mutual contradictions, derive their materials from Livy. The account of

<sup>1</sup> *Brutus*, 35.

Plutarch is independent of Livy, and furnishes most detail on the Cimbrian war.

When the Cimbri had gone away, the Teutones and Ambrones followed Marius with increased confidence in their own strength, as is generally the case when an enemy seems to take to flight. In what direction the Tigurini went is unknown. From an expression in the epitomisers which Plutarch passes over, it would appear that the barbarians took the camp of Marius; but this cannot have happened at the encampment near which the battle was fought, for in the march towards it, and in the whole disposition of the army, we recognise a retreat and a forced pitching of the camp. Marius, therefore, was obliged to pitch his camp in a position where there was no water, so that the soldiers had to fetch it from a distant well, and could not safely do so without their arms. Hence they demanded to be led to battle. Marius wanted first to form a fortified camp, for the enemy was quite near, and the circumstances unfavourable; but he could not carry his point, for the distress was so great, that some of the men attending on the baggage went, in their despair, to a piece of water quite close to the enemy. There they were attacked by the Ambrones. The soldiers went to their assistance; first the Ligurians, then one cohort after another hastened towards them without Marius' orders. Thus an engagement ensued, in which, for some unknown reason, the Teutones took no part; but they had probably not yet arrived. Even in this skirmish the Romans gained a brilliant victory, and the greater part of the Ambrones were destroyed; but, nevertheless, the Romans not having a fortified camp spent the following night in uneasiness, and in working at their ramparts. The next battle was not fought on the following day, as was expected, but on the second day, probably because the Teutones and the rest of the Ambrones did not arrive till then. Marius prepared every thing with the talent of a great general, and sent M. Claudius Marcellus (whose family always had able men, and who was probably a grandson of the worthy Marcellus in the Iberian war, who was five times consul), probably with a detachment of allies, to attack the enemy's rear. This plan was successful, as it frustrated the attacks of the barbarians upon the Roman camp. Even before, the fury of the Teutones had failed against the firmness and perse-

verance of the Romans, especially as it was summer, for southern nations have much stronger muscles, and can endure much more, both cold and heat, than we can. It is an erroneous opinion that they can bear less cold than we; for in Napoleon's campaign in Russia the Italians held out much longer than the other soldiers. The Romans therefore supported the heat of the sun far better than the Teutones. The Romans were stationed on a hill, where they were attacked, but drove down the enemy, and when they endeavoured to rally again in the plain, Marcellus fell upon their rear. One part endeavoured to save itself by flight, but was cut to pieces by the Gauls. The chief of the Teutones was captured by the Sequani; the remainder of his army retreated to their waggons, but could not maintain their ground, the Romans attacking them there also; the whole nation was literally almost annihilated, for those who survived the battle put an end to their own lives, and only a few were sold as slaves.<sup>2</sup>

When half of the danger had thus been removed, the Cimbri marched through Tyrol, and descended from the Alps of Trent into Italy. It was not the fault of Catulus that they succeeded in this, the cause being the immense superiority of the barbarians in numbers, and the terror which they spread. Orosius<sup>3</sup> is the only ancient writer on these events, in whom we rejoice to find a pure source of information; the narrative of Florus, where he describes the manner in which the Cimbri opened the roads is perfectly childish, for he speaks of them as if they had been the most senseless of barbarians, who wished to check the current of the Adige with their hands. Had Florus not been the *homo umbraticus* he really was, he would have known that when an army has to march through a river, the cavalry ride through it in close columns at a higher part, which most assuredly does check the current of the river, and greatly facilitates the passage for the infantry below: in many parts of the river Adige, this method is particularly successful. The Cimbri may have tried something of the same kind, and have believed that with their gigantic bodies, they might check the river; but this is impossible in the Adige as it is at Legnano. Florus further says that they threw trees into the river, intending

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Marius*, 19, foll.; Livy, *Epit.* 69; Vell. Patrc. ii. 12.

<sup>3</sup> v. 16.

thereby to stop its course; but I cannot believe that they were so foolish as to imagine anything of the sort. If they threw trees into the river, it was certainly because they wanted to make a bridge, or to break down the bridge of the Romans; and this plan could not but succeed. The Romans were stationed at each end of the bridge, on both sides of the river; one part was cut off, and obliged to surrender to the Cimbri, but they were set free in an uncommonly humane manner. It must be regarded as true, also, that on their passage over the most impassable Alps, they滑ed down the sides of the mountains, seated on their shields as on sledges. Lutatius Catulus, being unable to hold out against the rapid progress of the Cimbri, retreated even beyond the river Po. The whole country north of that river was laid waste; the towns of Verona, Mantua, Brescia, and others, were left to the protection of their own walls, and defended themselves, but the open places were destroyed. From the winter until the following summer, the Cimbri, we do not know why, tarried in the country north of the Po. We are completely in the dark as to what else took place.

Marius was informed in Gaul of the invasion of the barbarians, ordered his army to march, apparently towards Genoa in Liguria, and went himself to Rome. There all were full of admiration of him; and the belief that he alone could save Rome was so universal, that even the oligarchs supported his re-election to the consulship for the fifth time. The anxiety to gain his good-will was so great, that a triumph was offered to him, but he declined it until he should have conquered the Cimbri; and this confidence on his part found its way into the hearts of all. Marius now united his forces with those of Catulus, who had remained with his army as proconsul. Both crossed the Po with a force of somewhat more than 52,000 men. We are told that the Cimbri knew nothing of the defeat of the Teutones, which is a perfect absurdity; for it is impossible that during the period from the autumn till July, they should not have received any information. There can be no doubt that the feeling, that half their power was destroyed, led them to demand of Marius a country to live in; and if they made the same demand for their brethren, they can have been no other than the Tigurini. Whether the Cimbri wished to secure their passage back into Gaul, in order that in case of need they might

be able to retreat across the little St. Bernard, and whether for this reason they went to Vercelli, is uncertain; but notwithstanding all the different readings, it seems to be an established fact, that the battle was fought near Vercelli, on the slope of the Alps. I cannot see how it could have occurred to any one to place it in that corner of Lombardy, had it not been so recorded. The place of the battle is called Campi Raudii. Contrary to the Roman custom, the battle was announced three days beforehand, and it was fought on the 3rd before the calends of Sextilis, that is, on the 29th of July, as the calendar then stood. Thus long had the Cimbri tarried in that unhealthy country of Lombardy, where fevers are so common and water so bad for drinking. They had ravaged it ever since the beginning of winter, and epidemics had already broken out among them. On the day of the battle, Marius placed the army of Catulus in the centre, and distributed his own on the two flanks. The account of the battle, which we have in Plutarch alone, is so confused, that nothing can be made clear. It is incredible that the Cimbri should have formed a square mass, each side of which was several miles in length, for such a mass would have consisted of several millions; the sides of the square, moreover, are said to have been bound together with chains, so as to form an impregnable wall.<sup>4</sup> Marius is said to have placed his lines in such a position, that the sun and the wind were against his enemy<sup>5</sup>, but we cannot decide whether this is true or not. Catulus had to bear the brunt of the battle; at least, it was fiercest in the centre. The fate of the Cimbri was the same as that of the Teutones: they fled to their waggons, where women and children joined in the fight, and at last made away with themselves. A great number were taken prisoners, the Alps preventing their escape: in short, all the Cimbri who had come across the Alps, were extirpated; the only remnant was the tribe of the Aduatici, whom they had left behind on the lower Rhine, where accordingly they must at one time have had their fixed abode.<sup>6</sup>

It was a controverted point whether the merit of this victory belonged to Marius or to Catulus; but this is only a proof of the existing party-spirit, and I believe that there is no ground at all for looking upon the matter as doubtful, for it cannot be denied that Catulus was jealous and envious of the vulgar

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *l. c.* 27.

<sup>5</sup> Florus, iii. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Caesar, *De Bello Gall.* ii. 29.

upstart. Marius celebrated his victory by the most brilliant triumph that had ever been seen at Rome; but how giddy he had become in his lofty position was seen most strikingly by his entering the senate in his triumphal robe. He was rewarded for his unexampled services by being made consul for the sixth time, perhaps the first instance of a man being so often invested with this honour; for it cannot be said with certainty, whether Valerius Corvus had been consul six times<sup>7</sup>, though I am almost convinced of it; still it may be that the consulship which was regarded as his sixth, belonged to a member of his family with whom he was confounded. The general opinion at Rome was, that some one before C. Marius *had* been invested with the consulship six times, and the Romans evinced no surprise, until he obtained the same dignity for the seventh time. In his sixth consulship, he was called the third founder of Rome, after Romulus and Camillus; but that consulship, although in the end Marius was useful to the republic, was followed by such sad consequences, that it would have been better for Marius if he had died on the day of his triumph; for then the world would have seen him only in his glory, a glory greater than that of Scipio himself, and—have been deceived. Marius was not the man to be anything in quiet times of peace; the dissolution of Rome was rapidly progressing, and was of such a nature that Marius was obliged to act. There are different kinds of courage in reference to danger, for a person either stares death in the face with indifference, or he forgets it in the joy of the action. This in itself is noble, though the motive is not always so; it is only he who has a pure mind, and is conscious of a noble object, that is in the full enjoyment of individual freedom, and can accomplish great things. Many persons are deficient in this kind of courage, but have a definite moral courage by which they place themselves above all prejudices, it being indifferent to them whether they are mis-judged or not. Others are extremely timid in this respect, and though in danger they shew a lion's courage, yet they cannot prevail upon themselves to act upon an opinion which appears to be heretical. In this latter kind of courage, Marius was weak; for if it is true that he allowed himself to be used as a tool by the men who, during his sixth consulship, exercised such an influence upon him, he would appear to us in a very miserable light.

<sup>7</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 124.

The truth is, that at one time he was afraid of the demagogues, and at another of the senate: he had that sad partial weakness of a great man who is not a great character.

He had formed connexions with a knave, L. Apuleius Saturninus, a man who is frequently coupled with the Gracchi, although there can hardly be any difference so great as that between Saturninus and the Gracchi. This Saturninus was a man like Catiline, and a strange phenomenon. I can hardly believe that there were real foundations for all the charges brought against Catiline; for, in regard to some of them, it is impossible to discover what could have been his object. Ambition may drive men to dangerous enterprises, but it is really difficult to account for a man acting so madly as Saturninus did. It would seem that he was a revolutionary spirit, who did not clearly conceive what would be the result of a revolution, and never thought of institutions and government, but only of violence and destruction. He was by no means of vulgar origin: he belonged to one of the noblest plebeian families, just as in the French revolution, men of the highest nobility placed themselves at the head of the mob. I do not recollect at this moment whether it is of him or of his companion, C. Servilius Glaucia, that Cicero says that he had never known a man of a more malign wit<sup>8</sup>; and it was by that means that they swayed the people. In his career to the higher offices of the republic, which he had commenced as a partisan of the nobles, he had been offended. There were then eight *quaesturae*, which were given either to consulars or to others, and with which revenues were connected; one of them was the *quaestura Ostiensis*, to which the duty of providing for the granaries at Rome was attached. Saturninus had held the office of *quaestor Ostiensis*, and had availed himself of the privilege of the nobles to make himself guilty of peculation. But circumstances changed, and the oligarchs were no longer able to screen the sins of their friends; an honest party had been formed from both factions, under the leadership of C. Memmius, and thus Saturninus was deprived of his office. Just as this punishment was, it gave him a severe blow,<sup>9</sup> and he threw himself into the arms of the populace,

<sup>8</sup> Something to this effect is said by Cicero (*Brutus*, 62) of Glaucia; comp. *de Orat.* ii. 61, 65.

<sup>9</sup> Cicero, *Pro Sext. 17, De Harusp. Respons.* 20; Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. xxvi. Eclog. 2*, p. 527.

a combination of the dregs of the nobles and the middle classes. He then became tribune, and in this capacity displayed the most scandalous conduct towards the first men, such as the censors and others. When he offered himself for the tribuneship a second time, and a certain A. Noricus was put forward as his competitor, Saturninus incited the people so much against him that the unfortunate man was murdered in the market place. Saturninus thus obtained the tribuneship by force. The magistrates had no longer any authority: he who had the power, acted as he pleased.

One of his accomplices was the praetor C. Servilius Glaucia, a man of very noble birth, and not a *libertinus* as we might infer from his name.<sup>10</sup> It is difficult to say what these two in reality wanted, but however wild their scheme may appear, one of them seems to have intended, in his frantic folly, to establish himself as tyrant; but if they imagined that Marius would allow this, they must have been as mad as the drunkard in Shakespeare's *Tempest*. In order to comprehend the characters of the men who lived during this period of Roman history, we must look upon many of them as complete madmen. Robespierre was a man of similar stamp, for no one can say what his real object was, and probably he had none at all. Men of that description merely wish to rule at random, without having themselves any distinct notion of what they want. The second tribuneship of Saturninus was contemporary with the sixth consulship of C. Marius. He began a complete course of legislation, and by a series of seditious proposals tried to win the favour of the people. His intentions were very different from those of the men who are called seditious in former times; for he aimed at tyrannical power, a plan in the execution of which only such generals as Sulla or Caesar could have been successful. The accounts of the laws of Saturninus are very obscure, but we know that a comprehensive agrarian law was one of the most prominent<sup>11</sup>, and that he changed the furnishing of corn at a low price into real largesses. It would seem as if all the lands, which were to be distributed according to his agrarian law, were in Gaul, north of the Po, for it is improbable that they should have been in France. He is said to have also carried a *lex judicaria*. He

<sup>10</sup> In like manner one of the Scipios was called Serapio, from an actor whom he resembled.—N.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch, *Marius*. 29.

flattered Marius in every possible way, by telling him that he intended to establish colonies<sup>12</sup>, which were to consist of Romans and Italicans; for as the Italian allies had greatly distinguished themselves in the army of Marius, Saturninus favoured them just as much as the Romans, and this was the reason why many of the poor Romans were exasperated against the law. Marius was to have the honour of bestowing on three Italian allies, in each of these colonies, the rights and privileges of Roman citizens, a privilege far beyond the bounds of all civil power. If in former times a general had had such presumption, it would have called forth a rebellion. Even at this time the measure was regarded as something quite enormous, but in later times no one thought of taking offence at an imperator conferring the franchise, and thus exercising a part of the right belonging to the sovereign people alone. These laws, partly on account of their author, and partly on account of their manifest aim, were opposed by all honest men, and even by those who had before resisted the oligarchy with all their might, as well as by the broken-down oligarchs, who now demanded no more than what was fair. Hence C. Memmius, who twelve years before, as tribune, had called upon the people to break the power of the oligarchy, became the object of furious hatred with the seditious party, though he acted then as he had done before, only as an honest man.

The new agrarian law when passed by the people, did not require, according to the Hortensian law, to be sanctioned by the senate; but that the senate might not afterwards prevent its being carried into effect, Saturninus demanded that the senators should expressly swear to observe it five days after its being passed by the tribes.<sup>13</sup> The matter was discussed in the senate, and Marius refused taking the oath, perhaps because he had acquired some insight into the contemptible character of Saturninus. It was thought that he refused from malice, to induce his enemies, especially Metellus, to follow his example. This may have been the case, but the more probable cause was a want of fixed principles, which he shewed on many occasions; for soon afterwards he changed his mind, and advised the senators to take the oath, declaring that it was impossible to refuse it any longer. Cicero had a moral power

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 29; Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 21; Livy, *Epit.* 69.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 29.

which did not allow him to be overawed; in his oration *pro Rabirio perduell.*, he says: *Nihil me clamor iste commovet sed consolatur, quum indicat esse quosdam cives imperitos sed non multos.* Neither Plutarch nor Appian explain the connection. At the end of all laws there occurs this formula: *si quid sacri sanctique est quod non jus sit rogari, ejus hac lege nihil rogatur*, or *si quid jus non esset rogarier, ejus ea lege nihil rogatum.*<sup>14</sup> Now the unhappy advisers of Marius said, that matters would come to civil bloodshed, if the law were not passed; and that if it were passed, that formula would be a protection against anything which thereby became null and void in the law. This circumstance was not understood either by Plutarch or by Appian, and still less by their translators. By this piece of casuistry, they prevailed upon Marius, to declare on the fifth day in the senate, that even if the oath were taken, there yet remained that loop-hole; and Marius then took the oath, and after him all the other senators. Metellus Numidicus alone resisted, and showed a determination of character which was more honorable than his Numidian victories, and which makes us forgive him his pride towards Marius. In the time of trials he showed himself resolute and consistent. But Saturninus persisted in his plan; he ordered his *viator* to drag Metellus out of the senate-house, and declared him an outlaw (*aqua et igni interdicebat*), so that Metellus went into exile to Rhodes. The year passed away amidst the greatest atrocities. The stain in Marius' character is his weakness; thenceforth he was always undecided; he negotiated with both parties, and was at the mercy of the storms which surrounded him. But fortunately Saturninus and his followers carried their excesses so far, that they produced a fusion of parties; and Marius abandoned their cause.

When the time of the new consular elections came on, M. Antonius was unanimously elected, and it seemed certain that on the following day C. Memmius would be chosen the other consul: he was one of the most energetic and upright men of the time, and probably the same who had been tribune in the time of the Jugurthine war; if not, he was at least a near relative of that tribune. Against him Glaucia and Saturninus created a tumult. They had the audacity to cause

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, *ad Att.* iii. 23, *pro Caecin.* 33; Walter, *Gesch. des Röm. Rechts*, vol. ii. p. 12. notes 45 and 46. 2d. edit.

him to be attacked in the public market place, and having fled into one of the stalls, he was murdered.<sup>15</sup> This was too glaring a crime, and Marius was applied to, to put an end to these atrocities, and he at once resolved to do so. He received from the senate the command, *videret, nequid res publica detrimenti caperet*. He forthwith summoned all the equites and honest citizens. In this danger, it became evident that the nobles, at other times also, might have averted much evil, if they had not neglected their own protection. When the mutineers saw that all rose against them, they retreated to the Capitol, where they were besieged. Marius again shewed himself a skilful general: the *clivus* was taken, and the guilty fled into the massively built Capitoline temple, to storm which would have been considered sacrilegious. Into this temple, the water was conducted by pipes from the *aqua Marcia*: these pipes Marius ordered to be destroyed, so that the besieged would have perished with hunger and thirst. The ancient well which I have discovered, and which during the siege of the Gauls had provided the Romans with water, must therefore at that time have been in the same condition as it is at present, otherwise the besieged would have been able to satisfy their thirst.<sup>16</sup> This well is now in the most wretched condition; and it is impossible to drink the water, all kinds of dirt being thrown into it. Glaucia proposed to set fire to the temple, and thus to destroy themselves; but the others, hoping to save their lives, refused to do so, and surrendered at discretion. The ring-leaders were shut up in the curia Hostilia, that they might be tried. But whether it was that the populace had altered their minds, or that the government got up a mutiny to escape from the odium of executing so many nobles, the roof of the curia was scaled, and the prisoners were killed by the mutineers from above. Marius' conduct reconciled the people to him; and he now took a second step towards a better course, by causing Metellus to be recalled from exile. The laws of Saturninus seem to have been abolished, as were afterwards those of Livius. Marius then retired to the station of a private man, for he had never entertained the idea of making himself tyrant.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, in *Catilin.* iv. 2; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 32.

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch, *Mar.* 30; Aurel. Victor, *De Vir. Illustr.* 73; Appian, *l. c.* Compare vol. iii. p. 306. notes, 524 and 529.

The republic was shaken to its very foundations. The great dispute was about the courts of justice. The equites, from their jealousy and hatred of the senate and of individual senators in the provinces, had abused their judicial powers in such a way that they were looked upon as tyrants, and parties again began to apply to the senate. The system of farming the public revenues had become more and more developed; societies of farmers rented mines, tolls, tithes, etc., and others carried on usurious business with their capital; they had amassed the most exorbitant treasures, and extorted in the provinces far greater sums than the laws permitted. In the Bible we see the manner in which the *τελῶναι*, the agents of the *publicani*, carried on their proceedings. Such is the state of things even at this day at Rome: it is not long since the providing of necessaries for the galley slaves was given in contract by the government to an actress, who made a very lucrative business of it. She took quite a sufficient sum per head, but farmed out to others the actual supplying of the provisions: every one took for himself a small profit, and thus it went downwards, the prisoners almost literally dying of starvation. When a consul or proconsul oppressed the provincials, and protected the *publicani*, he was safe; but when an honest man checked the abuses of the farmers of the revenue, they took vengeance by accusing him of malversation, *repetundarum*, and got him condemned by false witnesses. Such was the fate of P. Rutilius, which created general exasperation. It was impossible to exercise any control, the *publicani* always supporting one another, for when one of them was accused, he had only to write to his colleagues at Rome, and request them to deal gently with him, and he was sure to escape. As soon as the equites had once established the system of regarding only their own interest, every attempt on the part of the provincials to obtain justice was useless. The hostility which then existed between the senate and the equites shows itself, in all nations at a certain stage of their development, between landed property and moveable property, as is now the case throughout Europe. The senators or optimates were the great land-owners, and the equites possessed the capital with which commercial speculations were carried on. There were, moreover, at Rome many circumstances in which moveable property might be employed against the

nation, and every one belonging to the government was dependent on the equites in consequence of their forming the courts of justice. Montesquieu who is otherwise excellent, sees these things in a wrong light, and it may be said in general that modern writers have thrown no light upon them; but we may yet form a very clear notion of them. There was a manifest hostility against the courts of justice, which had been called forth by their own tyranny.

---

### LECTURE LXXXIII.

THE happy termination of the war against the Cimbri and Teutones and the suppression of the disturbances of Saturninus were followed by a period of precarious tranquillity, during which no reflecting man could be mistaken as to the internal condition of the republic and its prospects, although the great mass undoubtedly continued to live on quietly and heedlessly. The condition of the rich and powerful was brilliant, but those who saw deeper cannot have overlooked the state of disease, and even the decomposition which was taking place; they must have seen the necessity for coming to a determination respecting the great question of the Italian subjects of Rome. But no one seems to have thought of a reform calculated to avert the threatening evil; though various changes were undertaken. It is a characteristic sign of these times, that those who wanted to get power began by making themselves popular, and after having obtained their ends went over to the opposite party. Thus Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus deprived the college of pontiffs and the other priests of the right of filling up (by *cooptatio*) the vacancies which occurred among them, and transferred it to the tribes in such a manner that only seventeen tribes (the smaller half of thirty-five) were chosen by lot to elect the priests.<sup>1</sup> Originally the pontiffs had been chosen from among the patricians, and by them in their curiae; when subsequently the plebeians were admitted to share the pontificate with the patricians,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *De leg. Agrar.* ii. 7; Vell. Paterc. ii. 12.

they naturally took part in the elections also; but afterwards when the curiae no longer met, and had become something quite different from what they had been originally, the college of pontiffs itself naturally acquired the right of cooptation. Now, how was it that Cn. Domitius transferred this right to seventeen out of the thirty-five tribes? The origin of the measure must have been that Cn. Domitius attributed a different meaning to an ancient expression, according to which the Luceres had been called (perhaps in the twelve tables) the *minor pars populi*, and which he applied to the seventeen tribes. This Domitian law is the latest instance of an occurrence in which we can trace any of the characteristics of the primitive constitution of Rome.

The great questions which were now brought forward on all occasions, were that concerning the judicial power of the equites, and the franchise of the allies. It had, as I said yesterday, become more and more evident every year that the equites exercised their right no better than the senators had done before, and that they were just as accessible to bribes. Their courts of justice had reduced the senate to a real state of dependence, and the senate and government, the best among them as well as the worst, must have felt the urgent necessity of a remedy. Among the best we may mention Q. Mucius Scaevola, who showed such exemplary and truly affecting conduct in Asia<sup>2</sup>, coming among the Asiatics like an angel from heaven, that had the publicani, against whom he protected the provincials, been able to find any pretext for accusing him, he would have been condemned like a guilty criminal.<sup>3</sup> Here then was a case in which the need of a reform must have been generally felt; but it is a misfortune to which all free states are exposed, and from which Rome was not exempt, that although every one may be convinced of the necessity of a reform, yet no one appears to see the way in which it is to be effected.

The question respecting the civic franchise of the Italicans, resembles the present Catholic emancipation question in Great Britain. Every one was convinced that the franchise must be granted, and was inclined to grant it; but then again, so soon as private interests were consulted, the affair appeared in a

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *c. Verrem*, ii. 10; Pseudo-Asconius, *in Verr.* ii. p. 210, *in Divinat.* p. 122. ed. Orelli.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *pro Plancio*, 14.

different light; thus while the Romans were one year willing to bestow the franchise upon the Italicans, another year they refused to do so. The idea of demanding the franchise or their emancipation had been entertained among the Italicans as early as the tribuneship of Tib. Gracchus; since that time thirty years had elapsed: they had often had great hopes, but had each time been disappointed. There had formerly been a better understanding between Rome and her allies than between any other ruling city and its subjects; but great bitterness was now spreading, and the Italicans came forward, and resolutely demanded the Roman franchise. The very men who had before inspired the Italicans with hopes, now became their zealous opponents, when they made their demands too insolently. So far as we can see, nothing at all was done for them, with the exception of a single law, which abolished the tithe on the *ager publicus*, and which is known only from Appian. Their demands now became more and more clamorous, as the franchise became more and more desirable for them. They had gradually assimilated themselves to the Romans, they had lost their dialects, and yet were expected in peace as well as in war to submit to the arbitrary proceedings of their Roman rulers. During this ferment the Roman government was in great fear; but whenever a measure was adopted, it only increased the exasperation. Some Italian allies, for example, had silently assumed the rights of Roman citizens, and one of them M. Perperna<sup>4</sup>, had even been made consul and censor, but at length it was discovered that he had no title to the franchise. During the general dissolution, everything at Rome had fallen into confusion: the calendar in Caesar's time was more than eighty days behind hand, in consequence of arbitrary intercalations; so also in the census: allies had been enrolled as citizens, because they acted as citizens, and had been entered by the censors in a tribe. Now on a sudden, a senseless enactment was passed, the *lex*

<sup>4</sup> Valer. Max. iii. 4, 5. It is impossible to decide whether the M. Perperna who was consul in the year 622 is the same as he who was consul in 660, and censor in 666; though it is not impossible, since, according to Pliny, *H. N.* vii. 49, he lived to the age of ninety-eight. In this case, however, Perperna's censorship would belong to a later date than the *lex Mucia Licinia* (657), and thus would be out of place here. If they were two different persons, the words *and censor* must be omitted from the text. But the whole question is rather doubtful, as in Valerius Maximus we read *lege Papia*, which cannot possibly belong to the story.

*Mucia Licinia*<sup>5</sup>, directing that a strict inquiry should be made, and that the names of all those who were not citizens in the strictest sense of the term should be erased from the lists. This law did not indeed forbid the allies to reside in Rome, but deprived them of the privileges connected with the residence, and thus took from them rights which they had acquired by custom. Thus at the very time when the Italicans demanded more than they possessed, the little which they did possess was taken from them. The degree of exasperation produced by this measure may easily be imagined; but such blindness then prevailed in everything.

Gradually, however, a considerable party in the senate came to the conviction that a reform must take place; and this party consisted of the sons of those who had thwarted the plans of C. Gracchus. They wanted to make an attempt to improve the state of affairs; the most urgent necessity was to reform the courts of justice. But this was opposed by the whole influence of the equites, which was so great that even Polybius said, that in his time there were few people who were not in some way or other subject to it. In order therefore to carry this point, it occurred to them to grant the franchise to the Latins and allies, a thing which ought to have been done independently of every other consideration. Under these circumstances the tribune, M. Livius Drusus, a son of the opponent of C. Gracchus, came boldly forward with a remedy for the distressed state of Rome. He was a man of extraordinary talents; his hands were unstained, and he was of a better nature than his father. The eyes of the whole nation were directed towards him, and the rational and leading men of the republic joined him in his endeavours to prevent a revolution by introducing the necessary reforms. Here again many things are obscure. It is strange that, in the history of this late period, there are more things which we can only guess at than in the early times of Roman history. In regard to the latter, the traditional forms are firmly established, and we may draw conclusions from them as evident as those drawn from mathematical premises, and say: "If such or such a thing took place, this or that other thing must of necessity have taken place likewise." But in these

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *pro Cornel. fragm.* 10. p. 449; Asconius, *in Cornel.* p. 67, ed. Orelli; *De Officiis*, iii. 11, *De Oratore*, ii. 64.

later times, when all institutions had lost their stability, we can no longer draw such inferences. It is for this reason that the changes introduced by M. Livius Drusus are so very obscure. The most probable opinion is that Appian<sup>6</sup> is right in stating that the main object of Drusus was to introduce a mixture in the composition of the courts of justice.<sup>7</sup> Had he attempted to give them back entirely into the hands of the senators, the consequence would have been a revolution. Even the *lex Servilia* had enacted that the courts should be divided between equites and senators, but that regulation had been of short duration. The number of senators amounted to three hundred; to these he wished to add three hundred equites, who were to be received into the senate; and out of these six hundred the jury<sup>8</sup> were to be taken, half of whom would undoubtedly be senators. As he thus admitted the equites into the senate, he offered them an advantage which might be an ample compensation for their loss of the exclusive possession of the judicial power. With this he connected another law, providing that *quaestiones* concerning judges who had judged partially or accepted bribes should be instituted before the same tribunal: an awful symptom of the times! What was to be the form of such *quaestiones*, we do not know, but it was probably intended that they should be appointed according to the tribes. This plan determined the equites to oppose the bill, as we clearly see from a passage in Cicero.<sup>9</sup> Many of the equites also had no wish to enter the senate, but preferred a position in which they were lords and masters of the state, and which enabled them to censure others, to one which imposed upon them a moral responsibility and exposed them to the danger of being censured and accused. It moreover appears that it was not the intention of the law of Drusus to keep up constantly the number of three hundred equites in the senate by filling up

<sup>6</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 35. Compare Livy, *Epit.* 71; Aur. Victor, *De Vir. illustr.* 66.

<sup>7</sup> Comp. Vell. Paterc. ii. 13; Cicero, *pro Rabir. Postumo*, 7, *pro Cluent.* 56; Livy, *Epit.* 70.

<sup>8</sup> From the time of C. Gracchus, the judices at Rome may be looked upon as analogous to our jury, a term which some English scholars have improperly applied to a much earlier period. But previously to the time of the Gracchi we read only of single judices, or of popular courts. In civil cases, individual *arbitri* still continued to be appointed; but for all state-offences and also for some criminal cases, there were the *quaestiones perpetuae*, analogous to our *juries*. — N.

<sup>9</sup> *Pro Rabirio Postumo*, 7; comp. *pro Cluentio*, 56.

vacancies as they occurred; on the contrary, the addition of three hundred equites seems to have been only a temporary measure. The equites may therefore have said, "the consequence of this bill will be, that in the end the judicial power will again fall into the hands of a senate of 600 nobles, and vacancies will be filled up at the discretion of the senate, as if we did not exist at all: the bill therefore is only a scheme to deceive us." But, notwithstanding all this, the measure of Drusus seems to me the best that could have been devised, because it was not his intention to stop short there, but at the same time, to confer the franchise upon the Italicans, and thereby to impart fresh life and energy to the higher classes of the Romans, and to extend the body of Roman citizens, so as to make them a nation with a new aristocracy. His agrarian law<sup>10</sup>, on the other hand, respecting which scarcely anything is recorded, aimed at raising the lower and restoring the middle classes, and was intended to benefit both the Italicans and the Romans. Now, as the Italicans were more nearly related to the Romans than the Umbrians and Etruscans, the same divisions now arose as had existed between the Italicans and Latins on the one hand, and the Romans on the other, in the time of C. Gracchus. The Latins consisted of the colonies scattered all over Italy, from Valentia in Bruttium to the foot of the Alps, and of the few old Latin towns which had not yet obtained the franchise, as Tibur and Praeneste. By the term Italicans were understood the Sabellian nations, Sabines, Marsians and their confederates, the Picentians, Samnites, and probably also the Lucanians, unless the relations of these latter had become worse through the Hannibalian war. It was probably not intended to favour in this way the Apulians and Sallentines among whom the Greek language predominated. All the others were regarded as foreigners, so that the Umbrians, Etruscans, Brutians, and the Greek maritime towns, did not come into consideration. In what manner such divisions of claims spread further and further, may be seen in the history of the internal disputes of other free states, with which our scholars are so seldom acquainted.<sup>11</sup> Thus the tribuneship of Drusus has been

<sup>10</sup> Aurel. Victor, *De Vir. illustr.* 66; *Scholia Bobiens.* pro *Milone*, p. 282 ed. Orelli; Diodorus, *Excerpt. Vatic.* p. 128 ed. Dindorf; Vell. Patere. ii. 14.

<sup>11</sup> In Geneva, for instance, there was a long dispute between the *citoyens* and the *bourgeois*, the latter claiming and obtaining the rights of the former. After these two parties were placed on a footing of equality, the *Nati's*, being the

a real *crux historicorum*, and people have asked "how could the bitter hostility between Drusus and the consul L. Marcius Philippus have arisen? Drusus was popular, and would not his laws have strengthened the aristocracy? Where then was the difference?" The answer to these questions must be looked for in the nature of the circumstances. The equites resisted the two bills with the utmost fury, and yet, as the Italicans came to Rome in large numbers, ready to take up arms in case of need, they were passed. Now as this was accomplished in the most illegal manner, the majority of the senate, as soon as the Italicans had left Rome, adopted, with incredible blindness, the plan not to concede to the allies that which had been promised to them; and they even declared this determination openly to Drusus. This caused exasperation between him and the dishonest senate, a fact which explains the words of Cicero, that the *tribunatus Drusi pro senatus auctoritate susceptus infringi jam debilitarique videbatur.*<sup>12</sup> He accordingly appeared either as a cheat, or as cheated. The stupid ruling party of the oligarchs were as dissatisfied with Drusus as the equites. They said, "Shall we allow 300 equites whom we cannot bear, to be placed on a footing of equality with us for ever?" Such people cannot see the unavoidable necessity for making concessions; but imagine that by their mere "No" they can uphold the old state of things. What now followed was the natural consequence of the character of the human heart. Drusus, until then a zealous supporter of the government, began to oppose the senate quite contrary to his former policy. The ruling party in the senate was as anxious to get rid of Drusus as the equites. Philippus was his sworn enemy; it was he who

---

sous of foreign parents, but born at Geneva, supported the party of the *Représentants* in their dispute with the *Négatifs*; and when the demands of the *Représentants* were satisfied in 1789, the resident aliens, or *Habitants*, came forward and made the same claims. Such is always the case in free states, and by this and similar instances, we may see clearly how impossible it is for a scholar like Freinsheim, though he was a learned and industrious man, to form a clear notion of the real condition of the ancient republica. Freinsheim might have had an accurate knowledge of many things, if he had concerned himself about the history of the constitution of his own native city of Strasburg; but he knew nothing beyond his library, and thus whenever he touched upon the living reality of ancient history, he saw nothing but hollow words. It is only when we conceive ancient history as something actual and real that it has any meaning.—N.

<sup>12</sup> *De Orat.* i. 7.

pronounced the awful sentence preserved by Cicero<sup>13</sup>, revealing the secret that there were no more than 2000 families whose property was unimpaired; from which we at once catch a glimpse of the abyss of destruction, and of the forlorn state of the republic. Such was the real state of things in those times, and we cannot wonder how it happened that the unfortunate Drusus found himself abandoned by both parties. He was an impetuous man, and had undertaken the dangerous part of a mediator between the Romans and Italicans (the Latin colonies were quiet, for they were sure to be the first to obtain the Roman franchise, and therefore allowed the others to bring forward their claims, only a few of them having entered into the interests of the Italicans). Things went so far that the Italicans swore an oath of allegiance to Drusus, which in the Excerpta Vaticana of Diodorus<sup>14</sup> is absurdly called by the editor ὅρκος Φιλίππου. This oath is extremely remarkable, for it shews an association of a peculiar kind, such as existed in Ireland thirty years ago. The Italicans swore that they would obey Drusus unconditionally, and endeavour to persuade others to undertake the same obligation. During this period Drusus was really in a feverish state: he was not in full possession of his own free will: he knew not what he was doing. Had he been supported by the ruling party, he might have still been able to solve the difficulties, and the war between Marius and Sulla would perhaps not have broken out. But he was irritated to the extreme, and his conduct towards Philippus, against whom he did things which he ought not to have done, showed that he was in a fever; but Philippus may have driven him to despair. While things were in this critical state, Drusus was assassinated by a wound in his side, which he received while he was walking in the evening up and down in the hall of his house, and conversing with his friends to prepare himself for a great discussion.<sup>15</sup> The perpetrator of the crime was never discovered. Scarcely a few hours after his death his laws were annulled, with the

<sup>13</sup> *De Officiis*, ii. 21.

<sup>14</sup> P. 128, ed. Dindorf.

<sup>15</sup> Vell. Patrc. ii. 14; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 36; Livy, *Epit.* 71. In the great houses of the Romans, as in the baths of Titus, there were spacious halls without windows, which were lighted only by candelabra. In these halls numbers of persons, both known and unknown, used to assemble, to obtain an audience of the master of the house, for the noble Romans were in reality more like princes than anything else.—N.

exception of that concerning the courts of justice, in doing which the senate assumed a power until then unheard of.

The death of Drusus happened at the most unfortunate moment, for the Italicans were now in a state of the greatest excitement; the best prospects had been held out to them, and there was now no one to realise them. At Rome there was as general a disinclination to grant them the franchise as there was, for instance, in England to grant independence to the Americans, and as there is at the present moment to concede the emancipation of the Roman Catholics. The Italicans were, in fact, looked upon as rebels. The party of Drusus was now again in the senate itself; they had lost their senses completely. Crassus died just at this time, and the wisest men, such as M. Antonius and the two Scaevolas, did not know what to do, and were intimidated. As the storm could not be averted, men threw themselves right in its way. The equites accused the senators as traitors. They had gained over the tribune Q. Varius, a Spaniard by birth<sup>16</sup>, whom Cicero calls *homo vastus et foedus*.<sup>17</sup> This uncouth fellow, whose franchise even was not certain, and with whom impudence supplied the place of talent, brought forward a bill, providing that a commission should be appointed for the purpose of inquiring who had had any public or private communication with the Italicans about their emancipation.<sup>18</sup> The lower classes at Rome, although they had nothing to lose by the laws of Drusus, were most furious against the Italicans, and the equites condescended to make common cause with the populace to support the bill of Q. Varius. It was carried, notwithstanding the greatest opposition of the most respectable men in the senate; for, as the people appeared in the forum in arms, the rational opposition of the ruling party was soon overwhelmed. This law gave rise to a great many lawsuits, and several noble senators were condemned as having treacherously encouraged the Italicans. A singular state of feeling had at that time sprung up at Rome: the senators acted the part of democrats, and the populace, guided by the equites, that of aristocrats, the former wishing to emancipate the Italicans, the latter not.

<sup>16</sup> His father was a Roman, but his mother was a Spanish woman.—N.—Cicero, *Brutus*, 62; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 37.

<sup>17</sup> *De Oratore*, i. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Appian, *L.* &c.; Val. Maximus, viii. 6. 4.

## LECTURE LXXXIV.

THE Social war is one of those periods during which the scantiness of our information is particularly painful. Livy had devoted four books to the two years of the Social war, but nearly all we know about it is contained in the meagre narrative of Appian, who not unfrequently makes statements which are incredibly one-sided, and in a few isolated passages which are extremely brief.<sup>1</sup> The passions, the exertions, the various changes of fortune, and the excellent conduct on both sides, warrant the assertion that this war is one of the greatest in all antiquity.

The first symptoms of the tendency of the Italic allies to separate themselves from Rome and to form a new kind of Roman state had been manifested as early as the second Punic war.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently Fregellae had revolted against Rome. Those who had been the first to determine on begininng the war were not those who actually took the field, but the people who lived at a greater distance. We do not know which nations were the first that resolved to take up arms; but it is said that in the year 662, in the tribuneship of M. Livius Drusus it had been the intention of the Latins during the celebration of the Feriae Latinae, to put the Roman senate and the consuls, especially Philippus, to death.<sup>3</sup> The plan was, on that occasion, to throw Rome into a state of anarchy, and then to put to death as many persons as they could. All the Roman magistrates (*συναρχία*), the consuls, praetors, and even the tribunes of the people were present at that festival, so that only a young noble, under the title of *praefectus urbi Latinarum causa* remained behind at Rome. Now as the Latins appeared at this festival in great numbers, it is very probable that they had this intention, especially the Tiburtines and Praenestines; but it may also be that so many Italicans flocked to the festival, that they considered themselves alone sufficiently numerous to carry out the plan. Drusus heard of this fearful scheme, and informed the consuls of it<sup>4</sup>, for even if he had not been a man of honour, he was a Roman, and what he wanted to do for the allies was at the

<sup>1</sup> In 1827 Niebuhr had remarked, "We shall probably soon learn more particulars about it from the fragments of Diodorus, lately discovered by Mai, if they are really new."

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 139. <sup>3</sup> Florus, iii. 18. <sup>4</sup> Aur. Victor, *De Vir illustr.* 66.

same time intended to strengthen Rome. After the murder of Drusus, the Italicans did not conceal their unbounded exasperation: they formed an association among themselves, and secured their mutual fidelity by giving hostages to one another. But the Romans sent commissioners with proconsular power to Picenum, where the ferment was greatest, in order to keep the allies within the bounds of their duty, as they called it, and to thwart their undertaking. There was at this time, a day of assembly of the Picentians at Asculum, and on this occasion the proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio came forward with his legate Fonteius (I do not recollect his praenomen<sup>5</sup>), to address the assembly, and deter them by threats and admonition from their undertaking; but the feelings of the Picentians were so irritated, that a word heedlessly uttered provoked them to open insurrection, and Caepio and his legate were murdered in the theatre of Asculum. The Italicans, who had at first only wished to obtain the Roman franchise, were now bent upon destroying Rome, and establishing an Italian republic, of which they themselves were to be the centre. The exasperation at Asculum rose to such a pitch, that all the Romans who happened to be in the place were seized and put to death.<sup>6</sup>

The insurrection now broke out everywhere, but apparently not everywhere with the same cruelty as among the Picentians; and it is highly probable that such nations as the Marsians, who were not inferior to the Romans in point of civilization, did not make themselves guilty of such atrocities as the Picentians, who were a cowardly and contemptible people. In the Epitome of the seventy-second book of Livy and in Orosius, the following people are mentioned as having then revolted:—the Picentians, Vestinians, Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucinians, Samnites, and Lucanians. Appian<sup>7</sup> adds the

<sup>5</sup> The praenomen is not certain. Comp. Orelli, *Onom. Tull.* s.v. p. 256.

<sup>6</sup> I will here make a remark merely because I want to mention to you a conjecture which I have made. In one of the newly discovered fragments of Diodorus (p. 129, ed. Dindorf.) we read a little story, according to which a clown, who was a great favourite among the Romans, happened to appear in the games at Asculum. The people, thinking that he was a Roman, wanted to kill him, and he saved himself only by proving that he was a Latin. His name, according to my conjecture, was not Sannion, but Sannion, the ancient name for Pulcinella; and this is the most ancient mention of the mask.—N. In the Eunuchus of Terence and in the Adelphi, the name indeed occurs, but not in its later character.

<sup>7</sup> *De Bell. Civil.* i. 39. Compare also Diodorus, xxxvii. *Eclog.* 1. p. 538 foll.

Apulians; and they were indeed in arms, but it is not probable that they had any share in the Italian state. All the peoples of whom the state was to consist, were Sabellians or Sabine colonies; the others like the Apulians, who belonged to the Oscan race, joined them merely out of hostility towards Rome. Some of the places on the gulf of Naples likewise rose in arms; but of the Latin colonies, Venusia alone joined the insurgents. Afterwards the Umbrians also were in arms, and for a short time even the Etruscans; but they too did not belong to the new republic.

These confederate Italian nations are said by Diodorus, who alone has preserved this fact, to have established a senate of five hundred, and to have appointed two annual consuls and twelve praetors, thus imitating the forms of the Roman senate and magistrates. Their first consuls were Q. Poppeadius Silo, a Marsian, and C. Papius Mutilus, a Sabine. Poppeadius was the soul of the whole undertaking, and had been a friend of Livius Drusus, with whom he had carried on the negotiations peaceably, but he was now determined to obtain his objects by force. The senate of five hundred was entrusted with the care of providing the armies with all that was necessary. Among themselves, these nations were actuated by very different feelings: they had been isolated for centuries, each having stood by itself, and even now that they were making themselves independent of Rome, the temptation must have been great to remain independent of one another. The Samnites still bore their old grudge against Rome: hence the implacable hatred of Pontius Telesinus, who declared in the battle at the Colline Gate, that, unless the den of the wolf was destroyed, Italy could never be safe against her ravages.<sup>8</sup> He probably belonged to the gens of C. Pontius, who is so prominent in the second Samnite war, and so fearfully humbled the Romans at Caudium. The Marsians, on the other hand, had never been engaged in any fierce or long war with the Romans, as the Romans had always faithfully observed honourable conditions towards them. The Marsians and Samnites accordingly were still as heterogeneous as before: they also differed from each other in language; the Marsians spoke Oscan, but in writing they used the Latin characters. The Samnites used the Oscan language, because the ruling class among them were Sabines.

\* Vell. Patrc. ii. 27.

The Marsians and their confederates were much purer Sabines; although in a wider sense they were all Sabines. We still possess coins with the portrait of C. Papius Mutilus. The seat of the Italian government was Corfinium, in the country of the Pelignians, a small but brave people, and its name was changed into Italica. There still exist many denarii with the inscription *Italia* or *Vitelii*, the latter or Oscan mode of spelling being probably Samnite, while the Latin form *Italia* is that of the Marsians. It is not improbable that here, too, the differences among the confederates had their influence.

When the war broke out, the advantage was decidedly on the part of the allies; and the only thing which saved Rome was the fact, that the Latin colonies remained faithful to her; for there can be no doubt that immediately after the commencement of the war, the Romans made up their minds to grant to them all the rights of Roman citizens.<sup>9</sup> This was effected by the *lex Julia*, proposed by the consul L. Julius Caesar, which is so often spoken of in works on Jurisprudence. It is a very common but erroneous opinion that the *lex Julia* conferred the privileges of Roman citizens upon the Italicans, who, in fact never acquired those privileges by any one law, but gained them successively by several laws: unfortunately we do not know the details. It is quite certain that the *lex Julia* affected the Latins only; its benefits extended over from forty to fifty Latin colonies, and not only to such as were established in Italy, but also to Narbo and Aquae Sextiae in Gallia Narbonensis. The former is afterwards mentioned as a *colonia civium Romanorum*. The old Latin towns of Tibur and Praeneste also, and all the other parts of Latium, which had not received the full franchise in 417<sup>10</sup> were unquestionably included among the places which now received it. We may further take it for granted that it was bestowed upon the Hernican towns, and perhaps also on those places which, until then, had been *praefecturae*, such as Venafrum, Atina, and several others. This prudent law greatly increased the number of Roman citizens; for even in the Hannibalian war the number of Latin soldiers amounted to 80,000, all of whom spoke Latin, and were more or less mixed up with the Romans. Here then the Romans had a people on whom they could rely, and it is

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 49; Cicero, *pro Balbo.* 8; Gellius, iv. 4

<sup>10</sup> See *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 411.

only to be lamented that the rights of Roman citizens had not been granted to them before. Had Rome been stubborn towards the Latins, it would have been lost. This granting of the franchise to the Latins belongs to the beginning of the year.

Although Hiero had said that the Romans used only Italian troops, yet they now carried on the war with soldiers drawn from all quarters. Hence we find in the Roman armies Gauls, Mauretanians, Numidians, and Asiatics, in short every place had to send its contingent, so that in point of numbers the Italicans were surpassed by the Romans. Another very great advantage possessed by Rome was its central position and its colonies, which, being scattered all over Italy, divided the countries of the enemy, separating the north from the south, and obliged them to leave every where strong garrisons as protections against those colonies.

If we had sufficient materials, I might describe to you this war in such a manner as to lay before you the great masses into which it must be divided. Our principal authorities are Diodorus and Appian. I have taken much trouble about this war and endeavoured to arrange the materials; but I have succeeded only very imperfectly in forming a clear conception of the whole. I will, therefore, give you only brief outlines. The scene of the war must be divided into three regions: the southern, the middle, and the northern. The southern field of the allies' operations was Campania as far as the river Liris; the middle comprised the banks of the Liris and the country of the Sabines as far as Picenum; and the northern was in Picenum itself, which formed the boundary of the operations. The Greek cities in the rear of the Italicans remained indifferent. The Bruttians are not mentioned in this war, a circumstance which shews how nearly they must have been annihilated in the Hannibalian war. The Messapians also are not named, probably because they had become completely Hellenised. The colony of Venusia, as I have already observed, joined the allies, for its population had become almost entirely Apulian and Lucanian. The army of the south was under the command of C. Papius Mutilus, and was opposed by the Romans under the consul L. Julius Caesar. Mutilus conquered a number of towns, Nola, Nuceria, Pompeii, Stabiae, and transferred the scene of war to Campania; but Capua was main-

tained by the Romans; Naples and the Greek towns remained faithful, and acted as if the war did not concern them at all. The contest became concentrated around Acerrae.<sup>11</sup> Towards the close of the year the advantage was still on the side of the allies.

P. Rutilius Lupus, commanded the middle army, and was opposed by Poppaedius or Pompaedius Silo, who displayed the qualities of a very great general. The Roman consul, Rutilius Lupus, was personally by no means able to cope with him, and lost his life in battle. Marius and Sulla served as lieutenant-generals in that army, which formed the main body of the Roman forces; and Rome had to thank these men alone for checking the progress of the enemy. Aesernia, a Latin colony in the heart of Samnium, was conquered by the Samnites after a vigorous defence, and not until it was compelled to surrender by the most fearful famine. Its citizens relied too much on the good fortune of the Roman arms; but their resistance shows the hatred existing in those colonies against the Italicans. There can be no doubt that the Samnites had previously offered the people of Aesernia a free departure. The first Roman who gained a brilliant advantage was Cn. Pompeius Strabo, who conducted the war as proconsul in Picenum. He was the father of Pompey, surnamed the Great, and then held the office of *praetor proconsulari potestate*; although he was marked by all the profligacy of the times, he was nevertheless a distinguished general. He defeated the Picentians in a battle in which 75,000 Italicans and 65,000 Romans fought, near Asculum.<sup>12</sup> The Romans gained a decided victory; Asculum was taken by the sword, and the fate of its inhabitants was fearful. The Picentians in general had to endure the severest punishments. Pompeius now penetrated into the country of the enemy from the north; and some of the allies, having lost their confidence in fortune, already began to abandon the cause of their friends, not being able to maintain themselves from want of unity. The first who did so were the Vestinians; and the Romans, perceiving this wavering spirit, tried to gain their antagonists over, by granting peace and the Roman franchise to those who were willing to lay down their arms. On what conditions the franchise was given in these

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 42.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 48; Vell. Patrc. ii. 21.

cases is not known; but what these allies received, must have been more than the mere *civitas sine suffragio*, for we afterwards hear of disputes as to the real meaning of the franchise of these people; and it would seem that the Romans purposely avoided being explicit and distinct in their concessions. Velleius Paterculus, who, whatever may be said against him, is an ingenious writer and master of his subject, says<sup>13</sup> that in this war upwards of 300,000 Italicans lost their lives, and that the Romans did not grant them the franchise until they had lost their life-blood. We may, therefore, suppose that half the men engaged on both sides fell, and that the contest was carried on with the greatest fury, just as in a civil war, whence Appian, in fact, relates its history among the civil wars.

The course of the war during the second year can be traced with even less accuracy than during the first. This much only is certain, that the northern Sabellians, the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrucinians, had, like the Vestinians, concluded a separate peace for themselves, and that, perhaps, even at the end of the first year. After their abandonment of the cause of the Italicans, the seat of the Italian government was removed to Aesernia, and Italica again received its old name, Corfinium.

The Samnites now formed the centre of the war, which they carried on with the same perseverance as in former times, at least, the three cantons of the Hirpinians, Caudines, and Pentrians; they would not hear of peace, and an immense number of battles was fought. The Romans, in their usual way, marched into Apulia and completely surrounded the Samnites, so that at the close of the year 663, the war was very near its decision. The Samnites, indeed, still maintained themselves; but, besides them, only a part of the Apulians and Lucanians continued to be in arms, and these people persevered only out of despair. They either reckoned upon the movements of Mithridates in Asia<sup>14</sup>, or they were determined to perish sword in hand.

In the course of the second year, the Umbrians and Etruscans also took up arms, but soon became reconciled to the Romans: their insurrection had quite a different character from that of the Italicans. A Roman praetor conquered the Etruscans, and the franchise was immediately granted to them. Formerly the Etruscans had furnished no troops to the Roman armies, but now they were ready to take up arms in defence of

<sup>13</sup> ii. 15.

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus, xxxvii. Eclog. i. p. 538, foll.

an honour to which hitherto they had attached no value. The ambition of the noble Romans obtained very dangerous rivals in the Marsians; while the Etruscans, as foreigners, were quite distinct from the Romans, and had therefore much less prospect of obtaining any of the high offices at Rome. The Marsians did not differ from the Romans more than, for example, the inhabitants of lower from those of upper Germany, and therefore readily united with the Romans. But the Etruscans and Romans were quite distinct, standing to each other in the same relation as exists between the French or Slavonians and the Germans, and hence it was less repugnant to the feelings of the proud Romans to grant the rights of equality to the Etruscans, than to the Marsians and others. The Samnites, as of old, were bent upon the destruction of Rome. The history, as I have related it here, is not contained in any ancient author; it can only be gathered from a careful examination of the circumstances—a source of information which is too much neglected.

---

### LECTURE LXXXV.

THE Italian war raised the fame of Sulla to the highest pitch, and his ill feeling and hostility against Marius now showed themselves clearly. In the year 664 he was elected consul; he was then forty-nine years old<sup>1</sup>, while Marius was upwards of seventy. Sulla therefore belonged to quite a different generation, and this circumstance completed the mutual aversion which existed between them. While the former was a man of noble birth, the latter was a soldier, who had risen by his talents and by fortune. Sulla was a very original character, and it is difficult to pronounce a brief and definite opinion on him. He was a great general and intimately acquainted with Greek literature; he spoke and wrote Greek in a masterly manner, and entertained the greatest partiality for Greek refinements and for Greeks of literary pursuits. In the war against Jugurtha he had distinguished himself as the quaestor of Marius, and had taken a prominent part in the transactions

<sup>1</sup> Vell. Patrc. ii. 17.

with king Bocchus. He therefore looked upon the termination of that war as his own work. Fortune accompanied him everywhere. He himself attached much weight to this fact; and it was this good fortune which especially drew the attention of the people towards him. It is not, indeed, an idle dream that certain men are always, or for a long time, favoured by fortune. He had also distinguished himself in the Cimbrian war, but still more in that against the Italicans, in which he far eclipsed the fame of Marius; and it may be said that in that war he was the only Roman who displayed brilliant qualities. He belonged to the illustrious gens of the Cornelii, and was in the sixth degree a descendant of P. Cornelius Rufinus, who acquired fame in the war against Pyrrhus; the family, however, to which he belonged<sup>2</sup>, was not illustrious, and was even poor. Hence he rose amid great difficulties, just as if he had belonged to an obscure family; the bond which had existed among the patricians had ceased to exist, so that the Scipios and the Lentuli were of no use to him. Marius was under the influence of the sad feeling which must be particularly painful to an old man, that the rising sun outshone him, and made him invisible. The extraordinary qualities of Sulla called forth in Marius a spirit of opposition and envy, and this again excited in Sulla a resistance which produced a mutual aversion, of which no doubt, Marius was the originator. We know that Marius endeavoured to keep his rival down, even at the time of the war against Jugurtha; and a man like Sulla must have owned to himself that he would have done the same, if he had been in the place of Marius. Thus the old man, by his wish to crush the younger, gave rise to the bitter feelings which afterwards vented themselves in so fatal a manner.

Marius, notwithstanding his advanced age, was insatiable in his ambition and his love of power, and he was now anxious to obtain the command in the war against Mithridates, which had been given to Sulla, the consul of the year. As I have been led by circumstances to mention this war, I will here relate its origin. The cause of it was, as far as Mithridates was concerned, most just; whereas the conduct of the Romans was the most glaring injustice. The kings of Pontus probably

<sup>2</sup> Gronovius correctly explains the name Sulla from *Sura*, *Sarula*, contracted *Sulla*, an apparent diminutive but with the meaning of a primitive. *Sura* is an agnomen of the Lentuli and others.—N.

belonged to one of the seven great families of the Persians, which alone had freedom, and being in a measure *sacrosancti*, had maintained their government as satraps over those parts ever since the time of the kings of Persia. The first of the family who is known, is probably the Arioobarzanes who was governor of those districts in the reign of Occhus; and the ancestors of Mithridates had therefore been powerful, and in possession of Pontus at a very early time.<sup>3</sup> The nation consisted of Syrians, though the mass of the population must originally have been Armenians until the mighty empire of Assyria sent its colonies into those quarters, where they were called Leucosyrians. The kingdoms of Pontus and Cappadocia had been left untouched by Alexander of Macedonia; and it was only under his successors that they were drawn into the Macedonian wars. The son of the then governor, Mithridates, who assumed the rank of a tributary prince, escaped the envy of Antiochus the one-eyed, through the influence of his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes. Those countries were afterwards strengthened, so that as early as the fifth century of Rome their governors styled themselves kings. During the long wars of Alexander's successors, especially between the Syrian kings and Egypt, they became completely consolidated, but subsequently they were divided into two kingdoms, Cappadocia and Pontus (in its narrower sense) which were governed either by members of the same dynasty, or at least by Persian families. This division existed about the year 620, when a Mithridates ruled over Pontus Proper, and a part of Paphlagonia, and not only afforded the Romans considerable assistance against Aristonicus, but sent galleys even against Carthage. The Romans had rewarded him, as they said, with Great Phrygia, which until then had belonged to the kingdom of Pergamus; but from a fragment of a speech by C. Gracchus<sup>4</sup>, we see that he bought it at Rome with his own money. The kingdom had thus acquired a great extent; its power and resources were considerable, and on a quite different scale from what we should so designate in our poor Europe. Asia accordingly was then divided into the large kingdom of Pontus, Bithynia, which was smaller, the Roman province, Cappadocia and the sea coasts, where Cilicia, Caria, Pamphylia, and a number of other small independent states existed in a chaotic condition.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *De Bellis Mithrid.* 8 and 9; Florus, iii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> In Gellius, xi. 10.

Mithridates left these dominions to his son, Mithridates VI., justly surnamed the Great, who was yet under age; and the Romans, we know not why, unceremoniously took Great Phrygia from him.<sup>5</sup> But the young monarch, in whom an implacable desire for revenge had thus been roused, shewed a great mind while he was growing up, preparing himself quietly, and endeavouring to extend his dominions, wherever he could do so without coming in contact with the Romans; for among many unusual qualities he had an extraordinary talent for dissimulation. He subdued the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and the Crimea, so that in the end his empire extended as far as the Ukraine and the river Dnieper. It might seem wonderful that the Romans did not interfere to check his progress; but Mithridates availed himself of the favourable time during which the Romans were at war with their allies. But the fact of the Romans being nevertheless fully aware of what was going on, shews that nothing escaped their notice. An opportunity soon offered of making himself master of Cappadocia also. Disputes had there arisen about the succession, the person who then occupied the throne being declared supposititious, and Mithridates gave the throne to Ariarathes, his son or brother. This provoked the Romans, and they set up an opposing king against him. Ever since Mithridates had come of age, he had done all he could to collect a fleet and a large army, evidently with the intention of using them against Rome. He calculated that the war which was raging in Italy, would weaken the Romans, and he was no doubt in connection with the Italian allies. But his preparations were not completed at the right time, and this circumstance, as had been the case so often, saved Rome from an imminent danger. Had he commenced the affair two years earlier, at the beginning of the social war, that war might have taken a different turn. He trusted too much in the success of the Italicans, and believed that they would make his conquests all the easier.

Rome meantime recovered from the Marsian war, which was continued only with feeble efforts. In the second year of the war, the Romans had sent commissioners to Asia to dictate laws to Mithridates, and this may have made an imposing impression upon him; for however low the Romans had sunk morally, politically they were as great as ever. Although they

<sup>5</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 13.

were most alarmingly threatened in Italy, yet they did not lose sight of Asia. In the mean time Mithridates supported the undertaking of a brother of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, in whose contemptible family parricide and fratricide were things of common occurrence. Nicomedes was expelled, and Mithridates became the ally of the new king; but still he allowed himself to be so far intimidated by the Romans as to allow the restoration of Nicomedes in Bithynia, and of Ario-barzanes in Cappadocia, though without giving up his plans of revenge. The Romans might still have avoided the war for a long time, if they had wished it; the government undoubtedly did wish it, but the individual governors, who hoped for booty, would not hear of peace, and compelled Nicomedes to commence hostilities against Mithridates that they might have a pretext for coming to his assistance. Cappadocia was not allied with the Romans, and Nicomedes had had forebodings that matters would not turn out well for him. Mithridates naturally took vengeance by invading Bithynia: he defeated the king and restored Nicomedes' brother, as a pretender against him. The Roman senate now openly interfered, and spoke to the Pontic king in a tone which implied that he had been the aggressor; they demanded that he should cease all hostilities against Bithynia, and recognise the king of Cappadocia whom they patronised. Nothing could be more unjust. Mithridates bitterly complained of the injustice, alluding also to their having taken Phrygia from him. In the meantime the war in Italy was almost decided, the Samnites and Nolanians alone being in arms, the rest having obtained the franchise. The Romans however were so exhausted that the war happened inconveniently for them. They collected three armies, in which there were scarcely any Romans<sup>7</sup>, but which were for the most part composed of the effeminate inhabitants of Asia Minor. They were to act against the well-disciplined troops of Mithridates, and the issue of the undertaking accordingly was such as it deserved to be. Two Roman armies were completely defeated, and the king met with scarcely any resistance to his progress; he conquered Bithynia, restored his son to the throne of Cappadocia, and subdued the whole Roman province of Asia, all the inhabitants of which enthusiastically received him as their deliverer. The

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *L. c.* 17.

rage against the Romans there was so great, that all the places in Asia Minor, which were quite Hellenised, and considered the war to be at an end, in one day murdered all the Romans and Italicans that were staying among them, in order to give to Mithridates a proof of their fidelity. The number is stated to have been 70,000<sup>8</sup>, which is almost incredible, as it was chiefly wealthy persons and merchants who resided there. The massacre was perpetrated with the greatest cruelty. Thus perished the numerous usurers and leeches of the country, who after the destructive wars of Aristonicus had extorted the highest interest from the poor people, and under the protection of the Roman governors indulged in every crime, and levied taxes and duties with unbounded tyranny. Nearly the whole continent of Asia Minor recognised Mithridates as their sovereign, and some of the maritime towns likewise submitted to him. As he had received a Greek education, he had rejected the doctrine of the Magi (no trace of this religion is found in his history except on coins where the sun and moon appear), and the Greeks looked upon him as a Greek, and placed all their hopes in him. This induced him to advance even into Greece, and he was everywhere received with joy. Athens allowed itself to be persuaded by a sophist Aristion to open its gates to him; the consequence of which was, that the sophist himself usurped the government.<sup>9</sup> Peloponnesus and Boeotia, in short nearly the whole of Greece submitted to Mithridates; Mitylene and Chios were wavering; Cyzicus and the Rhodians alone remained faithful to Rome. The latter foresaw the issue of the war, and were actuated only by prudence, endeavouring by a steady fidelity to make amends for the fault they had committed in the eyes of the Romans, during the war with Perseus; for they could not possibly feel any attachment to Rome. Mithridates occupied the whole of the Roman province as far as Magnesia, and besieged Rhodes. These occurrences excited enormous indignation at Rome, and the determination to carry on the war in good earnest. But the dispute as to who was to have the command occasioned the first civil war.

The senate, in whose power it was, according to the Sempronian law, to appoint a general for conducting the war, gave the command to Sulla. Marius, who could not keep up

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 22, 23.

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 28, &c. Plutarch, *Sulla*, 13; Athenaeus, v. p. 211, foll.

his great name by distinguishing himself in time of peace and was impelled by his irresistible desire to humble his adversary, likewise endeavoured to obtain the command. Twelve years had elapsed since his triumph; he had grown old, and sunk in public opinion. He may still have been an able general, although in the social war he had distinguished himself only once. The older he grew, the more he sank morally, and he no longer possessed the great qualities which had formerly concealed his faults. However he still had a party, and was still the man whom the anti-aristocrats put forward as their champion. We must not, however, believe that all the commotions of that time proceeded from party spirit, but all things assumed more and more a personal character.

When Sulla entered upon the consulship, no one appears to have thought that the republic was threatened by an internal war. Before taking the field against Mithridates, he wanted to bring the war in Italy to a close. Nola was still defending itself: we know not by what means. This part of the social war is called *bellum Nolanum*, just as its beginning is called *bellum Marsicum*. The *bellum Nolanum* was chiefly sustained by the Samnites who were still in arms; but it was rather an insurrection than a war, for there was no large army. It was one of Sulla's great qualities, that he never abandoned a great undertaking which he had once entered upon, whatever inducements there might be to do so; and in this case the Mithridatic war, which was already breaking out, did not induce him to withdraw from Nola. While Sulla was still engaged there, P. Sulpicius, the same who in Cicero's work, "De Oratore," as a young man takes part in the conversation, was tribune of the people at Rome. Whatever may have induced this young man of noble family to take such false steps—it was probably personal hatred of Sulla—he was the cause of Rome's misfortunes. He made the proposal that the command against Mithridates should be given to Marius, as the people, said he, had (according to the Hortensian law) the right to decide, even although the senate should have already distributed the provinces. At the same time he proposed that the new citizens, by whom we have to understand the Latins, Etruscans, and Umbrians, should be distributed among the old tribes, although it was intended to form them into new tribes. For the new tribes were to vote after the old ones, just as the

*tribus urbanae* voted after the *tribus rusticae*, whereby they would have lost much importance, for the *praerogativa* was of great weight. The new citizens indeed possessed the suffrage; but they recognised it as a mockery to obtain a right which, in nine times out of ten, they would not be even called upon to exercise, because the old Roman tribes in most cases quite agreed in their votes; for as soon as the majority of votes was ascertained the voting ceased. It was an extremely rare case that eighteen voted against seventeen. The proposal of Sulpicius, therefore, was on the one hand an injustice towards the old citizens; but Velleius Paterculus represents the matter in too bad a light; for as most people belonging to the *tribus rusticae* lived at a distance, and did not come to the city at all, and as the *libertini* who resided in the city had succeeded in getting registered in the *tribus rusticae*, the proposed plan must, after all, be called an essential improvement. Much, therefore, might be said for and against it.

It is inconceivable to me that this Sulpicius, whom Cicero loved so tenderly, should have deserved the severe censure passed upon him by Appian and Plutarch. That his conduct towards Sulla is unjustifiable requires no proof; nor can we say that he acted from pure motives. According to Cicero<sup>10</sup> he was highly educated, and a man of the most brilliant genius. It is true, that a man ever so great may be placed in circumstances in which he would act in the way that Sulpicius did; but I cannot believe that Cicero, even from youthful recollections, would have spoken so favourably of him, especially if we consider how he elsewhere expresses himself of the democrats, had he seen his actions in the light in which they appeared to Greek writers. Cicero also admires him for his talent as an orator, and he had heard him in his youth. We must further remember that the memoirs of Sulla were almost the only source from which those Greek writers derived their information; and that Sulla should speak of him in a derogatory manner cannot be surprising. This circumstance should put us on our guard in receiving such statements. Sulla was naturally exasperated in the highest degree at this injustice; and his resistance to it is a circumstance which, however formidable its consequences were, must not be censured too severely, if we consider the spirit of the times.

<sup>10</sup> *Brutus*, 55, and several other passages.

The old citizens, for here we can no longer speak of aristocrats and democrats, opposed the proposals of Sulpicius. He invited a number of new citizens to come to Rome, in order to carry his schemes by main force. But as the bill concerning the command in the Mithridatic war was one of the things affected by them, Sulla made up his mind to interfere, arms in hand. In former times, a Fabius Maximus Rullianus would have submitted to necessity, but those times were gone. Sulla resisted because he knew that Sulpicius and his associates would not stop short there, but aim at his life, for such was the spirit of the times. He assembled his army at Nola, and told the men that Marius would form a new army and disband them, so that they would have no share in the profitable war, and would be disgraced. They therefore unanimously resolved to follow him to Rome. He took six legions, and marched with them along the Via Appia against the city. The senate which was swayed by Sulpicius, was alarmed at the approach of an army, and sent ambassadors to ask what Sulla wanted. He returned an evasive answer, but advanced and was joined by his colleague Cn. Octavius. Marius and Sulpicius had indeed made preparations to defend themselves, but they were insufficient, Rome not being a fortress; the eastern suburbs, the most splendid portion of the city, were quite open. The gates were closed against Sulla, but this was of no use; houses had been built close up to the walls, as in the old towns of our own country; and the walls themselves were in some parts so much decayed that it was easy to step over them from the suburbs. In the Hannibalian war, it had still been possible to defend Rome; but now, after an interval of more than a century, when fortifications had ceased to be thought necessary, a great part of the city lay open, and the rest could not be defended. Marius did not attempt to defend the gates, but withdrew to the interior of the city. An engagement took place in the Carinac. Sulla with his superior numbers thus entered the city without any difficulty, and marched down the Via Sacra to the Forum, so that all his opponents dispersed.

Sulla used his victory with moderation, which shews him at that time in a favorable light. Marius with his son, Sulpicius, and nine others of his followers who had fled, were outlawed, but Sulpicius was overtaken and killed; besides him only two or three others were put to death. Marius with his son fled to

Ostia, and thence southward along the sea-coast. At Terracina, which he reached by a boat, he was in the greatest danger of being delivered up to his enemy. Thence he went to the Liris and Minturnae, where he was found concealed in the marshes in the neighbourhood, and thrown into prison. The magistrates of Minturnae, not venturing to put him to death, sent a public slave to kill him, for a price had been set upon his head. But the barbarian, a captive Cimbrian, was daunted by the sight of the aged warrior, and recognising in him his own conqueror took to flight, loudly exclaiming about the changeableness of fortune. As fortune on this occasion seemed to declare in Marius' favour, the decurions sent him off in a boat. He first sailed to Ischia and thence to Africa, where during the subsequent tumultuous period he dwelt amid the ruins of Carthage, forgotten and overlooked. At that time there either was no governor in Africa, or he belonged to the party of Marius. No one thought of saving himself by going to Mithridates.

Sulla used his victory with such moderation, that he contented himself with making some peaceful regulations, the particulars of which are not known. He was so far from tyrannical, that he even allowed the election of the consuls for the following year to take place without any interference on his part. The men who obtained the consulship belonged to different parties: Cn. Octavius, perhaps a son of the tribune M. Octavius, to that of Sulla, and L. Cornelius Cinna to that of Marius. It may seem strange to find that Cinna and L. Valerius Flaccus, although descended of noble patrician families, were now at the head of the demagogues; but this is another proof that the division into patricians and plebeians was then forgotten. Towards the end of the year, when Sulla thought that he had made all the necessary arrangements, and saw that the war against the Samnites might yet last for a long time, he went over to Greece, and there carried on the war against Archelaus, who commanded the army of Mithridates, and about whom I shall say more hereafter.

The senate in the meantime gave to Q. Pompeius Rufus, the colleague of Sulla in the consulship, Italy as his province for the following year, that he might counteract Cinna, support Cn. Octavius, and bring the social war to a close. Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great, was at this

time still commanding his army on the coast of the Adriatic and in Apulia. Of this man, Cicero says: *homo diis nobilitatique periinde invitus*, for no one was so generally hated: he possessed more malice and artfulness than we can conceive, and in this respect resembled the men of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, especially in Italy. He cared about no party, and only calculated how in the end he might gain the greatest power from the general confusion. The senate ordered him to resign the command of his army to Q. Pompeius; he pretended to be quite willing to do so; but in secret incited his troops against Quintus, and while the latter was administering to them their military oath, he was murdered by them.<sup>11</sup> Cn. Pompeius Strabo assumed the appearance of intending to institute an investigation of the matter, but allowed himself to be prevailed upon by the soldiers to resume the command,—a farce like that in Spanish South America with Bolivar and the like. He then wrote to the senate of the misfortune which had befallen him, and begged to be confirmed in his command, that he might be able to institute an inquiry, and as far as possible provide for the good of the republic. The senate was weak enough to grant his request; but he soon forgot the investigation. He was now at the head of the army in Italy, and waited for what might happen. As Sulla had led his army into Greece, the Samnites had again obtained breathing time.

But this state of tranquillity did not last long, for early in the year following (665) the rupture between Cinna and Cn. Octavius became complete. The Romans had adopted the system of forming new tribes to contain the new citizens; for, if they had distributed them among the existing tribes, the new citizens would, on all occasions, have far outvoted the Romans, and the old citizens would have sunk into insignificance.<sup>12</sup> To prevent the old citizens being completely overruled by the new ones, it was necessary to follow the plan which had been adopted in earlier times with regard to the Volscians and others. Respecting the number of the new tribes which were added to the thirty-five old ones, we have two different accounts; the one in Velleius Paterculus, the other in Appian. The former states their number to have been eight; but in Appian, we read δεκατέωντες ἀπέθηγαν ἑτέρας (viz. φυλάς). The word δεκα-

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 63; Vell. Patrc. ii. 20.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 49; Vell. Patrc. ii. 20.

*τεύοντες* in this passage is an absurdity, and has been changed into δέκα φυλάς; but then δέκα ἐξ αὐτῶν would more likely have been written. I believe that we must read δέκα πέντε ἀπέφηναν ἑτέρας. What induces me to make this conjecture, is a feeling of symmetry. If fifteen new tribes were added, the total number was fifty, against which number, nothing can be said. Thirty-five was a very awkward number, but had been made up gradually without any intention of stopping there. Moreover, the number 15 bears the same ratio to 35, that 3 bears to 7; thus the number of the fifteen new tribes is a little less than half the number of the old ones. The different statement of Velleius presents, in my opinion, no difficulties; and I account for it by the supposition, that at first the Latins were formed into eight new tribes, to which afterwards seven others were added, which were formed of Etruscans and Umbrians. The custom at Rome henceforth was, that the fifteen new tribes did not give their votes until the old ones had given theirs. P. Sulpicius had promised the new citizens that they should be distributed among the old tribes<sup>13</sup>, which was a manifest injustice towards the latter. Most of the *Romani rustici* lived at a great distance from the city; and it was an important advantage to those who lived in the city to be inscribed in the rustic tribes.

---

## LECTURE LXXXVI.

THE discussion about the franchise in Italy called forth different interests among the Latins, Italicans and Etruscans. Cinna who evidently aimed at sovereign power, came forward as the avowed head of the Marian party, and in order to win over the Italicans, he offered to distribute them among the old tribes. The Samnites were still in arms, hoping either to conquer Rome or to remain independent, whence they would not accept the franchise. This however alienated them from the rest who were anxious to obtain it. The divisions among the Italicans were almost as great as those among the parties at Rome. The party of Cinna consisted of the old Latin towns

<sup>13</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 77; Appian, *I. c.* i. 55.

from Tibur to Capua, comprising Tibur, Praeneste, the towns of the Hernicans, and several places between the Liris and Vulturnus. He demanded that the tribes formed out of these places should be dissolved, and be distributed among the thirty-five old ones.<sup>1</sup> I cannot conceive why Sulla did not adopt this very same measure, as it was the only method of forming a strong and powerful aristocracy amid the democracy; but perhaps he liked best the shadows of the old tribes. Multitudes of the new citizens now flocked to Rome, in order to carry Cinna's measure by their superiority in numbers. Cinna's colleague, Cn. Octavius, declared against it, and a fierce contest arose within the city, in which Cinna was defeated, and many of the new citizens fell. The statement that 10,000 new citizens were killed in this struggle is exaggerated, and cannot be believed. The senate now had the courage to come forward against Cinna, but committed an illegal act in declaring, by a *senatusconsultum*, the consular dignity of Cinna to be forfeited. Such a power might in former times have been exercised by the curies and centuries, but never by the senate alone; the decree was in fact void, unless it was sanctioned by the people. Matters, it is true, had gone so far, that the sovereignty of the people could no longer be recognised, but in form, at all events, the proceeding of the senate was revolutionary.

The war against the Samnites was still carried on in the neighbourhood of Nola, and a Roman army, which cannot have been equal to that of the Samnites, was besieging that city. Thither Cinna now repaired, and bribed both the officers and the soldiers, who had learned from Sulla that they held the fate of the republic in their hands; they supported him, and requested him to re-assume the ensigns of the consular dignity, and to lead them against Rome to humble the pride of the oligarchs. This he did. A truce must have been concluded with the Samnites. In order to raise his and his party's authority, he invited the aged Marius and the other exiles to return. Marius sailed from Libya to the coast of Etruria, where he formed Etruscan cohorts; for Marius was not at all delicate in collecting troops, and restored all slaves to freedom on condition of their taking up arms for him. Another exile who was recalled, was Q. Sertorius, a man who had joined the

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 64; Vell. Patrc. ii. 20.

party of Marius, chiefly on account of his aversion to the rulers, and who had no share whatever in the tyrannical acts of the demagogues. He is one of the best Romans of those times; he was noble-minded, open, humane, free from the narrow prejudices of his countrymen, and endowed with all the qualities requisite to make a great general. He was in that position in which, at the outbreak of a revolution, excellent men so often find themselves: they are not aware of what will take place, and in their innocence allow themselves to be led away. Afterwards they cannot get out of the connexions into which circumstances have thrown them, and thus they share disgrace and crimes with those by whom they are surrounded. Sertorius was innocent, and kept his hands clear, although he was obliged to witness the horrors which took place at Rome after the victory. We often cannot avoid pronouncing unjust opinions upon men, if we judge of them merely from the observation that they are connected with such or such persons. Sertorius was with Cinna, who advanced with his army from Campania, on the same road which Sulla had taken when he marched against Rome. Carbo, an accomplice of Cinna, who afterwards acquired a great name in those disturbances, joined his army. Marius meantime advanced against Rome from Etruria. The senate had called upon Cn. Pompeius Strabo for assistance, and he had accordingly given up the war on the Adriatic, and proceeded to Rome. Cn. Octavius was encamped on the Janiculum, and Cn. Pompeius at the Colline gate. The conduct of the latter was for a time so suspicious that the senate began to fear treason.<sup>2</sup> At last, however, he commenced an engagement with Cinna, which is much exaggerated in some accounts<sup>3</sup>, but seems in reality to have been only an insignificant skirmish. Its issue, indeed, was advantageous to the rebels; but the senate had at least some guarantee that it was not betrayed by Pompeius. After this a pestilence began to rage in both armies outside the city, by which many thousands were carried off. Cn. Pompeius Strabo fell a victim to it, according to some accounts; but according to others, he was killed in the camp by a flash of lightning.<sup>4</sup> The people, rejoiced at his death, gave vent to their exasperation against him, and when

<sup>2</sup> Vell. Patrc. ii. 21; Livy, *Epit.* 79; Appian, *De Bello Civil.* i. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Vell. Patrc. *l. c.*

<sup>4</sup> Compare Livy, *Epit.* 79; Appian, *l. c.* i. 68.

his body was carried through the city, tore it from the bier and mutilated it, for he had been the object of general hatred.

One army of the Romans was encamped near Albano, at the foot of Monte Cavo, and was opposed to one of the rebels. Latium, which after suffering dreadful devastations in the Volscian and Samnite wars, had been in the enjoyment of peace for some centuries, now received its death-blow; and the condition in which we find it under Augustus must be traced to the effects of this war. Marius took Ostia, Antium, Aricia, Lanuvium, and other places by storm, and laid them waste; Tibur and Praeneste joined him of their own accord. Four camps enclosed the city; and though the rebels were not strong enough to take it by storm, still the effect which they produced in the city was a complete famine. Both the generals and soldiers were so desponding, that at last the senate resorted to negotiations, and the deputies of the senate were obliged to comply with all the demands that were made. Cinna, who had been declared a rebel, was recognised in his dignity of consul, and Marius, as a private person, stood by the side of the curule chair with contemptuous smiles and looks, in which the deputies read their own sentence of death.<sup>5</sup> It was stipulated that no blood should be shed; but Cinna made a very equivocal promise, saying that it should not be done with his will. Cinna then demanded that Merula, who had been appointed consul in his place, should be deposed. This humiliation also the senate seems to have submitted to. The other consul, Octavius, however would not give way, and with a small band went to the Janiculum, with the senseless idea of defending himself. Towards the end of the year when the rebels entered the city, the slaughter, of which Marius was the chief cause, began. Cn. Octavius was slain, even while Marius and Cinna were entering the city; and the flamen dialis, L. Merula, bled himself to death at the altar of the Capitoline temple, in order to escape a similar fate. Marius now caused himself to be proclaimed consul for the seventh, and Cinna for the second time, without any elections. This was the point after which Marius had always been striving, in order to realise a prophecy which had been made to him, in consequence of an eagle's nest, with seven young ones, having fallen into his lap from an oak tree (Cicero calls it Marius' oak), when he was a

\* Appian, *I. c. i.* 70.

child. He had often consoled his friends with his prospect of seven consulships when they began to despair of his fortune; for as I have already remarked he was extremely superstitious.<sup>6</sup>

The victory which the rebels had thus gained was followed by the wildest cruelties. Marius had a body-guard of slaves, whom he sent out to murder those whom he wished to get rid of. In this manner all the most distinguished persons of the opposite party, the flower of the senate, were despatched, especially his personal enemies: no reasons were assigned, and no proscription was made; all was done by the simple command of Marius. Among these unhappy victims were the celebrated orators M. Antonius and Crassus. Q. Catulus who had been the colleague of Marius in the Cimbrian war, was likewise destined to be killed, but put an end to his own life. Marius' conduct towards him is one of the meanest actions of this unhappy man. There were but few good men with Cinna, such as Sertorius. Marius Gratidianus too, a cousin of Marius, must not be judged severely; but Cinna, Carbo and their friends were monsters, whereas the senate was headed by the best educated and noblest characters, if we make due allowance for the corruption of the age. The butchery was carried on to such an extent that at length even Cinna himself was induced, by the advice of Sertorius, to put to death the band of servile assassins kept by Marius. In the middle of January, on the sixteenth day after Marius had entered on his seventh consulship, he died, apparently in a fit of rage. The shedding of blood now ceased, but not the bitter spirit of the factions<sup>7</sup>, with which however we are but little acquainted.

At the time when Cinna was approaching the city with his army, the senate had given Q. Metellus, who was stationed near Nola, full power to conclude peace with the Samnites on whatever terms he might think proper.<sup>8</sup> The Samnites abused the favourable moment, and demanded the Roman franchise, not only for themselves, but also for their allies, the Campanians and Lucanians; and that all their captives and deserters should be given up to them, whereas the Romans were not to have theirs restored to them, but were even to be obliged to confer

<sup>6</sup> It is not improbable that his Syrian prophetess, Martha, may have suggested to him the number *seven*, which was a sacred number among the Jews and Syrians, as *three* was among the Romans.—N.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *L. c. i.* 75; Vell. Paterc. *ii. 23*; Plutarch, *Marius*, 45.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *L. c. i.* 68, who, however, gives a somewhat different account.

the franchise upon them.<sup>9</sup> Metellus concluded the peace on these conditions; and the Samnites, by a subsequent law, became Roman citizens. Thenceforth, they were the strongest support of the Marian party. The new tribes of the Italicans were now broken up, and their members were distributed among the old tribes; but we do not know whether this was the case with all of them. In whatever manner, however, it may have been done, it gave the new citizens a dangerous numerical preponderance. At the time of Cicero, it would seem as if all the Italicans, according to their nationalities, were collectively contained in a tribe; so that *e.g.* the Marsians and their neighbours were contained in the *tribus Sergia*, and all the *municipia* about Arpinum in the Aemilia. If this was so, it was, in my opinion, one of the changes introduced by Sulla, in order to render their numerical preponderance harmless.

The death of C. Marius was followed by a period of three years, during which Sulla was conducting the war in Achaia and Asia, and Italy was completely in the hands of the party of Cinna, who prepared himself for the war with Sulla. But Cinna made himself more and more hateful by his acts of oppression, and soon found that he had reason to mistrust his own followers, so that he found it necessary to demand hostages, which however were refused. His colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, the successor of C. Marius, had been commissioned to undertake the war against Mithridates: he had marched through Illyricum, Macedonia, and Greece, to Asia, where he was murdered by C. Flavius Fimbria. In his fourth consulship, Cinna was at Ariminum, forming a numerous army to attack Sulla in Greece—a very sensible plan. But the soldiers refused to embark, and slew Cinna in his camp. Cn. Papirius Carbo, whom Cinna had chosen for his colleague after the death of L. Valerius Flaccus, now remained consul for a whole year without a colleague. These men retained indeed the name of consuls, but they were in fact true tyrants.

In the year 665, Sulla had gone over to Achaia and Thessaly. Archelaus and Taxiles were at the time the generals of Mithridates, and in possession of Peloponnesus and southern Greece, as far as Thermopylae. Sulla gained the battle of Chaeronea against an innumerable host of barbarians—a battle which he himself probably did not reckon among those upon which he

<sup>9</sup> Dion Cass. *Fragm.* lib. xxvii. No. clxvi.; comp. Appian, *I. c.*

rested his military glory: the men, 100,000 in number, were as cowardly as the Persians or the armies of Indian chiefs. They formed a phalanx, and were armed as Macedonians, but a Scipio or a Hannibal would have said of them that, notwithstanding all this, they were like fish prepared by a clever cook, in various ways and under various names, but were after all nothing but fish. Sulla himself lost only a few of his soldiers.<sup>10</sup> Archelaus defended himself very differently in Piraeus. The long walls connecting the city of Athens with the port-town had been destroyed, perhaps, by Demetrius Poliorcetes; the communication does not appear to have been free even during the siege of Antigonus Gonatas; but Piraeus, as well as the city, was still protected by the strong walls of Themistocles, which had been restored by Conon.<sup>11</sup> Piraeus was occupied by a Pontic garrison, and the city was defended by the mercenaries of the tyrant Aristion, to whom Archelaus had entrusted it. Archelaus also did all he could to introduce provisions from Piraeus into the city, but with no success; for Sulla was watchful, and superior in both power and talent. The distress in the city rose to such a degree, that the inhabitants were at last completely exhausted. The walls amounted to four or five miles in circumference, and there was not a sufficient number of men to defend them. The city was taken by storm, and the massacre which followed was enormous; as if the conquerors had acted under the influence of an implacable hatred of Athens<sup>12</sup>, for which there was no reason. Few of the buildings of the city were destroyed, and not even the walls; but when Piraeus was taken soon afterwards, the walls of this place were pulled down, and the magnificent arsenal, as well as other buildings, was burnt to ashes: in short, Piraeus was completely destroyed, so that from this time it resembled the decayed towns in the north of Holland, where grass grows in the streets. In the time of Pausanias, it was only a small village near the port. Athens itself was almost depopulated, and henceforth we may apply to it Lucan's words: "*rarus et antiquis habitator in urbibus errat.*" After this, Sulla had some further advantages, and the Pontic commander was driven back into Asia.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, *Sulla*, 19, foll; Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 42, foll.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 30.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *l. c.* 38; Plutarch, *Sulla*, 13, foll.; Vell. Paterc. ii. 23.

I mentioned before that L. Valerius had led an army to Asia, but that he was murdered by his quaestor or legate, C. Fimbria, who assumed the command of the army. Mithridates was thus pressed by two armies which were hostile to each other. He first marched against Fimbria, who destroyed Ilium.<sup>13</sup> Sulla then concluded a peace with the king of Pontus, on conditions which appear scarcely credible<sup>14</sup>: the king gave up all his conquests, Bithynia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, and Cappadocia, and thus confined himself to his former dominions; he paid a war contribution of 2000 talents, and surrendered seventy ships of war. It was impossible to make more moderate terms, and Sulla did not even demand the surrender of the king's advisers.

Sulla now began to press C. Fimbria with all his energy, and the latter, who saw himself deprived of every hope of success, put an end to his life. His soldiers went over to Sulla, who, however, mistrusted them as men who were *contaminati caede consulis*, and as partisans of Marius, for they were for the most part Italicans, and had been enlisted and trained against Sulla in the time of Marius.<sup>15</sup>

It had been the wish of Cinna that C. Fimbria should conclude peace with Mithridates, and enter into an alliance with him. But this plan was now frustrated. Sulla, after having concluded the peace, settled the affairs of Asia, and punished the Greeks, and the Hellenised inhabitants of Asia Minor, the Ionians, Lydians, and Carians, in whose dominions the Romans had been murdered before the outbreak of the war. They were compelled to pay down at once five years' tribute, that is probably all the arrears for the time that the war had lasted, and in addition to it so heavy a war contribution, that those beautiful countries were ruined for a long time. The first generation after these events was so completely borne down that recovery was impossible; but still they gradually gained new strength, and in the time of the Roman emperors we find them in the most flourishing condition.<sup>16</sup> Nearly

<sup>13</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 53.

<sup>14</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 55, foll.; Plutarch, *Sulla*, 22.

<sup>15</sup> These soldiers remained in Asia for many years, and were known under the name of the Valeriani down to the time of Pompey and Lucullua. After the battle of Cannae, such a corps of soldiers had been sent out to Sicily.—N. —Sallust, *ap. Non.* xviii. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Caria, Lydia, and Ionia, form a true earthly paradise. These countries, after having suffered the greatest ravages, and even under a bad government—

five millions of our money were raised there with the utmost harshness, and within the shortest time. We have seen similar things under Napoleon, who did not trouble himself much about their practicability. The Roman equites, who always formed the retinue of the generals, advanced the money for the towns on interest at the rate of 24, or 36, or even 48 per cent., and afterwards raised their capital, together with the interest on it, by the aid of Roman soldiers. This was horrible tyranny, and the sword did not injure those countries half as much as the usurers; but Sulla wanted money to carry on the war.

During all this time he had shewn an extraordinary greatness of character. His house at Rome had been pulled down, his property had been wasted, his friends put to death, his family driven into exile, and many of them came to him, begging and entreating him to come back and take vengeance upon his enemies. But he was resolved to bring the war in Asia to a close, and to obtain the most favourable peace before returning. If he had not been a great man, he might have concluded a peace with Mithridates at an earlier period, and the king would have been glad of it. But Sulla acted differently, and wished to fulfil his duties towards the republic, before he thought of occupying himself with his private affairs.<sup>17</sup> And this was indeed the wisest course, for he was now in a condition to return with a victorious army which was attached to him, and with large sums of money at his disposal. But the undertaking on which he now entered, was nevertheless one of extreme boldness; for he had not more than 30,000 men, while his enemies had at their command a force of 450 cohorts, that is, upwards of 180,000 men, including such brave soldiers as the Samnites.<sup>18</sup> From the time of Marius, military forces

---

unless it be like that of the Turks—such as that of the Byzantines or Persians, may be restored to the highest degree of prosperity in the course of a few generations. If they were without any population, and were colonised by Europeans, they would, within fifty years, be in a very flourishing condition. This is the unanimous opinion of all travellers, to whatever nation they belong: all declare that they do not know a finer country in the world. An officer once told me that he had seen one beautiful country after another, first Rome, then Naples, which is much more flourishing than the former, next Peloponnesus, which is infinitely richer than Naples in fertility and the luxuriousness of the vegetation, and lastly Smyrna, which by far surpasses all the rest.—N.

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *L c.* 51; Vell. Paterc. ii. 24.

<sup>18</sup> Vell. Paterc. ii. 24, who states the number of his enemies to have been 200,000. Comp. Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 79.

are always counted by cohorts or small battallions, each containing 420 men, less frequently by legions. The troops of his enemies, moreover, had to fight for their existence, and the Samnites were determined not to conclude peace with Sulla. But he attacked the enemy boldly, with confidence in his good fortune and his own strength, and conducted the war in a brilliant manner.

---

### LECTURE LXXXVII.

THE consuls of the year, in which Sulla led his army back to Italy, were L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Julius Norbanus, who, like most of the few surviving patricians, favoured the democratical party. If superiority in numbers had decided the issue, or if one of the consuls had been invested with dictatorial power, and had known what use to make of it, Sulla could not possibly have met with success. But the republic was in a state of dissolution; and its leaders after the death of Marius were as unfit as those of France in 1799, when the Directory was so paralysed, and in such a state of decay, that the whole fabric would have broken down, if Napoleon had not returned from Egypt. Rebellions are multiplied under such circumstances, as the people cannot help expecting more from a change than from a continuation of the actual state of things. Sulla calculated upon the inability of the leaders of his opponents, and what the talented Caelius Rufus wrote to Cicero respecting the struggle between Caesar and Pompey, then actually happened<sup>1</sup>; for even the majority of the new citizens were disgusted with the rulers, who, had they been able to rely on the new citizens and a part of the old ones, might have thwarted all the attempts of Sulla. But the cohorts consisting of new citizens went over to him, even in his first campaign, and concluded a treaty with him, in which he confirmed their newly-

<sup>1</sup> This passage, belonging to the year 1827, is written in all the MS. notes that I have seen, with equal brevity, and can be explained only by conjecture. Niebuhr probably alludes to Cicero, *ad Fam.* viii. 14: *In hac discordia video Cn. Pompeium senatum quique res judicant secum habiturum: ad Caesarem omnes qui cum timore aut mala spe vivant accessuros: exercitum conferendum non esse omnino.*

acquired privileges—an occurrence resembling those which had taken place in earlier times between patricians and plebeians.

Under such circumstances, Sulla landed at Brundusium, and was received with open arms. It had been intended to make preparations to oppose him, but those which had been made by Carbo had broken down in consequence of the general opposition. Sulla advanced through Apulia, as if the country had been in the enjoyment of perfect peace. According to one account, the truth of which, however, is not certain, though it is very probable, he had an engagement, of no great importance, with Norbanus near Canusium<sup>2</sup>; but however this may be, we know that he found the main force of his enemies encamped near Capua at the foot of mount Tifata, where Norbanus was defeated, and large numbers of his soldiers deserted to Sulla. The latter had commenced negotiations while yet in Greece, and he now did the same with the consul Scipio. A truce was concluded, and hostages exchanged. But the negotiations which were protracted by Sulla with a view to deceive the consul and to seduce his troops, were interrupted, perhaps intentionally, by Q. Sertorius, who saw that the soldiers were gradually deserting the consul. Accordingly the truce was broken, and Sertorius occupied Suessa, which had declared for Sulla. The desertion among Scipio's troops became so general, partly from contempt of their own leaders, and partly because they were dazzled by Sulla's glory, that at length he found himself left completely alone. Towards the end of the year, when Sulla had gained such advantages, and was extending his power in southern Italy, many of his supporters took up arms in various parts of Italy. Among these were Metellus Pius in the modern Romagna; and Cn. Pompey, then twenty-three years of age, in Picenum, where he had great influence, for that country which had been subdued by his father stood in a sort of clientship to him. M. Lucullus and several others likewise took up arms for Sulla. Their party, and the forces with which they carried on the war, consisted for the most part of new citizens, with the exception of the army of Metellus, who may have had more old citizens from Cisalpine Gaul and Romagna.

The beginning of the following year, the second of the

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 84.

war, is marked by the most bloody and decisive occurrences. Marius the younger, then twenty-seven years old, who is sometimes called a son, and sometimes a nephew of C. Marius, but was probably an adopted son, was consul with Cn. Papirius Carbo. The latter had the command in the northern districts of Etruria, in the neighbourhood of Ariminum, especially against Metellus, Pompey, and Lucullus; young Marius was stationed on the frontiers of Latium. Sulla advanced from Campania where he had passed the winter. A decisive battle was fought near Sacriportus (it was not a town, but perhaps only a pass) probably on the road from Segni to Palestrina, and near the latter place; there Marius had concentrated his forces, chiefly Samnites, to protect Rome against Sulla. In consequence of this position Sulla could not advance towards Rome by the Via Appia. But Marius was defeated, and a part of his troops deserted to the enemy, whose loss is said to have been very slight. These districts and Etruria were the real seats of the party of Cinna, and the Latin towns were passionately interested in the cause. The rest of Italy, with the exception of Samnium and Lucania, seems to have been foreign to this party, or at least indifferent towards it. After the defeat of Sacriportus, Marius fled to Praeneste, which was quite devoted to his cause, well fortified, and at that time a very large town.<sup>3</sup> Sulla followed him, and blockaded the place; but he soon after led his army towards Rome, leaving behind him Q. Lucretius Ofella to continue the blockade of Praeneste, which contained within its walls old Roman citizens, Samnites, and the inhabitants of the place. Sulla himself went to Rome. He still showed great moderation, and but for the blind infatuation of his opponents, he might perhaps have determined to make an unbloody use of his victory; but they were intoxicated with rage, and there prevailed among them a fanaticism like that among the Jews at the destruction of Jerusalem. Even in the last days of the ascendancy of Cinna's party, the praetor, L. Junius Brutus Damasippus, caused a great massacre among the real or suspected favourers of Sulla, in which the venerable pontiff, Q. Mucius Scaevola was murdered, because he relied on his innocence and disdained

<sup>3</sup> The modern town of Palestrina, which contains about 6000 inhabitants, occupies only a part of the ancient arx, that is, the space of the ancient temple of Fortune and its precincts.—N.

to flee.<sup>4</sup> This fury however, did not give them strength to defend the city, and while the perpetrators of these horrors escaped, Sulla entered the city: he promised moderation, but his promise was meant in an awful sense. He next followed Carbo into Etruria, which was now the scene of the war—so far as the Etruscans were concerned, a real national war, because Sulla deprived them of the privileges which they had obtained. Carbo was near Clusium. The detail of this war is wrapped in deep darkness, and is very perplexing. Carbo, who had still a considerable army, made two attempts to relieve Praeneste, but he failed in both. He also made some other undertakings, as that against Carinas in Picenum, which likewise failed, and his troops deserted to the enemy. The forces of the Marian party melted away under his hands, desertion increasing continually. Many cases of desertion which then occurred are quite unaccountable; even at the beginning, P. Cethegus, one of the men who had been exiled with Marius, had surrendered to Sulla at discretion; and Albinovanus murdered his colleagues and lieutenants at a banquet, and then made peace with Sulla.

The war was brought to a decision by a last endeavour of Pontius Telesinus, whose brother commanded the Samnites at Praeneste. He and the Lucanian general, C. Lamponius, made an attempt to relieve Praeneste; but not being able to effect anything against the line of fortifications by which the place was surrounded, they hastened towards Rome, which they hoped to take by surprise. But Sulla, who was informed of their movement, threw himself into the city, and averted the danger. The battle which decided the fate of the world, was fought at the Colline gate. The Samnites and their allies are said to have amounted to 40,000 men.<sup>5</sup> Had they succeeded, Rome, according to the expressed intentions of Pontius Telesinus, would have been razed to the ground. The fear excited by the presence of such allies, must have made many of the partisans of Marius inclined to become reconciled with Sulla. Towards the evening on the day of the battle, which had long been uncertain, and had often been favourable to the Samnites, Sulla succeeded in breaking the lines of the Samnites; and their defeat was so great that Telesinus, in despair, put an end to his life. After this loss, Marius, and the younger Telesinus at

Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 88; Vell. Pat. c. ii. 26. <sup>5</sup> Vell. Pat. c. ii. 27.

Praeneste, began to despond also: they endeavoured to escape by subterraneous passages which led through the rocks into the fields; but finding that their flight was discovered, they killed each other.<sup>6</sup> Marius the younger cannot claim to be called a man of any extraordinary greatness: he was a detestable man, and had all the faults of his father; but of his father's great qualities, we cannot discover any but his perseverance; and this cannot excite our admiration, as it was commanded by necessity. Carbo also despaired, and fled to Africa. Thus ended this civil war. Italy was now cleared of all hostile armies; and only a few isolated towns in Spain, of which I shall speak presently, continued to offer resistance.

In the battle of the Colline gate, 8,000 Samnites had been taken prisoners, all of whom were surrounded and cut down in the field of Mars by the command of Sulla.<sup>7</sup> After the death of Marius, Praeneste surrendered at discretion to Lucretius Ofella: it made no capitulation. Sulla divided all its inhabitants into three great masses—the old Roman citizens, the Praenestines, and the Samnites; and, sparing the lives of the first, he put all the rest to the sword. The towns of Etruria surrendered one by one, and the inhabitants of most of them experienced the same fate as the Praenestines. Praeneste itself, however, was not destroyed, while most of the large Etruscan towns, such as Clusium, Aretium, Populonia, Volaterrae, which last had defended itself for two years, were razed to the ground. Faesulae, perhaps, escaped this fate, though it is possible that it may have been afterwards rebuilt.

At Rome, Sulla acted according to his own discretion. Hitherto he had been humane, but he now acted as a blood-thirsty monster: he set the first example of a proscription, that is, he made out a list of those whom any one was at liberty not only to kill with impunity, but for whose heads prizes were offered. Few, indeed, of those who were then murdered, could be compared with those who had been put to death by Marius and Cinna; but in extent the calamity was unsurpassed, for Sulla wreaked his vengeance even upon whole nations. It is said that, in this manner, no less than 2,400 equites lost their lives.<sup>8</sup> Whether the names of all of them were in the proscrip-

<sup>6</sup> Vell. Patrc. *l. c.*; Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 94.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *l. c. i.* 93. Compare Plutarch, *Sulla*, 29.

<sup>8</sup> Appian, *l. c. i.* 103, says 2,600, which number, however, comprises all the equites who perished in this war.

tion list may be doubted. Twenty-three, or, according to other but probably incorrect accounts, forty-three, legions had military colonies assigned to them in Italy.<sup>9</sup> In former times, no such colonies had been founded; the first colonies were simple settlements, serving as garrisons, to which a third of the territory of the town they occupied was assigned, and one member of each gens went out as *colonus*.<sup>10</sup> As each colonist did not receive more than two jugers of land, they must have had some other advantages besides<sup>11</sup>; we know that they retained their arms, which the old citizens of those towns did not. At a later period, we find Latin colonies, in which Romans and Latins had equal shares; but both kinds of colonies must be considered as garrisons to protect the frontiers, and we may take it for granted that in most cases the colonists were soldiers, who had fought in the legions. But there existed no relation between colonisation and military service; and the former was by no means a reward for the latter. It is not till after the second punic war, that we find assignments of public land being made to veteran soldiers. Bononia was the only colony in which there was a reference to an actual war, for the allotments given to the horsemen differed from those of the centurions, common soldiers, etc.<sup>12</sup> But the colonies of Sulla were the first real military colonies, the meaning of which term is this: a certain legion, when dismissed from service, was constituted as the body of citizens of a certain town, the whole territory of which was given up to the legionaries. If its extent did not come up to what the imperator had promised, portions were taken away from neighbouring districts, and added to the colony. The soldiers thus obtained a right to claim assignments of land, a right which had formerly belonged to the plebeians alone. We do not know all the places which were thus colonised. According to an ancient tradition of Florence, which is extremely probable, and which though it cannot be traced to any ancient author, yet is almost proved by an old reading in one of Cicero's Catilinarian speeches<sup>13</sup>, we may take it for granted that Florence arose as such a military colony out of the old town of Faesulae; so also new Aretium and other places in Etruria,

<sup>9</sup> Appian, *I. c.* 100; Livy, *Epit.* 89.

<sup>10</sup> Compare vol. ii. p. 45.

<sup>11</sup> Compare vol. ii. p. 47, foll.; vol. iii. p. 176.

<sup>12</sup> Livy, xxxvii. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Cic. in *Cat.* iii. 6; comp. however, Frontin. *de Colon.* p. 112, ed. Goes. : *colonia Florentina deducta a iii. viris assignata lege Julia.*

Praeneste, and others; but, in regard to several places, it cannot be proved satisfactorily. The inhabitants of such places were in most cases put to death. It was these colonies which formed the firm basis of Sulla's power. Similar things also happened in places where the old inhabitants were not extirpated: in these the new settlers became the cleruchi, and the old inhabitants had to pay a tax for the farms which they retained; this was the case especially with the old Latin colonies. Those which did not share this fate, had become *municipia* by the *lex Julia*, and remained so; those which were proscribed by Sulla, were now called *coloniae* not *Latinae*, but *Romanae militares*. These are the colonies of which Pliny<sup>14</sup> speaks, and the nature of which has always been misunderstood. The subject is one of those which were obscure even to the ancients; and even Asconius Pedianus, who knew history well, could not understand why Cicero called Placentia a colony, since by the *lex Julia* it had become a *municipium*.<sup>15</sup> Nearly the whole of Etruria became a desert, and the towns which had not become military colonies, were in ruins as late as the time of Augustus. The nation of the Samnites also was so far reduced by Sulla that nearly the whole country of the Hirpini was changed into a wilderness. Wherever he did not establish colonies, he gave the land, which in former times would have become *ager publicus*, to his favourites.

Sulla is remarkable for his fantastic belief that he had a vocation to accomplish great things, and especially that he was to be a reformer. He saw the state of dissolution in the republic, but he was unable to see that when old institutions have decayed, and an effectual remedy is to be applied, new institutions must be created in the spirit of the old ones, but adapted to the circumstances of the time. That which Sulla wanted, could do no good, for it was a mere dead restoration of what had perished from want of vigour and vitality: he recalled the ancient forms of the republic, imagining that they would be able to sustain themselves, and that, like the

<sup>14</sup> *H. N.* xiv. 8, 2.

<sup>15</sup> This is evidently a lapsus memoriae, for the passage of Asconius, (*in Pison*, p. 3, ed. Orelli) runs thus: *Magno opere me heritare confiteor quid sit quare Cicero Placentium municipium esse dicit. Video enim in annalibus eorum qui Punicum bellum secundum scripsierunt tradi, Placentiam deductam pridie Kal. Jun. primo anno ejus belli P. Cornelio Scipione, patre Africani prioris, Ti. Sempronio Longo, Coss, etc.*

man in Tieck's novel, he would push the world back to the point where, in his opinion, it ought to have stopped its course. However, as regards himself, he believed that he was destined to rule, and indulged in every possible licence, considering himself far above those forms.

He now began to change the laws, and to constitute the senate. It had been expected that, according to the principles of the party for which he had declared himself, he would complete the senate, which had been dreadfully reduced, out of the old nobility, but such was not the case: with a curious inconsistency, which shews how much even he, with all his absolutism, was under the influence of circumstances, he filled up the vacancies in the senate not only with equites, but even with his own centurions of quite vulgar descent, who, however were ready to do anything that he might wish.<sup>16</sup> He had none of the elements of an aristocracy: the party which was really active, powerful and intellectual, was that of the capitalists, i. e. that of the equites and the Italian municipia. But this party he hated, and wished to crush it; and as in such circumstances men throw themselves into the arms of the populace, Sulla, after the model of all oligarchs and counter-revolutionists, filled the senate with low people; just as in 1799 at Naples, arms were put into the hands of the lowest rabble. Thus while he aimed at saving the republic by forms, he himself disregarded them, and forgot the device of his own party.

The Cornelian laws, when looked into attentively, are a highly remarkable instance of the conduct of a short-sighted and obstinate man, who imagines that he can bring back by-gone times by restoring the ancient forms, and that nations can be made to assume any shape or form, like inanimate matter. The number of patricians was so much reduced that, sometimes for four or five successive years, both the consuls had been plebeians; but from henceforth, and so long as Sulla lived, the consulship was regularly divided between a patrician and a plebeian,—further he could not have gone without driving the people to madness, for all the Coryphaei of his party were plebeians. This change was in those times perfectly childish, although many others besides Sulla himself may have looked

<sup>16</sup> Comp. vol. iii. p. 301. foll.

upon it as a very salutary measure. He might have done many things, which would have been far more profitable.

He reduced the tribunician power to what it had been previously to the Publilian law (283), and thus undid the work of four centuries. The tribunes accordingly were deprived of the power of proposing laws to the assembly, which became now the exclusive privilege of the consuls and the senate. I almost wonder that he did not try to restore the curies; but he may have been prevented by the circumstance, that the curies had been so completely changed, that he would have had in them a democratic assembly. This also accounts for the fact that Dionysius saw in them something quite different from what they had been originally. Sulla neglected everything that he ought to have done to restore the republic to health; and despairing of every healthful development, he had recourse to *coups d'état* and violent changes. His depriving the tribunes of their power was a measure, for which much might be said, for the tribuneship was incapable of any further development; and there really was something revolting in it. But there are things which, however necessary and salutary, cannot be done without the greatest caution, because they run counter to common prejudices. Sulla, remembering that the tribunes had originally been only a protecting magistracy, and that they had not been allowed to hold any of the curule magistracies, which were reserved for the patricians, again went back and ordered that tribunes should be elected only *ad auxilium ferendum*, and that no tribune, after the year of his office, should be admitted to any office leading into the senate.

In order to secure the safety of his own person still more, he deprived the children of those who had been proscribed of their full franchise, that is, of the right of holding any office whatsoever.<sup>17</sup> This shameful law remained in force, until it was abolished by Julius Caesar.

Sulla's greatest change, however, was that by which he restored the *judicia* to the senate.<sup>18</sup> The senators ought now to have endeavoured to exercise their judicial power as impartially as possible; but very far from it!—justice had never been so venal as it was now; the system of bribery was carried on by the faction of Sulla to so intolerable and detestable an

<sup>17</sup> Vell. Paterc. ii. 28; Plutarch, *Sulla*, 31.

<sup>18</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* xi. 22; Vell. Paterc. ii. 32; Cicero, *c. Verr.* i. 13.

extent, that the senators themselves appeared to be purposely undermining their own power; and had it not been for the military colonies of Sulla, severe punishment would have been the well-deserved fruit of their proceedings.

Sulla also increased the numbers of magistrates and sacerdotal officers. In early times there were only four pontiffs and the pontifex maximus, two being taken from each of the two most ancient tribes. The number of augurs was likewise four in those times, and when subsequently the plebeians were admitted to a share in these dignities, each of these two colleges, by the admission of four plebeians, was increased to nine members, including the pontifex maximus, whose office was common to both orders.<sup>19</sup> At that time it was the intention to divide the priestly dignity equally between the two orders. When this ceased to be observed is uncertain, but it was probably before the enacting of the Domitian law. Sulla himself no longer thought of dividing the augurate and pontificate between patricians and plebeians—such was the power of circumstances over the fancies he otherwise indulged in—but he abolished the Domitian law, and restored to the colleges the right of co-optation, increasing at the same time the number of priests in each college to fifteen.<sup>20</sup> This number was a multiplication of three by five, whereas the former number was three times three; for we must remember that the pontifex maximus was included in either case.

This change had no great influence upon the state, but the increase of the number of praetors to eight, and of that of the quaestors to twenty, was of great importance; to the former he assigned in his reform of the criminal law, the *quaestiones perpetuae*. The number of quaestors was so greatly increased, because owing to the vast extension of the state, many more officers were required to keep the accounts of the treasury. The number of officers possessing the curule dignity was thus considerably increased by the additional praetors. The quaestors became members of the senate by virtue of their office, so that the twenty quaestors, who were elected every year, were almost sufficient to keep up the regular number of 600 senators.<sup>21</sup> This was perhaps not so much the result of Sulla's

<sup>19</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 351, foll.

<sup>20</sup> Livy, *Epit.* 89; Pseudo-Ascon. in *Divinat.* p. 102, ed. Orelli.

<sup>21</sup> There is no direct authority for this number of senators; but see Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 100; Tacitus, *Annal.* xi. 22. Cicero, *ad Attic.* i. 14, in speak-

intention, as of the natural course of things. No one was quaestor more than once. The arbitrary power of the censors, therefore, to create new members of the senate was almost abolished. The question, whether the senate was an elective body, thus appears in quite a different light. The senate now was a body representing the people, as in the very earliest times it had represented the burghers, being elected by the curies themselves; for the yearly election of twenty quaestors, who became at the same time members of the senate, gave to that body the character of an elective assembly; for whether the people elected every year twenty new senators, or appointed the same number of magistrates, who completed the senate, is one and the same thing.<sup>22</sup> But in the intermediate period it cannot be regarded as a representative assembly.

Sulla was very active as a legislator; and senseless as he shewed himself in matters connected with the political constitution, he must have had very superior advisers in his administrative, and especially in his criminal legislation; for it was he who first introduced any tolerable arrangements in the criminal laws, which had before been in a dreadful state. His regulations respecting the manner of conducting criminal law-suits are evidently improvements; but the particulars of this part of his legislation belong to a history of the Roman law. He also framed a *lex annalis*, determining the succession of public offices.

He kept a kind of body-guard of freedmen under the name of Cornelians, who soon became the most powerful persons. The state of Italy, especially in country towns, after the first storm was over, may be best learnt from the excellent speech of young Cicero for Roscius of Ameria, and from that for Cluentius. A person connected with these Cornelians, especially with Chrysogonus, the favourite of Sulla, might rob and murder with impunity: no one was safe from such persons, not even at the very gates of Rome. The condition of Italy was frightful beyond all description.

ing of the senators voting on a particular subject in his time, states the number to have been 415, fifteen voting on one side, and 400 on the other. From this we can infer no more, than that the total number of senators must have been greater than 415. In *Maccab.* i. 8. 15, that is towards the end of the sixth century, it is stated to have been 320; but not much weight can be assigned to this passage, considering the other statements which are there made.

<sup>22</sup> Compare vol. iii. p. 551, foll.

Sulla gave all these laws as dictator; for after the death of Marius and Carbo he had caused himself to be made dictator for an indefinite space of time, by the interrex L. Valerius Flaccus<sup>23</sup>, and with this title he governed the republic for two years. No one expected that he would ever resign his dictatorship, but he was probably exhausted by his long struggles; he may have felt that he was too old to carry on wars in foreign countries, or he may not have wished to do so. He may have believed that in the republic itself all the necessary reforms were effected, or else he may have despaired of their successful working<sup>24</sup>: in short, he laid down his power to the surprise and astonishment of every one. This was by no means a bold step, as Appian justly observes<sup>25</sup>, for he had his military colonies and the senate to rely upon, and his opponents were crushed into the dust. He retired to Puteoli, where he is said to have been attacked by phthiriasis, the most disgusting of diseases: his body was covered with ulcers out of which vermin grew. I believe that the fact of his having had this disease cannot be denied; and he deserved such a punishment. It occurs chiefly in the case of tyrants, such as Philip II., the Jewish king, Herod, Antiochus Epiphanes, and of rich land-owners who had been guilty of brutal conduct towards their tenants: but it is mentioned also in the case of the philosopher Pherecydes. Sulla wasted away from this disease; but he died in consequence of an accident. It was fortunate that he did die before his frame actually fell to pieces. At Puteoli, he attempted to deceive history and make the world believe that all his measures failed only because they were badly managed by his successors; but he in fact continued to rule through his trembling creatures. He played with the legislation of Puteoli, and insisted upon his wishes being carried into effect, although he pretended to live as a simple citizen like everybody else.<sup>26</sup> He died at the age of sixty of a haemorrhage, occasioned by a fit of rage against a young man who had con-

<sup>23</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 98.

<sup>24</sup> In 1827 Niebuhr thus expressed himself on this point: "It was in the natural course of things that he could not be satisfied with the success of his legislation; hence he who had shed so much blood in order to obtain supreme power, when he recognised the unsuitableness of his institutions, which he had created by so many acts of horror, resigned his dictatorship after having held it for two years. This is the most natural way of accounting for his resignation, about which so much has been said; even ingenious people have looked for his motives in more distant directions."      <sup>25</sup> *De Bell. Civil.* i. 103.      <sup>26</sup> Plutarch, *Sulla*, 37.

tradicted him. Had he lived ten years longer, he would have died as quietly as now, for no one would have ventured to do anything against him, since his opponents were annihilated, the tribunes paralysed, and all Italy in the hands of the military colonies which were attached to him. His body was conveyed to Rome, and the pomp of his burial was not less magnificent than that of Augustus, a fact which shews that his influence did not depend upon his person nor upon the moment alone, and that the attempts of Lepidus were senseless.

---

### LECTURE LXXXVIII.

BEFORE proceeding with the political history, let us cast a glance at the state of literature and the manners of the Romans at that period. The *Historiae* of Sallust began with the consulship of M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus. If we may judge of its importance from the speeches and letters, forming part of the work which are still extant, its loss is one of the most painful that we have to lament in Roman literature; though, perhaps, less on account of its historical value than of its merits as a work of art, as a masterly specimen of historical composition. The social war and the period of Sulla had been described by Sisenna, a sort of forerunner of Sallust, a cotemporary and early acquaintance of Cicero, who does not judge very favourably of his work as a literary production.<sup>1</sup> But I am inclined to think that we ought not to receive Cicero's opinion on this point as absolute truth; for he disliked the style of Sisenna because it was the *antiquum et horridum*, and an imitation of the *puerile genus* of the Greek historian Clitarchus.<sup>2</sup> He wrote quite differently from his predecessors in reading whose fragments we cannot refrain from considering that any one should have been able to write in such a manner. At that time the whole aspect of literature

<sup>1</sup> *De Legib. i. 2, Brut. 64.* Compare *De Divinat. i. 44*, and Sallust, *Jugurth. 95*.

<sup>2</sup> The contradiction between this passage and *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 436, where Clitarchus is called an *elegant* writer, must it seems, be solved by supposing that that epithet was meant to convey censure, with reference to Longinus, c. 3, who calls him *φλοιάθης καὶ φυσῶν*. Cicero (*l. c.*) says of Sisenna. *Hujus omnis facultas ex historia ipsis perspici potest, quae cum facile vincat omnes*

underwent a great change, just as was the case in Germany about the time of the Seven Years' war, yet there were some who would not abandon the old style and manner, such as Claudius Quadrigarius, who still adhered to the stiff and awkward antique fashion. The opinion of Cicero upon writers of this class must be received with great caution, though we cannot deny that Sisenna must have shewn great awkwardness and a want of refinement.

Pacuvius, of whom I have already spoken, and who was a little younger than Ennius, and considerably younger than Plautus, ranks very high among the Roman poets. If his works were still extant, they would undoubtedly excite our high admiration. He wrote only tragedies<sup>3</sup>, which were, no doubt, excellent. Anything like the satiric drama of the Greeks, does not occur among the Romans. At the beginning of the seventh century, Terence introduced quite a new style; and if we compare him with Ennius, Pacuvius, and still more with Plautus, he is infinitely more modern. The *nivōs* of antiquity completely disappears in him; for there is every appearance that his compositions were not revised. Caecilius Statius, a Campanian, was somewhat younger than Terence: his skill as a comic and graceful writer is praised by the ancients<sup>4</sup>, but his language is censured.<sup>5</sup> His 'fragments,' especially a large one in Gellius, do not give us any high idea of him. L. Attius (not Accius nor Actius) was a far greater poet; he lived to a very old age, so that Cicero knew him; he was a true genius in tragedy, the subjects of which he partly borrowed from the Greeks. He chiefly followed Aeschylus; and the fragments we still possess of his pieces are so beautiful that they will bear a comparison with the works of the Greek poet. But he was not a mere imitator; he also composed *praetextatae* resembling Shakspeare's historical dramas, which are not bound by any restrictions as to time and place, though Attius approached

---

*superiores, tum indicat tamen quantum absit a summo, quamque hoc genus scriptioris nondum sit satis Latinis illustratum,— and (De Leg. i. 2.) in historia puerile quoddam consecutatur, ut unum Clitarchum neque praeterea quemquam de Graec's legisse videatur—so that Niebuhr calls this puerile horridum, inasmuch as it abest a summo.*

<sup>3</sup> Fulgentius, *Exposit. Sermon. Antiq.* p. 562, however, mentions a comedy of Pacuvius entitled "Pseudo."

<sup>4</sup> Horat. *Epist.* ii. 1, 59; Vell. Patrc. i. 17; Charisius, lib. ii. in fin.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, *ad Attic.* vii. 3, *Brutus*, 74.

nearer to the Greek tragedies than his predecessors. In his tragedies, he seems to have chiefly used the senarius and the anapaestic verse of four feet; in the former, he did not strictly conform to the laws laid down by the Greeks; but the anapaests in his choruses were composed with the greatest strictness according to the Greek rules of versification. In his anapaestic metres, he displays greater freedom even than Terence; for his anapaests are metrical and no longer rhythmical. His *praetextae*, however, were written in long trochaic and iambic octonarii according to rhythm, but were more refined than those of his predecessors. Attius may serve to prove how much more refined the ears of the Romans had become in his time. His contemporary, C. Lucilius, of Suessa Aurunca, was not so distinguished in this respect; he used the hexameter verse, consisting indeed of dactyls and spondees, but with licenses, which sometimes exceed anything that even Ennius had ventured upon, so that his hexameters must be read according to rhythm, being actually *sermoni propiora*. He was either unacquainted with the laws of Greek versification, or else despised them. A remark which I believe no one has yet made is, that most of his books of satires were written in hexameters, but not all, some being composed in trochees.<sup>6</sup> His satires must have been very spirited and witty. If we possessed them we should not, like Horace, *naso adunco suspendere*, but should read his cutting and biting satires with pleasure. It must have been about the same time that Laevius<sup>7</sup>, the lyric poet, lived, who perhaps attained the highest possible degree of elegance and euphony in the old Roman style.

But however great may have been the care that was bestowed upon poetry down to the time of Sulla, the cultivation of a refined and elegant prose was completely neglected. A fragment of C. Laelius<sup>8</sup>, which has lately been discovered, shews that the prose written during this period was even harsher and ruder than in the time of Cato. C. Gracchus was the only one whose prose was distinguished for its *numerus*, and wanted little to deserve the epithet of perfect. The men of the sixth century, who were great as orators, either did not write at all, or

<sup>6</sup> Dunlop, *History of Roman Literature* (published in 1824), vol. i. p. 362, says "Twenty books of his Satires, from the commencement, were in hexameter verse, and the rest, with the exception of the thirtieth, in iambics or trochaica."

<sup>7</sup> Ausonius, *Cent. Nupt.* p. 181, ed. Scalig.

<sup>8</sup> See above note to p. 297.

exceedingly awkwardly, and much worse than they spoke. The historians previous to Sisenna can claim as little merit for the style of their productions, as our old knights of the sixteenth century, Götz von Berlichingen, Schärtlin, and others of the same class. The Romans were even inferior to them, for those knights were men of action, while the Romans were men of a school, and even as such, worthless.

As regards the manners and mode of life of the Romans, their great object at this time was the acquisition and possession of money. Their moral conduct, which had been corrupt enough before the civil war, became still more so by their systematic plunder and rapine; for the immense riches accumulated were squandered upon brutal pleasures. The simplicity of the old manners and mode of living had been abandoned for Greek luxuries and frivolities, and all their household arrangements had become altered. L. Crassus, the orator, was the first who had marble columns imported from Greece, four of which adorned a large saloon in his house. The Roman houses had formerly been quite simple, and were built either of bricks or peperino, but in most cases of the former material, and the furniture had been of a corresponding kind: now, on the other hand, every one would live in a splendid house and be surrounded by luxuries. The condition of Italy after the Social and Civil wars was indescribably wretched. Samnium had become almost a desert; and as late as the time of Strabo<sup>9</sup> there was scarcely any town in that country which was not in ruins. But much worse things were yet to come.

At the time of Sulla's death, Cicero was in his twenty-eighth year; he had already spoken several times and excited great attention. Q. Hortensius was older than he, and not free from envy, but rather inclined to keep down the young man, though he was in no way to be compared with Cicero. He had his share of all the depravities of his age; and it is an undoubted fact that he sold his own convictions, a thing from which Cicero was altogether free. Such dreadful times as those were, generally produce great mental excitement. All studies and philological learning were indeed destroyed in France during the time of the League; but the great commotion of that period quickened and sharpened the intellect and feeling. The Thirty Years' war which was purely

<sup>9</sup> vi. p. 253.

destructive, produced no such effect in Germany; but the Seven Years' war gave a fresh impulse to every thing, and awakened the muses. Owing to similar circumstances, the age of Cicero was rich in talented men of different descriptions; but none among his contemporaries could stand a comparison with him. Sallust was considerably younger than Cicero, and at this time only a boy; and when he had grown to manhood, Cicero was still shining in undiminished glory.

Sulla was yet alive when M. Lepidus came forward as the head of the democratic party against C. Lutatius Catulus, the leader of the aristocracy. This movement was one of those convulsions which so often follow after great events, through the folly of those who do not comprehend what has happened. Lepidus was blind to the fact that the present state of things was the result of the shocks which the republic had experienced; he wanted to rescind the acts of Sulla, and to make a counter-revolution. But in order to effect this he would have been obliged to abolish the military colonies of Sulla, to dismiss a number of senators, and to fill up their places with sons of the proscribed; for scarcely any of the proscribed themselves had escaped death. His whole undertaking was impracticable; for the victory of Sulla had been as decisive as possible, and Lepidus himself was not qualified, either by his intellect or his character, to carry such a plan into effect. From a fragment of Sallust's *Historiae*<sup>10</sup> we see that he had belonged to the party of Sulla, had purchased confiscated estates for a mere trifle, and had derived considerable advantage from the plunder which was carried on so long as Sulla was in power. During the French revolution many people were compelled to purchase confiscated estates, it being intended thereby to attach them to the interest of the revolution; and in like manner Sulla had gained over thousands who otherwise would have been hostile to him, by selling to them the property of the proscribed for almost nominal prices. However, Lepidus may have been a worthless fellow, and the breach was quite natural. He came forward as the avenger of the old Romans whose fortunes had been ruined. Every party which rules by blood, must split into fractions; many who had been intoxicated and afterwards became ashamed of it, now joined together to undertake the cause of humanity. The

<sup>10</sup> The speech of L. Philippus against Lepidus.

colleague of Lepidus, C. Lutatius Catulus, was an honest man, and had not enriched himself; he was a Sullan with all his heart; he had no doubt approved of Sulla's cruelties up to a certain point; but he was an honourable man, unstained by any crime; he possessed great experience, and was considered a wise adviser. He thus enjoyed a high reputation, whereas Lepidus had none.

Fuel for a new conflagration was not wanting. In all the towns which had received military colonies the whole of the old population had been expelled and reduced to beggary, unless, like Ofellus in Horace, they farmed their former estates as tenants of their new lords, and thus had an opportunity of waiting till the licentious soldiers were reduced to the necessity of selling their property. The number of the latter class of persons may have been considerable. All those unfortunate creatures from the Etruscan and Umbrian municipia, who must have wandered about as beggars, as well as many of the military colonists who had already squandered their newly-acquired fortunes, were ready to take up arms in any cause. It would thus have been very easy to form an army of desperadoes. In order to prevent any outbreak, the senate seeing in the undertaking of Lepidus only the commencement of new misery, made the consuls Lepidus and Catulus, swear not to take up arms against each other, and this precaution did good so long as they were consuls and at Rome. It was at that time the custom, probably introduced by Sulla, for the consuls to remain at Rome during the year of their office, and then to go to their provinces. But after the termination of his consulship, when Lepidus went to his province of Gaul, the war broke out. He himself had collected a large number of desperadoes in Etruria, and M. Brutus, a relation of the last Brutus, had done the same in Cisalpine Gaul. An attempt of Lepidus upon Rome was frustrated, for Catulus had taken wise precautions; and the whole undertaking broke down like a mere bubble. Lepidus himself lost all hopes, and embarked for Sardinia, where he died soon afterwards. His soldiers, after having maintained themselves for a time in Gaul under Perperna, went to Spain to join the army of Sertorius. M. Brutus was defeated by Pompey, and put to death.<sup>11</sup>

The war of Sertorius is of infinitely greater importance.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 105—108; Livy, *Epit.* 90; Plutarch. *Pomp.* 16; Florus, iii. 23.

We should be glad if we could read the detailed account which Sallust had written of it.<sup>12</sup> Sertorius, by no means a man of noble birth, was a Sabine of the praefecture of Nursia, subsequently the birth-place of Vespasian. The whole district was proverbial among the Romans for clinging to the old manners and discipline.<sup>13</sup> It forms a sort of Alpine valley (*val di Norcia*), in the Apennines; and it is a singular fact that the place preserved its freedom throughout the middle ages, and never lost it until the time of the French revolution.<sup>14</sup> It was a small democratic republic, which possessed even criminal jurisdiction without any appeal to Rome. The inhabitants of the Val di Norcia are still considered as robust and free mountaineers; but at the same time, even according to the Italian expression, as *facinorosi*. When they go into other districts, they do not always make the best use of their love of liberty, easily becoming notorious as banditti and criminals;

<sup>12</sup> We cannot say of how many books the *Historiae* of Sallust consisted. We have many fragments of the first five books, but there must have been many more books. From the fragments of the speeches contained in the work, we must infer, that it comprised the period from the consulship of Lepidus down to the end of the war of Pompey in Asia. Sallust was here perhaps obliged to some extent, to adopt the annalistic form which he otherwise despised. The work belongs to a late period of his life: his earliest production was the Catiline, which was followed by the Jugurtha, and his last work was the Histories. That they commenced with the consulship of Lepidus and Catulus, is attested by evidence, and may also be inferred from the probable fact that this was the point to which Sisenna had carried his historical work.—N.

<sup>13</sup> *Nursina duritia*. Fronto, p. 242, ed. Niebuhr.

<sup>14</sup> Down to the French revolution several places within the papal dominions had their own constitutions and jurisdiction, and even small places had their own criminal jurisdiction without any appeal to a higher court. Very few persons have any correct notion of the state of Italy previously to the revolution; and there is no work from which we could derive any satisfactory information upon it. I was therefore greatly surprised at the results of my inquiries in Italy. Tivoli, to mention one instance, was almost free, and the interference of the papal legate or delegate in its affairs was like that of a Roman proconsul, who arbitrarily encroached upon the liberties of a free town. This, and similar phenomena, were remnants of the times of the Romans. (Compare upon this subject an interesting letter of Niebuhr to Savigny in *Lebensnachrichten von B. G. Niebuhr*, vol. ii. p. 402, foll.) Thus, while some places had a republican constitution, others were oppressed by baronial despotism, or had a badly organised local constitution. In Ancona, the towns had a diet with great privileges, and the country was prosperous; in other places the magistrates acted according to their own discretion, and without any control. Within the Ecclesiastical State alone there were, perhaps, no less than a hundred petty constitutions and states, which were kept together only by the Pope. During the French revolution, however, all of them were abolished and supplanted by *prefectures*. I have discovered and collected several of those old constitutions.—N.

but in their own country they are peaceful.<sup>15</sup> Among the Romans the Nursians, in Cicero's time, had the reputation of having, like the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Vestinians, preserved their old Sabellian manners in their purity.<sup>16</sup>

Sertorius was the work of his own hands, and he owed his elevation to none but himself. In the time of Cinna he had delivered Rome from the freedmen of Marius; and afterwards, when Sulla came to Italy, Sertorius was legate of the consul L. Cornelius Scipio. In the year after, when Carbo conducted his affairs in Etruria so wretchedly that all hope was lost, Sertorius contrived to obtain a commission for Spain, which he was to maintain for his party. Had he been at the head of the Marian party, which was not the case, because he was not an intriguer, Sulla's plans would have been thwarted. The manner in which he acted in Spain did not arise by any means from mere policy, but from his noble disposition, and could not fail to win for him the affections of the Spaniards. He paid attention to their just complaints, afforded relief whenever he could, and did not treat the Spaniards as contemptible provincials, but tried to amalgamate them as much as possible with the Romans.<sup>17</sup> The plan of maintaining himself in Spain arose as early as that time, for Italy was almost entirely lost to his party. He had an army in the eastern part of the Pyrenees, on the road coming from the district between Perpignan and Collioure, which faced the enemy, and was commanded by Livius<sup>18</sup> Salinator. This army, after having repulsed an attack of Annius, whom Sulla had sent against it, allowed itself to be seduced to desert. This treachery was the greatest piece of good luck for Sulla. After Salinator, the legate of Sertorius, had been killed, Sertorius, deserted by his troops, could only save his life, and with a few attached followers he cruised for some time in the Mediterranean, where the Romans had little power, and where the pirates had extended their sway. Afterwards he endeavoured for a time to maintain himself at Iviza. Thence he fled to the Lusitanians, the enemies of the Romans. He met everywhere with

<sup>15</sup> I am indebted for my knowledge of the Val di Norcia to an old Roman Abbé.—N.

<sup>16</sup> A direct mention of the place does not seem to occur in Cicero, but he praises the Sabines in general as *severissimi homines*, in *Vatin.* 15, *ad Fam.* xv. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor.* 6  
<sup>18</sup> It would perhaps be more correct to read Julius Salinator; see Plut. *Sert.* 7.

great confidence, and was welcomed by the people; but he could not hold out anywhere, on account of the numerical superiority of his enemies. He therefore embarked for Mauretania, where he maintained himself for some time, and took part in a war between two pretenders in that kingdom.<sup>19</sup> He took Tangers, and after having made rich booty in Africa, wished to sail to the Canary islands, and to spend the rest of his life there in retirement and independence; but at that moment he was invited by the Lusitanians, with whom his success in Mauretania had made him still more popular; and the Roman governors in Lusitania, who belonged to the party of Sulla, had indulged, in the meanwhile, in plunder and persecution, under the pretence of acting against the friends of Sertorius. Sulla himself had died; and the belief that the edifice, which the dictator had built up, would now fall to pieces, very naturally took root in the mind of Sertorius, who lived at so great a distance, and he gladly accepted the invitation of the Lusitanians, in the hope that something could be effected. Wherever he appeared, both the Spaniards and the Romans declared for him. He found his greatest strength in that part of the population which consisted of the children of Roman soldiers and Spanish women (*hybridae*), who did not possess the franchise, but had Roman names, spoke both languages, and considered themselves as Romans; they formed the mediators between him and the Spaniards. Proscribed Romans, who till then had concealed themselves, also sought refuge with him; and the Spaniards, especially the Celibarians, who became enthusiastic in his cause, took up arms to support him.

---

### LECTURE LXXXIX.

As soon as Sertorius had made such progress that he could look upon himself as the chief general of Spain, he began acting upon a well-considered plan: he wished to blend the Spaniards and Romans together in such a manner, that the real character of Roman civilisation should be imparted to the nation, without however their giving up any of the peculiar and great qualities

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor. 9.*

which distinguished them as Spaniards. He formed a senate of three hundred members, consisting partly of proscribed Romans, partly of other Romans scattered in the provinces, and partly of the *hybridae*, and no doubt also of distinguished Spaniards. He thus constituted a Rome at a distance from Rome. This senate is known in history as the *senatus Hispaniensis*.<sup>1</sup> At Osca, the modern Huesca in the north of Spain, he established an academy, and collected the sons of the most distinguished families, whom he caused to be instructed in the Latin language and grammar in the ancient sense. They were also dressed like the sons of noble Romans, and wore the *bulla* and *praetexta*, at which their parents felt not a little pleased.<sup>2</sup> It is quite evident that he must have promised them the Roman franchise. These boys were at the same time a sort of hostages for their parents—a necessary precaution against the fickleness of the Spaniards. There was moreover formed a kind of body-guard of men who, according to the noble custom of the Spaniards, vowed not to survive their general. Sertorius remarked with pleasure, that the number of those who gathered around him and vowed to die with him was greater than had ever before entered into that relation with any other general. He also worked upon their imagination, by accommodating himself to their opinions. It may be that the story about the white fawn, by which he gained so much confidence, was, as Plutarch<sup>3</sup> says, a piece of imposition on his part; but I do not see why he should not, like his master, Marius, have been susceptible of such notions himself; and it seems to me not at all improbable that he himself entertained the same views on this point as the Spaniards.

Reckoning from the time when Sertorius first appeared in Spain, the war lasted eight years; but if we calculate from the time when, after the fall of his party, he placed himself at the head of Spain, it lasted only six years.<sup>4</sup> Q. Metellus Pius—the surname refers to his filial affection for his father, Q. Metellus Numidicus,—was sent into Baetica, and entrusted with the conduct of the war against Sertorius. Metellus, at first, was rather successful; but Sertorius soon gained more and more

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, *Hist. iii. ap. Serv. ad Aen. i. 698*; comp. Appian, *De Bell. Civil. i. 108.*

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor. 14.*

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor. 11*; comp. Appian, *De Bell. Civil. i. 110.*

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil. i. 108*; Livy, *Epit. 98*; Eutrop. vi. 1.

decided advantages over him; and things went at last so much backward, that the senate sent out Cn. Pompey with a fresh army.

Pompey was then a simple *eques*<sup>5</sup>; that is, he had not yet been invested with any office that conferred upon him the right of being elected into the senate. He was about thirty years old, and in the prime of life. It is very difficult to pronounce a decided opinion upon Pompey: he is not one of those characters whose outlines are clear and indisputable, as in the case of Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and Caesar; and it is even difficult to say whether he was a great general or not: he was one of those men who, in order to be great, must be favoured by fortune, if not throughout, at least up to a certain point. He did not possess sufficient strength and greatness to act consistently throughout life, in good as well as in evil days, and to be the same under all circumstances. There can be no doubt that he had distinguished himself very much in the social war under Sulla; for Sulla, who was certainly able to judge on a point like this, treated him with marked respect; nor that in the war against Sertorius he very far excelled Metellus, though in point of generalship Sertorius surpassed him. The war against the pirates was well planned and speedily concluded; that against Mithridates was not difficult indeed, but Pompey shewed himself resolute and active in employing the means which he had at his command. If, on the other hand, we consider him in his civil proceedings, especially during the period from his triumph until the war against Caesar, it cannot be denied that he had a cowardly fear of the Clodian faction, and that he had a mean jealousy of Caesar, whom he designedly wished to keep down, and to whose superiority he *would* be blind, although he knew it. In the accusation of Cicero, he behaved in a cowardly way; he was in fact, never a trustworthy friend. In the time of Sulla, when he was yet a young man, he was cruel, and Cicero himself does not doubt that, if the civil war had taken a different turn, Pompey would have displayed the same cruelty as Sulla<sup>6</sup>. In other respects too, not much good can be said of him, for in eloquence and acquirements he was below mediocrity. His head in statues and busts, which we have no reason to consider spurious, shews a considerable degree of vulgarity and rudeness, whereas Caesar's

<sup>5</sup> Vell. Paterr. ii. 30.

<sup>6</sup> Ad Attic. ix. 10 and 11. Compare x. 4.

head displays all his great intellectual activity. I will not deny that I have a dislike for Pompey; for I know that, from weakness and vanity, he was a different man at diffent periods of his life, and that in his later years there was a great falling off in his character, which cannot have been the consequence of old age, since, at the time of his death, he was not above fifty-six or fifty-seven years old.

Sertorius succeeded in several campaigns, and in two of them, so far as to compel Metellus to withdraw into Andalusia, and Pompey to retreat across the Pyrenees. Had the Spaniards been unanimous among themselves, Sertorius might have defied the whole power of Rome, and have annihilated his two opponents, but he had unfortunately to struggle against the rebellious attempts of the Spaniards, as well as against the Roman legions. He fought two battles in Andalusia, on the Guadaluvar and on the Sucro, against the united Roman proconsuls, in both of which one wing of each army gained a victory, so that they were not productive of any considerable advantage.<sup>7</sup> But, as the Spaniards did not remain faithful, Sertorius in the end fell into difficulties, notwithstanding the immense resources of his mind. Some towns deserted him, but on the part of others he experienced everything that faithful attachment could afford. Calagurris sustained a very energetic siege, and Sertorius, who exerted all his powers to relieve it, at length succeeded. But the faithlessness and cowardice of many places roused his indignation, under the influence of which he committed an act which is the only stain on his character: he sold the hostages assembled at Huesca as slaves.<sup>8</sup> This would have been quite natural in any other general; but Sertorius was of too noble a character, and should not have done it, for it was at variance with his humane disposition; and his power and influence were of a moral nature. The consequence of this act was, that the attachment of the other towns also began to give way.

M. Perperna<sup>9</sup>, probably a son of the consular M. Perperna, had led the remainder of the army of Lepidus from Sardinia to Spain, wishing, however, to carry on the war in his own name;

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *De Bell Civil.* i. 110; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 18. foll. *Pomp.* 19.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, *Sertor.* 25.

<sup>9</sup> He was a noble Roman, probably of an Etruscan family, for the termination *na* is Etruscan. It has been said that all gentile names must terminate in *us*,

but his soldiers compelled him to submit to Sertorius as his superior. To take vengeance for this, he, in conjunction with a number of Romans, formed a conspiracy against him; for Sertorius had before put to death several who had made similar attempts, whence Perperna found many ready to join him. Sertorius was murdered at a repast.<sup>10</sup> An incredible number of Spaniards who had remained faithful to him, shewed their attachment by killing themselves at his burial. Perperna compelled the Spaniards to recognise him as their general; but he lost the first battle he fought against Pompey, and was put to death.<sup>11</sup>

Pompey now returned to Rome to sue for the consulship. The people admired him enthusiastically, and he was their favourite to an unprecedented degree; a fact for which I cannot account, unless I suppose they expected he would restore the tribuneship. There might, indeed, have been reasons for such enthusiasm in favour of Caesar, though I do not mean to say that his conduct was altogether praiseworthy; but men of ability and strength could not help loving him, and Cicero, in reality, always loved him. There are times when a people feels the noble want of shewing enthusiasm for something. Pompey had not yet held any curule office, and had been invested with proconsular power without having had a magistracy; but he was now nevertheless made consul, together with M. Licinius Crassus, to whom he was then so hostile that the Romans trembled with fear lest they should take up arms against each other. But at the urgent request of the senate they made a reconciliation, and behaved honourably<sup>12</sup>; they were never afterwards false towards each other, though they lived together for nineteen years. Sometimes it even appeared as if they were good friends; but this appearance would again vanish.

Crassus has acquired his historical importance mainly by his

---

and that consequently Perperna must be a mere cognomen; but the Etruscan *na* answers to the Roman *ius*. We cannot think of Ernesti without loving and respecting him, but he was mistaken in a great many things; for example, when he said that Caecina was a cognomen, and sought a Gentile name for it; for the inscriptions show that it is a Gentile name.—N. Compare vol. i. notes 344, 922.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 113; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 26; Vell. Patrc. ii. 30.

<sup>11</sup> The Lectures in the year 1826-27, were not continued beyond the death of Sertorius.

<sup>12</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 121.

conquest of Spartacus. About five years after the death of Sulla, a Thracian of the name of Spartacus had broken forth from a barrack of gladiators at Capua, with about forty, or according to some authorities seventy-four, other gladiators.<sup>13</sup> The number of gladiators had increased at that time to an immense extent; and the rage of the Romans for this kind of public spectacles spread more and more every day. Ambitious persons availed themselves of this mania as a means of gaining popularity. Spartacus, after having broken forth with his fellow-prisoners, took his position on mount Vesuvius, which then formed an old decayed crater and was difficult of access. Many have acknowledged that Spartacus must have been a great man, and if he had lived in different circumstances, he would have shown this still more clearly. He and his followers concealed themselves in the crater, and an incredible number of runaway slaves joined them. Spartacus and his associates at first formed a band of robbers, and not only escaped the regular troops that were sent against them, but made great havoc among them, and thus acquired arms and ammunition, with which they must have been very scantily provided at the beginning. Spartacus now proclaimed the freedom of the slaves, and numbers flocked to him from all parts of southern Italy, which was either lying quite waste, or covered with slaves. The consequences of Sulla's devastations in those districts now became visible at once; for there were no freemen to check the insurrection. It is surprising to find that Germans also are mentioned among those slaves<sup>14</sup>. It may be that there were some of the Teutones; but it is more probable that they were introduced there through *commercium* by the Gauls. Two Gauls, Crixus and Oenomaus, were the generals of Spartacus, who ruled his men with dictatorial power. The war lasted upwards of two years. Three praetorian and two consular armies were completely defeated, a great number of

<sup>13</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 116; Livy, *Epit.* 95 and 96; Plutarch, *Crass.* 8. There is at Pompeii an edifice similar to a barrack; it has parapets and a number of arms have been found in it. At first I thought the building might have been a barrack; but I could not conceive why the Romans should have had a garrison in that place, and on a closer examination I found that the arms were those of the Samnites, which were, as Livy (ix. 40) says, afterwards given to the Campanians and then to the gladiators. Hence I have no doubt that the above-mentioned edifice was a *ludus gladiatorius*, in which the gladiators were locked up during the night.—N.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, *Crass.* 9; Livy, *Epit.* 97.

towns, such as Nola, Thurii, Grumentum in Lucania, and perhaps Compse in the country of the Hirpinians, were taken and ravaged with all the atrocities committed by bands of banditti; in fact few places escaped destruction. We know only the smallest part of those events. At length, however, in the third year, Crassus baffled the slaves. They possessed large establishments for the manufacture of arms; and they firmly believed that they might conquer and govern the greater part of Italy, though they would not, perhaps, destroy Rome. This plan of theirs would not indeed have been impossible, unless Rome had drawn its forces together from all quarters; but they were thwarted by Crassus and their own divisions. They were divided into three armies; and it was this circumstance alone that enabled Crassus to defeat them in detail. His last victory was gained near Petilia in Lucania, and he made the same cruel use of it as the German princes did of their victory after the Peasant war in the sixteenth century. The bodies and limbs of the conquered were seen impaled along the high road from Capua to Rome, or their torn limbs scattered over the roads.<sup>15</sup>

Italy was thus delivered from the most fearful of all dangers; but the ravages in the south were so great that the country has never been able to recover even that slender degree of prosperity which it enjoyed after the Marsic war. I believe that even its present wretched condition is better, and the population more numerous, than in the best periods of the Roman empire. This is evident from the very few monuments of this time. The free population was extirpated, the towns were destroyed; and the few in Lucania which are mentioned in the itineraries of the emperors, were scarcely anything more than places for changing horses. The country was cut up into large estates, which served as pasture for cattle and horses.

At the time when these events took place in Italy, a war was carried on in Asia against Mithridates, which is sometimes called the second, but more properly with Appian<sup>16</sup>, the third Mithridatic war. It arose out of that against Sertorius. After Sulla had left Asia, Mithridates fulfilled the greater part of the terms on which peace had been concluded: he gave up Bithynia to Nicomedes, and Paphlagonia to the prince appointed by the

<sup>15</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Civil.* i. 120; Plutarch, *Crass.* 11.

<sup>16</sup> *De Bell. Mithrid.* 68.


Romans; and delivered up his ships, prisoners, and money, but of Cappadocia, he gave only the greater portion back to Ariobarzanes, who was likewise protected by the Romans, and kept the rest for himself. No one, surely, can blame him for this; for the peace had never yet received the sanction of the Roman senate and people. Mithridates had only Sulla's word; and as he had signed it, he demanded of the Romans to do the same. The reason why Mithridates had not at the very first demanded the document guaranteeing the peace, was the fact that Sulla himself had to recover Italy before anything could be done. Afterwards the senate alone was in fault, for Sulla himself was not dishonest in this affair, but the senate was, and Mithridates was unable to get any document.

L. Murena, a Roman general, marched into Cappadocia, invaded the territory of Mithridates, plundered the rich temple of Anaitis at Comana; and although Mithridates did everything to avoid the war, Murena carried his aggressions so far, that at length open war broke out, in which he was defeated. Mithridates, with strict truth, declared that he had merely acted on the defensive in this whole affair, and demanded that the Romans should ratify the peace. As Sertorius was still in arms, the Romans accepted his excuses; but the documents of the peace seem never to have been exchanged. The Romans left him in possession of his part of Cappadocia, on his betrothing one of his daughters, who was then only a child, to Ariobarzanes.<sup>17</sup>


The great and last war against Mithridates, which lasted for nearly twelve years, was brought about by his negotiations with Sertorius, who sent two proscribed Romans, L. Marius, probably a Campanian new citizen, and L. Fannius, to Mithridates, and concluded an alliance with him. Mithridates was to assist Sertorius with his fleet; and it was especially stipulated that he should place the Cilician pirates, who were under his influence, at the disposal of Sertorius. Mithridates was to have the sovereignty of all Asia, in case of their being successful against the Romans.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 64—67.


<sup>18</sup> Appian, *De Bell. Mithrid.* 68; Plutarch, *Sertor.* 23 and 24.



11







THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY  
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT

This book is under no circumstances to be  
taken from the Building



